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Abstract 
 
Jasper Miles – ‘The Labour Party and the Westminster electoral system’ 
 
A study of the Labour Party and the Westminster electoral system is valuable at a 
time when interest in proportional representation (PR) is on the rise within the 
Labour Party. Recent publications on the topic have tended to lack either a 
thorough theoretical or historical basis. Therefore, a dual examination of the 
underpinning rationale for supporting different electoral systems, based on 
theoretical frameworks identifiable in the Labour Party and an examination of the 
pressures and environment in which Labour politicians have operated is required. 
In addition, the causes of the rising interest in electoral reform and PR within 
Labour from the 1980s onwards requires documentation. Many studies on the 
subject have been works of advocacy, overwhelmingly making the case for a 
movement away from FPTP towards a form of PR, hence lacking objectivity. Five 
main chapters constitute the study. The first two chapters explore the theoretical 
aspects and historical context, followed by more detailed chapters on the Plant 
Report, Jenkins Commission and the Alternative Vote Referendum. Elite level 
interviews with Labour politicians has been the primary research method, 
illuminating the issues, arguments and nature of the debate. The conclusion will 
stress that Labour considers itself to have a unique socio-economic agenda, 
unshared with other political parties and therefore remains sceptical of PR and 
coalition, threatening the Party’s ability to implement policies for the betterment of 
the working class. Whilst the pluralists in the Party have challenged the dominant 
democratic elitist discourse, the prevalent view is that a general election is 
concerned with the election of a single-party government. Therefore, the division 
is best viewed as a matter of principle between competing views on governance. 
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Introduction 
 
A study of ‘The Labour Party and the Westminster electoral system’ is valuable at 
a time when there is increasing interest in proportional representation (PR) within 
the Labour Party. The considerable margin of defeat for the Alternative Vote (AV) 
in the referendum in May 2011 has, at least for some within the Labour Party and 
wider Labour movement, failed to settle the question of electoral reform at 
Westminster. Immediately prior to the May 2015 general election, reports 
emerged of senior trade union leaders urging Ed Miliband to offer the Liberal 
Democrats electoral reform in return for supporting a Labour government.1 Post 
May 2015, Jonathan Reynolds and Chuka Umunna argued under First-Past-the-
Post (FPTP) “too many people feel remote and unrepresented… It forces the 
major parties to overwhelmingly devote their resources on just a handful of 
constituencies, because they believe these are the ones that might change 
hands. It therefore fails to treat voters equally… Most of all, it creates false 
electoral deserts where whole regions of the country are dominated by one party 
despite their opponents recording substantial numbers of votes.”2 John 
McDonnell MP wrote “The stark reality is that most voters explicitly rejected the 
Conservative manifesto last year, and yet we all must suffer a majority 
government as it tries to force these extreme measures upon an unwilling 
country.”3 Elsewhere a cross-party group of MPs and pressure groups has 
formed to build a consensus in favour of PR with the objective of introducing PR 
by 20214, and the Green MP Caroline Lucas brought forward a PR Bill and, 
although voted down, it did receive support from Labour MPs.  
                                                                  
1 https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/social-affairs/politics/news/69720/union-bosses-tell-ed-
miliband-give-lib-dems-election (Accessed 15th December 2016) 
2 Independent, ‘Let’s reboot democracy and replace our broken electoral system’, 14th December 
2015 
3 Independent, ‘John McDonnell calls on Labour to back proportional representation’, 7th May 2016 
4 PR Alliance Building Conference, St James the Less Centre, London, Monday 8th February 2016 
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An enquiry of how Labour has approached the topic of electoral reform at 
Westminster – specifically whether it should stick with FPTP or adopt a different 
electoral system whether it be majoritarian or proportional – offers the reader an 
in-depth study of how and why the issue has divided the Party since its inception 
in 1900. Moreover, ‘The Labour Party and the Westminster electoral system’ is of 
interest not just because of the flurry of recent attention to the topic, but due to 
the longer historical view and theoretical aspects that are under researched. The 
role the Labour Party has played in maintaining FPTP for British general 
elections warrants researching. Labour, it could be argued, has accepted an 
electoral system that is not in the electoral and political interests of the Party. 
Labour lost the 1951 general election despite polling more votes, a defeat that 
led to thirteen years in opposition. Indeed, the twentieth century reveals the 
electoral success of the Conservative Party, enjoying prolonged periods in office. 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, FPTP facilitated eighteen years of 
Thatcherism, undermining the planks of social-democracy, achieved even at the 
height of Conservative popularity on a vote share in the low to mid 40s. Despite 
the host of tracts critiquing the British constitution that emerged during the 
Thatcher and Major governments, many of which are explored throughout the 
thesis, the Labour Party has maintained FPTP. 
 
The issue of electoral reform has on occasion been prominent within Labour – 
the early years of the Party, the 1920s, the second minority Labour government, 
the 1980s and 1990s and the Brown government – but only briefly has Labour 
collectively been committed to electoral reform at Westminster. However, since 
the inception of the Party, the issue has prompted a diverse range of arguments, 
based on competing beliefs. Once Labour had replaced the Liberals as the main 
opposition to the Conservative Party, vying to form a single party government, 
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constitutional issues were at best of secondary importance to the far more 
important social and economic issues facing the country and therefore the Party. 
Consequently, Labour was often accused of ‘constitutional conservatism’ 
displaying a general satisfaction with the workings of the British constitution and 
the Westminster Model.5 Hanson went as far to say in 1956 “We appear, then, to 
be at the end of an epoch in the history of British Socialist controversy about 
parliamentary procedure.”6 It is important to note how lack of action on the 
constitution does not entail a lack of discussion on the constitution. 
 
Prior to New Labour’s constitutional reform agenda, the accusation of 
‘constitutional conservatism’ appeared sound. The Attlee government displayed 
little interest in the constitution. The notable exception was the reduction in the 
House of Lords delaying powers, designed to ease the passage of nationalisation 
through the Lords. Therefore, it was politics that motivated the reform with the 
objective of defeating a political opponent rather than a deep-seated commitment 
to constitutional reform. The Wilson and Callaghan governments displayed more 
interest in the British constitution: Wilson primarily over House of Lords reform, 
but also other aspects including the House of Commons and the Civil Service 
with the intention of ‘institutional streamlining’. Callaghan brought forward 
legislation on devolution to counteract the rise of Scottish nationalism, an attempt 
to defeat the political and electoral threat of the nationalists. Wilson and 
Callaghan’s key constitutional reform failed to materialise and the Westminster 
Model remained intact.7 
 
                                                                  
5 A. Wright, ‘British Socialists and the British Constitution’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 43, (1990) pp. 
323-345 
6 A. H. Hanson, ‘The Labour Party and House of Commons Reform – I’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 10: 
4, (1956) p. 456 
7 See J. Miles, ‘Harold Wilson and the British Constitution’, in A. Crines, & K. Hickson, (edts.) Harold 
Wilson, An Unprincipled Prime Minister?, (Biteback Publishing, London, 2016) 
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The Labour Party abandoned its constitutional orthodoxy with the election of 
‘New Labour’, ‘modernising’ the British constitution: devolution to Scotland, 
Wales, London and power-sharing to Northern Ireland; House of Lords reform; 
House of Commons reform; Freedom of Information; Independence for the Bank 
of England; and the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
into British law. There was however one vital omission from the list of reforms – 
the Westminster electoral system – and although an alternative electoral system 
was drawn up by the Jenkins Commission, the Labour Party manifesto pledge to 
hold a referendum remained unfulfilled. However, whilst FPTP remained 
untouched by ‘New Labour’, the devolved institutions adopted systems other than 
FPTP; the Additional Member System (AMS) in Scotland and Wales and the 
Single Transferable Vote (STV) in Northern Ireland. Whilst the devolved 
institutions are significant and warrant an investigation, the thesis as the title 
suggests, focuses primarily on the House of Commons as this is where the 
government of the United Kingdom is formed, therefore having primacy over the 
devolved institutions and retaining its unique position in the British constitution.  
 
Literature Review 
 
Peter Dorey’s The Labour Party and Constitutional Reform, A History of 
Constitutional Conservatism contains a chapter on electoral reform and outlines 
five main reasons for Labour’s support of FPTP: the mandate and the manifesto, 
the likelihood of coalition under PR, the consequence of PR on Labour’s 
economic agenda, importance of policy in reviving electoral fortunes and the 
electoral benefits that FPTP offers.8 “The main reason why the Labour Party has 
only sporadically intimated any interest in electoral reform has been the lack of 
                                                                  
8 P. Dorey, The Labour Party and Constitutional Reform, A History of Constitutional Conservatism, 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2008) pp. 14-17 
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enthusiasm emanating from the Party’s leadership, for whom general elections 
should be concerned with ensuring that one political party is able to win by virtue 
of attaining a majority of seats in the House of Commons… rather than a majority 
of votes cast nationally.”9 In addition, Dorey wrote a journal article titled Between 
Ambivalence and Antipathy: The Labour Party and Electoral Reform.10  
 
Mark Evans has two chapters on electoral reform, firstly in Charter 88: Successful 
Challenge to the British Political Tradition? and secondly Constitution Making and 
the Labour Party. Labour’s constitutional doctrine was termed by Evans the 
‘Hattersley Rule’ due to Roy Hatterley’s reasoned opposition to constitutional 
reform. Hattersley mockingly dismissed Charter 88, the pressure group 
committed to constitutional reform, as “the Charter of despair.”11 For Evans, 
Hattersley’s objection was threefold. Firstly, British exceptionalism and the 
sovereignty of parliament, entailing majority government, allowing a Labour 
government to enact redistributive policies. Secondly, the impracticality of the 
liberal rights agenda, the power afforded to the judiciary and a belief that 
democracy is best fulfilled through ‘good government’. Finally, individual rights 
have no meaning unless they can be actualised.12 Evans concluded in 
Constitution Making and the Labour Party that “Labour’s position on electoral 
reform has always reflected its leadership’s perception of the party’s immediate 
electoral prospects.”13 
 
                                                                  
9 Ibid., p. 357 
10 P. Dorey, ‘Between Ambivalence and Antipathy: The Labour Party and Electoral Reform’, 
Representation, Vol 40: 1, (2003) 
11 Guardian, ‘The Charter of Despair’, 12th December 1988 
12 M. Evans, Charter 88: A Successful Challenge to the British Political Tradition, (Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, Hampshire, 1995) pp. 205-212  
13 M. Evans, Constitution-Making and the Labour Party, (Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire, 2003) 
pp.26-30, 130  
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Martin Linton and Mary Georghiou explored the topic from a Labour perspective 
in Labour’s Road to Electoral Reform, What’s wrong with first-past-the-post?14 A 
short history was offered, including a brief outline of the ‘Plant Process’, before 
seven chapters on the failings of FPTP assessing distortion, disillusion, 
tacticalisation, polarisation, demoralisation, domination and dichotomy. The final 
chapter considers pluralism. Linton repeated his efforts with Mary Southcott in 
Making Votes Count: The Case for Electoral Reform15 and followed much the 
same pattern as the earlier text, repeating the same seven criticisms of FPTP, 
although in more detail, as to the historical chapters. The latter edition contains a 
chapter titled ‘The System for the Future’, a reference to the Jenkins 
Commission. Both texts are works of advocacy, attempting to convert Labour 
people and supporters to the cause of PR for Westminster, emphasising the 
failings of FPTP, whilst providing a basic historiography of the debate. A more 
thorough Labour historiography is offered in a PhD thesis titled The Labour Party 
and Electoral Reform; 1900-199716.  
 
Barry Jones and Michael Keating’s Labour and the British State, studied Labour’s 
relationship with the institutions of the British State. Throughout, the text 
examines how the theories of the state found within the Labour Party affect the 
practice and attitude of Labour in government and opposition. Book chapters 
address the emergence and integration of Labour, and its attitude towards 
industry, territory, the machinery of government and sovereignty. Whilst Labour 
and the British State is a formative text, discussion about FPTP is limited. The 
conclusion advocates a move towards a “fair and democratic electoral system” as 
                                                                  
14 M. Linton, & M. Georghiou, Labour’s Road to Electoral Reform, What’s wrong with first-past-the- 
post?, (Labour Campaign for Electoral Reform, Guildford, 1993) 
15 M. Linton, & M. Southcott, Making Votes Count: The Case for Electoral Reform, (Profile Books,  
London, 1998) 
16 A. Morris, The Labour Party and Electoral Reform; 1900-1997, Ph.D, (University of Essex, 2005) 
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FPTP masked Labour electoral decline, the implications for Labour’s standing as 
a national party and focussing on the ‘winnable’ constituencies.17 Jones and 
Keating wrote on the Labour left it is assumed that: 
 
“a majority of seats… will provide democratic legitimation for change and 
mobilise the ‘working class’ to overcome obstacles in its way… It is the implicit 
admission that a fundamentalist programme will command at best a plurality 
of support which underlies the insistence on the present electoral system.”18 
 
General, rather than party specific texts tackling the electoral reform debate in 
British politics can be sourced. Vernon Bogdanor’s The People and the Party 
System: the referendum and electoral reform in British politics contains two 
historical chapters analysing the periods 1831-1931 and 1974-1979. Subsequent 
chapters set out the case for reform; the operation of FPTP and its political 
consequences; alternative electoral systems, before ending by arguing in favour 
of STV.19 Bogdanor remarks on how Labour’s attitude towards the constitution 
changed in The New British Constitution: “It is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
Labour’s espousal of constitutional reform is in some measure a response to the 
vacuum created by a decline in the belief in socialism and social democracy.” 
Constitutional reform therefore was “in part the outcome of frustration at domestic 
political failure and exclusion from office, but it arose also from a loss of 
confidence in the ultimate aims of the Labour movement.”20 However, Bogdanor 
acknowledges how the constitutional reform agenda has links to Labour’s 
pluralist and decentralist tradition.21  
                                                                  
17 B. Jones, & M. Keating, Labour and the British State, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985) p. 205 
18 Ibid., p. 158 
19 V. Bogdanor, The People & The Party System, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981) pp. 
95-207 
20 V. Bogdanor, The New British Constitution, (Oxford and Oregon, Portland, 2009) p. 47 
21 Ibid., pp. 47-48 
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David Butler published two editions of The Electoral System in Britain: firstly for 
the period 1918-195122 and secondly since 191823. Jennifer Hart wrote 
Proportional Representation: Critics of the British Electoral System, 1820-194524. 
As the emergence of Labour coincide with the time frames analysed, Butler and 
Hart provide useful historical accounts of the role Labour has played in the 
twentieth century debate on electoral reform. The final chapter in Robert 
Blackburn The Electoral System in Britain addresses the arguments surrounding 
PR, the principles of PR, methods of elections, the rhetoric surrounding the 
debate outlining the arguments in favour and against PR, ending the chapter by 
making the case for the Additional Member System (AMS). A brief section 
analyses the ‘diverse’ reasons behind Labour’s increased interest in PR in the 
1980s: a younger generation of MPs viewing PR as a wider modernisation of 
Britain, favourable opinion polling, crushing electoral defeats and the 
fragmentation of the Left allowing the Conservatives to remain in government.25   
 
Texts in favour of a realignment of the British left between the Labour Party and 
the Liberal Democrats are explored in the thesis, as the issue overlaps with the 
electoral reform debate. David Marquand’s The Unprincipled Society26 and 
Progressive Dilemma27 were two books that appeared during the Thatcher 
government arguing for realignment, constitutional reform and a movement away 
from the two-party politics of the Westminster Model. Other texts written along 
                                                                  
22 D. Butler, The Electoral System in Britain: 1918-1951, (Oxford University Press, London, 1953)  
23 D. Butler, The Electoral System since 1918, (Oxford University Press, London, 1963) 
24 J. Hart, Proportional Representation: Critics of the British Electoral System, 1820-1945, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1992) 
25 R. Blackburn, The Electoral System in Britain, (St. Martin’s Press, Hampshire, 1995) p. 388  
26 D. Marquand, The Unprincipled Society, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1988) 
27 D. Marquand, The Progressive Dilemma, second edition, (Orion Books Ltd., London, 1999) 
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similar lines include Paul Hirst’s After Thatcher28, Will Hutton’s The State We’re 
In29 and Tony Wright’s Citizens and Subjects30.   
 
Important conclusions can be drawn from the texts outlined in the literature 
review: Labour’s shared attitude with the Conservatives towards the electoral 
system, the significance of the mandate theory (specifically for Jones and 
Keating for the ‘Labour Left’), a plurality of votes is sufficient for democratic 
legitimacy, the position of the ‘working class’, the role of the Party leadership, a 
fear of the consequences of PR and the acceptance of FPTP is based on 
acceptance that only a plurality can be achieved.  
 
‘The Labour Party and the Westminster electoral system’ differs from the current 
literature. Firstly, it is not a work of advocacy attempting to convert the reader to 
one electoral system. The issue at stake is the Labour Party’s attitude towards 
FPTP and electoral reform, not to say one system is preferable to another. 
Therefore, the thesis written as far as possible from a detached point of view and 
therefore aims at objectivity in examining the motivations and rationale of 
defenders of FPTP and supporters of reform. Secondly, the thesis adds to the 
historiography and knowledge found in other accounts, by exploring in greater 
depth commissions enacted by Labour – the ‘Plant Report: A Working Party on 
Electoral Reform’ and the ‘Independent Commission on the Voting System’ – 
reanalysing and reappraising the ideas put forward. Thirdly, there has been very 
little written about the Alternative Vote Referendum. The leading text on the 
matter Don’t Take No For An Answer31 was in the main, a work of advocacy, 
                                                                  
28 P. Hirst, After Thatcher, (Collins, London, 1989) 
29 W. Hutton, The State We’re In, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1995) 
30 T. Wright, Citizens and Subjects: An Essay on British Politics, (Routledge, London, 1994) 
31 L. Baston, & K. Ritchie, Don’t Take No For An Answer: The 2011 referendum and the future of 
electoral reform, (Biteback Publishing, London, 2011) 
12 
 
exploring the failings of the Yes campaign and what can be done to win, should 
another referendum on the electoral system take place. Therefore, the AV 
Referendum has been under-researched, considering it was only the second UK-
wide referendum, and specifically the role played by the Labour Party in the 
referendum. Fourthly, accounts of what happened on Plant, Jenkins and in the 
AV Referendum, the role of committee members and the Labour leadership 
require further exploration as they were significant events and the arguments 
contained warrant exposure. Finally, whilst Dorey, Evans and others deal with the 
arguments proposed by defenders of FPTP and supporters of PR, there is a lack 
of analysis of how the electoral system ties in with different theories of the state 
found within the Labour Party.  
 
Three theories of the state can be identified within the Labour Party, all impacting 
on the electoral reform debate: pluralism, democratic elitism and Marxism. 
Pluralism advocates the dispersal of power, whether it be through political 
institutions or localised organisations, and is a strand of thinking on the British left 
that can be associated with cooperatives, trade unions, friendly societies and 
popular uprising. Most recently, it found expression in Maurice Glasman’s Blue 
Labour. The work of Marquand, Hirst, Hutton and Wright is associated with 
advocating constitutional reform on the British left and a movement away from 
two-party politics of the Westminster Model of government.32 Democratic Elitism 
is identified with Joseph Schumpeter, notably in Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy, stating “we now take the view that the role of the people is to 
produce a government, or else an intermediary body which in turn will produce a 
national executive or government.”33 The thoughts of Karl Popper and Harold 
                                                                  
32 See Marquand, The Unprincipled Society; Marquand, The Progressive Dilemma; Hirst, After 
Thatcher; Hutton, The State We’re In; Wright, Citizens and Subjects 
33 J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1976) p. 295 
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Laski will also be explored, along with the Fabian Society’s notions of planning 
and centralised reform, emanating from a reforming Labour government at 
Westminster. Marxism sets out Labour’s relationship with capitalism, the British 
State and how the Party has been committed to the parliamentary system, 
through the works of individuals such as Ralph Miliband. Labour strategy for 
power has been based on the ballot box – an electoral strategy rather than a 
popular strategy – and gaining representation has diverted attention away from 
class and socialism. 
 
The importance of pluralism, democratic elitism and Marxism to the research is 
such that they are fleshed out in detail in the ‘Theoretical Chapter’. Thus, a 
theoretical basis on which the arguments for or against electoral reform can be 
built upon is offered, allowing the electoral reform debate to be located within a 
theoretical context. Consequently, a discussion on the supporting framework to 
which FPTP supporters and electoral reformers can be attributed is vital in 
establishing the dominant strand of thinking within the Party. The twofold nature 
of the electoral reform debate and its importance was recognised by Hanham, 
who acknowledged the position of both the theoretical and historical, writing: 
 
“It is impossible to carry on a debate about electoral reform without raising a 
number of theoretical issues. As a result, the history of electoral reform has 
always had a dual character, since it consists both of the history of certain 
measures and the history of certain ideas.”34 
 
Combining the historical and theoretical elements of the debate offers the reader 
a full explanation of the cause of the division and how it has played out. The 
                                                                  
34 H. J. Hanham, The Reformed Electoral System in Great Britain, 1832-1914, (The Historical 
Association, London, 1968) p.7 
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electoral system influences a country’s political system, impacting on political 
parties, ideology and policy. Therefore, the electoral reform debate is of 
fundamental importance, generally for British politics, and explicitly for the Labour 
Party; its place within the British political system, its unique objective of bringing 
about through parliament a social democratic Great Britain and how it relates and 
behaves towards other political parties. An alternative electoral system is likely to 
impact on how Labour operates within the political system, and has 
consequences for its desire to form single party governments, transform society 
and defeat its political opponents. 
 
Research questions 
 
The three key research questions are:  
 
1. What have been the main theoretical approaches to electoral reform in the 
Labour Party? 
 
2. What have been the main historical approaches to electoral reform in the 
Labour Party? 
 
3. Why has interest in electoral reform at Westminster in the Labour Party grown 
since the 1980s and with what consequences? 
 
Methodology 
 
The thesis is concerned with an elite level attitude found within the Labour Party 
towards an aspect of the constitution – the Westminster electoral system. Ideas 
are vital to the research, and the detailed narrative is placed within the broader 
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context of the influence of different political theories. Therefore, a hermeneutical 
method has been adopted as the purpose of the research is to understand and 
explicate certain beliefs. Alvesson and Skoldberg write hermeneutics “is useful 
for the very extended sphere of research that consists in the interpretation of 
texts in the literal sense of the word: interviews, documents, notes from 
participant observation, as well as other researchers theories, conceptualisations 
and so on – in short, the working field of discourse.”35 Hickson noted the 
appropriateness for a historical study, a method he adopted for his study of the 
1976 IMF Crisis. “Hermeneutics is concerned with the recovery of the meaning 
and understanding of the historical actors own beliefs and interpretations and the 
understanding of the context in which they operated.”36 It is assumed texts have 
definite meaning as the research is focused on the ‘recovery’ of ‘beliefs’, and we 
can – or can attempt to – understand and expound on such beliefs. 
 
A full understanding of an individual’s actions can only be gained by referencing 
an individual’s beliefs and how they shape behaviour, along with the self-
interpretation of his or her behaviour. Hence a correct interpretation of human 
behaviour requires an understanding of beliefs. Yet beliefs do not operate in a 
vacuum and an important aspect of hermeneutics is the importance placed on 
considering context. Freeden explains that “understanding can be manipulated, 
mistaken, and misguided.” Therefore, “hermeneutic theories of understanding 
take into account the social, cultural, and political contexts, past and present, in 
which understanding and misunderstanding take shape.”37 Context is provided 
throughout the thesis by archives, newspaper articles by those involved in the 
                                                                  
35 M. Alvesson, & K. Skoldberg, Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research, (London, 
2010) p. 106 (emphasis in original) 
36 K. Hickson, The IMF Crisis of 1976 and British Politics, (Tauris Academic Studies, London, 2005) p. 6 
37 M. Freeden, ‘Hermeneutics’, in L. M. Given, The SAGE Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research 
Methods, (New York, 2008) p. 386 
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commissions as well all as journal articles. In addition, parliamentary papers, 
statements made in the House of Commons, speeches and debates at 
conferences and meetings, television and radio interviews, diaries, 
autobiographies, biographies and any relevant historical and political literature, 
are used. 
 
To gain information on the elite-level attitude, interviews were the most suitable 
and appropriate way to gather new data. As Devine noted, the advantages of 
qualitative research are “Clear where the goal of a piece of research is to explore 
people’s experiences, practices, values and attitudes in depth and to establish 
their meaning for those concerned.”38 Therefore, of importance are ‘values’ and 
‘attitudes’ with interviews placing “an interviewee’s attitude and behaviour in the 
context of their individual biography and the wider social setting.”39 Qualitative 
methods are good at capturing “meaning, process and context”40 and offer a 
‘holistic approach’. Seldon writes: “Interviews can be particularly helpful in 
fleshing out documents when it comes to reconstructing the roles and methods of 
personalities, and their relations with others” with such relationships “not only 
complex, but may also be veiled from contemporaries.” In addition “Interviews 
can also assist by revealing the assumptions and motives lying behind 
documents… Underlying philosophies and approaches may have been so taken 
for granted by participants that no need was felt to elucidate them in the written 
record.”41 
 
                                                                  
38 F. Devine, ‘Qualitative Methods’, in D. Marsh, & G. Stoker, (edts.) Theory and Methods in Political 
Science, (Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire, 2002) 2nd edition, p. 207 
39 Ibid., p. 199 
40 A. Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research, (Routledge, London, 1988) p. 62 
41 A. Seldon, ‘Elite interviews’, in B. Brivati et al (edts.) Contemporary History Handbook, (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 1996) pp. 354-355  
17 
 
The new data enhances the analysis and reappraisal of the different arguments 
and attitudes advocated by Labour politicians. Moreover, the data provides an 
insight into the Plant Report, Jenkins Commission and AV Referendum which 
otherwise would remain unknown. The interviewees provided first-hand accounts 
of the disagreements, the context and importantly the underlying rationale of 
disagreements, and as the interviews were from across the Party and 
incorporated the range of views on the matter, the thesis offers the reader a 
considerable depth and range of argument. The extensive range of interviews42 
with leading participants has provided the thesis with a wider range than previous 
studies and therefore adds to the existing knowledge through the gathering of 
unrecorded information. Interview transcripts were produced, returned to the 
interviewee to be amended or clarified, before being analysed, interpreted and 
utilised within the research. As will become clear throughout the thesis, interview 
material is used extensively, and provides the backbone to the answering of the 
research questions.  
 
Interviewees were contacted on the basis that they had been directly involved 
with one or more of the three case studies, had a knowledge or specialism in 
Labour and electoral reform or their known views: against reform, keen reformer, 
or ambivalent. In short, they had a stake in the electoral reform debate within the 
Labour Party. Their contribution to the Plant Report, Jenkins Commission and 
Alternative Vote Referendum and knowledge of the wider attitude of the Labour 
Party towards electoral reform meant they could make a significant contribution 
to the content and originality of the thesis. The interview began by asking broadly 
the same questions – what position do you hold? Why? How was this opinion 
formed? – before moving on to more tailored questions depending on their 
                                                                  
42 See Appendix 1 for list of interviewees 
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contribution to each event, knowledge of how issues were decided and resolved, 
or potentially unresolved, or comments they had made for example in a speech 
or book. As such, the questions allowed the interviewee to talk at length on the 
topic, more like a ‘semi-structured’ conversation in which the pre-written 
questions were a “checklist of topics to be covered.”43  
 
Archival research supplemented the interviews, including at the Labour Party 
History Museum and the London School of Economics, by providing the 
opportunity to enter the thinking of the historical actor. Unfortunately, it was not 
possible to access Roy Jenkins’ private papers as they are subject to the thirty-
year rule. The ideas and arguments explored in the Plant Report and Jenkins 
Commission were expanded upon elsewhere, including journal articles and 
newspapers. Indeed, newspaper articles from the twentieth and twenty-first 
century have been utilised, affording as Kaul mentions, a sense of the 
‘contemporary’, “a window on to the past, a witness of the times, conveying 
something of the intangible ‘atmosphere’ which surrounds events… In seeking to 
understand the past behaviour of men and women, it is necessary to remember 
that they were reacting to events which were unique, unprecedented – often 
unexpected.”44 Secondly, newspaper articles are useful in examining the thinking 
surrounding the events, offering analysis from leading commentators. “Journalists 
are much closer to the leading actors and thus often have a shrewder 
understanding of the game being played than can be acquired from a distance… 
Their writings not only reflect the on-going process of policy formation but capture 
some of the controversies and tensions within the party.”45 There are limitations 
of using the press, namely bias, the lack of reflection and hindsight, yet this is no 
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44 C. Kaul, ‘The Press’, in Brivati, Contemporary History Handbook, p. 299 
45 Ibid., p. 302 
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reason to avoid using the press, as all articles can be qualified and placed within 
the wider narrative. 
 
Structure 
 
The thesis is divided into five main chapters, plus the introduction and 
conclusion. ‘For and Against the Westminster Model: Labour’s theories of the 
British constitution’ outlines pluralism, democratic elitism and Marxism, the 
thinkers associated with each theory, key ideas, their meaning, and relationship 
to the electoral reform debate within the Labour Party. ‘Making their minds up? 
Labour and the Westminster electoral system in historical perspective’ charts the 
debate from the inception of the Labour Party, through the pre-World War One 
debates, the displacing of the Liberals in the 1920s as the main opposition to the 
Conservatives and minority government, the lack of interest both pre and post-
World War Two, and the increasing interest in the 1970s. Following on from the 
historical chapter are three ‘case studies’, spanning a 25-year period.  
 
‘The slow rise and quick fall of the Plant Report’ explores the Working Party that 
met from 1990-1993. During the 1980s there was a burgeoning interest in 
constitutional reform within the Labour Party and wider society. The inability of 
Labour to counter Conservative statecraft led the Party to consider different 
methods and ideas to broaden its appeal, and through the ‘Plant Report’, such 
ideas on constitutional reform, were fleshed out in detail. ‘Realigning the British 
left and the Jenkins Commission’ investigates the committee that met for eight 
months in 1998, putting forward an alternative to FPTP that would be placed in 
front of the electorate in the form of a referendum. The commission was tied up 
with ‘the project’, an elite level attempt by a handful of individuals within the 
Labour Party and Liberal Democrats to realign the ‘progressive’ forces in British 
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politics. Lastly, ‘The end of New Labour and the AV Referendum 2011’ differs 
from Plant and Jenkins insofar as it was not a commission but an election. Yet it 
remains important, as the referendum occurred as the Labour Party attempted to 
move on from ‘New Labour’ in opposition, having been defeated in May 2010 and 
forced from office through the formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition, exposing the split within the Party. 
 
Each case study has been chosen due to its explicit connection with Labour’s 
attitude towards electoral reform at Westminster, revealing something of the 
division, its depth and significance within the Party. Moreover, each event is 
important, individually and collectively as they all form the wider narrative found 
within the Labour Party, with the arguments professed, the processes and 
decisions made all impacting on Labour’s place within the British political system. 
The arguments surrounding electoral reform and the theories found within the 
Labour Party have continuing relevance in the face of the political and electoral 
challenges facing the Party, and therefore deserve to be brought back to the fore, 
to survey the road travelled and the direction it should take in the future. 
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Chapter 1 – For and Against the Westminster Model: Labour’s theories of 
the British constitution 
 
Jones and Keating wrote “In Britain, it is usually the Labour Party which is cast as 
the party of state power given its programmes of nationalisation, planning, and 
public welfare.” However, “it has rarely given any sustained attention to the form 
of the state whose power and role it is pledged to extend” in part an “intellectual 
failure on the party of Labour leaders and policy makers.”46 Whilst Jones and 
Keating are critical of the lack of a coherent theory of the State within the Labour 
Party, three theories can be put forward, with a direct impact on electoral 
systems, electoral reform and how a political party behaves towards other parties 
once within Parliament: pluralism, democratic elitism and Marxism. Each theory 
will be discussed along with the implications for the electoral reform debate, as 
they offer an analysis and a theoretical foundation as to why the Labour Party 
has and continues to be, divided on the issue. 
 
Pluralism 
 
The centralised state has been the object of much debate and criticism amongst 
British pluralists and has consequently influenced and found favour amongst 
academics and politicians who subscribe to a range of political ideologies. 
Drawing on the distinction between civic pluralism found at a ‘grassroots’ level 
and institutional pluralism found within political bodies, this section will outline the 
pluralist critique and vision of British politics, specifically the pluralist strand in the 
Labour Party and the role that a reformed electoral system could play in bring 
about such a vision. Robin Cook declared: “The appalling insight supplied by the 
                                                                  
46 Jones & Keating, Labour and the British State, p. 2 
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Thatcher experience is that there are no real checks and balances in the British 
Constitution. The doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament means that the 
tyranny of parliamentary majority is absolute. Yes, the first-past-the-post system 
has given us strong government and I for one have had strong government up to 
the back teeth.”47 
 
Civic Pluralism 
 
Much like the economic market place, pluralists accept there are a wide range of 
views and dispositions located within society, and individuals desire to belong to 
groups and organisations that represent such views. The ability to freely 
associate in groups is a way of maximising liberty, democracy and influencing, 
through pressure, the policy process. Therefore, an all-encompassing State – the 
Leviathan envisaged by Hobbes – fails to represent the rich complexity of group 
life which constitutes society. For once sovereignty is accepted as the ‘supreme 
power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by law’; Parliament can consider 
itself to be the dominant force within society, encircling all groups, as nothing 
would be exempt from the absolute, perpetual, indivisible and inalienable state. 
G.D.H. Cole maintained “There is no universal sovereign in the community, 
because the individuals who compose that community cannot be fully 
represented by any form of association. For different purposes, they fall into 
different groups, and only in the action and interaction of these groups does 
sovereignty exist.”48 The life blood of society therefore is not the Houses of 
Parliament but the self-organising groups within communities - the local cricket 
club, the Women’s Fellowship – groups in which individuals have freely chosen to 
participate.  
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In addition to offering protection against the state, freely associating groups 
provide a defence against the destructive force of capitalism that has no regard 
for communities and tradition. The best protection against both the state and 
capitalism is not a ‘socialist’ government at Westminster where the class war is 
contained but in society. Therefore, voluntary groups located where the 
grievance exists, are better placed to introduce socialism; Mutual Organisations, 
Co-Operatives, Worker’s Boards, Guilds, empowering socialists in industries and 
specific geographical areas, fostering a better understanding of the needs, and 
desires, and, therefore, furthering the cause of the working class. Thus, Douglas 
Jay’s comment ‘the man in Whitehall knows best’49 does not ring true as an 
individual’s allegiance is not to some distant, abstract and impersonal notion of 
the ‘State’. Rather it is to groups in which individuals participate voluntarily, as 
these organisations offer the best defence of rights and freedoms, for it is here 
that true collective action is realised through the free association of citizens.   
 
More recently, Maurice Glasman sought to return the Labour Party to its pre-
1945 pluralist disposition, in part a response to Cameron’s ‘Big Society’. ‘Blue 
Labour’ was articulated in The Labour tradition and the politics of paradox. “Only 
democratic association can resist the power of capital and that the distinctive 
practices of the Labour movement are built upon reciprocity, mutuality and 
solidarity.”50 Consequently, to view 1945 as the high-water mark of British 
Labourism, delivering socialism for the working class from the top-down, would 
be flawed. Instead, Glasman affirms the 1889 London Dockworkers Strike is the 
leading example of successful bottom-up political activism. Politics should be 
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localised and the role of the labour movement should be to foster localism and 
social activity, for example London Citizens who have campaigned for the living 
wage. Consequently, the centralised British State restricts civic society from 
flourishing. 
 
The increasing role of the state in the twentieth century, particularly post-World 
War Two, taking up functions which were previously fulfilled by voluntary 
organisations, marginalised and reduced the role of charitable organisations in 
society. Tony Wright, the former Labour MP and academic wrote “We 
desperately need some new little platoons, just as we need some new forms of 
civic collectivism. A world in which the individual stands alone in the face of the 
big state and the big corporation, at the mercy of bureaucrats and markets, is not 
a world in which the civic virtues will flourish.”51 Hirst contests “more power to the 
state and less to socialists” has drained “socialism of creative energy as a social 
movement and diverts it from constructive enterprise in civil society.”52 The 
energy and drive for the introduction of socialism must come from the within 
society, not from the political elite. Accordingly, rather than power moving inwards 
towards the state, it should be dispersed, moving downwards towards civic 
society, allowing communities the freedom to endorse and promote policies, 
catering for needs specific to a given area. 
 
Institutional pluralism and the Westminster Model 
 
Institutional pluralism – the belief that political institutions should be more 
reflective of society as a whole – had support in the early twentieth century. Cole 
                                                                  
51 T. Wright, ‘Reinventing Democracy’ in Hirst, & Khilnani, (edts.) Reinventing Democracy, (Blackwell 
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considered in The Social Theory “Misrepresentation is seen at its worst today in 
that professedly omnicompetent ‘representative’ body – Parliament – and in the 
Cabinet which is supposed to depend upon it. Parliament professes to represent 
all the citizens in all things, and therefore as a rule represents none of them in 
anything.”53 However, the positive perception of the reforming Attlee government 
gave credence to the belief that all is required to enact social reforms is a Labour 
majority at Westminster, aided through FPTP, considered to be the best electoral 
system at delivering strong, effective and single party governments. Yet by the 
1980s this appeared uncertain. Jones and Keating wrote that whilst the Party’s 
disparate interests had been able to unite behind an electoral strategy, accepting 
constitutional norms, “the strategy’s acceptability was dependent upon success 
measured in terms of winning control of Parliament and upon the state’s ability to 
deliver the economic goods. By the 1980’s neither expectation appeared well-
founded.”54 
 
The celebrated British constitution of ‘good government’ consisting of a stable, 
two-party politics, delivering what ‘people wanted’, requiring the occasional 
modification began to come under a wide-ranging critique. One such contribution 
was Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform, written from the Right as a critique 
of the centralising impact of Labour governments in the 1970s. Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s a number of key texts emerged55 criticising the centralising 
impact of the Conservative government’s New Right economic and social 
policies. Lord Norton notes how the intellectual climate in this period and the 
prominence of groups such as Charter 88 meant “few (appeared) willing to 
challenge publicly and in print the views expressed” despite the case for a new 
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constitutional settlement being “in substance flawed… Dangerous, then, and 
pretentious.”56 For Norton, constitutional reformers had misunderstood political 
developments in the 1980s: exaggerating claims of the erosion of civil liberties 
and the emergence of a coercive state; underappreciated the persistence of 
pluralism in British politics; and proposed remedies which will be unable to solve 
the ailments they claim to diagnose. Instead, the legislative process was the 
appropriate method to redress grievances.57  
   
Hirst and Khilnani considered “In the name of greater economic efficiency and 
respect for individual rights Conservative governments since 1979 have 
accumulated unprecedented powers for the central government.” This has been 
achieved by two means: the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the 
freedom of an unwritten constitution.58 Thus, new governing foundations were 
required, for whether government was too weak or too strong, both lacked 
political endorsement. The case for accepting the traditional orthodoxy of British 
political science that the existing electoral system contributes to good 
government, considered Steed, had always underestimated the accidental nature 
of the relationship contingent as it is upon the social and political divisions in the 
country and the way they translate into political parties.59  
 
The key characteristics of including parliamentary sovereignty, ministerial 
accountability, unitary state, executive dominance, civil service neutrality, a 
general election once every four or five years conducted under FPTP generally 
delivering single party governments, the mandate and the manifesto, has, 
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according to pluralists, a tendency to hoard power at the centre. The ruling party 
could enjoy the crown in Parliament, a legacy of the Glorious Revolution with the 
former power and privileges of the Monarch placed in the hands of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet. Britain’s ‘unwritten’ constitution, with no formal ‘Bill of 
Rights’, the inability of Parliament to ‘bind its successor’, the executive being 
drawn from the legislature and a judiciary interpreting the laws passed by the 
legislature, enabled a party to govern with strong and decisive leadership. Norton 
writes that the Labour Party comprises of a range of attitudes towards the 
constitution – socialist, liberal with its emphasis on decentralisation and Marxist – 
but the dominant attitude within the Party is the “Traditionalist” approach 
accepting the Westminster Model. Traditionalists appeal to different strands of 
thought from British history, the continuity and durability of British political 
institutions and the maintenance of a party majority in the House of Commons, 
through the existence of two dominant parties, facilitated by FPTP. Government 
is afforded the freedom to respond to changing circumstances, offering 
leadership through Party loyalty, with the manifesto serving as a guide to the 
intentions if returned to office.60  
 
Wright considered “Left and right might do so for different reasons, and for 
different purposes, but the effect was the same. A Tory governing tradition and 
socialist collective tradition found common ground in applauding the merits of the 
top-down and flexible constitution and in resisting proposals which would imperil 
its unity, discipline and cohesion.”61 Elections were no longer about representing 
individual interests but creating governing majorities, meaning representatives 
were tied to parties. Competition was limited and given the winner-takes-all 
system, the imperative is to become the winner. Through mandates and 
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manifestos “Citizens are reduced to voters, multiple arenas of citizenship 
narrowed to the periodic visit to the polling booth, professional party machines 
substituting for the authentic activity of democratic politics, a politics of 
observation rather than of engagement.”62 A single party dominating the 
legislature and forming the executive has the ability, due to the lack of ‘checks 
and balances’, to make and pass laws of its own choosing: an ‘elective 
dictatorship’ to borrow Lord Hailsham’s phrase. Consequently, the winning party 
allegedly only governs in the interest of those it represents. Wright considered “A 
winner-takes-all electoral system goes hand in hand with a winner-takes-all 
system if government”63, an attitude that permeates the Westminster Model. 
Those who fall outside the winning party’s electoral base are excluded from the 
decision-making process, as are the other political parties who have invariably 
lost. The governing party therefore lacks an imperative to seek compromise and 
coalition with other groups.  
 
The post-World War Two Labour revisionists, notably finding expression in Tony 
Crosland’s The Future of Socialism, had little interest in the political and 
administrative machinery through which redistribution and public expenditure 
would be achieved. In the 1950s and 1960s Labour politicians were concerned 
about the political implications of an increasingly affluent working class.64 As such 
the policies would be implemented through the existing parliamentary machinery, 
including Cabinet and Whitehall. John P. Mackintosh accused the parliamentary 
reformers in the 1960s of naiveté and foolishness for thinking reform was 
possible without diminishing the power of the executive.65 Mackintosh was critical 
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of the workings of Parliament in an era when the Labour Party was satisfied with 
the constitutional setup. He considered that the Executive had become too 
powerful and this needed to be checked by a stronger Parliament. Moreover, 
“The old, straightforward parliamentary system of democracy has been added to 
and been confused by other concepts of legitimacy and other methods of 
obtaining and demonstrating support.”66 No longer did a parliamentary majority 
confer ‘moral authority’ on to laws. 
 
Prior to the Conservative Party election victory in 1979, and considering the 
governing difficulties of the 1970s, Roy Jenkins had voiced his concerns about 
the two-major parties moving away from the centre ground. Only a ‘new’ kind of 
politics could resolve these problems. Jenkins, the former Labour Home 
Secretary gave a speech titled ‘Home Thoughts From Abroad’ in which he 
criticised the “constricting rigidity – almost the tyranny – of the present party 
system” and believed “The case for proportional representation (to be) 
overwhelming.” Instead of coalition government being feared, it should be 
embraced, as it was “essential for democratic leadership.” Furthermore, “The test 
is whether those within the coalition are closer to each other, and to the mood of 
the nation they seek to govern, than they are to those outside their ranks.” In his 
closing remarks, Jenkins, advocated for “A strengthening of the radical centre”67, 
suggesting that the formation of the Social Democratic Party, of which he would 
go on to be a founding member, was already in his thoughts. 
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Implications for Governance 
 
The actions of the Thatcher government and the policies introduced are, as the 
opening quotation from Cook suggests, a reference point for pluralists on the 
Left. The Thatcher government stands accused of ramrodding through 
controversial legislation on less than half the popular vote. The introduction of 
New Right economics and social policies – individualism, consumerism and 
personal responsibility – undermined the planks of social democracy, shifting the 
debate away from collectivism and ending the ‘post-war consensus’. Although the 
Conservative Party won four successive general elections – two of which were 
landslide victories in 1983 and 1987 – on no occasion was a majority of the 
popular vote achieved. Indeed, not since the National Government of 1931 – and 
the unique political circumstances of that year with the temporary end of the party 
system – has the winning party achieved over 50% of the popular vote. 
Consequently, this raises issues for the mandate received by the winning party to 
introduce its manifesto, particularly for a government desiring to introduce a new 
socio-economic agenda.  
 
Birch questioned the theory of the ‘mandate and the manifesto’ deeming it “rather 
misleading picture of how the system actually works”: the unspecific nature of 
party programmes; the influence of a range of factors on voters; and 
governments, due to events outside their control and the pursuing of policies, not 
included in their manifestos. Moreover, since 1974 the vote share for the two 
major parties has declined, at times the successful winning party gaining less 
than forty per cent of the vote, bringing into question whether the electorate have 
given the winning Party a mandate. “Elections of this kind constitute a mandate 
for compromise or coalition, not a mandate for ideological policies of either a left-
wing or right-wing kind.” Furthermore, “a feeling of democratic legitimacy should 
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lead the governing party to drop the more extreme and controversial parts of its 
programme and to pursue only those policies for which it could reasonably claim 
the support of at least half the nation.”68 A proportional electoral system would 
have in all likeliness, resulted in the Conservative Party sharing office with 
another political party, acting as a brake, diluting or preventing controversial New 
Right policies. 
 
However, in practice the idea that the government of the day can make and 
implement laws as they please, free from restraint, is not as straightforward. 
Independent minded backbench MPs can be the fiercest critics of their 
governments and British parliamentary history is littered with MPs who critique 
their own Party - the adage that the ‘opposition are in front of you and the enemy 
are behind you’. Furthermore, although MPs can be whipped to ensure the 
government can pass its legislative programme, it has always been the case that 
on ‘Matters of Conscience’ MPs can vote as their morals dictate. Indeed, there is 
a growing body evidence compiled by Cowley and Stuart, suggesting MPs are 
becoming more rebellious, refuting the accusation that MPs simply follow the 
instruction of the parliamentary whips.69 Rose cites four constraints upon party 
government: firstly from within, which is greater for Labour than the 
Conservatives due to how policy is formulated within the Party, including the 
influence of the membership, the NEC, and the implications of breaking 
manifesto commitments for the leadership; secondly, party competition and the 
prospect of electoral defeat; thirdly entry into government and the ‘trappings of 
power’; and lastly global politics, global economics and British membership of 
supranational bodies.70  
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The parliamentary majority enjoyed by the government impacts on its ability to 
enact legislation. A slim majority is always in danger of being whittled down 
through by-election defeats and defections across the floor of the House. For 
example, the 1974-1979 Labour Government, was reliant upon the parliamentary 
support of the Liberal Party in 1977-78. In addition, the final six months of the 
Major Government was reliant on the parliamentary support of Ulster Unionists. 
Parliamentary arithmetic under FPTP can result in a situation whereby Coalition 
and ‘Supply and Confidence’ are required, thus bringing other political parties into 
the decision-making process. Indeed, there is nothing intrinsic within FPTP that 
guarantees single party government, especially with the decline of the two-party 
system in Britain, as shown by the events of 2010 and the proceeding parliament 
in which the Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats formed a fully-fledged 
coalition. FPTP fosters rather than solely delivers single party government and, 
given the multi-national nature of the United Kingdom, FPTP can deliver a 
pluralist vision of democracy leading to deliberation and power sharing.  
 
The fracturing of the electorate and the two-party system 
 
Walkland, writing in 1977, claimed “It is the final disservice of the governing 
parties that as they become less relevant they grow ever more self-protective, 
whatever the cost to the nation.” Furthermore, they decline into “Sectarian 
minorities, blocking institutional reform and failing to take account of new 
realities.”71 The ‘natural’ party affiliations of the manual working class and 
propertied middle class do not apply as they once did, with the reducing 
appropriateness of referring to British politics as ‘tribal’. The Labour Party is not 
exempt from the changing nature of society with the traditional bonds of social 
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class, party and nationality wearing thin. In turn, this raises the prospect of the 
erosion of Labour Party’s traditional electoral base, furthering the imperative to 
reach out into all groups within society. Jones and Keating noted in the mid-
1980s Labour’s “electoral strongholds, traditionally the basis of its electoral 
success, are now its greatest weakness. Located in declining industrial areas, 
they are unrepresentative of modern British society and help to insulate the party 
from the reality of its popular decline.” Furthermore, “the territorial distribution of 
the Labour vote now raises serious doubts about its credibility as a ‘national’ 
party.”72  
 
Socialists, argues Hirst, have “treated the working class as if it was both 
homogenous and the overwhelming majority of society, whereas neither of these 
claims is the case.”73 The working class is diverse: skilled and unskilled, urban 
and rural, regionally different, propertied and social tenants, unionised and non-
unionised and ethnically diverse. Indeed, a significant proportion of the working 
class have always voted Conservative, for reasons that are still contested. David 
Marquand affirms “Labour’s class appeal has always been fundamental to it. But 
class is subjective, not objective… At the heart of Labour’s class appeal lay the 
assumption that the class dimension must, by definition, have primacy over all 
other dimensions.” This entailed “assumptions that working class interests had a 
special legitimacy denied to other class interests.” Whilst appealing to millions of 
working class voters it could only rise so far as it did, but could not appeal 
beyond that base. Many “refused to give primacy to the class dimension of their 
lives” whereas others “could not see why the working class, as a class, had any 
moral claim on anyone else.”74 
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The unexpected Labour loss in 1992 led Marquand to affirm the aforementioned 
were at odds with the requirements of coalition building, coalition membership 
and the Party was ill-equipped to win over the other constituencies which a “new 
progressive coalition” would have to embrace. Labour had been unable to build 
the broad electoral alliances required to win as they had done in 1945 or 1966, or 
that which the pre-1914 Liberal government enjoyed. The winner-takes-all 
assumptions of the Labour leadership “made it impossible for it to provide more 
than transitory shelter for the diverse and heterogeneous constituencies which a 
new progressive coalition would have to embrace.” A wide-range of anti-
Conservative could be included: Liberal Democrats, Welsh and Scottish 
nationalists, feminists, ethnic minorities, Greens and the anti-system constituency 
of Charter 88. For this to materialise Labour had to “abandon tribalism, to give up 
the dream of single-party hegemony and to practice a politics of pluralism, 
negotiation and mutual education, based on respect for identities and aspirations 
that differ from its own.”75 
 
The failings of FPTP 
 
Hirst stated “It would not be exaggerating to say that the two-party system is the 
most important unwritten annexe to our unwritten constitution.” However, “The 
two-party system has now broken down irrecoverably, but no new stable system 
of party competition in election has come to replace it.”76 Similarly, Wright stated 
the political system is living off its capital. “Whereas it was once possible to argue 
that the electoral system reflected the essential character of British politics, for 
the last two decades it would be more accurate to say that it is only the electoral 
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system which propped up British politics in its traditional form.”77 In the Post-
World War Two era at the height of the two-party system only a handful of Liberal 
MPs were returned to Westminster and the combined vote share of the 
Conservatives and Labour regularly achieved over 90%. Wright continues; “It 
was then plausible to argue (notwithstanding a lack of precise mathematical 
fairness) that there was a broad ‘fit’ between a majoritarian and adversarial two-
party political system and the disposition of issues, ideologies and classes.”78  
 
Such a fit, according to electoral reformers no longer occurs and the system is 
only kept in place by those who benefit from the present arrangement. Since 
1974 the Liberal Party, in all its various guises, has continued to poll well but 
failed to gain the representation on the proportional basis it warrants. Whether it 
is desirable to have an electoral system biased towards sectional interests and 
against parties, including the Liberal Democrats who enjoy a broad nationwide 
appeal, is debateable. In Scotland and Wales the nationalist parties have grown, 
so much so that in the 2015 general election the Scottish National Party (SNP) 
won fifty-six out of fifty-nine constituencies. Moreover, the workings of FPTP 
entail the winning candidate requires only one more vote than the candidate in 
second to win the constituency. Accusations of ‘wasted’ votes follow, as the votes 
above and below the ‘winning post’ figure – namely the runner-up’s total plus one 
or votes cast for losing candidates – are considered not to impact the outcome of 
the result. A proportional electoral system, in which an electors vote is 
redistributed, would solve the alleged problem of ‘wasted’ votes. Martin Linton 
considered that in the pluralistic society “many more voices want to be heard” 
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and individuals are “consumers” who demand a “wider choice” and “influence on 
decisions that affect their lives,” above all wanting “their votes to count.”79 
 
PR has the potential to allow parliament to become representative of the wider 
society: women, ethnic minorities, nationalists, unionists, europhile and 
eurosceptic, socialist and capitalist. The cleavages within a pluralistic society 
would find new voices in Parliament rather than being contained or excluded as 
present in the ‘two-party’ system. The ability of FPTP to encourage unity would 
be weakened, potentially breaking up the major political parties, who consist of a 
collection of individuals who, in some circumstances have widely differing views. 
However, a political party whilst containing a wide spectrum of opinions is a 
coalition in itself, sharing common aims that are not shared by other political 
parties. Thus, the question raised is whether the Labour Party should seek to 
form a broad electoral coalition in order to win a general election through 
compiling votes from across society, or seek to increase Labour’s electoral 
coalition through inter-party deals and coalition deals.  
 
Curtice argues that with the decline of marginal constituencies, there is an 
increased likelihood of coalitions at Westminster, meaning that the formation of 
the Conservative-Liberal coalition in 2010 was not an aberration and is likely to 
become the norm.80 The increased vote for the Liberal Democrats and the 
Nationalists, resulting in a decline of votes won by Labour and the Conservatives, 
meaning fewer seats being held by the two main parties, increases the chances 
of a hung parliament. Hunter questions this line of reasoning, highlighting the 
number of marginal constituencies was lower in 1983 than 2010, and yet that 
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election resulted in a 144-seat majority for the Conservatives. Bar the 2010 
general election result, the declining number of marginal constituencies has not 
impacted on FPTP’s ability to deliver majority governments. Hunter questions as 
to whether those analysing marginal constituencies are asking the correct 
question: “Whether these seats are won on a fair basis is a completely different 
question to whether first past the post can produce majorities.”81  
 
Consequently, it does not necessarily follow that a small number of marginal 
constituencies will lead to a hung parliament. The number of marginal 
constituencies has no bearing on whether FPTP has worked correctly, fulfilling its 
oft mentioned benefits of delivering strong and stable government. On occasions 
when FPTP fails to yield a clear winner, especially in times of political flux and 
fluidity such as the 1920s, 1970s and 2010, history suggests that the party 
system returns to delivering single party government.  Moreover, Hunter 
challenges the Diamond and Radice Southern Discomfort thesis, writing “Labour 
has traditionally fared far worse in southern England than elsewhere and to base 
a strategy on winning back the South (which was never won) would be 
comparable to a Conservative strategy based on winning Wales and Scotland.” 
The importance of having support from all social groups is therefore emphasised 
along with having policies that are attractive to voters in places which are not 
traditionally Labour.82  
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Realignment of the Left and Coalition Government 
 
Traditionally the Labour Party has been averse to coalition and electoral pacts. 
However, there are notable exceptions in the twentieth century, including 
Ramsay MacDonald and ‘the Great Betrayal’, which led to the National 
Government. Ralph Miliband, commenting in Parliamentary Socialism affirmed 
“There was the fear of anything resembling alliance with non-Labour and anti-
Labour elements...Whatever the Labour leaders had not learnt from 1931, they 
had learnt that never again must any Labour leader propose any kind of 
collaboration with Labour’s opponents”83 thus ruling out coalition with the parties 
of capital. Eatwell and Wright, assert in Labour and the Lessons of 1931, “One of 
the most frequently drawn lessons...was that Labour should never again form a 
minority government...this lesson made sense in so far as a socialist party could 
hardly hope to implement socialist measures when dependent on non-socialist 
support.”84 MacDonald’s actions convinced the Labour movement that such 
arrangements should be avoided, for it is the Labour Party which is the guardian 
of workers. The Lab-Lib Pact 1977-78 differed, borne out of political necessity, 
ensuring the survival of the government, rather than a belief in the merits of 
power-sharing and coalition government. 
 
Regardless of the predominant thinking within the Party, a ‘re-alignment of the 
Left’ between Labour and the Liberal Democrats has found supporters. 
Mackintosh outlined the benefits of the Lab-Lib Pact in the Scotsman: a “counter-
weight to the Left and puts Labour in touch with five million voters who, in 1974, 
rejected both the traditional main parties”; politicians having to consider the 
impact of policies on people not the manifesto or party; and lastly the 
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Government’s survival rests on its relationship with the Commons. The objective 
of a realignment would be to “produce a major left-of-centre party which would be 
tied neither to Marxist dogma nor the trade unions.” Debates over the mixed 
economy would cease and those who wished for state ownership “would have to 
make their case to the electorate.” Lastly, a realigned party could “shed the 
desperate constitutional orthodoxy of the left and accept the development of 
democratic controls over government, from Parliament downwards.”85 Adonis, 
who joined the Labour Party in the mid-1990s from the Liberal Democrats after 
Blair had become leader, was originally in favour of a coalition between Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats, influenced by the work of Roy Jenkins who advised: 
"The only real difference is that Labour is now the larger party of social 
democrats, the Lib Dems are the smaller; and in our political system, it is 
generally wise to support the larger party if they are on the same page."86 
 
Adonis stated in 5 Days in May “Believers in a social market economy and an 
open, liberal society are spread across all three major parties…having more in 
common with progressives in other parties than with the extremes of their own 
party. Coalitions might therefore promote consensus behind mainstream social 
market policies, and make governments stronger and better.” However, 
considering the 2010 Conservative-Liberal coalition his opinion had changed. “I 
hope coalition is not necessary after the next election. I believe Britain would do 
best with a One Nation Labour majority government.” Adonis lists four lessons he 
has learnt about coalition, of which two are of specific interest: “It is possible to 
make coalitions work in modern Britain, and for them to be as stable as single-
party governments” but qualifies this point, affirming “coalition is not a superior 
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form of government to single-party majority government…Labour must seek to 
win on its own, and to do so as an effective progressive coalition within itself.”87 
 
As Labour struggled against the dominant statecraft of the Conservative Party 
during the 1980s and 1990s, its position encouraged thoughts of coalition and 
electoral pacts, gaining favour with journalists, politicians and academics. It was 
perceived by some that coalition with the Liberal Democrats was the only viable 
route back into government for the Labour Party. Marquand argued that a 
successful anti-Thatcherite coalition – once the myth, tradition and deception of 
opposition parties working together had been dropped – would have to include 
“conservative interests and tendencies as well as radical ones… It is how to 
assemble an anti-Thatcher coalition capable of offering a convincing radical 
alternative to the radicalism of the Right, while at the same time appealing to 
non-radical interests and opinion. Seventy years of British history suggest that 
neither the Labour Party nor the SLD can do this all by itself.” The pre-World War 
One Liberal coalition fell apart and the Labour Party was unable to construct an 
equivalent. Importantly, PR was an “indispensable first step towards a citizen 
democracy. If such an agreement proved electorally successful” wrote Marquand, 
“It would be a temporary arrangement, leading hopefully to a situation where 
future elections were held on the basis of PR” thereby giving new meaning to 
parts of Southern England “where, under the present system, Labour is on a 
hiding to nothing.” To succeed, the electoral pact would have to be based on a 
political policy, a shared policy agenda. “People are increasingly prepared to 
listen to each other” and “party frontiers are simply too restrictive for creative 
political and intellectual debate.”88  
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Hirst wrote that PR would change our political system, and that whilst Labour has 
shared the Conservative myths about FPTP, they must accept 1945 was an 
“exception and unrepeatable event”. Furthermore, “Coalition government need 
not mean weak government” and in a “collaborative political culture” governments 
are “most effective” when they work through “large sections of the public through 
informed consent and dialogue”, which can only tackle the social and economic 
problems facing Britain. Moreover, a broad social pact, not a narrow electoral 
pact is required, with the Labour Party accepting policy derived from a process of 
“inter-party and interest group bargaining, not from party manifesto or conference 
decisions.”89 
 
Binding Labour and the Liberal Democrats is contingent on the introduction of 
electoral reform. “A commitment (or at least openness) to PR by the Labour 
Party” claimed Rustin in 1985, “would in itself be a major factor making for the 
reconstruction of an anti-Thatcher alliance, in place of the anti-socialist collusion 
between Tories and the Alliance which has dominated recent British politics.”90 
Hutton writing a decade later affirmed “The Liberal Democrats are one obvious 
ally” for the Labour Party. “There is even a case for a formal electoral alliance, if 
only to make clear the nature of their common project.”91 Hirst claimed “In a 
general election, voting Democrat or SDP is voting for a party that either can only 
govern in coalition with Labour or will let in Labour as the largest governing 
party.”92 However, whether this has ever been the case is open to debate, and 
                                                                  
89 T. Davis, & D. Green, ‘Labour’s One Hope: Labour cannot win the next election’, Marxism Today, 
Feb 1989; P. Hirst, ‘Strong Medicine’, Marxism Today, October 1991; Hirst, After Thatcher, pp. 230-
231 
90 M. Rustin, For a Pluralist Socialism, (Verso, London, 1985) pp. 139-140 
91 Hutton, The State We’re In, p. 325 
92 Hirst, After Thatcher, p. 30 
42 
 
the events of May 2010 with the formation of a Conservative-Liberal coalition 
makes doubtful the claim of voting Liberal Democrat is tacitly supporting Labour. 
 
Summary 
 
Whilst in Europe coalition politics is the norm, it has at Westminster been 
considered the ‘un-British’ way of doing politics, with the two major political 
parties, apart from at times of national emergency, subscribing to the traditional 
Westminster Model of single party government. British politics is not, for 
illustration, German or Australian politics, where ‘sister’ parties form coalitions 
should a viable situation arise: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and 
Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU) and in Australia the Liberal Party and the 
National Party. Nevertheless, talk of a Labour-Liberal Democrat Coalition has 
always found support, based on the assumption the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP), the subsequent Alliance and then Liberal Democrats are a party of the 
‘centre-left’, formed in opposition to the Thatcher government, part of the wider 
‘progressive’ anti-Conservative majority in the country. PR would facilitate such 
an understanding.  
 
Pluralists assess the declining ‘tribal’ nature of British politics, with weakening 
party affiliation, reduced party membership and a decline in the vote share of the 
two major parties although still dominating the number of constituencies, requires 
the adoption of a proportional electoral system. Whether it be the breakdown of 
traditional class loyalties (a more affluent working class and a socially-liberal 
middle class with economic freedom); greater equality for women and 
homosexuals; a new ‘political class’ of University educated professionals; the rise 
of Scottish and Welsh nationalism and to a lesser extent English nationalism; the 
reduced influence of Trade Unions in a service rather than producer economy; 
43 
 
and the decline of religion and traditional morality within society; there is a need 
for these groups to gain representation in the House of Commons.  
 
Single-party government fails to represent the diversity of views in society, as a 
single-party government acts in the interests of its own electoral base and ‘tribe’. 
Only under a reformed electoral system would a government represent such 
diverse interests. All those groups and factions which previously had been 
excluded from the decision-making process, would find themselves included, in a 
new collegiate and consensus-based politics. The Labour Party would be forced 
to move beyond the alleged narrow class-based party, only seeking to represent 
its core constituents in working-class communities, to a broad-base social 
movement, representing in agreement all the anti-Conservative forces in the 
country. Furthermore, a rapprochement with the Liberal Democrats, or the SNP 
given that they are now the third biggest party in British politics, would be 
necessary to build a ‘progressive’ coalition at Westminster, better representing 
society, an expression of twenty-first century pluralistic Britain. 
 
Democratic Elitism 
 
Democratic Elitism rejects the classical theory of democracy moving away from 
discerning the ‘common good’ through debate and deliberation towards a liberal, 
representative, procedural and importantly limited model of democracy. The 
thoughts of two political thinkers who ascribed to the elitist model of politics will 
be outlined: Joseph Schumpeter, whose work Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy was based upon forty years of observations of socialism and 
democracy and Karl Popper The Open Society and its Enemies which sought to 
contribute to the understanding of totalitarianism and the significance of the 
perennial fight against it, by putting forward a new theory of democracy. 
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Furthermore, the work of the aforementioned will be supplemented by other 
thinkers and groups, including the Fabian Society, as the ideas put forward by 
this particular group of middle-class radicals and intellectuals is vital in 
understanding the Labour Party’s satisfaction with the Westminster Model of 
government.  
 
Schumpeter 
 
The democratic method according to the eighteenth-century philosophy of 
democracy is, in the opinion of Schumpeter, “that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions which realises the common good by making the 
people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to 
assemble in order to carry out its will.” Consequently, the “selection of the 
representatives is made secondary to the primary purpose of the democratic 
arrangement which is to vest the power of deciding political issues in the 
electorate.”93 Therefore, democracy is the rule of the people, and the people have 
a right to rule. Such a view of democracy – voicing, reflecting, and representing 
the moral and intellectual development of society turning the legislature into a 
great debating chamber – is mistaken, for it is not possible for representatives of 
the people to represent what could be called the ‘will of the people’, so it was not 
possible to conform to ‘what people really want.’ As each individual has the 
capacity to reason to different conclusions it is impossible for representatives and 
parliament as a whole to discern the ‘common good’.  
 
Moreover, Schumpeter writes an ordinary citizen will display more intelligence 
and clear-headedness in a card game than a political discussion with other non-
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politicians as they cannot comprehend the scale of the decisions made and their 
impact compared to the practical politician. “For the private citizen musing over 
national affairs there is no scope for such a will and no task at which it would 
develop. He is a member of an unworkable committee, the committee of the 
whole nation, and this is why he expends less disciplined effort on mastering a 
political problem than he expends on a game of bridge.”94 The non-politician has 
a reduced sense of responsibility and an absence of volition explaining why there 
is a lack of judgement on their behalf, for at the bridge table there are clearly 
defined rules disciplining and immediately responsible to the players. “These 
conditions, by their failure to be fulfilled for the political behaviour of the ordinary 
citizen, show why it is that in politics he lacks all the alertness and the judgement 
he may display in his profession.”95 Max Weber expressed similar sentiment, 
writing about the dangers which mass democracy presented to national politics. 
Principally, “the emotional elements will become predominant” with the “mass”, 
regardless of social strata, thinking “only as far as the day after tomorrow… 
exposed to momentary, purely emotional and irrational influences.” Successful 
politics is conducted with the head, aided through a “smaller number of those 
who participate in the deliberations” and “the more unambiguously 
responsibilities are understood by each of the participants and by those whom 
lead.” Indeed, “the finest political achievements of the English parliament are the 
products of unambiguous responsibility.”96 
 
Through the limitations of the ordinary citizen’s capabilities, he or she argues and 
analyses in a primitive manner, incapable of the rationality of a politician. As a 
result, the deciding of issues by the electorate becomes secondary to the election 
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of the men and women who are to do the resolving. Accordingly, “we now take 
the view that the role of the people is to produce a government, or else an 
intermediary body which in turn will produce a national executive or 
government.”97 Furthermore, compromise cannot be reached on qualitative 
issues. For example, the issue of taking the country to war is a matter of 
conscience for the representative, which might be opposite to that of his or her 
constituents. However, the representative has greater access to the facts and 
figures and is therefore better placed to make political decisions. Moreover, the 
government must have one agreed position which is adopted by all those in the 
government, for it is unworkable to have a plethora of disparate views. Indeed, it 
is the government that can make the most informed decision due to their ability to 
access information. 
 
Schumpeter states: “The voter outside of parliament must respect the division of 
labour between themselves and the politicians they elect”, understanding “once 
they have elected an individual, political action is his business and not theirs. 
This means that they must refrain from instructing him about what he is to do.”98 
Consequently, leadership becomes the true function of the electorate’s vote, as 
the electorate have abdicated responsibility. However, a party seeking re-election 
must consider the electorate’s views or otherwise it risks being removed from 
office. Aneurin Bevan, made a similar argument to Schumpeter, stating the 
electorate “may not know the facts as he knows them. Indeed, they cannot 
expect to do so. In our complicated society there must be division of labour.” 99 
However, Bevan judged confidence existing only when a political party choose a 
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representative of a like mind, yet not necessarily of the same background, or else 
confidence will decline. 
 
Consequently, the definition of democratic method becomes “that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decision in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”100 
Democracy is therefore a competition for leadership, further defining democracy 
“to free competition for a free vote”, meaning men and women are sent to the top 
by a process of competitive elections. As the act of voting is an open competition, 
democracy becomes like the market place, in which various groups and 
individuals – equivalent to enterprises and entrepreneurs – compete for the votes 
of electors, the political ‘consumers’. “What businessmen do not understand is 
that exactly as they are dealing in oil so I am dealing in votes.”101 Although 
imperfect, like economic competition, “The justification for this is that democracy 
seems to imply a recognised method by which to conduct the competitive 
struggle, and that the electoral method is practically the only one available for 
communities of any size.”102 Therefore, when the electorate go to the polls to cast 
their ballot, they are merely stating their preference for one set of leaders over 
another, asking themselves whether the current government warrant another 
term of office, or whether they should be replaced. This is the only political 
control the electorate have over their elites as they have the ‘function of evicting’ 
the government and inserting a new one. In turn, this should result in 
considerable amount of freedom of discussion for all, especially the press, which 
is considered a cornerstone of a democratic society.  
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Schumpeter states “the first and foremost aim of each political party is to prevail 
over the others in order to get into power or to stay in it...the decision of political 
issues is, from the standpoint of the politician, not the end but only the material of 
parliamentary activity.”103 James Bulpitt advanced the idea of ‘statecraft’, that the 
primary objective of political parties is “The art of winning elections and achieving 
some degree of governing competency.”104 Therefore, a political party in power 
must govern competently if it is to remain in power, and in the same way that 
armies strategically compete over a stretch of land or a hill, political parties are 
also in a competition. The Labour Party is engaged in a political battle with the 
Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish and Welsh nationalists 
and all other political parties that enter the contest with the aim of controlling the 
legislature. 
 
PR is rejected by Schumpeter as voters cast their ballot for the creation of a 
government. Once the representatives are within the legislature, laws are passed 
through majority decisions, emphasising the importance of what happens in the 
legislature. “Evidently the will of the majority is the will of the majority and not the 
will of ‘the people’. The latter is a mosaic that the former completely fails to 
‘represent’”, as ‘the people’ is a far greater concept than the majority. Once in the 
legislature a majority is still required to pass laws, therefore it is reasonable to 
assume the majority is formed by one party. Schumpeter goes on to state how 
PR will: 
 
“offer opportunities for all sorts of idiosyncrasies to assert themselves… 
prevent democracy from producing efficient governments and thus prove a 
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danger in times of stress... If acceptance of leadership is the true function of 
the electorate’s vote, the case for proportional representation collapses 
because its premises are no longer binding. The principle of democracy then 
merely means that the reins of government should be handed to those who 
command more support than do any of the competing individuals or teams.”105 
 
Popper 
 
Popper is concerned less with the question ‘who should rule?’ deeming it should 
be replaced by a new question: “How can we organise political institutions that 
bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?” 
Popper’s theory rests on the “adoption of the proposal to avoid and resist 
tyranny” and he distinguishes between two types of government: one in which a 
government can be deposed without bloodshed through a general election with 
social institutions providing means by which the rulers may be dismissed by the 
ruled, and the second by which the ruled can only be got rid of by social 
revolution. Therefore, implied in the adoption of this principle is the “conviction 
that the acceptance of even a bad policy in a democracy (as long as we can work 
for a peaceful change) is preferable to the submission to a tyranny.” In addition, 
while democracy means ‘rule by the people’ or ‘popular sovereignty’, people, 
according to Popper, do not rule anywhere. Instead it is governments that rule.106  
 
The theory of the ‘removal of government’ compared to the ‘old’ theory of 
democracy raises the practical problem of PR. Rule of the people favours PR, for 
if people rule through their representatives then numerical distribution of opinion 
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should mirror as closely as possible the views of those who rule – the people. 
Such an argument collapses if Popper’s argument is accepted, for PR suffers 
from a number of failings and thus is problematic. Whereas under a single-
member constituency system an MP has the freedom to vote against the party 
line, under a proportional system the MP is “bound to (their) party because he 
has been chosen to represent it and it alone.” Furthermore, PR “does not 
represent the people and its views but simply the influence that the various 
parties (and party propaganda) had upon the electorate on polling day.”107 
“Accordingly, nobody looks on election day as a Day of Judgment; as a day when 
a responsible government stands to account for its deeds and omissions, for its 
successes and failures, and a responsible opposition criticises this record and 
explains what steps the government ought to have taken, and why.”108 
 
The formation of a government becomes problematic, due to the multiplicity of 
political parties under a proportional electoral system, as small parties can have 
significant influence over a government’s decisions. Yet, so long as “one takes 
the ‘essence’ of democracy to be popular sovereignty, one has to swallow these 
problems as a democrat because proportionality appears to be ‘essential’.”109 
Importantly, PR impacts on the government’s removal by the people’s verdict in 
three ways. Firstly, the unlikeliness of an overall majority results in the people’s 
verdict not being expressed, as no party has been thrown out, for no judgement 
has been passed. Secondly, people get used to not holding political leaders 
responsible for their actions, and a loss of support simply indicates a momentary 
wavering in popularity. Finally, under PR it is possible for a party which has lost 
considerable support to remain in power through the support of a minor party, 
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thus governing against the decision of the electorate. Moreover, the minor party 
could bring down a government without reference to the electorate, forming a 
new government with an opposition party – a “grotesque contradiction to the 
basic idea of proportional representation, which is that a party’s influence should 
correspond to the number of its votes.”110  
 
For Popper, it matters not who rules “if it is possible to get rid of the government 
without bloodshed. Any government that can be thrown out has a strong 
incentive to act in a way that makes people content with it. And this incentive is 
lost if the government knows it cannot be so easily ousted.”111 A two-party system 
appears to be the best form of democracy, leading to self-criticism, a result of 
competition and “clear condemnation by the electorate that cannot be 
disregarded”, forcing “parties to learn from their mistakes or to go under.”112 
Indeed, there is an imperative for the opposition to be as “good and strong as 
possible. Otherwise the voters are forced to let a bad government go on 
governing, because they have reason to think that ‘nothing else will be any 
better’.” Popper dismisses the argument that PR is ‘more democratic’ than FPTP, 
as it refers to an outdated theory of democracy as government by the people, 
which has been superseded by the majority power of dismissal.113  
 
Laski 
 
Harold J. Laski’s political journey covered pluralism, Fabian socialism and 
Marxism.114 Having been influenced by the success of the Attlee government he 
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affirmed the purpose of a general election was the creation of strong government. 
Laski rejected claims that parliament should represent a microcosm of society 
and in England and America “you have no law prohibiting the existence of social 
groups and you get a two-party system.” On the European continent “you get a 
proliferation of groups that in turn leads to an unstable ministerial system; and 
where there is ministerial instability, you get, I suggest, the development of 
revolution… That makes me hostile to proportional representation on the ground 
that it multiplies groups.” Laski suggests the “business of a legislative assembly is 
not to mirror the variegated opinion of a democracy but to make possible the 
existence of an executive with some degree of permanence.”115  
 
He reiterated this point in Reflections on the Constitution that as a strong believer 
in a “stable executive with sufficient authority to drive important and substantial 
programmes through the House of Commons in the life-time of the Parliament of 
five years, I remain completely unconvinced by advocates of proportional 
representation, in any of its numerous forms, or of kindred expedients like the 
alternative vote.” Such was Laski’s faith in FPTP he did not think it important that 
“from time to time, a minority of the electoral votes may give a party a majority of 
seats so that it is able to form a government. For it would be a very stupid party, 
obviously courting defeat, which failed to remember that it must not outrage the 
Opposition, that it must show a real respect for a minority of importance, and that 
it must pay careful attention to the currents and cross-currents of opinion outside 
the House of Commons. Consequently, constitutional reforms that pose a threat 
to the clarity and consistency of government, especially a socialist government, 
should be rejected, where compromise naturally inhibits the implementation of 
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controversial or radical policies. Moreover, ‘Minority government”, he argued “is 
invariably uneasy government, and usually cowardly government.”116 
 
The ‘Mandate and the Manifesto’ 
 
The rejection of PR and an emphasis on party governments lends itself to the 
doctrine of the ‘mandate and the manifesto’. With the extension of the franchise 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it “gradually came to be accepted” 
according to Harvey and Bather “that political reform meant that the electorate 
could not only choose a Government but indicate a policy.”117 Additionally, Utley 
considered with heightened tensions between social classes in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, two political parties emerged with policies designed to 
appeal to the different social classes. “These issues demanded a national policy, 
or rather a choice of national policies. They necessarily had a centralising 
influence on politics, and this was of immense importance for the doctrine of the 
mandate.”118 The growth in the electorate during the period and the introduction 
of the secret ballot had meant that in the constituencies, individual electors could 
no longer be bought off. Furthermore, candidates could not know every elector in 
the constituency. As a result, “votes had to be won by promises of legislation.”119 
 
Utley reasoned that the essence of the doctrine is that the government “must 
obey the people”, appealing “not primarily to the distinctive interests of particular 
localities but to the will of the people as a whole.”120 If for example, a candidate 
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was elected on a popular platform of abolishing tuition fees, the member’s 
freedom once elected would have increased for he would not be bound by a 
national policy dimension. However, “His ability to discharge his promises would 
depend on the willingness of other Members, many of whom would be committed 
to incompatible policies, to co-operate with him. Consequently, he would be 
forced into compromises and uncertain, fluctuating coalitions, and if any national 
policy ever emerged from all these compacts it would bear a small enough 
relation to anything which any constituent in the whole of the kingdom ever 
imagined he was voting for.”121 This has a direct impact on the doctrine and for 
PR that would make more likely independent and small parties. “The more 
undisciplined a legislature, the harder it is for the electorate to exert any 
continuous influence on policy.”122 
 
Roy Hattersley, former Deputy Leader of the Labour Party and traditionally a 
defender of FPTP, wrote “Critics of our present system underestimate the 
importance of the twin doctrines of the manifesto and the mandate – parties 
publishing their programme before the election and promising that, given the 
chance, they will do their best to put it into practice after polling day. With 
proportional representation that process – offering the electorate the chance to 
reject or endorse specific policies – is rendered impossible.”123 The manifesto is 
the contract between the executive and the electorate, providing a direct link 
between the electors and the elected, not to be watered down or negotiated away 
through horse-trading. The principle of the ‘mandate and the manifesto’ ties in 
with certain elements in the Westminster Model, including ministerial authority 
and responsibility, impacting on a minster’s relationship with his or her Civil 
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Servants, and draws on the extensive power residing in the executive. 
Additionally, ‘collective responsibility’ – the principle that all those in government 
will uphold government policy or resign if they disagree – under the pressures of 
coalition has the potential to breakdown.  
 
A programmatic party such as the Labour Party, with its commitment to social 
change, led Richard Crossman to affirm “Our morality requires us to keep faith 
with our party, recognising that we have been sent to Parliament to carry the 
mandate out…Now, what could be more immoral than entering Parliament and 
failing in our faith to the party outside?”124 Rose observes that within the Labour 
Party the manifesto acts as a contract not just between the Party and the 
electorate but also within the different parts of the Party – the Parliamentary 
Labour Party with its commitment to serving the nation and the Party conference 
and role of the membership.125  
 
However, both Labour governments and Conservative governments face 
unexpected events and it is not possible for a manifesto to foresee all actions, 
and therefore contain the relevant policies. Yet the actions of the government are 
not rendered illegitimate and nor is the authority of the government brought into 
question, due to the ‘implied manifesto’. Emy, and Hofferbert and Budge 
considered knowledge of the longstanding ideology and values of the party 
permits the electorate to have a reasonable expectation of policies.126 Hattersley 
affirmed: 
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“The government can’t promise all it’s going to do, it can’t do all it promises. 
With FPTP you sort of know which side the Party is going to be on when the 
crunch comes even if events arise that government had not anticipated. That 
is possible under FPTP but not under PR and coalition.”127  
 
A Conservative government would in times of financial difficulty be expected to 
cut government expenditure and cut taxes for families and business to boost 
consumer spending. A Labour government on the other hand would increase 
government expenditure through public works and welfare to boost the economy. 
Yet, should there be a coalition government, especially if it consists of political 
parties who have no history of working together, then the expectation of how the 
government will act is unknown. Furthermore, Bale professes single party 
government or minority government are far more likely to enact their manifesto 
commitments than coalition governments, for greater control of the premiership 
and government can be exercised by the electorate. Indeed, between 1988 and 
2005 eighty-eight per cent of manifesto pledges were upheld within the lifetime of 
the next parliament.128 
 
The theory of the ‘mandate and the manifesto’ offers a view of democratic 
legitimacy, acting as a contract between the winning political party and the 
electorate, regardless of whom individual voters have cast their ballot in favour of 
and whether they have read the manifesto. “Voters have no way to bind those 
they elect to do what they wish. Nor can politicians in office compel events to 
produce what they promised when in opposition. Once in office, the manifesto is 
a touchstone by which the current practice of the governing party can be 
assessed; it can also be an albatross signifying that its achievements are 
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wanting.”129 The manifesto becomes a ‘statement of intent’, forewarning the 
opposition that they have no constitutional justification to prevent policy, and 
informing civil servants about the political commitments of a newly elected 
government. The electorate, faced with competing programmes of government 
on a national basis, will give the winning political party the moral authority to 
govern, allowing it carry out its manifesto commitments, through a different set of 
leaders in office.  
 
Leadership, the Labour Party and the Fabians 
 
Schumpeter’s theory results in leadership becoming a key facet, in the light of the 
electoral mass “incapable of actions other than a stampede.”130 The leadership of 
the Labour Party seeks to represent workers within the confines of Westminster, 
locating the class conflict in Westminster, by having working people and those 
sympathetic to the working class and socialism elected to Parliament. However, 
Marc Stears, claims that the Labour Party has a split attitude towards leadership. 
On the one hand “Labour insists that there is something inherently suspect about 
the very idea of leadership”, trumpeting “its egalitarianism” not presuming one 
individual is ahead of the other by “virtue of personality, expertise, or ability to 
represent key interests.” On the other hand, the party requires a “singular focus 
for the public, a singular decision-maker at the centre, and a singular figure with 
whom the broader movement can identify.”131 Tony Crosland considered in The 
Future of Socialism people would rather tend to their gardens than become 
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engaged in politics.132 A diary entry by Richard Crossman in 1959 reveals the 
unease that some Labour politicians feel when contemplating leadership and 
their class. Hugh Gaitskell said to Richard Crossman: 
  
“We, as middle-class socialists have got to have a profound humility. Though 
it’s a funny way of putting it, we’ve got to know that we lead them because 
they can’t do it without us, with our abilities, and yet we must feel humble to 
working people.”133  
 
The Fabians, contrary to pluralists, consider society should be engineered by 
administrators from the top-down – preferably Fabians or Labour people – who 
could govern on behalf of the working class. Reform of society could be achieved 
by having likeminded individuals in positions of power – permeating the 
establishment – implementing reform through the parliamentary route, thus 
committing the Labour Party to equality and efficiency through a centralised 
state. Strong, decisive and responsible government would result, entailing a 
rejection of a written constitution and PR, as both would undermine the 
Westminster Model, the sovereignty of parliament and importantly reduce the 
opportunity of a parliamentary majority. 
 
Marxism was rejected on the basis that evolutionary socialism was the ‘wave of 
the future’ rather than violent revolution, and through ‘gradualism’, ‘moderation’ 
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and a ‘step by step’ approach, socialism could be introduced. Webb affirms 
organic reform is based upon four principles: that it is democratic, acceptable to 
the majority of people; gradual, thus causing no dislocation; regarded as moral by 
the mass of the people; and constitutional and peaceful.134 The British State, duly 
reformed, would become in the words of George Bernard Shaw “A first-rate 
practical instrument of democratic government.”135  
 
Little attention was paid to the possibility that the structure by which they hoped 
to achieve reform was permeated with values opposed to theirs, and therefore 
attempts to enact their values might be defeated. The existing structure of the 
British State could be utilised to change society in accordance with their values. 
Norton writes that the socialist approach to the constitution considers it possible 
“to impose Socialist control of government and so create a strong, centralised 
government which can implement Socialist policies and concomitantly withstand 
attempts at obstruction by the City, by industrialists, by the capitalist-controlled 
mass media and by international financiers.” Moreover, “The Socialist emphasis 
on the mandate and intra-party democracy favours MPs who are willing and 
prepared to ensure the implementation of the party manifesto.”136 Sovereignty 
was not to be undermined by a written constitution or PR, which would hinder 
legislative and executive power ensuring the forward march to socialism through 
parliament, could continue. Collectivism was to be advanced by a parliamentary 
majority committed to socialism, enacted on behalf of the working class, not 
necessarily by those from the working class.    
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The Hollowing Out of the British State and its impact on Democratic Elitism 
 
Due to the changes made to the British state, questions are raised as to how 
much influence the state has over national affairs and therefore the elite view of 
democracy. The ‘hollowing out of the state’ first applied by R. A. W. Rhodes, 
claimed “potentially dramatic changes”, notably local government reform, 
privatisation and agencification, were leading to “diminished central capacity” in 
the British state. “In sum” he argued, “current trends erode the centre’s capacity 
to steer the system – its capacity to govern.”137 Power has moved upwards to the 
European Union and other international bodies, outwards to the private sector 
through privatisation and QUANGO’s, and downwards to local government and 
the devolved bodies. Indeed, dissatisfaction with the political system can be 
discerned; in 2001, the lowest poll was recorded at a General Election post-WW2 
registering at 59%. The two subsequent elections in 2005 and 2010 saw only 
marginal improvements; 61% and 66% respectively. Moreover, with declining 
party membership it does suggest that the electorate are disengaged from 
mainstream politics and are apathetic towards political elites. 
 
If Schumpeter’s theory is accepted, that we elect competing elites to govern on 
our behalf, yet these elites no longer have the power and capacity to govern, 
then a central plank of elite theory is brought into question. Consequently, the 
pluralist analysis arguing for extra-parliamentary politics, reengaging with the 
electorate at community level, empowering groups and charities, acknowledging 
the diversity of society is the method to encourage electoral participation. 
However, a counter thesis can be put forward, namely the ‘reconstituted-state’ 
thesis. Whilst the impact of globalisation, market principles and new public 
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management is accepted, the core executive can still play a positive role and is 
strongly placed relative to other actors in the policy process for it possesses, both 
the resources and strategic learning capabilities to reshape its existing capacities 
and develop new forms of intervention.138 
 
Summary 
  
By rejecting the classical definition of democracy where parliament is 
representative of the people, and accepting most members of society are unable 
or unwilling to participate in the role outlined by classical democracy, the elitist 
theory is arguably a more ‘realistic’ interpretation of the limits of political 
participation. By accepting the fundamental position of leaders and leadership, 
Schumpeter states his theory is “a theory much truer to life” and “Propositions 
about the working and the results of the democratic method that take account of 
this are bound to be infinitely more realist than propositions which do not.”139 
This, in contrast to the old view of democracy, is a thoroughly practical solution to 
government. The rationale of FPTP is as Schumpeter states “to produce strong 
governments and to avoid deadlocks”140, therefore delivering single-party 
governments rather than coalitions.  
 
Schumpeter continues: “Owing to the electoral system the actual redistribution of 
seats is apt to give an exaggerated picture.” FPTP, manages to produce 
exaggerations due to the ‘Cube Law’; a 2% lead in the popular poll should equate 
to a 6% more seats. Thus, the lack of proportionality is considered a positive by 
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defenders of FPTP, as it has the ability to produce strong governments.”141 
Schumpeter’s theory allows the Labour Party to accept the British State and 
Constitution, with a strong executive dimension wielding its parliamentary 
majority to enact legislation, delivered through a plurality electoral system. In 
rejecting the Marxist critique of the state and capitalism and accepting the Fabian 
belief in Gradualism and parliamentary reform, the Labour Party considers it can 
deliver Socialism on behalf of the working class through the Westminster system.  
 
Marxism 
 
Marxists contend that the Labour Party’s faith in the reforming capabilities of 
Westminster has been erroneous, for the Labour Party is not the vehicle to 
introduce socialism and emancipate the working class. “The Labour Party is a 
dead end for Socialists…It is time to look for an alternative to Labour. We need 
socialism more urgently than ever. But it won’t come through parliament and the 
Labour Party.”142 The present electoral system has impacted on the Labour 
Party, moderating policy and ensuring a dominant position on the British left and 
harnessing the support of the British working class. This section will firstly outline 
Labour’s adherence to constitutional politics, along with why Westminster has 
been deemed the only arena in which to fight the class war. Secondly, how the 
Labour’s electoral strategy of moderation – a consequence of FPTP – ties into 
the Party’s unwavering faith in parliamentary politics. Lastly, if we accept the 
premise of the Marxist interpretation that the Labour Party is incapable of 
delivering Socialism, then what role, if any can electoral reform play, in bringing 
about Socialism. 
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Ralph Miliband observed in Capitalist Democracy in Britain that the importance of 
the House of Commons does not derive from its actual powers but “enshrines the 
elective principles”, providing legitimacy for the government, which in turns relies 
on its capacity to command a majority in the House of Commons. This has been 
the state of affairs for over three hundred years. Miliband goes on to state this is 
a “unique prerogative” turning the House of Commons into a “focus of hope”, 
suggesting all that is required to bring about fundamental change is a majority in 
the House of Commons. “In other words, there is no need to look for 
revolutionary alternative: the mechanism for any change that may be wanted is 
already available.” In due course, given the correct parliamentary arithmetic, a 
socialist order could come to fruition with the winner claiming a ‘mandate’, based 
on the “habitual assertion that the British people had expressed a clear desire”. 
This all forms part of the “democratic mythology” which in turn feeds into the 
political culture of Great Britain, becoming the mainstay of democratic life. Finally:  
 
“The whole of political life in Britain has been dominated by the belief that the 
House of Commons was, or could be made to become, the effective 
instrument of such changes as various classes, groups, and interests might at 
different times want to achieve in the economic, social, and political character 
of British society.”143 
 
Consequently, extra-parliamentary activity is rendered futile, for there is no need 
for people to take to the streets, exert pressure through trade unions, charities, 
popular movements, when a majority in the House of Commons, committed to 
socialism can deliver a socialist Britain.  
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Labour’s Constitutionalism 
 
An electoral strategy in Britain naturally leads to the House of Commons 
becoming the most important institution as this is the institution where the British 
government stands or falls. The influence of the Fabian Society ‘gradualism’ can 
be observed. Keir Hardie considered “the propaganda of class hatred is not one 
which can ever take root in this country…Mankind in the main is not moved by 
hatred but by love of what is right. If we could have socialism on the S.D.F 
(Social Democratic Foundation) lines nothing would be changed – save the 
worse.”144 Ramsay MacDonald, Labour’s first Prime Minister – an individual who 
held considerable influence both within the Parliamentary Labour Party, and 
outside Westminster – considered, “‘Neither Marx nor Engels, saw deep enough 
to discover the possibilities of peaceful advance which lay hidden beneath the 
surface...Socialism is no class movement...It is not the rule of the working class; it 
is the organisation of the community.”145  
 
The early leaders of the Labour Representation Committee and Labour Party, 
such as Hardie and MacDonald, placed their faith in society evolving towards 
socialism, draining British socialism of a scientific analysis, instead adhering to an 
ethical creed. People it was deemed were bound together through a common 
identity, reducing the importance of class. Consequently, British socialism 
synthesises ‘class’ and ‘nation’, and the Labour Party’s faith in the institutions of 
the British State led the Labour Party down the path of moderation and electoral 
politics. Cliff and Gluckstein state that this has been to the advantage of the 
Labour, allowing the party to channel the class struggle through political 
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institutions. “Since the birth of the Labour Party there had been a link, albeit 
indirect and tenuous, but real nevertheless, between the class struggle and 
voting Labour” meaning “politics is about elections and which party forms the 
government.”146   
 
Since the inception of the Labour Party electoralism and constitutionalism have 
been evident: The 1903 secret Gladstone-MacDonald Pact was designed to give 
the party a greater chance of securing representation within Westminster. 
Supporting the Liberal Government from 1910-1914 and entering the Wartime 
Coalition from 1915-1918 further bound the Labour Party to the British State. 
John McGurk, chairman of the 1919 Labour Party Conference reiterated the point 
made by Sidney Webb, emphasising how the British constitution, offered the 
most feasible route to the betterment of the working class, acting as a strong 
opposition to the parties of capital, affirming: 
 
“We are either constitutionalists or we are not constitutionalists. If we are 
constitutionalists, if we believe in the efficacy of the political weapon… then it 
is both unwise and undemocratic because we fail to get a majority at the polls 
to turn round and demand that we should substitute industrial action.”147  
 
The first minority government in 1924 and the second minority government in 
1929-1931 further convinced the Labour Party on the merits of the levers of 
power. All that was required was a parliamentary majority, and the Labour Party 
could then govern in the same fashion as its Conservative counterpart, accepting 
the conventions of the parliamentary system. After participating in Churchill’s 
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Wartime Coalition the Labour Party achieved a parliamentary majority in 1945 
and in doing so it became apparent that, with political will and an electoral 
majority, the machinery of the British state could be used to the benefit of the 
working class. Aneurin Bevan, wrote In Place of Fear, that as a young miner in a 
South Wales Colliery, his concern was with one practical question: “Where does 
power lie in this particular state of Great Britain, and how can it be attained by the 
workers?...Where was power and which road to it?”148 During the United 
Kingdom’s first attempt to enter the Economic Community, under Harold 
Macmillan’s Conservative Government, Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell famously 
told Labour Party Conference in 1962 that entry would result in “the end of Britain 
as an independent nation-state… the end of a thousand years of history”149, 
warning Labour voters of the implications of European federalism and the 
transfer of our sovereignty and democratic rights. Peregrine Worsthorne, the 
Conservative and former Editor of the Sunday Telegraph, considered by 1978 
Labour was now a party of the establishment, witnessing:  
 
“the transmogrification of Labour from a moralising band of proselytising 
missionaries into a political arm of the governing class… classical-type 
members of the British political establishment.”150 
 
Pimlott argues that Labour’s constitutionalism stems from the influence of the 
trade unions: “representation was what they had in mind” and “policy was 
secondary.”151 Only when representation had been gained, could the Labour 
movement consider policy and think about enacting ‘socialism’ onto the statute 
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book. Pimlott continues: the “Purpose of the Labour party has always been to win 
seats: to gain the election, at local and national levels, of men and women who 
are representative of the working-class.”152 The trade union movement, arguably 
a conservative force, do not seek to overturn the capitalist system, instead acting 
as a shield for workers against capitalism. “Labourism” David Judge maintains 
“binds the private interests of workers indissolubly to capital, by securing material 
gains through compromise and integration.”153 Labour MPs from Scotland, for 
example, were engaged in ‘brokerage’, going down to Westminster and bringing 
back financial benefits for their constituents. Once the Labour Party, as the 
political wing of the trade union movement, had achieved representation, 
parliament could be considered the best defence against big business and 
market forces.  
 
Such continuity, respect and unwavering faith in the British Parliamentary system 
led Miliband to state, in his oft quoted phrase, “Of all political parties claiming 
socialism to be their aim, the Labour Party has always been one of the most 
dogmatic – not about Socialism but about the Parliamentary System.”154 As such 
the Labour Party has been concerned about winning the levers of power, not the 
transformation of society. Miliband goes on to avow “The Labour Party has not 
only been a parliamentary party: it has been deeply imbued by 
parliamentarianism.”155  
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Labour’s Dominant Position on the Left 
 
Commanding the support of the working-class has allowed the Labour Party to 
permeate deep into the psyche of the working-class that their best interests are 
dependent upon voting Labour. McKenzie and Silver conducted a survey in the 
mid-1960s discovering “The Labour Party is perceived overwhelmingly by its 
working-class supporters as the party of the working class and for the working 
class and pursues policies which are beneficial to it.”156 The Labour Party is 
perceived, and views itself, as the representative of the working-class, existing to 
further the interests of the working-class, something which could not be achieved 
without the existence of a Labour Party.  
 
The two-party system and the role FPTP plays in maintaining the situation allows 
the Labour Party to continue to be the dominant force on the British Left, and 
unless the two-party system irreversibly breaks down then Labour’s position is 
likely to remain. Ralph Miliband contests, “In electoral terms, whether at national 
or local level, the Labour Party occupies a crushingly dominant position in 
relation to other groupings on the left.”157 The Labour Party has successfully 
bettered the Liberal Party, Communist Party of Great Britain, the SDP Liberal 
Alliance, the Socialist Worker’s Party, Respect and most recently the Green 
Party. Consequently, it became very difficult for other political organisations who 
seek to act on behalf of the British working class, to offer a credible alternative, 
as the Labour Party could extract material benefits in a way unavailable to 
another party of the left.  
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The Moderating Effect of FPTP 
 
Labour’s electoral strategy under FPTP, according to the Marxist critique forbids 
the party adopting a radical outlook, continuously chasing the votes of non-
socialists in order to win an electoral majority. Thus the Party adopts reformist 
measures to appease the desires of ‘Middle England’, ‘Worcester Woman’ and 
‘Mondeo Man’ – moderate policies which are designed to win the vote of the 
‘median voter’ rather than policies committed to the introduction of socialism. 
Furthermore, FPTP discourages political fusion, aiding unity within political 
parties, thus leading to compromise over policy, in an attempt to woo the votes of 
non-socialists. Unity, as Leo Panitch states, becomes the key enabling the 
Labour Party to maintain its “Immediate electoral utility as a defensive agency for 
the working class.”158 The idea of betrayal is ever present in the Labour Party - 
‘whilst cowards flinch and traitors sneer, we’ll keep the Red Flag flying here’ – 
could be applied to MacDonald during the events of 1931 and the breakaway 
SDP in 1981. Disunity and division, has the potential to split the Labour vote, 
allowing a party of capital to come through the middle and win the constituency, 
consequently reducing the prospect of high office.  
 
In order to win elections, the Labour Party has to be a ‘broad-church’, winning the 
votes of the middle classes, as the working class alone are insufficient in 
delivering Labour governments. Moderating policies comes naturally to the 
Labour Party, with the argument becoming increasingly circular, for to win the 
votes of more non-socialists the leadership has to become more conservative. 
Whatever radicalism the Labour Party espouses is quickly side-lined and 
excluded. “Dire prophecies (of the self-fulfilling sort) of electoral disaster” would 
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result, claims Miliband, “at the hands of decent ordinary men and women who are 
not socialists if the Labour Party were to adopt the doctrinaire, unrealistic, and 
pernicious policies advocated by the left.”159 In addition, electoralism requires 
votes, not a definite political commitment. Consequently, the Labour Party seeks 
the support of conservative forces, for example, Tony Blair courting the support 
of Rupert Murdoch in the run up to the 1997 general election, to ensure the Sun 
newspaper supported Labour, with the purpose of gaining votes. 
 
It is questionable whether the working class in Britain have much interest in 
radical politics: the adage ‘nobody as conservative as the British working class’. 
Indeed, a significant minority of working-class people vote Conservative – 
‘Angels in Marble’ in the eyes of Benjamin Disraeli – and have played an 
important role in delivering Conservative governments. Peter Shore asked, “How 
is it that so large a proportion of the electorate, many of whom are neither 
wealthy nor privileged, have been recruited for a cause which is not their 
own?”160 The reasons for the alleged conservatism are manifold; the impact of 
the non-conformist churches with the chapel offering education and betterment 
for the working class, the concept of deference accepting the supposed superior 
ability to govern, the media including print and television, the trade union 
movement who have channelled the working class down the parliamentary road, 
the moderation of the Labour Party, the influence of the Conservative Party on 
sympathetic elements of the working class and the proficiency of the 
establishment to build the British nation.  
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The Role of Electoral Reform and Proportional Representation 
 
Electoral reform can be perceived in both a positive and a negative light. It can 
break Labour’s dominant position on the British left and lead to a socialist party 
representing the working class, aiding the transformation of the British economy 
and society. Conversely, electoral reform can be perceived as a bourgeois trick, 
designed to distract the working class from the real and day-to-day class 
struggle, sedating revolutionary demands. Constitutional reform would therefore 
be mere institutional tinkering. Hilary Wainwright deemed “Socialists should be at 
the forefront of attempts to make it (the electoral system) fair, whether or not it is 
to our immediate electoral advantage… In the long run, socialism needs the 
active support of the overwhelming majority of people; we have nothing to fear 
from an electoral system which requires us to win such support.”161 Arthur 
Scargill considered PR to be a “fundamental socialist concept… no socialist 
seriously committed to democratic, accountable representation can advocate any 
other electoral system.”162  
 
Wainwright contests that the New Left is “more critical in every way of Britain’s 
parliamentary institutions. Westminster is not the hallmark of democracy that it is 
for the Labourist left…the New Left, with its experiences of campaigning in close 
co-operation with other organisations on the left, is far less protective of the 
Labour Party’s monopoly of working class politics”, part of Labour’s opposition to 
PR. Working in alliances with other organisations on the left has led to the belief 
that the consequences of PR are not considered a threat. Moreover, PR would 
provide the opportunity for “some party of the left, from inside and as well as 
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outside the Party, to establish an electoral competitor to the Labour Party.” The 
present situation of electoral competition emanating from the centre and right “the 
all-powerful pressure within the party is to silence the left in the mad rush for the 
centre.” Whilst PR would be secondary to the pressure from society, “such a 
party could provide a beacon spreading light on needs, initiatives and ideas that 
up till now have existed only in Labour’s shadow.”163 
 
Scargill saw PR “not as a device for compromise and coalition but as the exact 
opposite: a means of polarizing political views around alternative programmes 
and class approaches, of clarifying the fundamental contradictions within 
capitalism and exposing the class nature of this society, thus involving more and 
more people in the struggle to transform it.”164 Consequently, PR would allow 
ideological and political purity – winning power “for my class and its allies”165 –  
unlike the collusion of the Labour Party with capitalism under the present system. 
Socialism will lack support and legitimacy unless a majority can be garnered in 
favour and therefore what is required is an “electoral system which gives an 
appropriate number of parliamentary seats in direct relation to the number of 
votes cast.”166 In addition, the PR method should allow half the seats to be 
allocated through geographical constituencies and the other half by Labour Party 
conference, thus reflecting the views of party members. Echoing the sentiment of 
Wainwright, Scargill writes “No change in electoral process will on its own alter 
the nature of a society.” However, PR does “help provide the basis for carrying 
that tradition forward within the structures already familiar to the British people. 
Furthermore, it demands levels of political campaigning and education sadly 
neglected in recent decades by the leadership of the Labour Party and key 
                                                                  
163 Wainwright, Labour A Tale of Two Parties, pp. 281-282 
164 Scargill, ‘Proportional Representation’, p. 80 
165 Ibid., p. 80 
166 Ibid., p. 80 
73 
 
organisations in the Labour movement.”167 The inherent fairness of PR will be a 
“vote for clarity, for participation, for mobilising the British people to build a 
society worth living in. A vote for proportional representation is a vote for 
democracy, and a vote for socialism.”168  
 
Richard Kuper writes that the notion the electorate are sovereign through a 
choice of competing teams for government in a general election once every four 
or five years, is an “extraordinarily emaciated vision of democracy.”169 In contrast 
socialism – with its aim to meet human needs and aspirations – requires 
“democratic institutions at every level of state and society, through which people 
actively participate in shaping their own destinies.” FPTP only offer a restricted 
involvement. It assumed “the voter, in exercising your choice and expressing 
your sovereign independence, affect the outcome in the way you desire.”170 
Kuper outlined the benefits of PR for the left: Firstly, tactical voting would cease 
as every vote would count, rectifying Labour’s loss of support; secondly, a left-
wing alternative to Labour would receive seats in proportion to its vote share, 
forcing the Labour Party to alter its policies; thirdly, PR would be one aspect of 
democratising every sphere of the British state; lastly, the combined strength of 
such a socialist party, together with the left in the Labour Party, would determine 
the weight of socialist ideas in the country as a whole.171 
 
Robin Blackburn affirms the “workings of the British electoral system are, quite 
simply, indefensible” contributing to a “mediocre and constipated two-party 
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system that fails to reflect a far more various society.”172 Opponents of PR in the 
Labour Party see it as a threat to the “unity and prospects of the labour 
movement; Left Labourites add that it would lead to coalition governments 
dominated by the Centre.”173 Blackburn reiterated the argument “PR would 
certainly make it easier for a New Left party to secure electoral representation” it 
would not weaken the “overall representation of the Left in a truly proportional 
system, but merely put Labour in a less inflated position, and one in which it 
might be pulled to the Left rather than the Right. It should not be forgotten that 
past Labour governments have, in political terms, always been coalitions under 
the structural domination of the Right.”174 Interestingly, a Labour agreement with 
the Centre to introduce PR would strengthen the Left inside and outside the 
Labour Party, as it would “oblige Labour’s leaders to consider a possibility which 
has scarcely ever bothered them before – that they might face competition from 
that quarter.”175 
 
A twin process is advocated, coordinating extra-parliamentary activities with the 
parliamentary process. In The British Road to Socialism the Communist Party 
declared “when a socialist majority in Parliament is won it will need the support of 
the mass movement outside Parliament to uphold the decision it has taken in 
Parliament. Conversely, the Parliamentary decisions will give legal endorsement 
to popular aims and popular struggles.”176 The state, which the Labour Party 
seeks to control through a parliamentary majority, is not neutral: it is a Capitalist 
State; business interests, the power of the financial district in the City of London, 
the press and media, armed forces and secret service, House of Lords and the 
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Crown are all institutions which are deeply conservative and would fight to 
preserve their position against Socialism. Consequently, a mere majority for the 
Labour Party in the House of Commons is insufficient for Socialism for it is the 
capitalists who have and maintain control. 
 
Summary 
 
The role of electoral reform is key, fostering the formation of an electorally 
successful socialist party, breaking up Labour’s hegemonic hold on the British 
Left. No longer would the working class assess that there is no alternative to 
Labour, as those who consider the Labour Party has been complicit in the 
advancement of capitalism, would have the opportunity to vote for an authentic 
party of the left, committed to the introduction of socialism. Importantly, their vote 
under a system of PR for a socialist party would result in representation, breaking 
Labour’s hold on the working class, who would no longer have to fear voting for 
anything but Labour in case of ending up with a party of capital. Voting for the 
Communists would provide a degree of legitimacy in a Capitalist democracy, 
which according to Miliband is a necessary prerequisite and should be treated as 
a duty and opportunity, not a distracting and meaningless chore.177  
 
Yet, Marxists could argue that electoral reform is a distraction. Electoral Reform 
may have support among the ‘North London dinner table sets’, academics, 
Guardian readers, constitutional reform pressure groups such the Electoral 
Reform Society – the liberal intelligentsia. It is, therefore, a bogus concept; free 
elections are illusory, as elected politicians, regardless of political party, will be 
part of the ruling class under which ever electoral system is utilised. Such is the 
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power and influence of the ruling class, they can shape opinion by using the 
media and education system to ensure the present system is maintained. 
Furthermore, elections obscure the fact that the struggle of the working class is a 
daily event. Whereas “Parliamentary reformists think the working class should 
bestir itself only once every five years” by casting a vote in favour of the Labour 
Party, “the battle between the classes goes on day in, day out.”178  
 
Although the Labour Party has considerable support from the working class, the 
faith they place in parliamentary politics and the Labour leadership is misdirected. 
The deeply lodged Fabian watchwords of ‘Gradualism’, ‘moderation’ and 
‘reformism’ located within the psyche of the Labour Party, result in the Party 
being incapable of bringing forth socialism. Instead the Labour Party which has 
become part of the capitalist state has been deeply imbued with 
‘parliamentarianism’, and through elections the ‘class conflict’ is channelled 
through the parliamentary method. FPTP gives the Labour Party a hegemonic 
position on the British Left – the ‘true voice’ of the working class - ensuring that 
the Labour Party can pursue its moderate policies, chasing the votes of the whole 
nation. 
 
The Labour Party far from fostering revolution within working class communities 
has acted as a break, channelling the demands of workers through the 
parliamentary route. Electoral politics and democratic representation were the 
means by which the Labour leadership sought to show it was a credible and 
potential party of government. Furthermore, it was the means which allowed the 
Labour Party to show its respectability, and become acceptable and be accepted 
by the establishment, tying it to the British State. Accordingly, the extra-
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parliamentary route has been considered obsolete, a result of the Labour Party’s 
inherent belief in democratic elections. Yet, the Marxist analysis considers extra-
parliamentary tactics to be a necessary pre-condition to enact Socialism. The 
Labour Party is not a vehicle for the introduction of socialism; it is rather an 
organisation whose aim has been to win elections, attempting to win the levers of 
power every four or five years. 
 
Conclusion   
 
Pluralism, democratic elitism and Marxism place a different emphasis on the role 
of the electoral system and the purpose of elections. Whilst they are disparate 
schools of thought, there is in some areas overlap and agreement. Marxists, 
much in the same vein as pluralists, consider the Labour Party’s faith in the 
reforming capabilities of the parliamentary system is mistaken and the role of 
extra-parliamentary activities to be vital in bring forth socialism. Parliament is, for 
pluralists, detached from the localities in which grievances occur and therefore 
unable to adequately respond, therefore insufficient for curing socio-economic 
ills. Instead, democracy is located in a vibrant network of autonomous bodies, a 
view contrary to those who subscribe to the elitist tradition. Furthermore, the 
House of Commons fails to adequately represent the groups and cleavages in 
society which under FPTP are prevented from finding expression and influencing 
government policy. PR would increase the likelihood of coalition, negotiations 
and consensual politics at Westminster, preventing parities acting in the interests 
of their own ‘tribe’ and utilising the sovereign powers of parliament at their own 
behest. Instead, the House of Commons would reflect the society of the day, not 
the society of years gone by, fostering the formation of new political parties and 
providing greater opportunity for new political parties to gain representation within 
parliament. 
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The state which the Labour Party seeks to control through a parliamentary 
majority is not neutral but, for Marxists, a capitalist state. Consequently, whilst 
electoral reform could open up the House of Commons to an authentic party of 
the left, it would have to be supplemented by extra-parliamentary activities to give 
extra legitimacy in taking on the conservative forces in society. Emancipating the 
working class is not possible through the parliamentary system and the working 
class need to bestir, or be bestirred as the ‘class struggle’ is reduced to an 
electoral event once every four or five years. Democratic elitism with its emphasis 
on government and leadership does not take into account the daily struggle of 
the working class that manifests itself in a variety of ways. Symbolically, the 
crossover between pluralism and Marxism is highlighted by the support offered to 
Charter 88 from Ralph Miliband and Hilary Wainwright, both favouring the 
emergence of a political party on the left committed to socialism, something more 
likely under PR. Reforming the electoral system it is claimed would break 
Labour’s dominance, offering a genuine and viable socialist alternative, 
committed to the emancipation of the working class. 
 
Democratic elitism – reducing elections to a competition for votes and the 
creation of government – rejects PR on grounds that it reduces the likelihood of 
single party government and the control exercised by the electorate. Thus it 
offers a more limited vision for the electorate than pluralism or Marxism, one in 
which government does the governing. Yet it ties in with the Labour Party’s 
strategy of electoral politics, the nature of the Westminster Model and the 
influence of the Fabian Society. The unique relationship the Labour Party has 
with the working class and its objective of representing working-class interests, 
eventually becoming a governing party of the British state, channelled the Labour 
Party through the parliamentary road to socialism. Consequently, with elections 
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being about the election of government and FPTP’s ability of delivering single-
party government, arguments in favour of electoral reform – such as those made 
by pluralists and Marxists – are dismissed.    
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Chapter 2 - Making their mind up? Labour and the Westminster electoral       
system in historical perspective                       
 
The notion that constituencies elect their representatives based on the simple 
plurality ‘of the person with the most votes wins’ can be dated back to 1265, 
when Simon de Montfort summoned Parliament to Lewes. Consequently, 
territorial constituencies using First-past-the-Post (FPTP) are an established fact 
in British politics, predating the rise of modern political parties. The Labour 
Representation Committee (LRC) – as latecomers to the political system having 
entered the British State at the beginning of the twentieth century – sought “to 
promote and co-ordinate plans for labour representation.”179 Focusing on the 
attitude of the Labour Party throughout the twentieth century up to the growing 
demands for electoral reform in the mid-1980s and the commissioning of the 
Plant Report, the chapter will chart the key events and arguments used by 
Labour politicians. The period analysed includes the pre-World War One debates 
and the electoral dilemma facing the Party, the inter-war years in which Labour 
experienced minority government and Ramsay MacDonald’s ‘great betrayal’, the 
post-World War Two era and the height of the ‘two-party’ system and finally the 
growing interest in proportional representation in the 1970s, minority government 
and the election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government. 
 
1900-1914 
 
The problem facing the LRC was gaining representation to the House of 
Commons when fighting in three-cornered contests, with a lack of funds, against 
the two established parties of British politics; the Liberal Party and the 
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Conservative Party. In secret, James Ramsay MacDonald arranged a meeting 
with Herbert Gladstone, the Liberal election agent. It was agreed LRC candidates 
would have a free run in certain constituencies if they left the Liberals an open 
field elsewhere. The Gladstone-MacDonald Pact of 1903 was born out of fear of 
splitting the anti-conservative vote and did have some success in both 1906 and 
1910, allowing the LRC to gain representation. In 1906 of the 29 seats won by 
the LRC 11 were in double-member constituencies; of the fifty LRC candidates, 
18 enjoyed a straight contest with a Conservative opponent; and only three LRC 
MPs elected in England and Wales faced Liberal opposition. In January 1910 
Labour fought just 27 seats against Liberal opposition and in December 1910 a 
mere 11.180 
 
By 1914 only 9 out of its 39 seats had been won against Liberal competition. 
Whilst the Liberals and Labour reaped the benefits of the pact, at constituency 
level Labour activists resented standing down in favour of the Liberal candidate, 
especially at a time when the Labour Party was building up their political 
organisations across Great Britain. The Pact also highlighted a contradiction 
within the Party: the trade union movement – that sought to represent the 
working class within the House of Commons, whilst maintaining its independence 
and delivering social goods for the working class – had bound itself to a party of 
capital in the form of the Liberal Party. Moreover, the Liberal Party, whilst 
embracing some social policy reforms, in Victorian Britain had been the party of 
laissez faire economics, free-trade, the industrial revolution and the new business 
classes and, whilst it was experiencing an ideological shift, it remained wedded to 
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the capitalist system. Therefore, an ideological tension remained between 
liberalism and socialism. 
 
In 1908, a Royal Commission on Electoral Systems was set up under Herbert 
Asquith, the Liberal Prime Minister. The Commission claimed there were over 
300 different electoral systems. The report recommended – with one dissentient, 
who supported the Single Transferable Vote (STV) – the introduction of the 
alternative vote (AV), arguing it was “the best method of remedying the most 
serious defect which a single-member system can possess – the return of 
minority candidates.” Yet according to Butler there was a lack of enthusiasm to 
discuss the Commission’s findings as it was not even debated in Parliament.181 
Although too divided to give evidence to the Royal Commission, the Labour Party 
remained concerned about its ability to gain greater representation in the House 
of Commons and the restrictive nature of the Pact with the Liberals, with the 
Party failing to gain further ground. Duly, interest in electoral systems took hold 
and between 1908 and 1914 the Party internally debated the matter. 
 
Arthur Henderson, the then leader of the Labour Party, put forward a proposal at 
the 1909 Labour Party Conference for a number of electoral reforms including 
“the prevention of the election of members by a minority of votes.”182 However, 
this proposal rode on the back of other reforms to electoral practices including 
universal suffrage and one-man-one-vote. During this period the Trades Union 
Conference (TUC) also concerned itself with the matter, yet was indecisive. In 
1908 the TUC called for an inquiry into the Second Ballot method of voting183, yet 
one year later defeating by a large majority a resolution moved by Labour Chief 
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Whip, George Roberts, that proposed PR as “the best method of removing 
electoral anomalies and inequalities.”184 Therefore, whilst the Labour Party and 
the TUC expressed reservations about FPTP, they had not yet set upon a clear 
alternative. 
 
Henderson returned to electoral reform at the 1910 Labour Party Conference, 
moving a similar motion to that of 1909, although when a delegate from the 
Battersea Labour Party moved a motion supporting PR Henderson spoke 
against. Mentioning the Royal Commission and urging conference not to bind the 
leadership to a particular system whilst the PLP was considering the Second 
Ballot and the STV, Henderson stated that the Party had “listened to Lord 
Courtney (a Liberal peer and the Secretary of the Proportional Representation 
Society), but in spite of all they heard and the consideration they gave to it, the 
Party was divided as to whether this was really the best method.”185 
Consequently, the Labour Party was officially committed to an unspecified form 
of PR, yet divisions existed as to which electoral system was the way forward. 
Furthermore, it was debateable whether the rank and file had any knowledge of 
the working and the effects of different forms of PR. 
 
MacDonald, a key figure as a practical politician and a political thinker, remained 
unconvinced on the merits of electoral reform, refuting the arguments in favour of 
PR during the Edwardian debates. Constitutional reform, whilst appearing 
reasonable will entice socialists, yet “will probably not bear examination. They 
may be but ‘will-o’-the wisps’ leading into bogs those who foolishly follow.”186 On 
the matter of the electoral system MacDonald’s first concern was based on the 
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expense of multi-member constituencies rather than targeting constituencies 
which the Labour Party had a genuine chance of winning. Therefore, wealthier 
parties would be favoured.187 MacDonald’s second concern was based on the 
strength of minorities whom he considered did not automatically deserve 
representation based merely on their existence. He told delegates in 1911 that 
“no democratic body like the Labour Party ought to associate itself with the idea 
(of PR).”188 Philip Snowden disagreed, arguing Labour’s dependency on the 
Liberals was a consequence of Labour’s inability to win three-cornered contests 
under FPTP, and as such meant that the Labour Party could never be truly 
socialist. Some form of PR would allow the Labour Party to be truly independent 
in the House of Commons. The high-profile nature of MacDonald played its part 
in the 1911 conference, which defeated a motion 1,255,000 against and only 
97,500 in favour of PR.  
 
In 1913 and 1914 the debate within the Labour Party intensified. At the 1913 
Labour Party Conference a delegate proposed that “no scheme of redistribution 
will be satisfactory which does not include a system of Proportional 
Representation applicable to all parts of the United Kingdom.” However, another 
delegate moved that ‘Proportional Representation’ be replaced by the ‘Alternative 
Vote’ hoping that Conference vote on AV rather than PR.189 In the same year a 
report was published by the National Executive Committee (NEC), The Labour 
Party and Electoral Reform: Proportional Representation and the Alternative 
Vote. Roberts, the Chief Whip, and W.C. Anderson, the Labour MP and Chair of 
the ILP, set out arguments in favour of PR, affirming three-cornered contests led 
to the election of MPs on a minority of the vote, something regarded as 
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“undemocratic.” They were conscious of the Labour Party’s reliance on the 
Liberal Party to gain representation. AV would leave the Labour Party open to 
attack from the Liberals, who could unite with the Conservatives – “a combination 
of capitalist forces against Labour” – with the potential to harm the representation 
of the Party.190 There could be no guarantee that ‘weak-kneed’ Liberal electors 
would put the Labour candidate as a second preference and a real danger 
existed that the Labour candidate would be eliminated before second and third 
preference were counted. 
 
STV “would spur into activity many Labour organisations which are now 
compelled either to remain idle or to support candidates of capitalist parties” 
giving each Labour MP “security” and “independence.”191 STV would provide both 
“freedom” and the elector “equality in the value of the vote” as under FPTP an 
“elector has often no first choice nor even a second choice offered to him. If he 
votes at all he must often record his vote for some candidate who cannot possibly 
represent him” and “thousands of Labour voters would for the first time have the 
opportunity of voting for a Labour candidate.”192 The Labour Party would be free 
to “act independently and to formulate its own policy and to remain in every 
sense independent and distinct from the capitalist parties.”193 Acknowledging that 
coalition would result under STV, Roberts and Anderson considered “the 
character of the government that can be formed will be determined by the public 
declarations made by the parties and candidates seeing the suffrages of the 
electors.”194  
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MacDonald led the arguments against PR, utilising the same rationale used at 
the 1911 Labour Party Conference. Labour according to MacDonald’s 
calculations would be worse off under PR and “Today every vital political school 
of thought finds its champion in the House of Commons, and, in addition, is 
moulding Parties in the House of Commons.”195 The PR view is political opinion 
in the constituencies should be “divided into watertight compartments…Socialists 
should vote for Socialists, Labour Party electors for Labour Party candidates, 
Liberals for Liberals and so on.”196 This would not give “democratic control” as the 
resulting situation in the House of Commons “is different in its character and in its 
policy from the separate groups which appeal to the constituencies and receive 
separate support at the election.”197 Under PR parliamentary problems of 
“combination and cooperation are left to be solved by detached groups which 
have no mandate” appealing to the country “as though they were to be absolutely 
separate in their Parliamentary action.”198  
 
Consequently, MacDonald attached great importance to what happened in the 
House of Commons, for this was the institution that mattered most in the 
democratic process. If PR was adopted, the Commons would have to proceed on 
the same lines of “criticism, combination and majority rule”199 as under FPTP. PR 
would make the House of Commons less representative as parties would have to 
be regrouped, “either by coalition or otherwise… and then all their boasted party 
independence vanishes.” This would cause “an enormous amount of log-rolling 
and the very separateness of the elections makes the necessary co-operation in 
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Parliament all the more dishonest.”200 Appeals made to the country in elections 
would be more misleading and on the matter of independence from the Liberal 
Party, “nothing has hampered our Movement in the country more than this false 
idea of independence” writing damningly “it is humbug.”201 However, MacDonald 
did back the introduction of AV - albeit in the final paragraph - stating AV “would 
enable us to fight every seat we had a reasonable chance of winning and in 
doing so we would not be hampered by the cry that we were splitting the Liberal 
vote.”202  
 
The significant influence MacDonald held over the Labour movement was vital in 
influencing the debate in the early years of the Labour Party, although it was 
apparent that given the disparate views clear opposition to FPTP existed. 
However, the reformers could not find consensus on which alternative to FPTP 
they wished to adopt. At the 1914 Labour Party Conference speeches were 
made by MacDonald, Roberts and Snowden making their case for the status quo 
or PR. Conference voted and both PR and AV were rejected, 1,387,000 to 
704,000 and 1,324,000 to 632,000 respectively, with the power and influence of 
MacDonald key in defeating STV. It was reported that members were “always 
suspicious of anything that came from the middle-class movement”, reiterating 
comments made in Justice “that had a resolution in favour of the present system 
been put to the delegates it would have been defeated by a still bigger 
majority.”203 The Labour Party had been committed to electoral reform in 1909 
and PR in 1910 yet was also concerned with other electoral practices. The 
indecisiveness over the electoral system reflects the conflicting views over the 
way to gain representation and the role the Party should play in the British state, 
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impacting on the depth of the commitment to replace FPTP, for PR was rejected 
in 1911 and rejected again in 1914 along with AV. 
 
1914-1918 
 
In return for extending the life of the Parliament during World War One, a 
Speaker’s Conference was established, with a remit of Electoral Reform. It 
recommended abolishing plurality voting with most rural seats using AV in 358 
constituencies and the STV for cities (boroughs) in 211 which returned three to 
seven members. Attending the Speaker’s Conference on behalf of the Labour 
Party was S. Walsh, G. J. Wardle and F. Goldstone who proceeded to argue and 
vote in favour of AV despite the 1914 Conference resolutions.204 Although 
unknown at the time, Michael Steed claims “Had this particular mixture been 
implemented, it would after the decline of the Liberal Party have proved harmful 
to Labour (which would not have had its under-representation in more rural areas 
corrected) and beneficial to the Conservatives (who would have been more fairly 
represented in the industrial cities).”205 
 
During this period the Liberal Party was still a strong political force in Great 
Britain and dominated the Wartime Coalition, and with the electoral victories of 
1906 and 1910 fresh in the memory, electoral reform was a fringe concern. The 
former Liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone supported FPTP as it forced 
together a disparate group of Liberals – Radicals, Unionists and Free Traders – 
under the same banner. Subsequent Liberal Prime Ministers were equally as 
sceptical; Asquith admitted “The matter is not one which excites my passions, 
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and I am not sure it even arouses any very ardent enthusiasm.” Lloyd George 
wished the House of Commons would not imperil the rest of the Speaker’s 
recommendations by pressing their proposals for PR: believing it not, an 
essential part of their package and programme for reform.206 Snowden 
commented “Many Liberals either failed to understand how the single 
transferable vote worked at all, and even if they did they clearly failed to 
appreciate the calamity that was about to befall them.”207 
 
In the changed political circumstances of the War, Henderson considered that 
Labour had more to gain than to lose from AV. Henderson, in conversation with 
C. P. Scott in December 1917, claimed “that for more than 20 years – ever since I 
went into Parliament – I had held that a really progressive and democratic policy 
could only be based on the union of the Labour and Radical parties.” When Scott 
asked how a Labour Party intending to run candidates over the whole country 
could secure co-operation with progressive Liberals, said that “he would depend 
on the Alternative Vote and on a friendly understanding between Liberalism and 
Labour to give each other their second choice.”208 Such a ‘friendly understanding’ 
never saw fruition and if it had come about, it would not necessarily have been 
helpful to the Labour Party 
 
The Bill oscillated between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The 
opposition of the House of Commons towards PR had gradually stiffened, until it 
had been practically eliminated from the Bill, apart from two and three-member 
University seats. The Conservative dominated House of Lords reinstated PR 
thinking it in the best interests of the Conservative Party, based on the premise 
                                                                  
206 House of Commons Debate, Vol: 95, col. 1169, 4th July 1917; House of Commons Debates, Vol. 
95, col. 492, 28th March 1917 
207 Quoted in Curtice, ‘The electoral system’, in Bogdanor, The British Constitution, p. 510 
208 Wilson, Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928, pp. 316, 317 
91 
 
that AV benefitted the Labour Party who would receive the second preferences of 
Liberal voters. When the Bill returned to the House of Commons AV was 
reinstated. On 6th February 1918, the Bill was in danger of being lost with the end 
of the session and prorogation ceremony scheduled for later the same day. A 
compromise was reached in which AV was dropped and a royal commission 
would examine setting up PR on a limited basis. It was debated a month later in 
the House of Commons, and quietly rejected.  
 
The 1920s 
 
The 1920s was a defining decade for the Labour Party, increasing its 
representation in the House of Commons, and along with the Conservatives, 
seeing the decline of the Liberal Party. The 1918 ‘Coupon Election’ saw Liberals 
and Conservatives endorsed by the government receive the ‘coupon’ letter, 
refusing to stand against one another, in the hope of continuing the wartime 
coalition. The result was a Liberal Prime Minister, Lloyd George, propped up by a 
much larger Conservative Party, which dominated the government. However, the 
Liberal Party had split between ‘Coalition Liberals’ led by Lloyd George and those 
who favoured political independence led by Herbert Asquith. As such, the political 
landscape had fundamentally altered and the Labour Party emerged as the 
strongest opposition party largely by default, achieving 22 per cent of the vote 
and fifty-seven MPs. The perception that the Liberals were indistinguishable from 
the Conservatives as a party of capital would have appeared justified. 
 
In February 1921, Sir Thomas Bramsdon, a Liberal MP secured time for a PR 
Bill. The Bill was debated on 8th April 1921 with 25 Labour MPs voting for and 5 
MPs voting against. At the time, three prominent Labour members were vice-
presidents of the Proportional Representation Society: Snowden, Clynes and 
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Lord Parmoor. The Proportional Representation Society claimed sympathisers to 
the Bill included the Trades Union Congress, based upon a Resolution of Annual 
Conference in 1918, and the Independent Labour Party based on a Resolution 
from 1914. The defeat of the Bill ensured the conclusion of the question for that 
Parliament. Interestingly, far more Labour MPs attempted to introduce PR for 
local government elections in February 1923 and a Liberal bill a month later to 
introduce AV.209  
 
Marquand writes that the effects of PR in the 1920s would have made the 
political motives of MacDonald very difficult. MacDonald’s first objective was to 
ensure that British politics revolved around a struggle between the Conservative 
and Labour parties, in which the Liberals could be dismissed as irrelevant. The 
second was that Labour must present itself as a credible alternative government 
which had the ability to govern singlehandedly.210 MacDonald in his diary wrote 
“we shall always tend to return to two great Parties, and that is the position today. 
The two parties fighting for supremacy are our own and the Tory Party of 
reaction.” MacDonald had bluntly observed in 1920, the old battles for electoral 
reform were over and the new question was whether Parliament was suitable for 
modern social conditions.211 MacDonald was more interested in the long-term 
ambitions of the Labour Party commanding the heights of the British State and 
the practical considerations of government, rather than the short-term gains of 
electoral reform. 
 
Yet MacDonald had made statements to the contrary, suggesting his hostility 
towards PR was mellowing. In the Socialist Review in December 1922 he wrote 
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“The changes in election problems that followed the last extensions of the 
franchise seem to me to have greatly strengthened the case for the adoption of 
some scheme of PR.”  In the New Leader in January 1924, whilst PR may result 
in minority or coalition government under the present situation “everything points 
to a continued ‘stalemate’.” The first effect of PR would be to “loosen party 
bonds.” Members “will more frequently than they now do, use their own 
judgement as to how to vote.” Parties in the House of Commons will rule “more 
by their administrative success than by party force, whilst the legislation that will 
be carried will have to be more in accordance than it now too often is with public 
desires.” Consequently, “It will weaken organisation, but strengthen reason; it will 
make Ministers more the instruments of the general (electorate).”212 
 
In spite of these comments favouring reform MacDonald’s aims, as stated by 
Marquand, appeared to be making headway, vindicated by the general election 
results of November 1922 and December 1923. In 1922 Labour won 142 seats, 
on an increased vote share of 29.4%, becoming the official opposition. Cook 
comments “The net outcome of 1922 for the Labour Party was its growth from a 
relatively ineffective and insecurely-based force to the position of a vigorous and 
determined opposition securely based in several major industrial regions.”213 
December 1923, fought on the issue of ‘free-trade’ and ‘protection’, saw further 
Labour advances into the remaining Liberal strongholds in the industrial areas. 
The three parties were separated only by 100 seats (Conservatives 259, Labour 
191 and the Liberal’s 159) the Labour Party had announced their readiness, if 
called upon, to form a Government. On 21st January 1924 Baldwin’s 
Conservative government was defeated by 72 votes on a Labour amendment to 
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the King’s speech. Asquith instructed his Liberal Party to vote with the Labour 
Party and bring down the Conservative government, rather than form an anti-
socialist alliance. The following day Baldwin resigned, and the first Labour 
Government took office. 
 
Labour’s NEC in 1923 had called upon the parliamentary leadership “to accept 
full responsibility for the government of the country without compromising itself 
with any form of coalition.”214 Given the precarious parliamentary arithmetic the 
Labour government was likely to be short-lived unless it could form an alliance 
with one of the parties of ‘capital’. Indeed, relations between Labour and the 
Liberals in the formative weeks of the government appeared cordial: a Liberal 
candidate did not contest the Burnley by-election, ensuring Henderson could 
return to Parliament. The Liberal Chief Whip Vivian Phillips, in a speech on 9th 
February 1924 stated “For the first time for ten years the forces of progress in this 
country were able to command a majority in the House of Commons...With 
goodwill and consideration, not only in parliament but in the constituencies, they 
could march together a long way before their paths need diverge...By the result 
of the recent Election it had fallen to a Labour Government to try to do many 
things which Liberals desired to see done. The Liberals were ready to put the 
public need before any mere party interest and to help a Labour Government to 
do these things.”215 Such optimism proved to be short lived. 
 
If the Liberals believed that they would receive gratitude for keeping Labour in 
power, they were mistaken. MacDonald, displayed little cordiality and in 
conversation with Scott, had “reverted again and again to his dislike and distrust 
of the Liberals. He could get on with the Tories. They differed at times openly 
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then forgot all about it and shook hands. They were gentlemen, but the Liberals 
were cads.”216 Lloyd George in April 1924 had protested at Labour’s attitude 
towards the Liberal ‘patient oxen’ who were keeping them in office. In his first 
speech as Prime Minister, MacDonald emphasised that the Labour Party will 
concern itself with what it considered to be the great national and international 
matters, setting the tone for how his government would act and their attitude 
towards any idea of coalition. 
 
“Coalitions are detestable, are dishonest. It is far better, I am perfectly certain, 
for the political life of our country, and for the respect, in which we desire to be 
held by colleagues who disagree with us, that we should express our views as 
an independent political party."217 
 
Marquand notes the cause of MacDonald’s “lordly, not to say cavalier, attitude to 
the Liberals” was the desire for British politics to revolve around the Labour Party 
and Conservative Party, and thus the Liberals had to be marginalised and shown 
to be ineffectual. Regardless of the threat of Liberal MPs in parliamentary votes 
bringing down the Labour government at almost any moment, MacDonald 
refused to allow the “government to look as though it depended on the Liberals” 
for this would “not only strengthen their credibility” but “would weaken Labour’s 
credibility as well.” Consequently, MacDonald, “had to prove that he could govern 
without the Liberals, and he could only do that if he behaved as though he did not 
care whether they voted against him or not.”218 In spite of being a minority 
government and the limits this placed on its actions, the Labour government 
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intended to govern as if it was a majority. Accepting parliamentary procedure the 
King’s government would continue and should they be defeated on a vote of 
confidence, they would in the same fashion as the Liberals or Conservatives, 
appeal directly to the country. 
 
The principal voices for positive relations with the Liberal Party wrote Wilson was 
the New Statesman and Snowden. However the “attitude of the Labour party was 
faithfully reflected by its leader” sharing “the same petulant rage against the 
Liberals for continuing to exist was apparent… and in the country Liberal MPs 
were subject to a spontaneous assault by Labour organisations, especially in 
constituencies which Liberals had narrowly captured from Conservatives in the 
absence of Labour candidates.”219 MacDonald, speaking at the newly opened 
Tufton Street Labour Club in May 1924 expressed his doubts about PR and 
whilst it was “admirable and unanswerable in theory up to a point”, the issue of 
the purpose of voting remained:  
 
“What we have got to solve in representation is not merely how the House of 
Commons is going accurately to reflect party opinion outside, but when party 
opinion outside has been accurately reflect in the relative proportion of parties 
in the House, how from that representation are you going to form a workable 
Government?”220 
 
After failing to abandon FPTP in 1918, the Liberals and Lloyd George were 
becoming increasingly conscious during the 1920s that they were now the third 
party in British politics and only PR could save them. In January 1924, a Liberal 
Committee was set up to examine the merits of PR and AV. In May the second 
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reading of a Private Member’s Bill containing PR, put forward by a Liberal, was up 
for debate. On 30th April, a Liberal Party meeting decided to back the view of John 
Harris, arguing that co-operation was dependent upon electoral reform, and no 
election should take place until this had been passed into law. Pugh notes: “Two 
days before the debate the Liberals formally invited Labour to support the Bill and let 
it be known that the Liberal party would meet to reconsider its attitude after the vote 
on the Bill had been taken. There was a widespread feeling that this was intended to 
be an ultimatum.”221 Labour resented both having to rely on Liberal votes in the 
House of Commons and the proposal put forward by the Liberals for PR. As such, 
the Parliamentary Labour Party rejected a majority recommendation from the 
Cabinet to support PR. So incensed were Labour backbenchers that it was decided 
‘by a large majority’ to leave the Bill to a free vote but to give it no facilities if it 
passed the second reading. The argument ran that since the Liberal Party failed to 
bring in PR when they thought it would be helpful to the Labour Party, why should 
the Labour Party help the Liberals when they think it will be helpful to them.222  
 
Herbert Morrison, Labour MP for Hackney seconded the rejection of the Bill. 
Morrison considered under PR it would be impossible for candidates to make 
themselves known and impossible for candidates when elected to keep in touch 
with their constituents afterwards, thus emphasising the constituency link. Under 
PR the tendency would be for “special groups representing minority opinion on 
special questions to make immoral bargains in the House of Commons, and that 
in fact the whole philosophy behind PR was the elevations of the minority and the 
subjection of the majority to specialist opinions of cranks and freaks.” Any theory 
of government based on the coming together of antagonistic opinions was wrong 
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and contrary to the interests of democracy and of the country. In a swipe at the 
Liberal Party, Morrison affirmed PR was the natural philosophy of decaying 
parties and it was not natural to strong men and women who wanted the country 
to be governed wisely and firmly. FPTP did maintain secure representative 
government and the present political situation was temporary and would return to 
that of two parties. 
 
Henderson, the Home Secretary, deemed that while the government would have 
been willing to consider AV, it could not however do the same for PR. 
Henderson, before turning his attention to the behaviour of the Liberal Party 
towards the minority Labour government, stated on this particular matter three 
factors had to be considered. Firstly, no party had made reference to the issue in 
their manifestos; secondly the division which existed in all parties; and thirdly, the 
treatment PR had received in previous parliaments and its rejection. Referring to 
the ‘ultimatum’ delivered by the Liberal Party Henderson, to loud cheers from 
Labour benches stated: “If we have to be threatened like this, if, because we 
won’t go their way on all occasions, certainly not on this, if because we will not 
promise to bring in a bill, as my right hon. friend asks, we are to be threatened, I 
can only retort by saying, ‘Well get on with the job’.”223     
 
The actions of the Liberals potentially reinforced the growing scepticism towards 
PR in the Labour Party since the 1916-1917 Speaker’s Conference. Joining with 
the Conservatives to reject the measure 238 votes to 144, only 28 Labour MPs 
voted in favour and 90 against, in total a majority of 94 against. Of those who 
voted in the Cabinet, four supported PR and two voted against. James Maxton, in 
an address to a May Day 1924 rally in Glasgow epitomised Labour’s attitude. The 
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Liberals, he said had tried to drive them into a particular lobby, but they had 
decided to tell Asquith, Lloyd George and the rest to go to hell. Now, he added, 
the Liberals were threatening to hold a series of weekend meetings throughout 
the country. God help Asquith and Lloyd George if they tried to address a 
meeting at Bridgeton Cross on a Saturday night.224 
 
By rejecting PR, Labour had put at risk the parliamentary support of the Liberals, 
not to the disappointment of some Liberals. As The Times reported, the ‘Patient 
Oxen’ were uneasy225 and could no longer endorse policies which transgressed 
‘liberal principles’. Accordingly, the days of the first Labour government were 
numbered and during the August and September 1924, the government came 
under increasing pressure. Two treaties with the Soviet Union and the Campbell 
Case – the charge of ‘incitement to mutiny’ against a British Communist 
newspaper editor and the Labour government’s decision to suspend prosecution 
– led to a perception that Labour was sympathetic to communists, providing 
ammunition for Labour’s opponents. On 31st September the Conservatives 
registered a motion of censure, and the Liberals followed with an amendment 
calling only for a select committee inquiry. MacDonald and the Cabinet treated 
both issue as a Matter of Confidence on the Government. On 8th October, the 
Conservatives abandoned their censure motion and voted for the Liberal 
amendment. Duly, the government was brought down by 264 votes to 198 and so 
ended the Labour Party’s first government. 
 
Yet a general satisfaction existed with FPTP within the Party and amongst 
Labour-supporting intellectuals. A Fabian Tract published in 1924, written by 
Herman Finer, deemed “What Government are we going to make?” was the 
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ultimate electoral question.226 Finer argued that the workings of Parliament force 
“men to leave their small caves and enter into larger combinations for the support 
of a common programme” meaning the exactness of representation is “neither 
real nor ultimate political moment.”227 The single-member constituency 
encouraged a MP to fulfil their duty in return for recompense and a MP is a 
representative not a delegate “subject to a possessive relationship with his 
constituents” with whom he can consult and in turn who the constituents can 
blame or praise. Consequently, the single-member system is “highly 
representative” whilst also giving “a predictable sphere of independence for the 
Member.” Given that a Parliament cannot foresee everything that is going to 
happen, the close connection of MPs and electors guarantees “popular 
consultation” along with the importance of by-elections in gauging political 
opinion.228 
 
Furthermore, a Cabinet must rest upon a party organisation and to “be effectively 
responsible to the country must rest upon the support of a single party.” The 
electorate then “is best able to know who is to praise or blame” at a general 
election.229 Secondly, the need for political bargaining with “ministrable” groups – 
a reference to small parties who during coalition negotiations could expect to 
become government ministers – is avoided. Finer also considered that AV did not 
offer a majority in the “English political sense of the word i.e. a majority of positive 
supporters.” Moreover, and in accordance with the objectives of MacDonald and 
the Labour Party “it is likely that within 15 years the Liberal Party will be 
electorally defunct... It would be the height of political unwisdom to introduce a 
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new and vicious element into the constitution to counteract a temporary ill.”230 
George Lansbury, at the 1926 Labour Party Conference, “thought that the 
majority of the decisions under the present system had worked for the other 
people; but if they were wise, they could now make it work for themselves.” He 
went on to affirm “while Electoral Reform is needed to remedy the existing 
defects, the proposals of the Proportional Representation Society, involving large 
constituencies and numerous representatives for each constituency, are not in 
the best interests of democratic government and ought to be opposed.” 
According to Butler the statement implicitly supports AV.231 
 
As MacDonald had first stated in the House of Commons, the Labour Party was 
‘not afraid of what fate we may meet in the process.’ The fact that the Labour 
government had been removed from office on a Liberal motion, reinforced the 
perception that the Liberals were opportunistic and unsympathetic to the Labour 
Party, thus legitimising MacDonald’s policy of keeping them at arm’s length. The 
relationship between the two parties had disintegrated during the 1920s and the 
feeling within the Labour Party was a socialist majority was on the horizon. 
Therefore, reliance upon the Liberals for parliamentary support would be a thing 
of the past. Moreover, electorally in 1924 it appeared Labour was on course to 
displace the Liberals as the main opposition to the Conservatives, gaining 1 
million more votes than in 1923 and the lead over the Liberals widening to 2.5 
million in 1924. Indeed, between 1925 and 1929 Labour won 11 seats from the 
Conservatives in by-elections, plus a further 2 seats from the Liberals. Labour 
was learning and experiencing how to win under FPTP in the 1920s and the 
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objective of a return to a ‘two-party’ system was coming to fulfilment, with the 
Liberals in the process being reduced to a rump of MPs.  
 
1929-1931 – The Second Labour Government 
 
Held in the face of rising unemployment the 1929 general election produced a 
hung parliament. Labour, whilst polling over 300,000 fewer votes than the 
Conservatives was returned to Westminster with 287 MPs, the Conservatives 
second with 260 MPs and the Liberals on an improved 59 MPs. It was to date the 
best electoral result for Labour in both votes and seats. Stanley Baldwin, the 
sitting Conservative Prime Minister resigned immediately and advised the King to 
send for MacDonald, as anything else might have seemed ‘unsporting’. Baldwin 
was determined, wrote A.J.P. Taylor; that Lloyd George should not get the credit 
for turning the Conservatives out – or still worse, for keeping them in232 - negating 
any possibility of the Liberals putting Labour into office. Baldwin’s actions further 
marginalised the influence of the Liberal Party, suggesting the Conservatives 
were at ease with British politics revolving around the Conservatives and the 
Labour Party. On 5th June 1929 MacDonald became Prime Minister for the 
second time. 
 
The Liberal Party were fully aware that only through political bargaining and 
coalition building would they be able to influence government policy, a 
consequence of now being the third party in British politics. Parliamentary 
mathematics necessitated Labour would be able to form only a minority 
government, reliant on the support of the ‘king-maker’ Lloyd George and his 
truncated Liberal Party which contained a significant minority of MPs inclined 
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towards the Conservative Party rather than Labour. As such there was no 
guarantee Lloyd George could hold his party together and force it to vote with 
Labour. However, Lloyd George had the ability to turn out the Labour Party by 
aligning his party with the Conservatives. MacDonald’s distrust of Lloyd George, 
a feeling shared in Labour and across the House, had not mellowed even in light 
of the precarious parliamentary arithmetic. A diary entry in 1929 claimed the 
Liberal leader was “like Samson shorn of his locks and bent on destruction...one 
of those men who are never happy unless they are the leading figures or are 
pulling down others.”233 
 
The Labour Party, led by MacDonald and in light of his governing principles was 
concerned with winning power yet as in 1924 this was only achievable with 
Liberal support or acquiescence, to ensure the survival of the full parliament. The 
Liberals were fully aware of their position as ‘Kingmaker’ and sought to gain 
electoral reform, particularly a form a PR, from any bargaining, preventing 
terminal electoral decline. The Labour Party knew conceding demands on 
electoral reform had the potential to perpetuate the Liberal Party and give them a 
significant foothold in British politics indefinitely. A former Liberal, F. W. Pethick-
Lawrence, commented on Labour’s favourable electoral position, urging 
MacDonald “we should make no bargain of any kind with Lloyd George and 
particularly about any change in electoral method. PR would be the devil. It would 
destroy our constitution and substitute the folly of continental politics. The 
alternative vote would postpone an absolute Labour majority – perhaps for a 
generation.” Furthermore, he believed “There is a great feeling in the party 
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against electoral change. It might be induced to support it but it would be against 
its conviction, and this would be very bad for the morale of the party.”234 
 
MacDonald, in his government’s first King’s Speech, wondered “how far it is 
possible, without in any way abandoning any of our party positions… to consider 
ourselves more as a Council of State and less as arrayed regiments facing each 
other in battle... So that by putting our ideas into a common pool we can bring 
out... legislation and administration which will be of substantial benefit for the 
nation as a whole” a statement often interpreted as MacDonald’s first overtures at 
a ‘National Government’. He had of course ruled out coalition in 1924. The 
statement included a direct reference to electoral reform. Yet, in the ensuing 
debate, MacDonald’s position on the matter appeared non-committal as to which 
alternative was preferable, and importantly added what he considered to be the 
objective of an election:  
 
“One view of Government is the static view where we are in exact replica, on 
a very small scale, of the millions of electors...But the other view is that the 
real, final purpose of an election is to elect a Government – and I use the word 
rather apart from merely electing a House of Commons.”235  
 
Fair records how MacDonald, after consultation with the Cabinet and leaders of 
other parties, proceeded to set up a Speaker’s conference led by Viscount 
Ullswater who had presided over the conference on electoral reform in 1917-18 
and on devolution in 1919-20. Preparations for the Conference consumed four 
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months, much to the annoyance of Lloyd George, before the deliberations began 
on 4th December 1929.236 Ullswater records in his report “It was arranged that the 
conference should itself determine the subjects which it would consider, in the 
light of the suggestions made by the parties, and the order in which they would 
be taken.” Ullswater also noted in his report that the chances of a successful 
conference were hindered by the lack of framework and parameters, leading him 
to speculate “whether it reflects the attitude of the Prime Minister to the whole 
subject of the enquiry...anyone with experience in such matters will recognise 
what a handicap the absence of terms of reference must impose on a conference 
so constituted, faced by so vast a field of possible enquiry, and concerned as it 
must be with so many complicated and controversial issues.”237 MacDonald’s 
decision not to provide strict terms of reference suggests he intentionally desired 
the Conference to get bogged down in wrangling, thus scuppering the chances of 
the Conference.  
 
The make-up of the Conference reflected the House of Commons with seven 
Labour members, seven Conservatives, four Liberals, and four representatives 
from the House of Lords, including the chair. It was decided that enquires would 
be made into electoral funding, the use of motor vehicles in transporting voters 
and relaying election speeches to other locations by radio. In addition, plural 
voting would be examined. MacDonald explained to Ullswater that it was 
necessary to enquire into the “representative value of the national vote cast in the 
constituencies for the candidates belonging to the various parties...Can any 
scheme of counting votes give to each vote approximately an equal value for 
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representation purposed? If it can, would it sacrifice other requirements of an 
efficient democratic machinery?”238  
 
In spite of its minority position, the Labour Party was conscious of the need to 
give the impression of credibility and respectability, tying it to the British State 
and showing the electorate it was capable of governing. In December 1929, the 
government was facing difficulties in passing a ‘Coal Bill’ and without the support 
of Liberal MPs would be defeated. Lloyd George sought to use the Coal Bill as 
leverage to prise electoral reform out of the government, as it was now a national 
necessity. Herbert Morrison told the Liberals that they had a choice; vote for the 
Coal Bill and be a progressive party or bring down the Labour Government. 
Moreover, the political outlook for the Liberals was bleak as the country was 
steadily getting back to the two-party system.239 MacDonald and Lloyd George 
met at the beginning of February 1930, in an attempt to bridge the gap between 
the two men. MacDonald noted in his diary, “Lloyd George came and talked with 
Thomas, Snowden, Henderson and myself about an agreement to keep us in 
office for from two to three years, turned upon whether we would give him a 
bargain on Electoral Reform…He is fighting for his life and asks us to give it to 
him. In the two years, he will take to himself our good record and leave for us our 
bad. The bargain proposed really amounts to this: we get two years of office from 
the Liberals and give them in return a permanent corner on our political stage.”240 
 
The successes gained by the Labour Party throughout the 1920s at waging 
electoral war on the Liberals was, through electoral reform, at risk of being 
undone especially when for the first time the Labour Party was the biggest party 
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in the House of Commons. Legislating for an alternative electoral system ran the 
risk of undermining MacDonald’s aim of returning to a two-party system. In a 
memorandum MacDonald outlined his scepticism towards any deal with the 
Liberals. “In general terms, I am in favour of some agreement, but I am not in 
favour of making it definite in details or committing it to writing. We should apply 
the conditions which, without hampering either Party, were observed after the 
second election of 1910, when we held a balance and kept the Liberal 
Government in.”241 An agreement which lacked detail, whilst giving both parties 
freedom, would have offered very few guarantees of lasting for a full parliament.  
 
MacDonald listed seven difficulties the Labour Party would face if it were to go 
further than the loose agreement outlined above. 
1. Neither an agreement nor an understanding can be kept private, (impacting) 
on the spirit of the Party. 
2. Its details will be almost impossible to fix, and once we admit that we are 
definitely in the hands of the Liberals… the attempt to fix details from week to 
week will put us more and more in a position subordinate to the Liberals. 
3. It will strengthen Mr Lloyd George’s grip upon his own Party and… authority in 
the country. 
4. It will hamper us at by-elections and generally in carrying on in the country an 
offensive against the Liberals. 
5. In the present temper of our Party no such measure could be introduced in an 
agreed form. It would lead to an abandonment of any expectation we may have 
(of) returning to a two-Party system. 
                                                                  
241 Note dates 4th February, 1930, MacDonald Papers, 5/171 Quoted in Marquand, Ramsay 
MacDonald, pp. 529-530 
108 
 
6. Up to the present we have kept the initiative in our hands… we will have to 
face a conflict with the House of Lords sooner or later, that will put the Liberals 
very much in our hands and we should lose whatever advantage that will give us. 
7. We should, therefore, delay the conversation and endeavour to go on week by 
week negotiating on troubles as they arise. That undoubtedly leaves our tenure 
of office somewhat uncertain, but the price we shall have to pay for a two years’ 
security will be so high that we cannot pay it.242 
 
Compromising the independence, responsibility and accountability led 
MacDonald to express reservations at the prospect of a pact with the Liberals. A 
report appeared during March 1930 MacDonald was complaining that Lloyd 
George was intriguing with Labour people behind his back. Liberal obstruction 
continued and it became increasingly clear to the Labour government that only 
electoral reform would overcome the Liberal impasse. On 18th March 1930, the 
Labour leadership agreed to introduce an electoral reform Bill, agreeing to 
concede AV, and the Liberals duly abstained.  
 
However, MacDonald’s scepticism towards electoral reform, its impact upon the 
independence and electoral capability of the Labour Party, along with the distrust 
of the Liberals surfaced quickly.  
 
“From the birth of the Party until now we have held rigidly to the position that 
we were standing on our own legs and that has been inculcated as a cardinal 
principle from John o’Groats to Land’s End. It has become part of the very 
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nature of the Party… the scheme proposed by the Liberals would secure for 
them the very maximum possible representation, and for us the minimum.”243  
 
Additionally, it was obvious that any such electoral innovation would induce an 
end to the two-party system in which his party had only recently become a vested 
member: 
 
“Supposing we agreed to support the scheme we should have to get it through 
the Party, both in Parliament and at the Annual Conference. This we could not 
possible do without being quite candid as to our reasons... We should have to 
use arguments which will admit that we have given up hope of creating two 
parties, one of which would be ourselves, and that we have fallen back upon 
the assumption that a progressive majority in Parliament would always have 
to be found by a combination which would either frankly be a Coalition with a 
sharing of office, or a Government such as we have at the present moment 
depending upon the support of the Liberals.”244 
 
Labour representatives in the ongoing Speaker’s Conference, which had 
reconvened on 8th May 1930 after the recess, were deliberately obstructive, 
seeking to change electoral practices and finances – destroying the plural vote 
and the perceived financial advantage of the Conservatives – rather than the 
electoral system per se. Indeed, the idea of adopting an electoral system which 
boosted the Liberals at the expense of the Conservatives seemed unattractive. 
The Tory members thought it best to ‘let sleeping dogs lie’ and sought to wreck 
any proposals, but voted with the Liberals that if any change were to be made it 
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should the adoption of PR perhaps fearing a combination of anti-conservative 
forces in constituencies. According to Campbell, Labour representatives would 
hear nothing but AV, which the Tories vetoed, and duly the conference broke up 
in July without agreement.245 
 
PR was unacceptable to the Labour members of the Conference. Lord Arnold, 
Paymaster-General in MacDonald’s government, claimed that parliament had no 
mandate to introduce PR and that it was only a means of representing minorities. 
According to the Conservative Samuel Hoare, “Socialist after Socialist (damned) 
PR with bell, book and candle. The Socialists could not have been more heavy 
footed. Indeed, they burnt their boats so completely that I do not see how they 
can ever get into them again.”246 All Labour members of the Conference bar one 
opposed AV yet were willing to consider AV, conditionally on the adoption of 
other reforms such as expenditure and University representation. There is 
disagreement in the literature as to where Labour committee members were 
receiving instruction. Butler, Fair and Skidelsky suggest the NEC proposed 
members of the committee to “offer a modicum of alternative vote on the 
condition that their list of reforms in the election law also be accepted,” a view 
supported by Snowden in his memoirs. Marquand concludes otherwise, believing 
Labour members were told to oppose AV. 247  
 
James Maxton, a leading Clydesider, during the second reading of the 
‘Representation of the People (No. 2) Bill’, declared himself as not at all 
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enthusiastic about this measure, as it showed the power of Lloyd George over 
the Government rather than the more important matter of the implementation of 
socialism. Furthermore, emphasising the social and economic factors above 
issues of political reform, Maxton desired attention be paid to the “immediate and 
urgent problems confronting the country, the first being that of the social 
condition of the people and the problem of poverty, and secondly, the general 
problem of economic reconstruction.” These issues should take precedence, as 
whilst “Our Parliamentary machine runs along very clumsily, and places upon 
every one of us a terrible restraint. The question,” he continued, “of how we are 
going to operate when we get here is one that ought to be decided as a question 
of more importance than how we are to adjust the machinery which sent us 
here.”248  Consequently, what mattered for Maxton was not the method of 
election but what happened once one was in the House of Commons. Voting on 
the second reading divided along strict party lines, 290 votes to 230. 
 
In March 1931, the clause allowing for AV was carried by 277 votes to 253. 
Despite the whips, 11 Labour and 2 Liberal MPs voted against it and 27 Labour 
members were absent unpaired. Beckett, the Labour MP for Camberwell was 
critical of the Labour Government supporting AV, reminding the House of 
MacDonald’s previous statements that the “hopeful future he said the Labour 
Party would have under the present system was to be sacrificed to prolong 
inordinately the dismal present.” J. M. Kenworthy MP, who sat on the Bill’s 
committee stage, spoke out against AV as a sell-out to the Liberal Party, 
perpetuating the three-party system, and to “make the winning of a majority by 
the Labour Party almost impossible.” Moreover, “On some great issue in the 
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future, such as the public ownership of the coalmines, the Alternative Vote would 
be used against them by the Liberals – ‘that dying party’.” 249 Regardless of 
Labour Party opposition, the Bill was finally passed in the Commons by 278 to 
228 votes on 2nd June 1931.  
 
Continuing reliance of Liberal votes in the House of Commons during 1930 and 
into 1931 raised the prospect of closer ties between Labour and the Liberals, to 
ensure the survival of the government for the full parliament. By May 1931, the 
regularity of meetings between the Cabinet and Liberal leaders led to speculation 
there would soon be Liberals in government, something Skidelsky believes 
MacDonald seriously considered.250 Owen writes that Lloyd George, in a 
memorandum to his secretary in July 1931, recorded a conversation with 
MacDonald, in which MacDonald had said that the Labour Party wanted an 
‘alliance’ with the Liberals and that he hoped that Lloyd George would join the 
government as Foreign Secretary or Chancellor of the Exchequer. This is 
disputed by Thorpe who states the document cited by Owen has never been 
found since and in turn references a paper in which Lloyd George tells Lansbury 
that if he joined Labour it would antagonise millions of Liberal supporters. Labour 
supporters would have been equally antagonised, especially the Trade Unions 
who had been angered by the wrecking of the Trade Disputes Bill. As such, 
Thorpe states “The case for arguing that a Lib-Lab coalition was about to be 
formed in July 1931, therefore, is virtually non-existent.251 What did exist 
however, was a situation whereby it was clear to all that the Liberals were 
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keeping the Labour Party in government, without being bound to the government 
through cabinet positions, ministerial roles and therefore collective responsibility.      
 
The Bill progressed into the House of Lords where it was subject to wrecking 
amendments, with the Peers focusing on the lack of a mandate for reform and 
seeking to restrict its implementation to the 174 seats in boroughs with more than 
200,000 people. Thus, the passage of the Bill was delayed to the extent where 
the Government would not have an opportunity to reconsider it until parliament 
reconvened in the autumn. The government were prepared to use the Parliament 
Act to introduce AV, as neither Labour nor the Liberals were optimistic about their 
electoral chances during deep economic problems and so were therefore keen to 
reach an understanding whereby the prolongation of the government was 
ensured. However, the financial crisis of 1931 led to a split in the Cabinet over 
cutting unemployment payments, thus causing the collapse of the Second Labour 
government. MacDonald would go on to form a ‘National government’ with the 
Conservatives and the Simonite Liberals, resulting in a Labour Prime Minister 
leading a government dominated by Conservative MPs. MacDonald’s act would 
go down in Labour folklore as the ‘Great Betrayal’ impacting on the Party’s 
attitude towards coalition at Westminster, and what this means for the working 
class whom the Labour Party represents.   
 
By the end of the 1920s and the second Labour government, the Labour Party 
had become increasingly sceptical about the merits of proportional 
representation. The Labour Party was willing to countenance AV - but not PR - 
and was put forward by the Labour government to buy the support of the Liberal 
Party, not for any intrinsic virtue of the voting system. Sir Austin Chamberlain, a 
Conservative MP, borrowed a phrase from Oscar Wilde when describing the 
attitude towards AV: “Whistler had no enemies, but he was intensely disliked by 
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his friends. It would not be quite true to say that this Clause has no enemies… 
but it is true to say that it is intensely disliked by its friends.”252 
 
The growth of the Labour Party as an electoral and political force throughout the 
1920s, experiencing minority government in 1924 and 1929-31, encouraged the 
Party to move away from PR. It was thought that the Liberal Party – often 
accused by Labour politicians as being akin to a ‘decaying corpse’ – was in 
terminal decline and soon would be electorally defunct, meaning British politics 
would once again revolve around two parties: Labour and the Conservatives. 
Therefore, the adoption of an electoral system which perpetuated the three-party 
system was highly disagreeable to many within the Labour Party, for it would 
continue the situation as through the 1920s in which the Labour Party had to rely 
on the Liberals, meaning a party of capital could obstruct a party committed to 
socialism. AV was a device hoped to ensure the survival of the second minority 
Labour Government for a full term, and whilst close to becoming law, was 
supported with little enthusiasm. The experience of government had taught the 
Labour Party two vital lessons: firstly, minority government reliant on the support 
of other political parties was restrictive and therefore was to be avoided; and 
secondly, with a parliamentary majority the workings of the British State would 
enable the Labour Party to enact its brand of socialism. 
 
1931-1945 
 
Jennifer Hart refers to this period as the “Barren Years” and Martin Pugh 
comments on the period from 1931-1939 that electoral reform excited “virtually 
no interest.”253 The Labour MP J.R. Leslie described himself as among the “lone 
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scouts” in the Labour Party for PR.254 The National Government had seen no 
need to pursue the Labour Government’s Electoral Reform Bill, particularly in the 
light of its vast parliamentary majority. The Labour Party, bar a few voices, had 
little interest in changing the voting system despite suffering the heaviest loss of 
seats to befall a major party from 288 MPs to 52 MPs. However, by default those 
who had chosen in the Labour Party not to serve in the National Government 
were the only credible opposition, and in light of the ‘Great Betrayal’ it was 
probably considered this was a reasonable result. Cecil H. Wilson Labour MP for 
Sheffield Attercliffe and an advocate of PR was bemused at the leading figures in 
the Labour Party, such as Dalton and Morrison, who wished to maintain the 
present system.255 Morrison, as shown, was staunchly in favour of FPTP, a 
position he unwaveringly held both pre and post-World War Two. 
 
In 1935 the Labour Party still fared badly – 40% of the votes won them less than 
one-quarter of the seats – but the Party remained loyal to the system which 
seemed to offer them the best chance of gaining a clear parliamentary majority. 
Richard Crossman, who would in the Wilson governments of 1964-70 be a 
leading figure in promoting a range of constitutional reforms, noted in his 1939 
How Britain is Governed that the electoral system in Britain created a “temporary 
dictatorship”256 between elections. However this was beneficial for government, 
as a system that encouraged more than two parties tended to lead to weaker 
governments: 
 
“proportional representation in parliamentary elections would be a national 
disaster. It would of course make the strength of the parties in the House 
                                                                  
254 Manchester Guardian, ‘Electoral Reform: All-Party support of PR’, 8th July 1943 
255 Manchester Guardian, ‘Unjust Election System: Labour Member criticises Party attitude to PR’, 
12th September 1936 
256 R. Crossman, How Britain is Governed, (Labour Book Service, London, 1939) p. 29 
116 
 
reflect more accurately the division of opinion in the country; but in so doing it 
would ensure the survival of the third party and encourage the formation of a 
fourth and fifth.”257 
 
Moreover, weakening of government would be disastrous for the Labour Party 
and the working classes, as change and reform would be impossible. In 1963, 
Crossman reiterated his objection to PR, arguing “Wherever proportional 
representation has been tried, it has fulfilled his (Bagehot’s) prediction that it 
would undermine the independence of the MP and increase the powers of the 
party managers who control the electoral lists.”258 Honeyman writes he never 
considered electoral reform again, “but his lack of action on the issue suggests 
that he remained very sceptical about the benefits of electoral reform generally, 
and proportional representation specifically.”259 
 
The Cabinet, which by May 1943 included Labour Ministers, had managed to 
ignore 114 MPs from all parties who had supported G. W. Rickard’s motion 
calling for a conference on electoral reform. Nevertheless, the wartime coalition 
was forced to include methods of elections in the terms of reference of the 1944 
Speaker’s Conference, a result of a two-day Commons debate in February 1944. 
On 8th February 1944 Sir Winston Churchill formally invited Colonel D. Clifton 
Brown to Chair the Conference. Nine Labour MPs along with James Maxton 
(Independent Labour Party) and Denis N. Pritt (Labour Independent) constituted 
the Labour membership. Pritt dismissed AV as it did not go far enough, whereas 
STV had the great benefit of resolving the redistribution problem and the 
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“extreme misrepresentation” of the present system would be replaced by “actual 
opinion.”260 
 
According to Butler, the main issue for Herbert Morrison, the Labour Home 
Secretary, “were the principles of redistribution and the fusion of the local 
government and parliamentary franchise; he did not think there would be much 
interest in proportional representation.”261 What occurred was a repeat of the 
previous Conference. Both Labour and the Conservatives were hostile towards 
any reform, STV being rejected by twenty-five votes to four and AV by twenty 
votes to five.262 Some Labour members felt that only by a combination of the 
Liberal and Labour votes, which would be made possible by the Alternative Vote, 
would the Conservatives ever be defeated. This relied on the assumption that 
Liberal voters were more inclined to put the Labour candidate as the second 
preference rather than Conservative, an issue which has raised considerable 
intrigue. Two Labour members of the Speaker’s Conference, having failed to 
convince their colleagues, abstained from voting on this issue263 and the adoption 
of the Alternative Vote at any election in a single-member non-University 
constituency was rejected. Once again the Labour Party had come down on the 
side of FPTP and confirmed its opposition the AV. 
 
Post-World War Two: 1945-1974 
 
The wartime coalition, of which the Labour Party had been a key part, broke up 
on 23rd May 1945 and the General Election was called for the July. The result 
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was a Labour landslide victory with a Commons majority of 146 seats, a net gain 
of 209 seats of which 79 were constituencies which had never previously 
returned a Labour MP. Breaking into territory which had never previously been 
captured and winning 394 seat, the Conservatives had gone down to their 
biggest defeat since 1906. The Labour Party polled 48.2% of the vote and a 
national swing was 12%. Importantly, the Labour Party had no need to seek 
alliances and negotiate with the Liberals, as they had done previously, and the 
long-term objective of replacing the Liberals as the main opposition to the 
Conservatives had been achieved. Clement Attlee became Labour Prime 
Minister, the first leader of the Labour Party with the ability to utilise a 
parliamentary majority. For the first time in the Labour Party’s history, the 
workings of FPTP had handed the party such a victory that the manifesto 
commitments of ‘Let us Face the Future Together’ could be enacted on to the 
statute book. 
 
Indeed, significant importance was attached to the doctrine of the ‘manifesto and 
the mandate’. Morrison, told the Labour Party conference in 1945: “Only by a 
Labour majority – a coherent Labour majority – can our programme be put 
through. I make no promise about what will happen to that programme if we do 
not get a clear and coherent and united majority.”264 The intellectual climate 
within the Labour Party towards the British State was one of acceptance, 
believing that having captured a parliamentary majority, they could control the 
machinery of government. Dalton, when opening the second reading debate on 
the Bank of England Bill, stated: “I hold in my hand a document entitled ‘Let us 
Face the Future, a Declaration of Labour Policy for the Consideration of the 
Nation.’ The nation considered it and having done so elected this House of 
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Commons. We have an unchallengeable popular mandate to carry out all that is 
contained in this document.”265  
 
Such was the confidence in the reforming capabilities of a Labour majority in 
parliament, talk of coalition and a deal with the Liberals was unnecessary. Butler 
notes that many of the policies enacted by the Labour government solidified the 
Liberals in opposition to it. Talk of coalition came from the Conservatives, led by 
Winston Churchill who had never heard of a ‘Liberal-Socialist’, and therefore held 
out hope for an anti-Socialist agreement between the Conservatives and the 
Liberals. The ‘Woolton-Teviot’ agreement of May 1947 made possible 
‘Conservative Liberal’ mergers and in the 1950 General Election 53 candidates 
stood under miscellaneous headings such as ‘National Liberal and Conservative’, 
‘Conservative and National Liberal, ‘Conservative and Liberal’ or ‘Liberal and 
Conservative’.266 Such varied headings would continue on into the 1960s with 
local Conservative associations happy to stand down in favour of a candidate 
with an aforementioned title.  
 
In 1950 Attlee referred to a rejection made in 1944 in refusing the calls of Liberal 
leader, Clement Davies, for a new inquiry into electoral matters267, an 
understandable decision given the political situation. Five years previously, the 
Labour Party had won its first landslide victory and during the parliament had not 
lost a by-election to the Conservatives. Furthermore, in the 1950 General 
Election, Labour polled 13,267,466 votes, at that time the highest poll ever won. 
However, boundary changes by the then Home Secretary, Chuter Ede, had an 
adverse effect on the Labour Party, with the changes favouring suburban and 
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middle-class constituencies.268 The result was a majority of five, thus making for 
a more insecure and weakened government. The cause of Labour’s downfall was 
England, for both Scotland and Wales increased their representation. Industrial 
working-class constituencies returned Labour MPs with extravagant majorities, 
whereas suburban England reverted to the Conservative Party. 
 
For eighteen months the Labour government battled on through Cabinet 
resignations and divisions until Attlee, under no constitutional obligation, called 
an election for 25th October 1951. Whereas in 1929 Labour had won more seats 
on fewer votes than the Conservatives, the system 22 years later had worked to 
the disadvantage of Labour. On a 48.8% of the vote, a total poll of 13,948,883 – 
an increase of 2.7% on 1950 – Labour suffered a net loss of 19 seats and won 
only 295. Cook claims the cause of Labour’s defeat was the Liberal Party, who 
fielded a mere 109 candidates, forcing erstwhile Liberal voters into the hands of 
the Conservatives. Accordingly, Labour faced the Conservatives in 495 straight 
fights in 1951 compared to 109 in 1950.269 Ironically, the reduced electoral 
capability of the Liberal Party – the abiding wish of the Labour Party – had hurt 
Labour’s electoral chances. Should Cook’s assertion be correct that erstwhile 
Liberals voted Conservative, then the validity of the claim Liberal voters naturally 
lean towards the Labour Party is questioned. Consequently, the 1950 general 
election suggests that under a preferential electoral system there is no guarantee 
Liberal voters would put Labour as a second choice nor in a straight contest 
between Labour and the Conservatives that Liberal voters would vote Labour.  
 
Returning to the opposition benches did not dampen Labour’s enthusiasm for 
FPTP. Morrison wrote of the benefits of the two-party system and rejected PR in 
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a Labour Educational Series booklet. The Labour Party had always been 
independent of the Conservative Party and Liberal Party and the British two-party 
system “leads to greater coherence and responsibility in government and 
opposition and the work of parliament.” Recognising Labour and the 
Conservatives were made up of individuals who, whilst subscribing to 
fundamental principles, differed on certain matter, believed the electors had to 
make a “broad choice as to which of the two great political parties more generally 
represents their point of view.” PR would result in “a series of minority groups to 
Parliament would make it very difficult to form majority governments… If there is 
no majority for any Party in Parliament, it means that coalitions have to be formed 
and bargains have to be struck, with the result that governments are unstable 
and firm, consistent policies are difficult to carry out.” Both parties are against PR 
“based on substantial constitutional considerations of public policy.”270 
 
In an article outlining the working of British parliamentary democracy, Morrison 
offered a traditional defence of the Westminster Model of governance, believing 
the “British Parliament is one of the most efficient and up to date instruments for 
its purpose.” Specifically, on the workings of the electoral system and its impact 
on the British political system Morrison considered a backbench MP was a 
representative not a delegate, “acting in the general public interest.” An MP also 
has a duty to uphold the government realising that the alternatives are “either a 
Government formed by the opposition or a general election in which he will be 
involved.” FPTP was a “safeguard against the development of minor or splinter 
parties” which was one of the reasons why the British people opposed PR, as PR 
would result in “no chance of forming a Government and no chance of getting 
their policies adopted except as a result of bargaining with other parties.” This 
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view was recognised as beneficial by the British people due to their “practical” 
nature, “that when they vote they are voting for a Government, and that their 
votes are wasted if they are spent upon a party which has no chance of forming a 
Government at any foreseeable date.” 
 
Moreover, a two-party system leads to an effective Government and an effective 
Opposition, meaning that it is within parties that broad agreement is obtained and 
how party policy would be enacted. For Morrison, a democratic country in which 
there are many views faces a choice. It can either organise points of view into 
separate parties, “for the reconciliation between them to take place as a result of 
bargaining at the general election and in Parliament itself.” However, the 
“preferred method” is the “reconciling” of different views “within the framework of 
the parties, each of which within itself contains the elements from which a 
Government can be formed.”271 In 1953 Herbert Morrison looked back at the 
Attlee administration and praised its record on parliamentary reform. Reducing 
the delaying power of the House of Lords, the abolition of University Seats and 
the final remnants of plural voting and increasing MPs salaries by two-thirds had 
all played their part in transforming the House of Commons from a ‘talking shop’ 
to a ‘workshop’.272   
 
In his textbook, Government and Parliament, published in 1954, Morrison 
declared the importance of the mandate given by the British people, writing that 
the opposition has a moral duty and justification to sustained opposition should 
the government try and introduce controversial legislation for which there is no 
mandate. So attached had Morrison become to the workings of the British State 
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that “If the Opposition is to be given no moral case for obstruction, the 
Government must ‘play the game’ and respect the principles of parliamentary 
democracy, otherwise representative government will be endangered.” 
Furthermore, “the British people rightly attach importance to a party being 
sufficiently coherent and united to give the country a Government not only of 
sound policy but of adequate strength and unity of purpose.” Indeed, Morrison 
goes on to write, perhaps influenced by the 1950-51 Labour government, “let the 
electorate remember that whilst there are objections to excessively large 
parliamentary majorities, there are even greater objections to a majority so small 
that the legitimate freedom of the MP is gravely limited.”273  
 
Losing despite receiving more votes than the Conservatives in 1951 provoked 
very little comment in the party as did Labour’s under-representation in 1955. 
Three successive election defeats in 1951, 1955 and 1959 did not make Labour 
more favourably disposed towards reform. The period between 1935 and 1970 
was the height of the two-party dominance. Average two-party vote during these 
years was 91.3%, the highest in 1951 with 96.85% and the lowest in 1964 with 
87.5%. In the 1959 General Election, 6 Liberal MPs and an independent 
Conservative were the only non-Labour or non-Conservative MPs returned to the 
House of Commons. The Scottish and Welsh Nationalists remained peripheral. 
Few worried about the electoral system, leading A. H. Birch to comment that in 
the 1960s the electoral system was “no longer a bone of contention”274. Labour’s 
position in the two-party system was secure and they were now the only 
opposition to the Conservative Party. With governments being returned on well 
over 45% of the vote, few worried about any theoretical injustice to the Liberals, 
                                                                  
273 H. Morrison, Government and Parliament, (Oxford University Press, 1954) pp. 98, 161-162, 
165 
274 A. H. Birch, Representative and Responsible Government, (Allen & Unwin, London, 1964) p.227 
124 
 
the third party. Indeed, the arguments for electoral reform and the introduction of 
PR could easily be dismissed as special pleading on their part, out of kilter with 
the desires of the nation who were choosing between two competing policy 
platforms. 
 
Harold Wilson’s Labour Party was elected in 1964 with a slim majority of four, 
returning the Labour Party to power after thirteen years of opposition. The new 
Prime Minister had no contingency plan for such a small majority which could be 
easily eroded through by-election defeats. Wilson intended to govern as though 
he had a larger majority and enact the government’s legislative programme 
accordingly. Two backbench Labour MPs, Woodrow Wyatt and Desmond 
Donnelly, suggested that a Lab-Lib understanding could be reached yet this was 
rejected by Jo Grimond. One of the features of the consultations with the Liberals 
in 1964 was electoral reform. During the summer of 1965, Wilson had allegedly 
looked seriously at changing FPTP in exchange for parliamentary support, “albeit 
without in any way committing himself.”275 Yet, Ziegler adopts a different view, 
affirming Wilson was “forthright in his denunciation of anything smacking of a 
coalition, even if it were merely to involve accepting Liberals in a few of the less 
important jobs.” However, Wilson was forced to look seriously at the matter in 
August 1965. Gerald Kaufman took soundings amongst backbenchers and 
broadly three were against a Lib-Lab pact for every two in favour of it and one 
uncommitted and Wilson could dismiss the possibility. Even if they had wanted to 
seek a deal with the Liberals, the Parliamentary Labour Party “would never let 
them get away with it.”276 
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Unlike in the 1940s, no attempt was made to exclude methods of election from 
the terms of reference for the Speaker’s Conference on Electoral Law which 
addressed such things as registration of voters, the voting age, absent voting, 
election expenses, television and sound broadcasting, election petitions, and 
relief. When the Conference came to discuss PR – in this case the STV – all 
Labour members denounced it. George Strauss considered FPTP had two major 
benefits: direct representation and effective government. “The effectiveness of 
parliamentary democracy” most importantly depended on a “close association of 
Members of Parliament with their constituents.”277 A Government with a majority 
was “essential” for “A government-representing party which takes full 
responsibility for everything which happens cannot put forward the excuse: ‘we 
would have done if we could, but we could not because we are in a minority’, and 
a Government that goes to the country on a programme tries to carry it out in 
Parliament. If it does not, it is attacked at the next election and may be turned out 
but that Government must take full responsibility without any excuses.”278  
 
John Mendelson, Labour MP for Pensitone, believed that pressure from 
academic circles and the Electoral Reform Society was simply to increase third 
party representation for the Liberal Party “and saw no reason why the baby 
should not ever be mentioned by name.”279 Mendelson, dismissed PR supporters 
who argued they were the “superior custodians of purity of democratic 
representation; because accuracy of representation… is only one half of the 
problem of government that faces a Commonwealth, and without the other half 
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and that is effective government, all discussion about accuracy of representation 
are academic.”280 
 
Mendelson deemed that once the first proposition – specifically that third-party 
representation hindered the chances of forming a single-party government – had 
been accepted, the second inevitable proposition was the “casting about for 
possible arrangements on a political programme which no single party wants… 
the search for policy that no single coalition partner really wants if he could form 
a single party government.”281 The seriousness of this was based on two factors. 
Firstly, “the essential basis of a democratic system of Government must be the 
ability of the electorate to place responsibility where it clearly belongs… It is the 
job of government that the electorate have to judge” the basis of all “political 
responsibility in a Commonwealth.” Secondly, Coalition government makes it 
“difficult to judge where responsibility really belongs” leading to more political 
cynicism.282  
 
James Idwal Jones, a Labour MP from Wales understood that “the prime object 
of a general election is to choose a government, a government according to a 
political policy” and the “task of a minority… is to seek a majority.”283 Jones 
thought this should be done by the hard work of the third party, not by changing 
the rules and the altruism of a major party. Jones refuted that safe seats were 
necessarily negative, stating “security of tenure for Members means security of 
tenure for governments as well”, although qualified the statement arguing “the 
best thing for a government at times is to be put on the opposition benches.”284 
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Samuel Charles Silkin “always unhesitatingly” came down on the side of 
“effectiveness… No democratic system can survive unless it is effective and that 
one has to subordinate even justice to that principle.”285 When the vote took place 
during Conference on STV, 19 to 1 voted against; the one dissentient being the 
Liberal MP, Eric Lubbock the grandson of the founder of the Proportional 
Representation Society.   
 
When Lubbock subsequently tried to raise STV in the Commons in 1968 he was 
rebuffed by Labour ministers. The object of the electoral system for the Home 
Secretary, James Callaghan, was to elect a government, not to be fair to the 
Liberal party.286 He sympathised on behalf of the Liberal Party, but it was “one of 
the inexorable facts of life that third parties come up against when a general 
election arises.” In effect, this was to rule out coalition government. Another 
minister, Merlyn Rees, when arguing against a change, referred to Professor 
Laski’s (mocking) assertion that there were 949 different methods of proportional 
representation. Rees was confident that ‘our democracy works’, one reason for 
which was “the clear majority which is given to the government of the day.”287  
 
It was clear in the post-World War Two era that the electoral battle lay between 
the Conservatives and Labour, with the Liberals few in number and only on the 
margins of British politics. The importance of the Labour victory in 1945 would 
live long in the Party’s collective memory, enacting social reforms to the benefit of 
the working class through the traditional practices and workings of the British 
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State. On the matter of constitutional reform, it is as Miles Taylor states, that 
“legislative efficiency” was the “ultimate consideration.”288 Legislative efficiency –  
free from the parliamentary wrangling with smaller parties – would be aided by a 
socialist majority in the House of Commons. The best way to deliver a majority 
was through FPTP, and when it did come to reform the Labour Party was more 
concerned with electoral practices – the law relating to broadcasting during 
elections and the lowering the age of voting from twenty to eighteen which had 
been recommended by the Conference – than with voting methods. Wilson 
dissolved parliament in 1966 and went to the country attempting to win an 
increased majority. The result was a landslide, with a 96 seat majority. Whatever 
troubles and failures the Wilson government faced, and the ensuing defeat in 
1970, they were convinced on the merits of FPTP.  
 
1974-1983 
 
In February 1974 Edward Heath called an election on the issue of ‘who governs 
Britain’ – the Trade Unions or the government at Westminster? The reply from 
the British electorate was inconclusive. The Conservative polled 100,000 more 
votes but the Labour Party won four more seats returning 301 seats to the House 
of Commons. As the sitting Prime Minister Heath had the constitutional right to 
seek to form a government, he spent three days attempting to guarantee the 
support of the Liberal Party offering a Speaker’s Conference on Electoral Reform. 
When this was rejected Wilson’s Labour Party formed a minority government, 
considerably short of a parliamentary majority. However, the support of the 
Liberal Party was intentionally avoided and on the parliamentary vote to pass the 
Queen’s Speech, Callaghan, the Home Secretary, deemed “it would be frivolous 
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to think you could defeat the Government on their programme without serious 
consequences arising.” Moreover, the behaviour of the opposition parties was 
irresponsible, and seemed to be “little more than a simple desire to bring down a 
Labour Government no matter what its policies, so that the Conservative and 
Liberal parties may climb into office on the back of a spurious national coalition.” 
Belief in the benefits of coalition, for Callaghan, was misguided: 
 
“A coalition is like a mule. It has no pride of ancestry and no hope of posterity. 
And on what policies would this unfortunate hybrid animal be expected to 
graze? … While its forelegs would be galloping off in the direction of public 
ownership of development land required for cheaper house building, its hind 
legs would be stuck fast in the speculators muck. I pity the jockey of such an 
ill-begotten mount.”289 
 
For the first time since 1929, FPTP had failed to produce a clear winner and as 
such doubt had been poured onto the legitimacy of the electoral system. Two 
months into the Labour government, during a Cabinet meeting on 4th April 1974 
Roy Jenkins brought up the question of the Edward Heath’s Speaker’s 
Conference which had come to an end with the dissolution of Parliament in 
February 1974. Barbara Castle notes in her diaries how the conversation 
transpired. Jenkins claimed the Conference had “unfinished business left over 
from the last Parliament and he was thinking of reconstituting it. But before he did 
he wanted to discuss how we should handle the matter of the single transferable 
vote”, an electoral system not favoured by the Labour Party since pre-World War 
One. Jenkins continued: “If we did not include it in the terms of reference we 
should look as though we were the only party not interested in electoral reform. 
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As the Liberals were very likely to propose its examination, it would be better for 
us to take the initiative. He suggested therefore that we should get the Speaker’s 
Conference to examine it in a ‘low pressure way’.”  
 
The response to Jenkins’ suggestion was critical. “Bob Mellish looked alarmed at 
this, while Mike (Michael Foot) came in emphatically: ‘Once we get into this it will 
grow and grow,’ he protested. ‘Why hasten the conference at all? I have always 
believed the Tories would come down for the alternative vote because it is in their 
interests.’” Indeed, in the mid-1970s it was the Conservative Party who were 
more inclined to electoral reform forming the ‘Conservative Action for Electoral 
Reform’ in 1975, fearing that the Labour Party would continue to form 
governments on reducing vote shares, thus introducing socialism without popular 
backing. With four out of the last five general elections delivering Labour 
governments (albeit only 1966 with a landslide victory) Conservative statecraft 
and their ability to win elections was brought into question. This was against a 
backdrop of a declining number of Scottish Conservative MPs from 31 in 1959 to 
16 in 1974, and the group enjoyed the support of such backbenchers as Nicholas 
Scott, Anthony Kershaw and Douglas Hurd. 
 
Foot’s criticism of Jenkins’ proposal was approved by Bob Mellish who added “he 
was darn sure the Speaker was in no hurry to have the conference reconstituted. 
Willie Ross (the Secretary of State for Scotland), in his lugubrious way, pointed 
out that all this was linked with the Kilbrandon Report, which had itself 
recommended a form of proportional representation as the only way of 
eliminating the perpetual Labour majorities in Scotland and Wales which 
devolution would produce.” Castle continues: “If we were not careful we could 
see the end of any possibility of a Labour Government. Harold reminded us that 
nothing could stop the Speaker’s Conference from producing an interim report – 
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particularly if we put on it some of the Labour maverick types like George Strauss 
as we had done before. It was obviously best to let this sleeping dog lie as long 
as possible. So we sent Roy away with a flea in his coalition ear.”290 
 
In the days running up to the October 1974 general election Harold Wilson 
affirmed that whilst he remained leader of the Labour Party he would not enter a 
coalition with any party, and proceeded to damn the tactics of the Liberal Party. It 
was the dream of ‘manipulating voices’ that the result of a general election would 
be the Liberals holding the balance of power, meaning “permanent majority for 
the Conservatives by the creation of a new Liberal Party out of the ashes of the 
Labour Party. They are wasting their time. This party is not for burning.”291 The 
electorate gave the Labour Party a majority of three in a different political climate 
across Great Britain. Whereas in 1964 the only non-Labour or non-Conservative 
and Unionist MPs were nine Liberals, by 1974 thirty-nine MPs were neither 
Labour nor Conservative. Importantly, eleven of whom were from the SNP who 
would play a pivotal role through the course of the Parliament. The fracturing of 
the two-party system in the 1974-79 parliament was not necessarily harmful to 
the Labour government, as the Conservative opposition was reliant on 
agreement amongst a disparate group of political parties.      
 
Wilson affirmed at the 1975 Party Conference that Labour was “the natural party 
of government”292, implying a satisfaction with the electoral mechanism which 
was delivering Labour governments, having only lost one election since 1964. 
The Labour Party was fulfilling its objective of governing in the same manner as 
its Conservative opponent. Yet, this did not prevent Roy Jenkins on Tuesday 18th 
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November once again raising the issue of proportional representation and the 
Speaker’s Conference in Cabinet. Castle claims it was “pleasant to have Roy 
Jenkins slapped down.” Jenkins “gave his excuse that the Conference ought to 
be reconvened to discuss certain outstanding items of electoral procedure and 
that it would be very difficult ‘not to refer electoral reform to it at the same time’. 
What was worrying was that, with Harold’s connivance, he had already sounded 
out the Opposition on this possibility. Ted Short, who ought to know better, 
supported him. There was, he said, ‘great pressure for it’, though ‘we must watch 
it very carefully’.”  
 
However, Castle declares the rest of the Cabinet turned on them. Denis (Healey) 
who “with good pragmatic vigour, denounced the idea as ‘absolute madness’. 
Even people like Roy Mason, Fred Peart, Malcolm and Willie Ross were against. 
Only the hard core of Jenkinites coalitionists (Harold Lever, Shirley Williams and 
Reg Prentice) were in agreement. So Harold had to sum up that the idea was 
turned down. But those rightists will go on beavering away, with Harold and Jim 
as their instruments, until they have finally destroyed the Labour Party’s 
independence and power to govern single-handedly.”293 Interestingly, those 
whom Castle listed as ‘Jenkinite’ coalitionists did not all go on to join the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP). Lever was made a Life Peer in 1979 and Prentice was 
deselected for his constituency in 1977 and stood for the Conservative Party in 
1979. Williams, would be one of the ‘Gang of Four’, a founding member of the 
SDP. 
 
Ron Hayward, former General Secretary of the Labour Party, speaking in 1976 
warned PR would mean “Coalition government at Westminster, on the lines of 
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our European partners, and it is goodbye then to any dreams or aspirations for a 
Democratic Socialist Britain.”294 However, the Labour Party lost its parliamentary 
majority in April 1976 and as the government could not deliver on the guillotine 
on the Committee stage of the Devolution Bill, the attitudes of nationalists 
hardened against Labour. The Conservatives saw their opportunity to strike and 
put down a motion of censure for 23rd March. Callaghan needed to appease the 
minority parties and established a Speaker’s Conference to examine 
representation in Northern Ireland to buy Unionist support and Proportional 
Representation for European Elections and Devolution for David Steel’s Liberals. 
Callaghan and Steel were wary of the need to avoid a general election, fearing 
heavy losses. On 23rd March 1977 the ‘Lab-Lib’ Pact was born, with the Labour 
government and the Liberals announcing the formation of a Joint Consultative 
Committee which would “examine Government policy and other issues prior to 
their coming before the House and Liberal policy proposals.”295  
 
The weight of feeling and tension within the Labour Party are revealed in this 
period on the debate on PR for Europe and the proposed devolved assemblies in 
Scotland and Wales. Callaghan told Steel, “As he would understand, proportional 
representation was an animal of a very different colour, for the party was against 
it and so was I”296 highlighting the hostility at the top of the Labour Party. 
Consequently, forcing the Labour Party to walk through the Lobbies in favour of a 
Regional List for the European Parliament would split the Cabinet and the Party, 
and accordingly collective responsibility was suspended. It was agreed that the 
government would ‘commend’ the Bill, thus ensuring a ‘free vote’. By the Second 
Reading collective responsibility was suspended and the Bill passed by 381 
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votes to 98. However, 74 Labour MPs opposed the Bill and 90 abstained 
including Cabinet ministers; Foot, Benn, Orme, Shore and Silkin, all of which was 
overlooked by Callaghan.297 
 
In December 1977, during the Second Reading of the Bill, Pugh emphasises that 
“Labour opponents of the scheme interpreted the question purely as a device by 
the Liberals to edge the country nearer to a general PR system; Fred Willey tried 
to damn the idea by referring the House to the effort of the 1929-31 Labour 
government to do a deal with the Liberals over PR.”298 Kirkup charts the course of 
events. Willey tabled an amendment calling for a vote to strike out the 
government’s preference for Regional List and replace it with FPTP, already in 
place as a schedule to the Bill, passing 321 votes to 224. 85 abstentions yielded 
a majority of 98. The PR clause was defeated by 319-222 votes, with the Labour 
Party dividing 147 for PR (including 60 Ministers) to 122 against and 46 Labour 
MPs abstained. 25 government Ministers either voted against PR or abstained.299 
It was clear that a substantial section within the Labour Party were against the 
Regional List System, particularly when the Commons majority of 183 against PR 
for the devolved assemblies is taken into account. 
 
The ‘Lab-Lib’ Pact came to an end in June 1978, placing the Labour Party in a 
precarious parliamentary position. Callaghan considered calling an election for 
the autumn but held back only for the ‘Winter of Discontent’ to harm the electoral 
chances of a Labour victory. Margaret Thatcher brought forward a ‘vote of no 
confidence’ for the 28th March 1979, on which the government fell by 311 votes to 
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310. The Scottish Nationalists sided with the Conservatives along with seven 
MPs from Ulster and an Independent. The Liberals, who nine months prior were 
partaking in the Lab-Lib Pact, also supported the Conservative motion, thus 
questioning the validity of the ‘Progressive Left’ argument. As Callaghan stated 
immediately after the Commons vote, echoing MacDonald’s view in 1924, ‘We 
shall take our case to the country’. In the ensuing general election, the 
Conservative Party won a working majority and beckoned in an era of neo-liberal 
economics undermining the planks of social democracy. Few worried about the 
electoral system within the Labour Party in consideration of winning 42.4% of the 
seats on 36.9% of the vote, thus benefitting from the working of FPTP. 
 
Indeed, Healey reflected on the Lab-Lib Pact and the whittling down of the 
Labour majority through by-election defeats and defections in his autobiography. 
Released in 1990, the same year the Plant Commission was set up, potentially 
as a repost to the growing demands for electoral reform within the Labour Party, 
he dismissed PR, coalition government and defended FPTP and single-party 
government. Moreover:  
 
“Labour cannot escape from its problems through alliances with the Centre 
parties, or through proportional representation. The non-Labour majority is 
probably as large as the non-Conservative majority; there is no guarantee that 
members of the Centre parties would vote Labour if their own candidates 
stood down – or vice-versa. Proportional Representation could not be 
introduced in Britain without years of wrangling over its precise form; previous 
attempts to change the British constitution, over devolution or the House of 
Lords, are not an encouraging precedent. The experience of PR in other 
countries shows that it has many defects. It tends to give excessive influence 
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to tiny political parties… and rarely produces a government which can act 
decisively in a crisis. 
 
In any case, if the Labour Party cannot defeat the Conservatives on its own, it 
is unlikely to do so in an alliance with the Centre or Nationalist parties; it is 
even less likely to form an effective government with them if it did. The Centre 
parties are deeply divided both on their values, their policies and their 
leadership; and each Nationalist party has only one aim, which none of the 
other parties share.”300 
 
The Labour Party after the defeat in 1979 could not have foreseen the eighteen 
years in opposition that awaited, and the internal trauma caused by Militant and 
the breakaway Social Democratic Party (SDP). Indeed, the ‘the gang of four’ – 
Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams, William Rogers and David Owen – who sought to 
‘break the mould of British politics’ committed, to many in the Labour Party, an 
act of treason akin to Ramsay MacDonald in 1931. As the ‘mould’ was to broken 
through PR the SDP were guilty by association, and responsible for returning the 
issue to the political agenda. Anderson and Mann state: “Proportional 
representation was too closely associated in most Labour minds with the hated 
SDP defectors and their Liberal allies to make any headway in the party.”301 
 
In 1983, the Labour Party manifesto was dubbed the ‘longest suicide note in 
history’ and was rejected by the British electorate, with Margaret Thatcher 
winning the first of her landslide victories. Labour achieved only marginally more 
votes than the SDP/Liberal Alliance, but considerably more seats; 8.4 million 
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votes won 209 seats compared to Alliance who polled just below 7.8 million votes 
but won only 23 seats. Bogdanor calculates that the Labour Party received thirty 
more seats than it would have achieved under PR. Curtice and Steed made two 
calculations, estimating on a national PR system Labour would have won twenty-
nine fewer seats, and a local PR system estimating the Labour would have 
returned twenty-two fewer seats.302 Having become one of the two major parties 
in British politics, the Labour Party’s position in the system was secure under 
FPTP even in the face of an electorally dominant Conservative Party and a 
resurgent third party. 
 
Summary 
 
A debate has existed towards the electoral system within the Labour Party since 
its inception. Whilst the Labour Party has flirted with electoral reform on a number 
of occasions, the Party has been committed to introducing PR for the House of 
Commons from 1910-1911 and 1918-1926. AV has often been advocated by 
some through genuine conviction and also as a compromise; “the lowest 
common denominator that the Liberals and Labour could agree if nothing else 
were possible”303 according to Anderson and Mann, as seen during the 1929-31 
Labour government, a device to buy Liberal support in order to remain in power 
rather than for any intrinsic merit of the electoral system. 
 
A range of factors have shaped the Labour Party’s attitude towards the electoral 
system: the best method to increase parliamentary representation and to become 
an independent political force, and the relationship with the Liberal Party. The 
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experience of minority government in 1924 and 1929-31 highlighted what a 
parliamentary majority could achieve if it was not reliant on the acquiescence of a 
party of ‘capital’. Coalition and the policy compromise involved, an event made 
more likely under PR, was inferior to single party government, as moderate 
Labour MPs and Cabinet Ministers such as Healey deemed. The argument from 
the Left during the Lib-Lab Pact, was unhappiness at the thought that 13 Liberal 
MPs had more influence over the Government than the 80 Labour MPs in the 
Tribune Group; a belief that the tail could wag the dog and a further watering 
down of the commitment to socialism. In addition, political events have shaped 
Labour attitude including MacDonald’s ‘great betrayal’ and the breakaway SDP, 
whose acts constituted betrayal of the Labour Party and the working class they 
sought to represent.  
 
Whilst MacDonald is resented for the events of 1931, and displayed a split 
attitude towards electoral reform, it was his underlying belief that British politics 
should revolve around a Conservative Party and a Labour Party that has had a 
great bearing on the governing ideology of the Party. The Labour Party should be 
independent, capable of fighting and winning elections across Great Britain and 
forming single-party governments. Consequently, any role for the Liberal Party 
had to be marginalised and its capability as an electoral force neutered. The 
1924 minority government and the attitude of the Labour Party in the 1920s 
clearly shows that MacDonald had every intention of keeping the Liberals at bay, 
emphasising that Labour was a Party capable of governing the British State. 
Interest in reform duly subsided as Labour’s position in the two-party system 
strengthened. Attlee’s 1945 reforming government was the fulfilment of Labour’s 
promise in the 1920s, utilising a parliamentary majority to enact social reform.  
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MacDonald’s attitude towards elections and governing was shared by 
subsequent Labour Party leaders and prominent figures within the Party, 
becoming the dominant view. Indeed, from the 1930s through to the mid-1970s, 
there was a lack of voices willing to make the case for electoral reform; a minority 
pursuit both within the Labour Party and wider society. The Westminster Model 
was accepted by the Labour Party, who chose to prioritise economic issues 
rather than constitutional reform. Whatever electoral and political difficulties the 
Labour Party faced, few within the Party believed it could escape them through 
PR and coalition. On the occasion when a deal had to be made, it was out of 
necessity rather than a conviction in the merits of parliamentary deals. In the 
period analysed a variety of system were put forward by dissenting voices, yet it 
was the perceived benefits FPTP that held sway within the Labour Party.  
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Chapter 3 - The slow rise and quick fall of the Plant Report 
 
The ‘Plant Report: A Working Party on Electoral Reform’, was an internal Labour 
Party enquiry that met from 1990-1993. Although the enquiry looked at potential 
electoral systems for the European Parliament, Regional and Devolved 
Assemblies, a reformed Second Chamber and subsequently developed a remit 
for Local Government, the main focus of the chapter will be the House of 
Commons, in line with the rest of the thesis. This chapter will begin by outlining 
the circumstances in which the Plant Report was written, the reasons for the 
growing pressure for reform and why the Labour leadership felt compelled to hold 
the enquiry. The chapter will then move on to the 1991 Democracy, 
Representation and Elections document, referred to in this chapter as the ‘Interim 
Report’, outlining the remit of the Working Party, theoretical issues and the nature 
and implications of different voting systems. In 1992, a short summary was 
released, referred to as the ‘Second Interim Report’, informing the progress the 
committee had made and the issues looked at to date. The Final Report 
published in 1993 states the arguments for and against reform of the electoral 
system and then recommends – decided through a series of votes by those on 
the committee – an electoral system for the House of Commons, the Second 
Chamber and the European Parliament.  
 
Through the use of interviews with those who sat on the committee, newspaper 
articles and secondary literature the issues raised in the report will be dissected, 
resulting in the issues of real politik supplemented with theoretical issues, raised 
in both the Interim and Final Report. The chapter will establish how proportional 
representation (PR) became a defining issue for the Labour Party in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, how conclusions were reached on the Plant Report and 
how the leadership sought to influence and ultimately contain PR. 
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The growth in pressure for voting reform 
 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the 1970s witnessed the decline of the combined 
vote share and seats for both Conservative and Labour parties, with the rise of 
the Liberal Party and the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP). For Joyce Gould, the 
February 1974 General Election shifted the focus in both the Labour and 
Conservative parties on to the legitimacy of FPTP. It was a “watershed moment” 
highlighting “The unfairness of FPTP in terms of votes and seats became clearly 
apparent for the first time since World War Two.”304 Many in the Labour Party 
cared little about the perceived unfairness of the electoral system when PR was 
discussed for the proposed devolved assemblies and European elections, it was 
viewed as ‘the thin end of the wedge’, leading people to question the legitimacy 
of the Westminster electoral system and eventually prompting a move away from 
FPTP. The breakaway SDP in 1981 were ‘guilty by association’ in their support of 
electoral reform and Labour politicians held the opinion that the ‘Gang of Three’ 
and others who joined were traitors or cowards, and whose actions hindered the 
Labour Party’s ambition of returning to office.  
 
Indeed, FPTP was not considered at fault for Labour’s defeat in 1979 or the 
electoral meltdown in 1983, when the Labour Party’s share of the vote fell to 28 
per cent. Instead it was a failure of policy – ‘the longest suicide note in history’ – 
leadership, presentation and organisation in the face of the electoral populism of 
Thatcherism. The Labour Party was deemed to be unelectable and given the 
internal Party strife with ‘entryism’ and the ‘hard left’, PR was low on the agenda. 
When the issue was raised, it was dismissed: Jack Straw considered PR to be 
about “giving parties who get the least number of votes the most power. It’s very 
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clever.”305 Peter Hain penned Proportional Misrepresentation in 1986 rejecting 
PR as it suffered from many flaws, whilst favouring AV for the House of 
Commons. After the second Thatcher landslide in 1987, an election in which the 
Labour Party considered it ran a successful campaign in terms of presentation 
and organisation, four percentage points gained had translated into only twenty 
more seats, a disappointing return. Consequently – and for reasons outlined 
below – interest in constitutional reform and, importantly, electoral reform and PR 
grew.  
 
Prior to 1979, the Conservative Party when in government had broadly supported 
the social and economic settlement introduced by the Attlee government. 
However, when the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher was 
elected in 1979 it embarked upon a series of economic, political and social 
reforms that ran contrary to the ideology of the Labour Party: privatisation of 
nationalised industries, restriction of trade union practices, restructuring the 
welfare state, all of which suggested the ‘post-war consensus’ had ceased. The 
Thatcher government was committed to the New Right ideology: shrinking the 
size of the state, cutting spending and liberalising the economy. Whilst pledging 
to ‘set the people free’, the power of local government was limited, the Greater 
London Assembly was closed down and the government utilised Royal 
Prerogatives and Privileges in order to pursue its agenda.  
 
Such significant social and economic changes, it was argued by electoral 
reformers, should have been supported by the majority of the electorate. On a 
minority of the popular vote deep societal and economic changes were driven 
through parliament, disregarding the views of the opposition inside and outside 
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parliament. Moreover, such an argument was used with increasing regularity by 
the opposition parties in parts of Britain where the Conservatives were in 
electoral retreat, specifically in Scotland. Yet this was not without problems. The 
Labour Party as a unionist party had adopted a ‘nationalist argument’, suggesting 
a government at Westminster – the place in which Labour was seeking to form a 
government – lacked legitimacy and that a significant minority of Conservative 
voters that remained in Scotland, should in effect have no representation. 
 
Labour’s Constitutional Reform Agenda 
 
The actions of the Conservative government had prompted a plethora of prose 
from authors such as Paul Hirst, Will Hutton, Michael Keating and David Jones, 
and David Marquand critiquing the British Constitution, advocating reform of the 
electoral system and promoting a pluralistic approach. Pressure groups formed 
campaigning for constitutional reform notably the Labour Campaign for Electoral 
Reform (LCER) and Charter 88, a reawakening of interest in civil liberties and in 
new forms of government. Charter 88 was critiquing not only the actions of the 
Conservative government but the perceived constitutional conservatism of the 
Labour Party. It followed Samizdat, a non-party newsletter committed to bringing 
together all anti-conservative forces publishing under the auspices of the 
Constitutional Reform Centre, for a new legal settlement. Neil Kinnock succinctly 
dismissed Charter 88 as “whiners, whinges and wankers”306 highlighting both 
Labour’s belief in the Westminster Model of government and the contempt in 
which constitutional reformers were held.  
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The Labour Party having traditionally been sceptical of wide ranging 
constitutional reform in the post-World War Two era, had become convinced of 
the need to alter Britain’s constitutional settlement. Had Labour won in 1992 a 
number of new institutions and other changes would have been introduced – a 
Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, signing up to PR for the European 
Parliament, an elected House of Lords by some system other than FPTP – all of 
which required the Labour Party to have a view on constitutional issues and PR. 
Pledging to introduce these institutions with no clear view, basis and agreement 
would have provided the Conservatives with an ‘open goal’ to attack Labour, 
arguing constitutional upheaval would result from a Labour government who had 
given no consideration to the implications of its policy. Moreover, the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention and the Executive of the Labour Party of Scotland 
were heavily engaged in drumming up support for a Scottish Parliament, perhaps 
realising that promoting a Scottish Parliament as a ‘one party state’ was going to 
be a ‘hard sell’. Consequently, the pressure for reform from different parts of 
Britain forced the British Labour Party to look more closely at new ideas.  
 
Roy Hattersley, then Deputy Leader of the Labour Party and Shadow Home 
Secretary, led the arguments against reform over the Plant process. He 
maintains that in this period “PR was very fashionable and there’s nothing more 
damning I can say than the word ‘fashionable’.”307 PR was one of many ‘fanciful 
ideas’, an outpouring in Hattersley’s mind of ‘radical chic’ that would disappear 
once poll ratings improved. Yet such ideas did find favour. Mary Georghiou 
commenting in the electoral reform edition of Samizdat – a publication dedicated 
to constitutional reform – argued that democracy should be Labour’s elusive ‘big 
idea’ and if the party were to adopt electoral reform it would be seen as a 
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symbolic indication that the voters could trust Labour with power. “Labour needs 
to show it trusts the electorate if it expects the electorate to trust us. To get the 
trust it needs Labour will have to admit that some people do not just want a 
different government but to change the way the government is elected.”308 
 
Dame Margaret Beckett shared Hattersley’s sentiment, stating that there was “a 
lot of talk about how the electoral system cheated the British people and what 
people really wanted was fair votes – that this demand was increasing.” With this 
feeling in the air, the Labour Party felt compelled to look into the matter. For 
Beckett the analysis was fallacious, as it was only a small but vocal minority 
demanding reform, not representative of the majority who were simply not 
interested.309 Alan Duncan from the GMB Union and Alun Michael, the MP for 
Cardiff South and Penarth concurred. At the 1989 Labour Party Conference the 
former affirmed: “There are some in this party who would have us believe that 
electoral reform is a burning issue, high on the political agenda. It is not” as the 
debate “has no interest or concern amongst the people we represent.” The latter 
was “not surprised The Guardian leader writer is urging us to go on this detour” 
though in truth it was “an irrelevant trip down a blind alley.”310   
 
Heath, Jowell and Curtice in Labour’s Last Chance, paint a picture of internal 
contradictions. In a cross-section survey, two different questions about electoral 
reform were asked, receiving differing responses. One question asked 
respondents how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement that: 
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Britain should introduce proportional representation so that the number of MPs 
each party gets matches more closely the number of votes each party gets. 
 
48% agreed, and only 27% disagreed. A second question put the matter 
differently, incorporating two commonly-expressed viewpoints for and against 
electoral reform, as follows: 
 
Some people say that we should change the voting system to allow smaller 
parties to get a fairer share of MPs. Others say we should keep the voting system 
as it is to produce effective government. Which view comes closest to your own? 
 
In response, only 33% favoured a change, while 60% favoured the status quo. 
Moreover, as measured by this latter question, opposition to electoral reform has 
grown slightly since 1983311 (54% favoured keeping the existing system in the 
1983 cross-section study while 39% were in favour of change). Consequently the 
oft professed popularity of PR was not necessarily as strong as the proponents 
claimed. 
 
The electoral possibilities of PR 
 
Although the evidence from the period suggests that support for electoral reform 
among the electorate is somewhat weaker than was acknowledged by its 
proponents, polling emerged of the electoral benefits for the Labour Party if it 
committed to electoral reform. The extra votes and seats would increase the 
likelihood of forming a government. The influence of academic commentators like 
                                                                  
311 A. Heath, R. Jowell, & J. Curtice, ‘Can Labour Win?’ in A. Heath, R. Jowell, J. Curtice & B. Taylor 
(edts.) Labour’s Last Chance? The 1992 Election and Beyond, (Dartmouth Publishing, Aldershot, 
1994) p. 291 
148 
 
Patrick Dunleavy on the Labour Party is understandable, given the political 
climate and the electoral appeal of Thatcherism. Dunleavy stated: “There would 
be about a three per cent net gain of Labour support which is in excess of 1.25 
million votes nationwide. If you looked at the change from the 1987 figure, you 
would be looking around 80 seats.”312 A poll for MORI conducted on behalf of the 
Electoral Reform Society suggested a fifth of centre party voters would switch 
their votes to the Labour Party if it committed itself to PR, a three per cent swing 
among the population at large. Backing PR would increase Labour support 
particularly among middle-class men living in the south-east, with ‘fairness’ and 
‘increased democracy’ the main reasons given for supporting PR.313 The 
opportunity to win over a considerable number of voters could not be passed up 
for a party seeking to return to office and would not have escaped the attention of 
Labour MPs. 
 
The need to look for different ways of attracting support stemmed from the 
question of whether Labour could win again under FPTP. Three successive 
general election defeats, seemingly unable to make electoral advances against 
the popular appeal of Thatcherism, had dented the belief that the electoral 
pendulum would swing to Labour. There was a feeling that FPTP, according to 
Lord Rosser “wasn’t very friendly to the Labour Party… The prospect of returning 
to office were not necessarily that great.”314 Others shared the pessimism of 
Labour’s electoral situation. Linton and Wintour, commenting in the Guardian 
argued “three successive election victories and dismay on the Left at the 
prospect at its impotence at preventing a fourth and even fifth Thatcher win.”315 
The prospect of Conservative hegemony, whether accurate or not, ratcheted up 
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the pressure on the Labour Party to consider other methods of election if it was 
ever to have the opportunity of governing.   
 
The Labour Party, even if it were to perform well at the next general election, still 
faced the possibility of a hung parliament with no party able to form a majority. 
Therefore, if a coalition was necessary, in all likelihood with the Liberal 
Democrats, the Labour Party would have to table an offer on electoral reform, the 
starting point for the negotiating with the Liberal Democrats. Consequently, to 
have a concrete proposal would show the Liberal Democrats that the Labour 
Party were serious about electoral reform, power-sharing and reforming the 
British constitution. The Liberal-SDP Alliance had performed well in terms of vote 
share in both 1983 and 1987 yet had been hindered by the workings of FPTP, 
receiving fewer seats than its national vote share warranted on a proportional 
basis. Observing two opposition parties to the Conservatives fuelled the 
‘progressive-left’ thesis, overlapping in some policy areas, with a combined vote 
totalling more than the Conservatives leading some to conclude there was a 
progressive majority in Britain. The shame of British politics had been a disunited 
left according to Marquand316, allowing the Conservative Party to dominate 
electoral politics in the twentieth century. 
 
As the talk of a ‘progressive left’ grew John Evans MP for St Helens North, a 
leading ally of Neil Kinnock, argued in late 1988 for an electoral pact in sixty key 
marginal constituencies in an attempt to defeat the sitting Conservative MP. 
Evans had in mind thirty in which the Labour candidate would stand down and 
thirty seats where the ‘centre’ candidate would stand down. It was time, to quote 
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Evans, “to think the unthinkable”317 and break with Labour’s historic fear of pacts 
and coalitions. Charles Clarke, Kinnock’s Chief of Staff from 1983-1992, 
accepted the view that Labour had to be more open to new ideas, potential 
strategic alliances, working with other individuals and political parties in a much 
more general way and to recognise other strands such as feminism and human 
rights. “Neil’s leadership was very much about being open to different forms of 
approach.”318 
 
The Labour Party’s adherence to bringing about a more equitable and fair society 
led some to question how a party committed to an equal society could support an 
electoral system where there is a clear disparity between votes cast and seats 
won. Where was the ‘equality’ and ‘fairness’ in supporting an electoral system 
that acted so unfairly towards the SDP-Liberal Alliance or to the millions of 
Labour voters in the south of England who repeatedly end up with Conservative 
MPs? Moreover, the issue of equality and fairness spread further than votes 
translating into seats. Baroness Gould states: “the issue of reform was part of a 
bigger wider movement outside of electoral politics. Charter 88 emerged along 
with the Labour Party’s Campaign for Electoral Reform. Equality and Fairness 
along with women’s representation were part of the deep societal changes 
happening in the 1980s”319 emphasising the pluralistic changes Britain was 
experiencing. 
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The ‘Labour Campaign for Electoral Reform’ and the build-up to Plant 
 
The ‘Labour Campaign for Electoral Reform’ (LCER) – an internal Labour Party 
grouping – grew dramatically by 1993, gathering a following of over 2000 
members and the sponsorship of over 60 Labour MPs. In spite of Labour riding 
high in the polls by 1993 the group became the largest campaigning group within 
the Labour Party.  
LCER Membership, 1984-1993320  
(Table 1) 
Date Number 
1984 35 
1985 50 
1986 100 
1987 200 
1988 300 
1989 700 
1990 1000 
1991 1,500 
1992 1,700 
1993 2,000 
 
Dale Campbell-Savours, the Labour MP for Workington, announced in The Times 
that of 125 Labour MPs he personally interviewed over the past nine months, 108 
were in favour of some change in the electoral system. The survey was 
dismissed by a party spokesman as “a series of informal discussion over a 
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period.”321 To further counter the poll conducted by Campbell-Savours, a survey 
by Market Access International consulted 35 MPs, of whom 25 said they did not 
support electoral reform.322 
 
Despite the arguments for reform and the increasing popularity of PR amongst 
Labour MPs, the Labour leadership and the wider Labour movement was not yet 
ready to reverse its opposition to electoral reform. Table 2 shows how the Party 
leadership was under pressure by a succession of conference resolutions 
concerning electoral reform, although these were met by a strong retorts at the 
1987 and 1989 Conferences by those who still favoured FPTP. 
 
Labour Conference and Amendments on Electoral Reform, 1987-1991323  
 (Table 2) 
1987 Brighton 25 Resolutions and Amendments 
1988 Blackpool 7 Resolutions 
1989 Brighton 37 Resolution and 6 Amendments 
1990 Blackpool 31 Resolutions and 6 Amendments 
1991 Brighton 35 Resolutions (30 for and 5 against) 
 
At the 1987 Labour Party Conference in Brighton a representative from Mole 
Valley moved ‘Composite 27’ in favour of setting up a Working Party on Electoral 
Reform. Whilst the Composite was seconded by Chorley and did receive support 
from representatives from Watford, it was contested by Kevin Stephens 
(Gloucester CLP) arguing the electorate have “seen what the economic doctrine 
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of the Liberals and the Tories mean to them – it means redundancies. They need 
protection and they need jobs” along with a National Minimum Wage and only a 
“Labour government can deliver that.” Peter Hain (Putney CLP) offered a 
traditional defence of the British system of representative government asking “is it 
really a priority to tinker around with the electoral system when we confront much 
more important issues of democracy?” Siobhan McDonagh (Mitcham and Morden 
CLP) argued the Labour Party lost because “not enough people wanted to vote 
Labour” and Labour will win “fighting on the issues that people find important.” 
 
The most vocal critic of electoral reform and PR was Hattersley who claimed 
supporting this composite would be “interpreted as, and in fact is, support for 
proportional representation” and would be “absolute folly.” Much to the enjoyment 
of the floor, Hattersley bashed the SDP asserting they are “united by only two 
principles: the first is a hatred of David Owen and the second is support for PR.” 
Furthermore, he went on to deliver a classical defence of FPTP; damaging our 
traditional system of democracy and eroding the rights of people to vote for the 
policies which they support – the manifesto and the mandate – and the 
unaccountable backroom deals and blunting of radical policies through “soggy 
compromise” associated with PR. Hattersley closed his speech affirming “the 
belief that we can win on our own, the certainty that we will win on our own, on 
our own policies, our own programme and our own philosophy. The only way 
forward for this party is to fight on its own policies and to win on its own policies. 
That is why we must defeat this resolution.”324 
 
It became apparent that the issue of electoral reform would not disappear. 
‘Democracy and the Individual’ headed by Hattersley was one of the groups in 
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Labour’s policy review. According to Hughes and Wintour in Labour Rebuilt, 
Hattersley realised he could side-line the most important issue in his remit – PR – 
by tying it to regional representation and reform of the House of Lords, an idea he 
first floated on 20th September 1988. It was attempting to “snare proportional 
representation in the lobster pot of constitutional reform.”325 No member of the 
group supported PR. Besides: “a scheme different from that by which Members 
of Parliament are elected” was possible as no minister would be drawn from the 
second chamber.326 This provided the opportunity for the final six paragraphs of 
its report to condemn proportional representation, citing reasons such as the 
confusion of coalition government, disproportionate influence over policy by 
smaller parties, the questioning of the “resolve of the Labour Party win outright” 
and PR would decrease democracy, through the watering down of manifesto 
commitments.327 
 
Whilst electoral reform was not a key issue at the 1988 Labour Party Conference, 
one year later the issue had returned, with a motion – composite 29 – calling for 
‘an urgent study on electoral reform in its widest sense’, in practice, a working 
party on electoral reform. Once again it was rejected, for it would have been a 
diversion from winning the next general election. Hattersley damned PR and its 
consequences for Westminster, claiming “proportional representation would 
diminish, not increase genuine democracy in the country” as it is in “the House of 
Commons that governments must build their majorities and introduce their 
legislation and for the House of Commons, PR would in consequence be a 
reduction, not an extension of democracy.” Furthermore, he attacked the smaller 
parties, believing at the “end of a week in which Labour had honed its policies the 
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party was “going to contemplate bargaining that away in a smoke-filled room with 
Mr Paddy Ashdown, Dr David Owen or anybody else to bargain away our 
manifesto. It would be an act of historic folly.”328 The resolution was duly defeated 
4,592,000 to 1,443,000 a majority of 3,149,000, a substantial majority of 3:1. 
However, the losing side drew comfort from the result, emphasising 1,443,000 
votes had been cast in the cause of electoral reform, affirming the issue was here 
to stay. Benn notes in his diary that the Conference National Executive 
Committee (NEC) discussed PR, “which was supported by Robin Cook, Ken 
Livingstone, John Evans and Clare Short. Hattersley, Kinnock, Bryan Gould, 
Beckett and I spoke against it. In the end there was a vote, with 23 to 4 against 
even having an NEC inquiry into it.”329 
 
The culmination of the policy review was Meet the Challenge, Make the Change 
published in 1989330. The document described FPTP as “the most honest, the 
most efficient and the most effective form of government.” Moreover, the 
document warned of the dangers to be associated with PR. “Talk of proportional 
representation or any alternative voting system would cause the electorate to 
question our resolve, our commitment, and our self-confidence.” Bryan Gould 
writing in A Future for Socialism331 considered PR generally suffered on a 
number of counts against a socialist criterion of diffusing power: the loss of direct 
representation through multi-member constituencies, the elector’s uncertainty of 
the ultimate destination and purpose of his or her vote because of transferable 
votes, and a significant increase in the power of Party officials to determine who 
should be elected as a result of national or regional Party lists. 
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The Labour leadership was divided. Hattersley considered even the most minimal 
softening of the position on PR a sign of weakness on behalf of the Labour Party 
and a whim that would evaporate once poll ratings rose. Kinnock was more 
flexible viewing the issue as not yet fully discussed in Britain: “those people who 
are entirely defensive about the possibility of change are much more dynamic 
and forward looking than some politicians give them credit for.”332 He thought 
debate was essential if widespread support was to be built. In addition, an open-
minded approach had the potential to foster more votes for the Labour Party, 
attracting support from those leaning towards the centre parties. Kinnock and 
those around him, according to Lord Whitty, were “quite positive” towards 
electoral reform and although “Neil would never say he was completely 
convinced, he would say he was more favourably inclined than any leader before 
or since.”333 Beckett agrees with Whitty, yet implies that Kinnock was ‘got at’ by 
those around him, who had “convinced themselves that this was the only way 
Labour could win, who were very strong advocates, persuading Neil that this was 
a valuable modernisation reform.”334 Exactly who ‘got at’ Kinnock, Beckett was 
not prepared to say. 
 
For the ‘modernisers’ within the Party, electoral reform was not only useful in 
distinguishing the present Party from its past but would result in a Labour 
government being pulled away from socialism towards the centre. Voters who 
perhaps did not yet ‘trust’ the Labour Party to govern would be reassured about a 
Labour government that was able to marginalise its more extreme elements. 
Philip Gould, a key strategist for the Labour Party, states “The drive towards 
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proportional representation came from a belief that it was the only certain way to 
make Labour safe. If you have PR, Labour can never govern alone. It was always 
to be neutered, a consensus not an extreme government.”335 Butler and 
Kavanagh reflected that “Mr Kinnock’s flirtation with PR and his subsequent 
emphasis on a broad-based co-operative approach to government was designed 
to soften Labour’s image and allay fears about a Labour government.” Patricia 
Hewitt and Clive Hollick thought PR might provide reassurance that the Party 
sought consensus and would not give in to the unions or the left wing.336 
 
However, ‘trust’, ‘modernisation’ and ‘centrism’ were only part of the rationale 
behind the increasing interest in electoral reform and PR in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. The fate of the Party at the ballot box encouraged a reappraisal of 
attitudes and objections to PR, electoral reform and coalition. Successive 
defeats, of which 1983 and 1987 had been landslide victories for the 
Conservatives resulted in the Party engaging with ideas such as PR, emphasised 
by the votes at Labour Party Conference, the increased membership of LCER, a 
more prominent role for electoral reformers such as Robin Cook and Marjorie 
Mowlam – individuals willing to make the political, moral, social and economic 
case for reform – and the increasingly sympathetic tone adopted by Kinnock. 
Primarily, PR was the method that would broaden Labour’s electoral appeal and 
put it into a position where it would enter government, as a single party or in a 
coalition with the centre. Consequently, PR was part of a wider strategy for 
power. 
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Meanwhile, the Scottish Labour Party was heavily involved with the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention also debating electoral systems for the prospective 
Scottish Parliament. As with the Labour Party south of the border, the need to 
keep the Liberal Democrats on board kept alive the option of electoral reform. It 
was decided at the Dunoon conference in March 1990 that it could not accept 
FPTP elections for the Scottish Parliament. As the Labour Party was the 
dominant party in Scottish politics in terms of votes and seats, Kinnock 
announced that “no one can claim that our party is examining the detail of 
methods of electing the Scottish Assembly from any position of weakness or 
supplication. We are doing it from a position of strength and in the interests of 
democracy.”337 Advocating an electoral system other than FPTP for a Scottish 
Parliament was an indication of the seriousness of the Labour Party’s 
commitment to a more pluralist and consensus-based politics. 
 
The Labour Party produced a policy document titled Looking to the Future in May 
1990, asserting “Labour (was) opposed to changing the electoral system for the 
House of Commons.” It reiterated how the House of Commons is the primary 
institution and, as such, a fundamentally different institution to all others. 
However, throughout 1990 the pressure for reform continued to grow, with Party 
leaders showing an increased willingness to consider PR for the European 
Parliament, a reformed second chamber, a Scottish Parliament and regional 
assemblies for England and Wales. A Working Party was to be set up by Labour 
Party Conference, as had been agreed by the NEC, without considering PR for 
the House of Commons. Gavin Laird, General Secretary of the powerful 
Amalgamated Engineering Union, questioned the logic stating it was “not credible 
then to say we are not going to look at the system, examine the system, for the 
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House of Commons.”338 Labour leaders believed that including the Commons in 
the Working Party’s remit would allow the Tories to claim Labour had abandoned 
hope of winning under the FPTP.339  
 
The opposition to the consideration of PR for the House of Commons – the 
position of the leadership – was defeated at the 1990 Labour Conference. By 
2,766,000 to 2,557,000 Conference approved a study on proportional 
representation, rebuking Hattersley who once again had promoted FPTP. Robin 
Cook argued “If you are to have a really thorough review of electoral reform, you 
cannot have no go areas.”340 It was, to quote Linton and Southcott, the moment 
when “Labour moved from outright opposition to an agnostic position on electoral 
reform”341 signifying a considerable change of attitude towards the electoral 
system, not seen since the 1920s. It is noteworthy that the decision to include the 
House of Commons in the Working Party’s analysis may have been even closer, 
had the builders union, UCATT, which opposed electoral reform, not lost its 
160,000 strong voting card; eventually forcing it to abstain. Laird argued that 
Labour would get an ‘even bigger’ majority at the next election if it committed 
itself to PR in advance of the poll, and raised questions of credibility if the Labour 
Party were to consider PR for other institutions but not the House of Commons. 
By contrast Ron Todd, the transport union leader, remained neutral on the issue, 
proposing only that it be debated.342  
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Pressure for reform of the electoral system came from a variety of sources and 
for a variety of reasons. Whereas the Labour Party had shown very little interest 
in electoral reform and PR during a prolonged period of opposition between 1951 
and 1964, the situation in the 1980s was fundamentally different. The 
Conservative government had embarked on a socio-economic course committed 
to the free market and the undermining of the planks of social democracy. 
Conservative statecraft was perceived to be hegemonic, and the third party – 
now the Liberal Democrats – along with the nationalist parties had fractured 
British politics, in turn promoting the ‘progressive left’ thesis. This raised the 
possibility of a hung parliament and the need for coalition, encouraging thoughts 
that a commitment to electoral reform was an avenue back into government. 
Indeed, electoral reform was a prerequisite for realigning the British left. 
Constitutional reform had found favour and had been articulated by academics 
and had increased in popularity with certain section of the electorate.  
 
As Neil Kinnock indicated, “What we are initiating is a formalised debate about 
electoral systems, not deciding in favour of PR – far from it.”343 Nonetheless, the 
enquiry, Democracy, Representation and Elections was the first serious study 
into the matter in the Labour Party since MacDonald, Anderson and Roberts 
investigated proportional representation prior to World War One. The Working 
Party was made up from different parts of the Labour Party; MPs Bryan Gould, 
Alistair Darling, Margaret Beckett, Hilary Armstrong, Geoff Hoon, John Evans; 
Peers Reg Underhill, Patricia Hollis and from 1992 Raymond Plant; MEP’s Geoff 
Hoon and Gary Titley; academics Raymond Plant and Ben Pimlott; trade union 
representatives Richard Rosser, Judith Church, Tom Burlison and members from 
the nations Murray Elder from Scotland, Ken Hopkins from Wales and Jack 
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McConnell as Scottish General Secretary of the Party. Thus, the committee 
contained a broad span of views and attitudes towards the electoral system due 
to variety of Labour backgrounds of the membership. The objective, according to 
Plant was to encourage a debate about the nature of representation and 
democracy.  
 
All constituency parties were invited to present evidence, The Parliamentary 
Labour Party allowed MPs to respond as individuals, Labour Peers were 
canvassed and set up a Working Party to respond, along with a visit to the 
European Parliament to discuss with Labour MEPs and other socialist 
delegations elected by proportional representation.344 Dr Tim Lamport, Secretary 
of the Working Party considers, “It was slightly different from a normal Labour 
Party policy committee having more autonomy… It ultimately reported to the NEC 
who set it up and determined who was on it and did not report to the Home Policy 
committee.”345 This increased freedom, particularly from the Home Policy 
committee, who would have had an explicit interest in the matter, allowed the 
committee to carry out its work free from direct interference from the leadership. 
However, with the Working Party involving individuals such as Beckett, meant a 
sceptical leadership could be assured that the committee would avoid advocating 
anything too radical.  
 
Plant’s original position 
 
For those who sat on the committee, Plant’s original stance on electoral reform is 
contested. Beckett believes “Plant changed his mind. When Plant was appointed 
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and one of the reasons Plant was appointed I suspect, was because he was a 
FPTP man.”346 Rosser disagrees along with Clarke and Lamport. Rosser always 
got the impression Plant was a “genuine agnostic on the issue. Therefore, he 
wasn’t starting out with a particular stance or position and looked at the issue 
openly” a view shared by Lamport.347 Clarke claims Plant “wasn’t particularly 
committed to any direction. He was certainly open minded, to put it mildly. He 
wasn’t an advocate and he wasn’t one of these liberal types who thought it was 
the most important thing in politics. I would say Raymond was more than open to 
it. He was certainly ready to give it a thorough investigation. On the other hand, in 
the event he looked at it properly and thought it wasn’t a starter, he would have 
been ready to say it wasn’t a starter.”348 
 
Regardless of opinions on where Plant started, there is agreement Plant changed 
his mind as the Working Party progressed. Whether he started out as a FPTP 
supporter or an agnostic his finishing position was pro-reform, not only in coming 
out in favour of a different electoral system but by joining the Labour Campaign 
for Electoral Reform. Beckett judges: “the arguments that convinced me against 
it, convinced him in favour of it. Now, whether he had pressure put on him by 
people around Neil who said this is increasingly what the leader wants, I have 
absolutely no idea. These things happen. Raymond will probably be outraged at 
any such suggestions. His view moved as the commission went on and he was 
trying to get something out of very divided views.”349 Rosser concurs, deeming 
Plant “became convinced of the need for change.”350 
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Hattersley chose Plant to be Chair, not wanting “some fashionable PR advocate 
to do it absent minded because it was the new idea of the day, we’ve got to 
change, modernisation.” Moreover, Plant was a “man you could trust, believe in 
his integrity” and perhaps most importantly given the attitude in the Party at the 
time, appeared to be “opposed to PR.” Hattersley “always believed, and I 
appointed him in the belief that he would come out strongly against. Indeed the 
day of the first meeting he told me he was strongly against.” The argument for 
Plant’s chairmanship was based on the belief that Plant was a “FPTP man” and 
he would not have been appointed “had I not thought him to be FPTP.” Hattersley 
is unequivocal and was in no doubt: “some months before he told me he was 
FPTP and he was appointed for that reason.”351  
 
Plant, when asked on his attitude towards electoral reform prior to chairing the 
Working Party, stated “I suppose I went into it, insofar as I thought about it at all, 
that I was in favour of FPTP.” When Hattersley asked for Plant’s view on the 
electoral system, Plant replied he had no views on the matter, the answer he 
wanted to hear, illustrating for Plant what Hattersley thought about PR. Yet Plant 
changed his mind due to the evidence the Working Party received and the result 
of going to Germany. “FPTP no longer really mapped accurately the range of 
interests in the country and you needed – not necessarily a more proportional – 
but more pluralistic kind of system.”352 It was also alleged that Hattersley 
described Plant as a “political innocent”353, suggesting that Plant’s lack of political 
experience was also part of the reason why he was chosen, something Plant 
took as a compliment. 
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Hattersley’s decision to appoint his friend Plant as Chair meant that someone 
who supposedly had very little prior interest in electoral systems and electoral 
reform – a ‘political innocent’ – was leading Labour’s first serious enquiry into 
electoral reform since prior to World War One. An academic from a background 
in political philosophy was chairing a group of individuals who were in the main 
politicians, resulting in the committee containing a range of opinions, some 
passionately held, with significant hostility to reform from elements of the 
leadership who did not wish to be seen as coming down in favour of reform. Yet, 
this neutrality would be vital in avoiding the perception of bias and allowed the 
Labour Party to argue it was starting with a blank sheet of paper, and as Charles 
Clarke affirms, it was important the conclusions carried weight.354 Plant’s 
appointment also sidestepped a potentially damaging split in the Labour Party. 
Hattersley considered that at the time there was a majority in favour of FPTP so 
we “avoided a row by having someone who was regarded as agnostic.”355 
 
The Interim Reports 
 
In 1991, the Interim Plant Report was released, stating two important caveats. 
Firstly, “the appropriateness of an electoral system is going to be governed to a 
large extent by our view about the nature of representation and by what we think 
that elections are actually for” drawing a distinction between a ‘legislative’ body 
and a ‘deliberative’ body.356 Consequently, if an individual considers the purpose 
of an electoral system is for the formation of a strong single party government 
then they are likely to support the simple plurality or majoritarian system, allowing 
the enacting of a legislative programme. However, if an individual considers the 
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purpose of an election is to produce a parliament that is a microcosm of society – 
where all strands of thoughts and opinions gain representation – then they will 
support a more proportional system, allowing a range of views to gain 
representation and influence policy through negotiation and coalition.  
 
Plant affirms “Those in favour of the first past the post or majoritarian systems 
tend to take the view that the House of Commons is the arena in which 
competing political philosophies or ideologies are locked in a constant combat 
and effectiveness depends to a large extent on parliament being able to continue 
to provide this kind of forum.”357 At Westminster, Labour and the Conservatives 
engage in a political battle with two competing visions of society. Consequently, it 
is undesirable for Parliament to consist of small single-issue parties, whose very 
existence threatens the capability and existence of a parliamentary majority 
committed to socialism. “In the view of the defender of FPTP it is more important 
to have the capacity to fight for a substantially fairer society than to superimpose 
some abstract and procedural idea of fairness and justice on a much less than 
fair society.”358 The electoral system might be considered to be ‘fair’ in relation to 
a pre-set criteria if the percentage of votes cast matches the number of seats 
won. Yet, as a counter to the ‘economic argument’ outlined above in the chapter, 
the society under PR might be very unequal and unjust, the opposite of which the 
Labour Party strives to create. 
 
The traditional socialist response to those who advocate Parliament reflecting 
society at large – a microcosmic view – has been twofold. Initially, “such a view of 
the function of electoral systems is highly individualistic. It is concerned only with 
fairness to individual preferences and does not consider any other sorts of social 
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values at all.” A socialist would concern themselves with the solidarity of a 
community voting for the socialist candidate; a bloc vote against the parties of 
capital. Even if the Labour candidate failed to win, the electors have shown unity 
in opposition to the parties of capital. Secondly, supporting an “electoral system 
purely on the grounds of a rather formal understanding of fairness, it might under 
a PR system introduced for such reasons, find it impossible to form a government 
which would be committed to securing greater social and economic justice or 
fairness.”359 The disparity between the percentage of votes and percentage of 
seats in the House of Commons may be undesirable, but the objective is to 
create a more equal society, something that can only be achieved by a 
parliamentary majority committed to socialism. Voting is not an end in itself but 
considered a means to an end, which is a more egalitarian society. 
 
“Advocates of proportionality, on the other hand tend to stress the idea of 
Parliament as a deliberative assembly in which the range of opinions reflected in 
proportional membership are negotiated and to some extent blunted by the 
almost inevitable coalition building that goes on.”360 Finer in Adversary Politics 
and Electoral Reform argued electoral reform and coalition politics can produce 
moderate policies which are in touch with mainstream voters.361 The majority of 
the British electorate are considered to be centrist and whereas FPTP gives 
disproportionate influence to extremists in both the Conservative and the Labour 
Party. As a result, the leadership of both the Conservative and Labour Party have 
to pander to the extremes, with the consequence of governmental policy being 
out of kilter and unrepresentative of the wishes of the majority of voters. 
However, depending on the political culture, the small parties in the political 
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system are not necessarily ‘centrist’, whereas the two large parties may be 
considered ‘centrist’, with the more extreme wings of the respective parties side-
lined. Furthermore, the nature of the coalition depends on the parties involved 
and the overarching ideology that binds them together, conceivably resulting in 
the larger ‘centrist’ party being pulled away from the centre. 
 
Describing parliaments and assemblies as either ‘legislative’ or ‘deliberative’ did 
draw criticism, for failing to acknowledge that a legislative body has a deliberative 
function and a deliberative body has a legislative function; legislation must be 
debated and requires a parliamentary majority for it to be passed into law, 
emphasising that an institution such as the House of Commons has a dual 
function. Furthermore, in the British political system with the executive emerging 
from the legislature, the executive must have the consent of a majority of the 
legislature. A response was offered in the Second Interim Report admitting that 
the House of Commons is both a “legislative and deliberative chamber” and 
institutions are “not necessarily static.” However, this was qualified by reiterating 
a distinction, at least in terms of emphasis between the House of Commons and 
that of other institutions envisaged by Labour’s constitutional reform agenda. The 
committee maintained “that this distinction has a central although not necessarily 
a determining role to play in selecting an electoral system.”362  
 
The second caveat mentioned by Plant affirms “no voting system can 
simultaneously satisfy a set of obvious conditions for social choice in a 
democratic society.”363 This is a result of the idea of ‘fairness’ and to whom we 
are seeking to be fair – electors, political parties, minorities, women and 
                                                                  
362 Second Interim Report of the Working Party on Electoral Systems (The Plant Report), London, 
1992, p. 3 
363 Report of the Working Party on Electoral Systems, 1991, p. 22 
168 
 
geographical regions – and the ‘hierarchy of fairness’ in which one puts them, are 
shaped by values. As Plant notes: “The important point is that the claim to 
fairness does not stand on its own, it is, rather, fairness given a particular 
assumption about the nature of representation,”364 going on to state in 
Parliamentary Affairs “Electoral mechanisms cannot be assessed in a wholly 
neutral way, as it were giving them points against a set of neutral criteria.”365 
Indeed there are cases where by seeking to be ‘fair’ to one group you may hinder 
another, and returns to Plant’s original assertion that what you consider to be fair 
is dependent upon what you consider elections to be for. Moreover, different 
forms of Proportional Representation contain different assumptions about some 
of the central features of representation, the role of parties and the nature of 
accountability.366  
 
Importantly, given the Labour Party’s commitment to devolved assemblies, it was 
agreed that different electoral systems can be used for different institutions, as 
the role and function of the institution varies depending on its powers and remit, a 
key factor in light of the Labour Party’s constitutional reform agenda. There is, as 
both caveats suggest, no perfect electoral system and therefore a case can be 
made for using more than one system in different areas of government. “The 
nature of representation in an institution” claims Plant, “has to be linked to the 
function of that institution rather than determined on abstract and contested ideas 
like ‘fairness.’ What we should be looking for is fairness in relation to function.”367 
Therefore, the argument is entwined due to different electoral systems fostering 
different views of the nature of representation, and the type of representation 
might be more suitable for one sort of institution than another.   
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The Single Transferable Vote (STV) was rejected by the Working Party, deeming 
it to suffer from several pitfalls. There are issues over whether the electorate 
would understand, for example, how the divisor is worked out or how the 
preferences are redistributed, with the process much more complex than simply 
marking ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ on a ballot paper. Whilst none of the interviewees were 
prepared to state the British electorate were not capable of understanding how 
votes were translated into seats under STV, Plant wrote “We do believe it is 
important for citizens to be able to understand the electoral system in which their 
democratic rights are exercised.”368 Understanding the system is a vital principle 
in a democratic society and the Irish, along with other countries, appear to have 
understood STV. It is easy to assume that the workings of FPTP are widely 
understood, whereas the workings of STV are likely to be a different case. The 
‘fairness’ of STV is consequently open to scrutiny if the electorate cannot 
understand how it works. 
 
A critique of STV offered by Dummett – noted by the Working Party in the 
Second Interim Report – was the results under STV are “devoid of equity, either 
to the candidates or to the voters,” as the outcome “depends on the accident of 
which candidates fail at early stages to avoid elimination.” Consequently, the 
voter can never know whether by voting or listing their choices in a specific 
manner they may actually harm their preferred candidate’s chance of winning. 
“STV ought never to be contemplated.” As AV is also a preferential system, it too 
can be critiqued in the same manner.369 Additionally, the size of the 
constituencies under STV in terms of electors would be in the region of 350,000, 
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therefore resulting in some constituencies being vast geographical areas, further 
diluting the constituency link in a multi-member region. STV, at the time of writing 
the Plant Report posed specific problems for the Labour Party. Having just 
emerged from years of in-fighting the idea, to quote Plant, “of setting up an 
electoral system that actually encouraged people to stand against one another 
wasn’t going to be something they were going to embrace very fondly.”370  
 
For the House of Commons, the Plant committee recognised the legislative 
function of the House of Commons and considered there was a “powerful case” 
for leaving untouched the central elements of the representative and electoral 
system. This included clear accountability through a constituency base, thus 
ruling out multi-member constituencies as in STV as well as national or regional 
List System. Furthermore, it questioned the role of top-up MPs under the 
Additional Member System (AMS) / Mixed Member System (MMS). Lord Whitty, 
a supporter of AMS considered that the Labour Party could not back an electoral 
system that did not maintain a constituency link, believing “MPs do really identify 
with their constituents, either in a negative sense that they’re causing trouble, or 
in terms of the next election – the accountability. The trouble with a too broad 
electoral system is you lose that accountability.”371  
 
Rosser, also a supporter of AMS, attempted to dispel the argument that electors 
would question who the top-up MPs represent. “Most people would feel they still 
have a constituency representative, namely the person who won the 
constituency.” More interesting would be how the constituency MP would feel 
about the top-up MP. “Having someone who could claim legitimacy in the same 
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constituency…could be quite a distasteful prospect (for the constituency MP).”372 
Although it would be interesting to see how the constituency MP would react to a 
top-up MP claiming legitimacy within his or her constituency, the question of who 
the top-up MP represents remains. It is possible to argue that AMS is one of the 
few electoral systems where you are voting for a coalition, at an individual level 
with the voter expressing their preference for coalition partners. However, at an 
elite level, where coalition negotiations take place, the individual voter’s 
preference counts for very little as it will be party leaders who decide the makeup 
of the next government. It could also be argued that it is illogical and 
contradictory to have an electoral system whereby a voter can openly vote and 
express a desire for two parties to form a coalition. The two parties may have 
fundamental differences on the economy or direction in which to take the country, 
and there is no guarantee that if the situation arises whereby the two parties 
could work together, that they will form a coalition.  
 
Plant considered the constituency link to be key, ensuring a direct link between 
constituents and legislators which would be weakened in a multi-member 
constituency. “In relation to predominantly legislative bodies” noted Plant, “we do 
believe that the constituency basis of representation is very important in terms of 
securing the accountability of an elected person to a clearly identifiable group of 
people.”373 Maintaining the direct constituency link was criticised from some 
quarters prompting a response in the Second Interim Report arguing that the 
direct constituency link keeps the MP in touch with grassroots feeling about 
policy and its implementation, rather than becoming preoccupied with 
Westminster politics. Furthermore, given the Labour Party’s historic commitment 
to community it would be paradoxical for the party to commit to diminishing the 
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role of communities in electoral terms.374 Bryan Gould, considering himself 
‘something of a romantic’ on the history of British parliamentary democracy “liked 
the thought that each MP was sent to Westminster primarily to serve his or her 
constituency rather than a particular party.” When challenged in the House of 
Commons by a Liberal MP on the grounds he had only received 37% of the vote 
and could therefore not claim to represent his constituents, Gould replied 
rhetorically, “Who would you replace me with – someone who got only 19%?”375   
 
Beetham refuted the importance of the constituency link as “In matters of national 
policy and legislation” whether in government or opposition “the MP represents, 
in the sense of act for, only those who voted for them... Anything else would 
undermine the idea of a mandate, and the conception of an election as a choice 
between competing party programmes.” As such an MP follows the party line 
rather than those of his or her constituents. A consequence “is to leave a large 
part, even a majority, of the national electorate without an MP to represent them, 
in the sense of acting on their behalf on the basic issues of national policy and 
legislation which elections are supposedly about.”376 However, Beetham’s 
explanation does not take into account the role of an MP, who has a duty to take 
up the concern of the constituent and seek redress at the highest level regardless 
of who the constituent voted for. To do so is in the MPs interests, for they do not 
know whether the constituent has voted for them due to the secret ballot, and to 
aid with re-election an MP should seek to resolve all constituency matters. As 
Finer noted, the single-member constituency results in a Member of Parliament 
being a representative, not a delegate. “It allows the individual member a latitude 
of personal discretion and initiative outside the party programme… which makes 
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for good government… This personal system produces an intense responsibility 
and responsiveness to the electorate on one side, i.e., the system is of a highly 
representative quality: and on the other, a predictable sphere of independence of 
the member.”377  
 
Beetham emphasises that keeping abreast of the geographical spread of the 
population ensures under FPTP “the lower house is a mirror image of the 
electorate according to its geographical distribution...From a geographical point 
of view, you could hardly have a system that could produce a more 
representative, or microcosmic assembly.” Yet, Beetham affirms that “when the 
electorate is primarily choosing between competing programmes for national 
legislation, not someone to represent their local interests, it is hard to see why 
the national assembly should be proportionate to the geographical distribution of 
the electorate, and not to the distribution of the party vote in the country.”378 
Consequently, Westminster as a national assembly, should not be based on 
geographical representation but a national system, legitimising the national 
mandate.  
 
The LCER claimed in 1987 that “although 10 million voted Labour, only three 
million were needed to elect 229 Labour MPs. The other seven million were 
either wasted on a losing candidate or were used to boost the majorities of 
winning candidates.”379 The Plant Report refutes the ‘wasted vote’ argument – 
votes above and below the ‘winning post’ figure – namely the runner-up’s total 
plus one or votes cast for losing candidates – acknowledging “It would be better 
to call them surplus votes and then to consider whether there is a plausible 
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reason for regarding such votes as wasted.”380 As mentioned earlier, voting in 
solidarity with others, expressing an opinion in terms of class, family interests, 
ethnicity, gender or religion, is the way an individual is expressing their opinion, a 
point made by Rose and McAllister. Which votes are the wasted votes? The 
concept of a ‘wasted vote’ is as Dummett explains, “not merely vague, but 
incapable of being made precise.”381 
 
Furthermore, Plant thought it undesirable that there has been a decline in FPTP 
ability to closely equate share of the vote and share of seats. “While the First 
Past the Post system does not directly aim at proportionality, nevertheless a 
decline in some kind of predictable relationship between votes and seats would 
actually undermine the concept of representation and the function of Parliament 
held by defenders of First Past the Post. There has to be some rational and 
predictable relation between votes and seats if there is to be a defence of First 
Past the Post as a legitimate system even on its own assumptions.”382 Therefore, 
if the chief virtue of FPTP – single-party government – could be achieved on a 
percentage vote share in the low thirties then this would bring into question the 
legitimacy of the system, particularly if the winning party in terms of seats 
continually polled fewer votes across Great Britain.    
 
The Interim Reports were the building blocks for the committee to move on to the 
Final Report where it would go on to make firm recommendations, and therefore 
the two interim reports did not clarify the Labour Party’s policy on PR for 
Westminster. They were more concerned with electoral theory – unsurprising 
given Plant’s academic background in political philosophy – with the interim 
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report making clear there is no such thing as a perfect electoral system and the 
assertion of fairness does not stand on its own but to the criteria by which one is 
judging fairness. Importantly given Labour’s constitutional reform agenda, 
different institutions can use different electoral systems. Indeed, Plant 
acknowledged that the House of Commons was still going to be the primary 
legislature even within the devolved settlement, resulting in a “powerful case for 
leaving the central elements of the representative and electoral system...of vital 
importance to the legislative function of the place.” Indeed, it would still be 
advantageous to maintain an electoral system that produces majorities and 
therefore the power to elect a government which will initiate legislation. 
Importantly, the power of making and unmaking government should be in the 
hands of electors, not politicians in ‘smoke-filled rooms’ who cobble together 
coalitions after the election.383 Consequently, the interim report does hint that the 
options available to reformers were limited to AV, SV or a variation of AMS, a 
system that involves multi-member constituencies, rather than STV or regional or 
national list systems.   
 
The 1992 General Election, Labour and Proportional Representation 
 
The polls in the lead up to the 1992 General Election placed the Labour Party 
ahead of the Conservatives, on course to be at least the largest party. However, 
the lead in the polls evaporated in the final few days and the election held on 9th 
April 1992 gave the Conservative Party under John Major their fourth successive 
general election victory achieving just short of 14.1 million, the highest poll in a 
British general election. However, rather than the commanding lead in popular 
vote translating into a third successive landslide for the Conservatives, FPTP had 
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only given the Conservatives 336 MPs, a slim majority of 21. The Labour Party 
had won 271 MPs on 11.5 million votes, an improved showing on 1987. The 
FPTP ‘pendulum’ had started to swing towards the Labour Party, with the vote 
becoming more efficient in terms of translating votes into seats. 
 
During the final few days of election campaign the issue of proportional 
representation emerged. The Labour Party manifesto – It’s Time to Get Britain 
Working Again – stated, “We will continue to encourage a wide and well-informed 
public debate on the electoral system. The Working Party on electoral systems 
which we established in opposition under the distinguished chairmanship of 
Professor Raymond Plant will continue its work with an extended membership 
and enhanced authority and report to the next Labour government.” Contingent 
on a Labour Party victory, Kinnock elaborated on the function of the Working 
Party suggesting it could be converted into a formal government inquiry reporting 
to the Prime Minister, possibly even a Royal Commission, and its membership 
would be widened to include members from outside the Labour Party, including 
business, trade unions, churches and members of other political parties. 
Consequently, the Labour Party had gone further than it had before in endorsing 
PR and the Liberal Democrats were invited to join the Plant Committee. 
According to Blackburn, the Labour government would respond by determining 
its own policy on the matter, which would then be laid before the electorate at the 
next general election.384  
 
Charter 88, under the guidance of Anthony Barnett, arranged ‘Democracy Day’ 
on 2nd April 1992, the moment in which the Labour Party would announce its 
support for PR. It was according to Beckett “Such a sign of lack of confidence” 
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feeding the view “which was untrue, that we didn’t stand for anything and we’d 
say anything to try and get elected, desperate to get the Liberal vote, saying 
something we probably didn’t mean.”385 It also ensured the newspaper headlines 
would focus on hung parliaments, coalition, the Liberal Democrats and the 
nationalists, away from the more salient economic issues. Clarke considers that 
the issue of PR and the shadow budget were the two big issues that had not 
been fully thought through by the party, “manifesting uncertainty about what we 
were going to do” resulting in the Labour Party looking “untrustworthy” and as 
such was a “weakness.” Accordingly, “The electorate were not clear whether we 
would do something or would not do something, and this was exposed in the last 
few days before polling.”386 
 
Kinnock faced difficulties on the Granada 500 programme on April 6th, failing to 
provide a direct answer to the question of whether he was in favour of PR, 
responding “Yes, sure – well, quite no, it is not quite so simple”, saying that he 
was waiting for the Labour Party’s Working Party to report. Kinnock’s position 
was understandable for in public he had attempted to remain neutral on the 
issue, to avoid being drawn on either side of the argument. An open declaration 
of support had the potential to be interpreted as a loss in faith in Labour’s ability 
to win.387 In an attempt to balance the views of defenders of FPTP and reformers, 
along with his own preference which was becoming increasingly sympathetic to 
PR, Kinnock had to do so without providing the Conservative Party the 
opportunity to attack him for appearing to fudge the issue, a lack of principle and 
a lack of confidence in the Labour Party’s ability to win. Kinnock’s view was that 
in any event an electoral mandate would be required to make such an 
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“irreversible and significant” change to the future of our political democracy.388 A 
general election manifesto commitment would be the traditional and constitutional 
manner for the change to be agreed. 
 
Butler and Kavanagh conducted a post-election survey amongst Labour 
candidates, with many quick to condemn PR, believing it showed weakness, 
distracted from the National Health Service and taxation or they were opposed to 
PR.389 Clarke is of the view that in 1992 “we couldn’t win unless we reassured 
electors that it was safe to come back to Labour, for all sorts of reasons; winter of 
discontent and other points in between”, with the issue of PR as noted hampering 
Labour’s chances of success.390 However, Hattersley disagrees believing it had 
no effect. “If you wanted PR passionately you would have voted Liberal” as it was 
a “niche issue.”391 Hattersley reflected:  
 
“Labour certainly wanted to poach Liberal votes. We wanted to poach Tory 
votes as well, but we were less successful in that endeavour. Unfortunately, 
we actually lost support by what appeared to be a sudden conversion to 
constitutional reform. The proposals set out during two press conferences 
(exactly a week before polling day) had been official party policy for years. But 
the unexpected enthusiasm with which the plans were advocated appeared to 
be the product of sudden panic.”392 
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Post-election research, detailed in the table below, demonstrations how different 
election systems would have affected the 1992 General Election result.393  
 
Number of MPs and percentage of seats in the House of Commons 
(Table 3) 
Party and 
Vote share 
Result and 
% of seats 
AV SV STV AMS 
Conservative 
41.9%  
336 MPs 
51.6% 
325 MPs 
49.9% 
304 MPs 
46.7% 
256 MPs 
39.3% 
 
268 MPs 
41.1% 
Labour 
34.4% 
271 MPs 
41.6% 
270 MPs 
41.5% 
271 MPs 
41.6% 
250 MPs 
38.4% 
232 MPs 
35.6% 
Liberal 
Democrat 
17.8%  
20 MPs 
3.1% 
30 MPs 
4.6% 
49 MPs 
7.5% 
102 MPs 
15.7% 
116 MPs 
17.8% 
SNP/PC  
3.5%  
7 MPs 
1.1% 
9 MPs 
1.4% 
10 MPs 
1.5% 
20 MPs 
3.1% 
18 MPs 
2.8% 
 
A different majoritarian system would have resulted in the Labour Party standing 
still or decreasing, and therefore would have provided little or no electoral benefit, 
refuting the argument that a different electoral system would have been beneficial 
in 1992. Indeed, the only party that stood to benefit in 1992 was the Liberal 
Democrats, with a swelled number of MPs, increasing the likelihood of coalition. 
Under a proportional system the Labour Party would have had fewer seats and 
been reliant on the parliamentary support of the Liberal Democrats. Moreover, 
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the Conservatives would still have been the biggest party and as the sitting party 
would by, constitutional right have had first opportunity at forming a government 
or coalition.  
 
Evans offered an analysis of tactical voting in the 1992 general election. Contrary 
to the ‘progressive-left’ thesis – a belief that Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
are on the same side of politics – the Conservative Party would have been the 
main beneficiary of tactical voting in 1992. Indeed, a Sunday Telegraph/Gallup 
poll, published only four days before polling day, showed that if minor parties 
were to hold the balance of power, 45 per cent of Liberal Democrat supporters 
favoured keeping the Tories in power compared to 41 percent who preferred the 
Liberal Democrats leverage being used in favour of the Labour Party.394 
Whatever electoral benefits had been advocated by reformers prior to the 
election – whether backing PR or electoral pacts – were not borne out in the 
post-election study. Thus Healey’s assertion that “the non-Labour majority is 
probably as large as the non-Conservative majority; there is no guarantee that 
members of the Centre parties would vote Labour if their own candidates stood 
down – or vice-versa”395 was vindicated. The Conservatives could in 1992 equally 
have argued that there is a split on the Right of British politics, that a vote for the 
Liberal Democrats was a vote against the Labour Party. Rather than the 
overtures towards the Liberal Democrats resulting in a broadening of Labour’s 
electoral appeal, it encouraged wavering Liberal Democrats and those 
instinctively anti-Labour into the arms of the Conservatives, therefore having the 
opposite effect. 
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Kinnock stood down as leader of the Labour Party, replaced by John Smith, with 
Margaret Beckett becoming his deputy. Smith’s proposals for constitutional 
reform included incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into 
British law, devolution for Scotland and Wales, House of Lords reform, a freedom 
of information bill and regional government. He had attacked the “relentless 
centralisation of power” under the Conservatives that had rendered Westminster 
“dictatorial and remote”.396 However, electoral reform at Westminster entailed 
different issues compared to the electoral systems for the proposed devolved 
assembles, considering it “more complicated” than other aspects of constitutional 
change. Moreover, “There’s a good and healthy debate going in within the Party 
and I don’t want to prejudge it.”397 
 
According to Smith’s biographer, Andy McSmith, in 1991 Smith discussed with 
Ashdown in a taxi the possibility of PR. Smith’s version of the conversation was 
that “we did not talk specifics”398, but according to Ashdown’s office, the gist of it 
was that Smith was ready to concede proportional representation for the 
Commons, the Scottish Parliament and regional assemblies, in return for Liberal 
Democrat support for a minority Labour government, should there be a hung 
parliament. The Ashdown Diaries record during a gathering of the Bilderberg 
Group in Spain in May 1989, Ashdown and Smith drank copious amounts of 
brandy, yet the shadow Chancellor rejected the idea of electoral pacts, believing 
that Labour would win in its own right. Consequently, the leadership of the party 
was, in relation to reform of the Westminster system, at best sceptical, as Smith, 
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from the Right of the party, was unenthusiastic, and Beckett originally from the 
Left of the party was outright hostile. 
 
The account of events in late 1992 by Whitty emphasises the hostility of the 
Labour leadership to reform, how the problems facing Labour had not changed – 
Labour trailed the Conservatives by 7% and despite gaining forty more seats, the 
Party had received a lower percentage of the vote than Callaghan had in 1979, 
immediately after the ‘winter of discontent’ – yet the prevalent view was one more 
general election would see Labour back in government. 
 
“In one of the meetings, in late 1992, John sent Margaret to tell the committee 
that the leadership will not support, if you go for electoral reform. It poured 
cold water on the work they’d been doing for the last eighteen months… In 
some ways the politics had not changed. The Labour Party had failed to win 
another general election… So if anything the arguments after 1992 were 
stronger for looking at electoral reform. John and Margaret and the high 
command in general were far more hostile after 1992. One more heave was 
the attitude, on both policy and the electoral system.”399  
 
The Final Report 1993 – ‘Report of the working party on electoral systems’ 
 
Having met on twenty-eight occasions; taken advice from both those inside and 
outside the Labour Party, interested individuals and groups and academics; 
visited Europe, including Germany to gain an understanding of the German 
Additional Member System; the Final Report was published in April 1993. 
Whereas the Interim Report was interested in assessing the criteria by which 
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electoral systems can be judged, the Final Report sought to make 
recommendations for the House of Commons, as well as the Second Chamber 
and the European Parliament. The arguments put forward in Chapter One – The 
Case for Reform – and Chapter Three -The Case for First Past the Post – are of 
interest given they set out the arguments in favour and against reforming the 
Westminster electoral system, which is set against the background of the Labour 
Party’s wider commitment and enquiries into constitutional reform. David Butler 
claimed that “The Plant Report is a revolutionary document”400 as it attempted to 
move Labour away from electoral conservatism. 
 
The Case for Reform acknowledges Labour’s constitutional reform package is, in 
part, recognition of the growing pluralism in British society, whether it be 
individualism, particular groups, or the distinctive identities found across the 
United Kingdom. For Plant, FPTP fails to recognise the growing pluralism in 
British life in terms of party representation, as there are regions of Great Britain 
where substantial support for a political party does not return MPs. In order to be 
consistent with Labour’s wider constitutional reform agenda an electoral system 
should be adopted that reflects and provides opportunities for new voices to be 
heard. If one party dominates in a particular part of Britain it could lead to 
alienation and frustrations, excluding the representation of others, particularly 
with the growing north-south political divide.  
 
Secondly, the issue of having more women in Parliament was considered, as in 
the Interim Report; and the same conclusion was reached that the electoral 
system has little impact on the number of women MPs as it was a matter of social 
context. Changing social attitudes towards minority and ethnic groups along with 
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positive discrimination in the form of all-women shortlists, was the preferred 
method. Thirdly, the suitability of FPTP must be questioned in relation to 
devolution and its inability to be sympathetic to local and regional issues, with the 
potential for devolved assemblies to claim more legitimacy as they are elected 
under an alternative electoral system, based on increased proportionality. For 
those who favoured electoral reform it was necessary for the Commons and 
central government to have enhanced legitimacy, even if they have a diminished 
sphere of power within Labour’s proposed programme of constitutional reform. 
Plant claimed: “This can only be achieved by a change in the electoral system 
which makes central government more sensitive to local and regional issues and 
interests, as represented and expressed in the House of Commons.”401 
 
Whilst Maurice Duverger maintained “The simple majority single-ballot system 
favours the two-party system”402 the Case for Reform considered that due to a 
decline in ‘Cube Law’, FPTP is likely to lead to more hung parliaments, and 
therefore part of its rationale, namely single party government, would cease. In a 
multi-national state like the United Kingdom, with strong regional identities and a 
separate ethnic-based politics in Northern Ireland, the two-party system comes 
under pressure from the forces of pluralism. It is also claimed that the 
geographical concentration of the vote leads to areas of the country becoming 
‘no go’ areas for political parties. Lord Whitty stated FPTP exaggerates the 
“perceived geographical divide in the UK. The Thatcher government, and to 
some extent the present government, govern from the South-East. By and large 
Labour governments govern from London and the north, the industrial heartlands 
and Scotland.”403 Robin Cook showed how Labour, in the 1992 general election 
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produced its second highest number of votes in southern England, more than in 
the North, Yorkshire or Scotland but returned only three Labour MPs. 
Proportionally, the Labour Party was entitled to an MP from Dorset and even 
from Berkshire.404 
 
Consequently, the claim a government receives a ‘national mandate’ from the 
electorate is problematic when the winning party’s support is concentrated in 
particular regions of Great Britain. The recent experience of the policies pursued 
by the Thatcher government and the landslide victories in 1983 and 1987 would 
have been fresh in the mind. Not since 1935 and the National Government has 
the government received over 50% of the vote, thus implicating the notion of the 
‘mandate’ and the legitimacy this provides. A government, as suggested by Plant, 
can win a “substantial majority on the basis of a percentage of the vote in the low 
forties...It is important that fundamental changes are very widely supported, if 
they are to be seen as legitimate and not undone by some incoming government 
with a different ideological perspective.”405 When interviewed, Plant considered 
the idea of the ‘mandate’ to be “laughable.” A party having to do something 
because it’s in the election manifesto even though the policy is “outmoded” is 
awkward. “Only a minority of the voters who have read the manifesto to start with 
and more importantly a minority of voters have voted for the manifesto under 
whatever favourable electoral considerations… You’ve always got to go outside 
the box of Labour interests and Labour values… to enable the Party to galvanise 
enough support to form a government.” More importantly, is “how you can write a 
manifesto that has sufficient flexibility if you like, to make it possible for people 
outside of the Labour movement to vote for you.”406 
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During the height of the two-party system in the post-World War Two era neither 
Labour nor the Conservatives managed to win over 50% of the vote. Rosser 
shared Plant’s rejection of the mandate, claiming the “issue is a mandate from 
35-40% of the electorate rather than a mandate from the electorate as a whole is 
an argument against FPTP.”407 Winning a mandate on a popular vote of less than 
50% may be undesirable, yet as Whitty stated “I’m not sure why and at what level 
between 35 and 50 it becomes an issue”. However, he qualified his opinion that if 
“the majority voted against the government, I do think it’s a problem”408 
suggesting anything less than 50% for the winning party is problematic for the 
mandate. As such the policies introduced by the government are not necessarily 
in the interests of the whole nation but designed to appease the constituency 
base. Yet this does raise the matter of how one judges what is and is not in the 
national interest, and by what scale this is measured. 
 
The ability of FPTP to deliver pure ideological values – a vision and introduction 
of democratic socialism – is questioned and cannot be defended on the grounds 
that it is in the electoral interests of the Labour Party. At the time of the Plant 
Report, only in 1945 and 1966 had FPTP provided Labour with significant 
parliamentary majority. In 1964 Labour had a parliamentary majority of four and 
in October 1974 a majority of three. “If the achievement of democratic socialist 
values has to depend on First Past the Post and the strong and effective 
government this is supposed to produce, then its contribution to the achievement 
of these values has historically been extremely intermittent.”409 Although the 
Labour Party won four out of five elections between 1964 and 1979, only in 1966 
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was this with a working majority. Given that the Labour Party has a unique social 
and economic agenda, FPTP is unlikely to be the vehicle for the introduction of a 
Democratic Socialist Great Britain. 
 
Secondly, FPTP encourages parties to move towards the centre, as this is where 
both the beliefs of the median voter reside and the bulk of the electorate. This 
argument was put forward by Anthony Downs, and used in the Interim Report. 
Downs claims voting is a rational act and political parties are rational actors and 
both will maximise their own interests. The government will utilise the ‘Majority 
Principle’ subjecting each decision to a “hypothetical poll” always choosing the 
“alternative which the majority of voters prefer. It must do so because if it adopts 
any other course, the opposition party can defeat it...Thus to avoid defeat, the 
government must support the majority on every issue.”410 Consequently, “The 
critic of PR cannot claim that First Past the Post provides an unalloyed 
opportunity for parties to preserve ideological purity”411 as internal compromise 
on policy in political parties must take place in an attempt to win as many votes 
as possible.  
 
Consequently, the Plant Report suggests that coalition government may be 
preferable to single party government. “It is surely better to be able to carry out a 
very substantial part of a programme, rather than be left in a position powerless 
to make a difference to the lives of those who have suffered the depredations of 
a Conservative government elected with just over 40 percent of the vote.” 
Hitherto, single party government had always been seen as superior. The 
reasoning was based on the work of Max Weber who put forward a distinction 
between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, the latter being a 
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willingness to compromise in order to gain a particular electoral benefit. Coalition 
was justified on the basis that “adherents of the ethic of responsibility who are 
concerned to achieve something, if not everything, of what we stand for are in a 
more defensible position, mainly because we have to be concerned about the 
needs of those who depend on a strong Labour input into government, rather 
than maintaining a high level of ideological purity at the cost of political 
impotence.”412 
 
The ability of FPTP to continue to deliver strong government is brought into doubt 
by the fragmentation of the party system, with smaller parties winning and 
holding on to seats. Moreover, strong government is not necessarily a desirable 
criterion, as “strength has to be linked to effectiveness to produce a reasonable 
criterion of judgement.”413 Indeed, an “effective government is one which has 
policies to meet the needs of the country and the political will and capacity to 
implement them… More likely to be produced by a system other than First Past 
the Post, because it will embody a wider degree of consent and legitimacy. Under 
a reformed system, a government will have a greater incentive to seek wide 
consent and thus greater legitimacy for its policies with Parliament.” The ensuing 
change to the British political tradition that would follow a change to the electoral 
system would correct “some of the most intractable British problems, impeding 
the possibility of our development into a modern democratic society and of a 
successful economy.”414 
 
Plant continues: “Labour would be the biggest party in any coalition and as such 
would have the democratic legitimacy to enact the bulk share of its manifesto 
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whilst making minimal concessions to the junior coalition partner. A changed 
electoral system would “provide incentives to see greater legitimacy and consent 
within parliament” changing “the behaviour of parties” making more likely a 
“climate for greater collaboration within British politics...Maintaining such a tribal 
approach to politics is likely to make parties seem more and more irrelevant, 
given the more pluralistic and instrumental approach to politics in the modern 
world.” Those in favour of reform wondered whether “defenders of First Past the 
Post would seriously argue that Labour should not seek power, because it could 
not possibly countenance the possibility of political negotiation with other parties 
because of what such critics regard as its undemocratic nature.”415 
 
Should hung parliaments and coalition result from a change in the electoral 
system no party can claim the democratic case for formulating a programme of 
government without wider consent. The legitimacy of the mandate is doubtful in a 
hung parliament meaning a party has to seek wider consent for its programme of 
government. Negotiations which follow do not have to be in ‘smoke-filled rooms’ 
but “informed by the political judgement and sensitivity of party leaders”416 to 
MPs, party officials, peers and the electorate, implying a wide range interests will 
be taken into account. Yet, the first three groupings are to some extent detached 
from the electorate, who although directly accountable to the electorate in the 
case of MPs, could go against the wishes of their constituents due to the lure of 
ministerial roles, enacting policies and being in government. Another 
consideration is the internal party structure, which could affect who and how 
many individuals hold influence on the direction of coalition talks and entering a 
coalition. 
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Lamport recalls spending a whole afternoon going through The Case for First 
Past the Post with Beckett, agreeing with her on what it could say.417 The Labour 
Party should be committed to pluralism but rather than seeing pluralism within the 
House of Commons, defenders of FPTP who see pluralism as valuable to the 
Labour Party suggest pluralism between institutions is more worthy – inter over 
intra institutional pluralism – with decentralisation and devolution of power a key 
part of the Labour’s commitment to constitutional reform. The basis of this 
argument lies in the House of Commons producing the executive while all other 
institutions, although important, do not carry the same legislative function. 
Different electoral systems for the devolved institutions, rather than undermining 
the legitimacy of the House of Commons, is perfectly compatible with FPTP for 
the House of Commons, for checks and balances would be provided by the 
devolved institutions. 
 
FPTP is defended on the basis it “secures a clearer form of accountability to the 
electorate via the manifesto and mandate”, two essential ingredients of 
parliamentary democracy, whilst avoiding “taking the election of the government 
out of the hands of the electorate and into the hands of those making behind-the-
scenes inter-party deals.”418 The diagnosis offered in the Case for Reform that 
the vote share of the two main parties is decreasing and hung parliaments are 
likely to occur more often is rejected: it is “entirely speculative” and is “not a good 
basis on which to embark a fundamental reform of the electoral system.” Even if it 
were accepted to be correct, the “development of policies with a strong national 
and regional appeal and by improved organisation”419 was required for electoral 
victory. Pressure for reform had arisen from a prolonged period in opposition, but 
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the possibility of “single party government” was not going to be traded away “for 
an electoral system which seeks to incorporate regional differentiation at the cost 
of permanent coalition” and having to rely on support from other parties.420 
 
The failure of the Labour Party to win elections is down to the policies it puts 
forward and “If its policies have not been found to be acceptable in certain areas 
and regions of the country or, say, in rural constituencies, then it is to our 
policies, our organisation and our presentation that we should turn for an 
examination, rather than to an alteration of the electoral system.”421 Labour is a 
nationally-based party and consequently should have broad-based policies that 
appeal across the country, and the pursuit of power relies on creating converts 
not the “artificial device of changing the electoral system.”422 In the past the 
Labour Party had representation in the South West and East Anglia and we see 
no reason why Labour cannot win again in these areas. It is not “right to resort to 
manipulating the electoral system for the House of Commons to combat regional 
concentration of party support. Rather, the Labour Party should develop ever 
more relevant policies that can appeal to voters in Hampshire and Sussex, as 
much as in Strathclyde or Wales.”423 
 
The Case for First Past the Post makes a traditional defence of the ‘mandate and 
the manifesto’, something that is argued to be crucial to democratic 
accountability. Political parties are by their nature coalitions of left and right, and 
therefore policies have already been discussed and compromised between 
diverse interests. Under a different system, manifesto commitments would be 
traded away post-election. Therefore, “the electorate has no way of expressing a 
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view about the policies which emerge from such negotiations” and is in fact 
undemocratic, for the electorate can exert no influence at that stage. FPTP 
“enables the electorate to have a clear choice of government.” The question 
asked when the electorate go to the polls is “‘which government do you want?’... 
making government accountable to the electorate in a way that no other system 
can.”424 The electorate in 1992 were not “cheated” through the electoral system 
failing to give expression to the anti-Tory majority. Instead, the electorate through 
their actions of voting for political parties other than Labour acquiesced to the 
return of a Conservative government. Only by retaining “a sense of integrity in 
relation to their own values and retaining a sense of honesty, fair dealing in 
relation to the electorate and a proper sense of accountability”425 will the Labour 
Party win an election. Although there is concern about a strong executive elected 
on a national vote share in the low forties, “under PR, smaller parties could 
exercise pivotal power with a much lower percentage vote.”426 
 
Recommendation, reaction and impact 
 
For a legislative body it was considered the electoral system should ensure as far 
as possible “direct accountability to the electorate” and, therefore, the Working 
Party was “not prepared to endorse an electoral system for the Commons in 
which individual representatives do not face the electorate directly and in which 
direct accountability to the electorate is diminished.”427 Consequently, both 
regional and national list systems were rejected along with STV for both are 
based on multi-member constituencies, leaving the Alternative Vote (AV), 
Supplementary Vote (SV) and MMS, devised by Rooker, with 500 seats won 
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under FPTP and the remaining 150 ‘top-up’ seats won by candidates who had 
stood in a constituency. The system shared similarities with the system 
recommended by the Hansard Society in 1976, who advocated three quarters of 
the House of Commons to be elected in single-member constituencies under 
FPTP and one quarter regionally according to a more proportional system, with 
those elected on the top-up having to stand for direct election.428   
 
None of the interviewees who sat on the committee were prepared to say who 
supported which system, claiming they could not remember given the length of 
intervening time. Whilst entirely plausible it could cynically be described as a ‘vow 
of silence’, unwilling to divulge the way the Committee divided, and as the votes 
were not recorded it makes it difficult to know how each individual voted. Two 
reports appeared in the press firstly in the Financial Times and secondly in The 
Times. Combining the two articles suggests the working party voted 10 votes to 6 
in favour of reforming the electoral system, deciding 11 votes to 4 that any new 
system had to be based on MPs representing individual constituencies rather 
than being elected in strict proportion to the number of votes a party wins 
nationally. In deciding which electoral system to recommend, the committee 
agreed by 9 votes to 7 SV.429 The numbers put forward coincide with Plant’s 
comments that MMS was “rejected by a majority on the Working Party” whilst 
there was also a “majority on the Working Party which favoured moving away 
from First Past the Post.” The position was best summarised as a “clear majority 
in favour of a single-member constituency majoritarian system.”430  
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Yet the decision that was reached came as somewhat of a shock to Plant and 
Lamport. Plant wrote it appeared to him to be a “small majority in favour of an 
additional member system but between these straw polls and the final meeting of 
the Working Party at which final recommendations were made some change 
came about in the intimated voting intentions of certain members of the Working 
Party.”431 The shift was a result of Smith ‘getting at’ members of the Committee – 
“certainly the MPs” - having “everyone in separately telling them which way they 
should be voting. I think Alistair (Darling) particularly was quite strongly in favour 
of some move away from FPTP but after he had the interview with John Smith he 
wasn’t… I think a lot of people were got at but they won’t let you know they were 
got at.”432  
 
Lamport shares Plant’s view, recollecting some on the Working Party “changed 
their position a bit”, wanting “to be seen as going the way the leadership wanted 
it to go”, leading Lamport to be “surprised” because “one or two didn’t take the 
same position they had indicated previously.” As such, “Either they were leaned 
on or felt this is the side the bread is buttered and I’m going to do what the 
leadership want me to do...I think there was less support for the proportional 
system than there probably had been, people didn’t want to be seen to be going 
for that.”433 Indeed, Plant found himself voting in favour of an electoral system he 
didn’t support, in an attempt to ensure the Working Party would recommend 
reform. “I didn’t want the Supplementary Vote” stated Plant, however “I did in fact 
vote for it or else otherwise the majority would have gone for FPTP which I didn’t 
want. To keep the issue alive it seemed to me best to vote for the Supplementary 
Vote.” According to Plant, Rooker when he realised MMS was going to be 
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rejected voted for FPTP as opting for SV was worse than retaining FPTP.434 
Stuart claims Rooker had unsuccessfully argued for a top-up of about 100-150 
members to make SV more proportional.435 
 
Regardless of the role Smith played in encouraging the Committee to reject PR 
and come out in favour of FPTP, some members took it upon themselves to 
make the workings of the Committee as difficult as possible. Prior to the Working 
Party voting on which system to recommend, according the Financial Times, 
Beckett attempted to deliver a ‘Minority Report’, containing only a menu of 
options and not making any firm recommendations to the NEC, a position that 
was rejected by Plant. Beckett wanted to “try and make it absolutely plain that we 
didn’t all go along with this aim of changing the electoral system and to put the 
argument across for FPTP, which otherwise were not going to be put.”436 The 
Times reports that Beckett was so angered after the working party had opted for 
SV, she walked out the meeting and continued to demand a minority report.437 
Bryan Gould saw himself in a “spoiling role”, not wanting to “provoke an outright 
split”, contenting himself with “trying to ensure it arrived at no meaningful 
conclusion.”438 Baroness Armstrong who at the time was Smith’s Parliamentary 
Private Secretary (PPS), replaced Jo Richardson when she fell ill, chosen in 
effect to ‘spy’ on the Working Party. “John felt that he could not get a hold of what 
was going on in there. And he didn’t want a surprise. So he put me on so I could 
tell him what, politically, the issues were coming out.”439  
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“In a sense” wrote Lamport when reflecting on the Plant Report “SV was perhaps 
the lowest common denominator or 'least worst' option. Some may have backed 
it on the basis that, if there were to be change, this represented the minimum.”440 
Lamport later reflected “there were some people on the working party who 
thought that we’re not going to get away with supporting FPTP, although that’s 
what we’d like to say and SV is the minimum change we can get away with.”441 
Armstrong considered it was “alright at the time but it was a fudge.”442 Whitty 
thought it was an attempt to keep everyone happy but rejected it was a ‘fudge’ as 
the working party had “gone through the system of exhaustive ballot, so it was 
never the majority view of the committee. It was the one that people had the least 
objections towards, which is one of the problems.”443  The recommendation of a 
not very proportional system was a fudge, Plant deemed in the New Statesman & 
Society, along with the committee’s decision to emphasise the function of voting 
systems rather than their fairness. “The political dynamics of the working party 
made it rather difficult to have entirely sharp priorities without risking the whole 
thing.”444 
 
Advocacy of change was always likely to meet resistance. In January 1993, 
Beckett is supposed to have told colleagues on the Working Party at a two-day 
meeting, “if you lot carry on like this there’s going to be a fucking great row in the 
party.”445 David Hill, Labour’s communication director, told the final meeting of the 
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working party on 31st March 1993 “I’ve come to put a lid on all of this.”446 The 
response of Smith and Beckett to the recommendations was, perhaps given their 
known positions, unsurprising. Smith and Plant had already had an argument at 
the 1992 Conference over whether the Working Party should be allowed to make 
recommendations on the House of Commons rather than arriving at conclusions 
of BBC-like impartiality.447 Plant considered that the working party must deliver a 
firm recommendation to the NEC as not making a fixed recommendation after 
two and half years of work would have made a mockery of the working party and 
undone all the work hitherto completed. Smith and Beckett considered it to be a 
diversion from vital modernisations required to make the Labour Party electable, 
particularly One Member One Vote (OMOV). A commitment to changing the 
electoral system was an unnecessary diversion from winning the next general 
election.  
 
On 19th May 1993 Smith released a press statement thanking the Working Party 
for all its efforts but going no further and stating his own position and that of the 
Labour Party. “Most electors” Smith affirmed, “vote for a party with the intention 
that with their support it should form a government. That is not a relevant 
consideration to, for example, the European Parliament which does not have the 
obligation to produce and sustain a Government.”448 MMS was rejected due to 
the dilution of the constituency link and having two classes of MP. Secondly, “it 
would make a coalition government the most likely outcome of an election” and 
the electorate according to Smith were entitled to vote for a “set of distinctive 
policies and for a government which will carry them through.”449 The course of 
                                                                  
446 Ibid., p. 13 
447 Plant, ‘Proportional Representation’, p. 70 
448 Labour Party Archive, Press Release, The Rt Hon. John Smith, 19th May 1993, Working Party on 
Electoral Reform, Labour History and Archive Study (LHASC) 
449 Ibid., 
198 
 
action given its “constitutional significance” was, for Smith, pledging a 
referendum. 
 
“It should be for the people to decide…That is why I firmly believe that the 
final decision on this issue must be taken by means of a referendum and why 
I propose that such a referendum be held during the first Parliament of the 
next Labour government. It would be held at a time when the Labour 
Government had begun the most radical programme of constitutional reform 
this century. There could be no more appropriate time for the public to be 
given the opportunity to settle the long-standing debate on the future of our 
electoral systems.”450 
 
When Plant floated the referendum at a meeting of the Working Party he found 
little support.451 Yet Smith’s decision to refer whether to reform the Westminster 
electoral system to the British electorate kept both reformers and traditionalists 
happy, for it did not fully close the door on reform nor come down in favour of 
reform. The referendum was also a device that prevented the Labour Party 
splitting in the run up to the next general election, and although it meant the issue 
did not go away, it was side-lined. In effect, pledging to hold a referendum was a 
party management device.  
 
According to Beckett “John was a great believer in getting rid of things that cause 
division and problems because the voters don’t like a party that’s divided. He was 
no great enthusiast for this type of constitutional reform, thinking one of the ways 
to curtail the issue was to say, ‘well you think the British people demand this, but 
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no one has ever asked the British people. Why don’t we ask the British 
people?’”452 However, Beckett may have been understating the role she played in 
convincing Smith to commit to a referendum. In an interview in 1994 with The 
Times Beckett affirmed she had persuaded Smith to make the offer. A 
referendum was the right answer affirmed Beckett, as “The British people are 
being sold a pup” based on a “snare and delusion… that if they had PR it would 
be easier to influence and change the decision of government. I think it would be 
more difficult… Speaking as a practical politician, there is only one way to put to 
bed this constant clamour.”453 
 
The Plant Report received a variety of praise and criticism from both within and 
outside the Labour Party. At a meeting of the PLP, MPs passed judgement. Dr 
Tony Wright, the academic and Labour MP in Birmingham argued “to retreat now 
from the point we have reached – that first-past-the-post is no longer good 
enough – would be an act of electoral suicide.” Others such as Derek Fatchett, 
chairman of Labour’s FPTP group warned of “coalition by stealth” whereas 
Gerald Kaufman deemed the Party “was spending too much time on irrelevancies 
such as this”, questioning “Who is going to volunteer to be replaced in a Labour 
Cabinet to make way for coalition partners?” John Spellar and Bruce Grocott 
condemned PR, the former stating “it is not our job to prop up the Liberals”, while 
the latter desired the Labour Party to “kill the debate stone dead.”454 
 
Outside of Labour, David Butler called it a “revolutionary document” although 
considered SV a “silly answer” which “has probably set back the cause of 
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electoral reform” as SV “happens to be a bad one (electoral system).”455 Given 
the strong opposition to reform from within both the Labour and Conservative 
parties and the wider British establishment it seems rather harsh to suggest such 
a thorough examination of electoral reform had set back the cause of reform. 
Others of the left and right variously described it as a “half-baked compromise” 
and “the worst option.”456 Georghiou deemed it would encourage tactical voting457 
and Wainwright thought SV could actually produce more disproportionate results 
than First-Past-the-Post458 as can happen under redistributive majoritarian 
systems due to the distorting effects of the second and, under AV, lower 
preferences.  
 
Those who were willing to partake in the research offered a range of views on its 
impact on the Labour Party. Beckett considered that it did have “quite a big 
impact on Labour MPs because they were also going through the same 
arguments. Nothing excites MPs quite like a change which might affect their own 
circumstances.”459 After all, a Labour MP in a marginal constituency may 
consider that under a different electoral system it becomes much more difficult to 
hold the constituency. Rosser deemed that the impact of the report was “not as 
much as one might have hoped. Within the Labour Party outside the commission, 
there were still very polarised views. The majority of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party and probably the membership outside, still wanted FPTP… It is not a 
Report that has led to radical change across the democratic system in this 
country.”460  
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The most damning account of the response to Plant Report from within the 
Labour Party came from Whitty, claiming most Labour MPs “couldn’t understand 
why we were bothering, which I thought was a bit short-sighted at the time. I had 
a few arguments at the time, but it was never going to receive an easy ride in the 
PLP, as they prefer the majoritarian system.” Moreover, “Given that the Leader 
and the Deputy Leader were adamantly opposed to electoral reform, it wasn’t 
going to get anywhere anyway. The bulk of MPs were against it, and by and large 
the Unions were against it so it was regarded as an intellectual exercise.” Had 
the Leader had the will and political capital to follow through with electoral reform 
for the House of Commons “there would have been tensions and they would not 
have been able to get away with it.” It had also become apparent by the time the 
final report had been released that John Major’s Conservative government were 
deeply unpopular and there was a feeling in the Labour Party of “‘well what’s all 
this about?’ ‘We’re going to win.’”461 
 
Summary 
 
The issue of electoral reform and PR became important within the Labour Party 
in the late 1980s. The dominance of Conservative statecraft had prompted 
people to look at the economic, moral and political case for constitutional reform, 
coinciding with sections of the Labour Party losing confidence in FPTP, searching 
for other avenues to return to office, one being proportional representation. 
Reformers argued FPTP was the vehicle that delivered aggressive free-market 
policies, with negative social effects. Electoral reform and PR became 
fashionable as a device, it was believed, that could taper the excesses of 
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Thatcherism and put the Labour Party back in touch with centre voters thus 
offering a route back into power.  
 
External factors, mainly those of electoral failure, thus created the internal 
pressure within Labour, leading to pressure groups such as the LCER, 
conference votes and a more prominent role for those sympathetic to reform. 
Appearing to be unable to escape the demands for an enquiry, the leadership 
acquiesced, agreeing to hold an enquiry but omitting the House of Commons, yet 
were subsequently defeated at the 1990 Labour Party Conference when the 
widest possible remit to the enquiry was awarded. Hattersley duly appointed his 
friend, the academic Raymond Plant – someone Hattersley could trust and 
thought would deliver the answer he wanted to hear – to Chair a Working Party 
looking at a wide range of constitutional issues. For three years the Working 
Party, consisting of individuals from all parts of the Labour movement and with a 
wide range of views, met and debated the vices and virtues of the arguments for 
reform and different electoral systems, taking evidence from academics, interest 
groups, trade unions and Labour politicians, ultimately producing three reports. 
 
The first report was theoretical – unsurprising given Plant’s academic interests –  
outlining the issues of electoral reform and proportional representation, the 
second was an update on the work of the committee, and the third and final 
report stated the case for reform, the case for retaining FPTP and made specific 
recommendations. Consequently, the Working Party moved from predominantly 
theoretical arguments of democracy and representation to issues of party politics, 
specifically relating to the Labour Party. Key ideas are outlined across all three 
reports: there is no such thing as a perfect electoral system, with opinions based 
on what individuals consider to be the purpose of elections, and ‘fairness’ does 
not stand on its own and must be ‘fairness’ in relation to a pre-set criteria. 
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Importantly, given Labour’s commitment to altering Britain’s constitutional 
settlement, institutions entail different purposes and therefore a different electoral 
system can be adopted. The constituency link was key, maintaining a direct link 
between legislator and elector, and therefore electoral systems involving multi-
member constituencies were ruled out as the dilution of the constituency link was 
contrary to Labour’s historic emphasis on community. Moreover, a system such 
as STV contained the prospect of Labour Party candidates from different wings of 
the Party competing against one another. 
 
The Final Report sought to reconcile a range of views, made more difficult by the 
actions of the leadership particularly once the leadership had been assumed by 
Smith and Beckett who both sought in different ways to disrupt the Working 
Party. Furthermore, with Bryan Gould openly admitting that he sought to prevent 
the committee arriving at any meaningful conclusions and Baroness Armstrong 
openly divulging she was sent on the committee to report back to John Smith, the 
report was unlikely to receive an easy ride from both those on and those outside 
the committee. The steadfastness of the FPTP cohort led Bryan Gould to affirm: 
“The pro-PR people weren't strong or committed enough to overcome the 
determination of the FPTP people to let the exercise just run into the sand.”462 
 
When it came to the recommendation for the House of Commons the leadership 
was successful, discouraging the Committee from coming out in favour of the 
more proportional and pluralist MMS. Instead their actions made SV the only 
viable system for reformers; otherwise the Working Party could have come out in 
favour of the status quo. SV was therefore the ‘least worst’ option, significantly 
less proportional, maintaining many of the features of FPTP. Plant became 
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convinced of the need for reform, originally starting out as pro-FPTP, but 
ultimately considering the Labour Party had little to fear from coalition, as Labour 
would be the biggest party, and would be able to implement considerable parts of 
its manifesto, a bold and controversial statement in light of Labour’s aversion to 
coalition.  
 
Far from the 1992 General Election emphasising the need for electoral reform it, 
if anything, had the opposite effect. When the issue of PR emerged in the final 
days of polling the Labour Party looked unprincipled, unable to say whether it 
supported the present system or favoured reform, putting off potential voters. 
This uncertainty was duly apportioned blame for contributing to Labour losing the 
election. When John Smith replaced Neil Kinnock – who was becoming 
increasingly sympathetic to reform – as leader and Beckett became his Deputy, 
the two top positions in the Labour Party were held by individuals hostile to this 
type of constitutional reform. The Working Party was closed down in Autumn 
1993, not allowing time for the committee to look at Local Government. With the 
next Labour government committed to holding a referendum on the electoral 
system, and the increasing unpopularity of the Conservative government the 
Labour Party continued with its internal party and policy reforms, focusing on the 
next general election. 
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 Chapter 4 - Realigning the British left and the Jenkins Commission 
 
Focusing on the Independent Commission on the Voting System, commonly 
known as the ‘Jenkins Commission’, the chapter charts Labour’s interest in 
proportional representation (PR) between 1994, with Blair winning the leadership, 
and the end of Labour’s first term in office in 2001. Consequently, the chapter 
establishes and explores the personal view of Blair and other leading figures who 
rose to prominence under ‘New Labour’; the relationship between Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats and the desire, or lack thereof for coalition; the general 
election result and its impact on the introduction of electoral reform at 
Westminster and a coalition with the Liberal Democrats; and the arguments put 
forward by the Jenkins Commission and the reaction to its recommendations 
within the Labour government and Parliamentary Labour Party. A variety of 
sources will be utilised including interviews with those who sat on the Jenkins 
Commission and who were prominent in the New Labour era, memoirs and 
diaries, newspaper articles, journal articles, and secondary literature. 
 
The Plant process and subsequent referendum commitment by Smith, had to 
some degree, contained the matter, although it was far from settled. Yet, the 
more pertinent question remained, namely whether the Labour Party would be 
able to win a parliamentary majority at the next general election and form a 
government or whether they would have to rely on the parliamentary votes of 
Liberal Democrats. With the death of Smith in 1994, a leadership contest was 
fought between Margaret Beckett, John Prescott and Tony Blair, with the last of 
these emerging victorious, ensuring the ‘modernisation’ process would continue. 
All three had committed to upholding Smith’s referendum pledge on reforming the 
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Westminster electoral system during the leadership contest463, likely wishing not 
to be seen to be going against a policy pledge made by Smith and accepting the 
party management benefits the referendum commitment entailed. Given the 
views of the candidates, it was far from an endorsement of PR. 
 
Blair and Proportional Representation  
 
Blair’s views carried significant weight due to his position and had the ability to 
direct Labour Party policy. Publicly, Blair would be non-committal, remaining 
‘unpersuaded’ of the case for PR, a remark he would return to throughout his 
time as leader. Writing in the New Statesman after Thatcher’s second landslide 
victory in 1987, in which Labour’s vote had increased for the first time since 
October 1974, Blair stated that PR was not the answer to the electoral problems 
facing the Labour Party. It would instead lull the Party and electoral reformers 
into a false sense of security about Labour’s electoral prospects, rather than 
tackling the big and necessary issue of modernising the Labour Party in order to 
win.  
 
“Labour’s new enthusiasts for PR put their case not primarily on grounds of 
constitutional principle, but as a strategy for power. The implications of their 
case are fundamental: that Labour cannot ever again win a majority of seats 
in parliament; and that what cannot be achieved through the front door of 
majority government can be bundled in by the back door of coalition and 
electoral pacts… The real question for the Labour Party is why it is not 
achieving sufficient electoral support. It must face this question irrespective of 
whether we retain the present electoral system or change it, whether we stand 
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for election alone or in a pact. The campaign for PR is just the latest excuse 
for avoiding decisive choices about the party’s future.”464 
 
Blair would, after a fourth successive general election defeat in 1992, affirm the 
need for continued modernisation. “The issue for Labour today,” he told 
journalists, “is not change or no change but what type of change. Nobody should 
be under any illusion that the route back to power can be achieved without 
fundamental reform of ideas and organisation”465, an attempt, claim Mandelson 
and Liddle, to ensure there was no rolling back of the reforms enacted by 
Kinnock “but also at others – including, they thought, Kinnock himself – who 
might now advocate an immediate commitment to reform of the electoral 
system.”466 Whatever view Blair and Brown held about PR “they argued that you 
do not win elections by changing the rules.” What mattered was building upon 
Kinnock’s achievements, turning the Labour Party into a “broad-based party of 
the left and centre, rather than watch it turn into a minority left-wing party that 
would have to rely on electoral reform to unseat the Tories.”467 Consequently, the 
Labour Party could not escape its policy and organisational problems through 
electoral reform and PR. If the Party did avoid the difficult decision it would not be 
in a position to win an election. 
 
Blair returned to the issue in the New Statesman in 1996, reiterating his thought 
that electoral reform was a way of avoiding making difficult decisions. Yet, Blair’s 
reasoning went further than PR resulting in reluctance to modernise. When asked 
whether he was against PR Blair said “Yes. I have never been convinced that 
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small parties do not then get disproportionate power.” Emphasising social and 
economic factors as greater priorities for the electorate than constitutional reform, 
Blair considered “Whether you change the voting system or not the hard 
decisions still remain and people want to know where you are on the economy 
and jobs, health and education”, all areas “Labour has to get right… My worry is 
more about what I used to call the unilateralist and PR option for the Labour 
Party. You carry on with policies the electorate won’t support, change the voting 
system and hope you can somehow gain power by joining forces with other 
political parties. It doesn’t work.”468  
 
Paddy Ashdown notes a discussion with Blair at the start of August 1995, “much 
of it on PR.” He told Ashdown that “intellectually he had serious reservations 
about PR and didn’t believe that the public would want it.” The fear of upsetting 
the written press made Blair uneasy – a theme he would return to at different 
times – not wanting the “whole of the Tory media deployed against me… If the 
tabloid newspapers really take against it, we could lose and find the public 
opposed.”469 Blair would make the same argument in November 1995, believing 
the Tory press to be “reasonably well disposed towards me... They believe that, 
since I am hostile to PR, I can provide an interregnum between the current 
Conservative Government and a future right-wing one...But if I support PR they 
will think they are out not only this time, but for good. And then they will throw 
their lot behind the Tories again.”470 Again, in January 1996, Blair expressed that 
he understood the power and influence of the press wishing not to upset Rupert 
Murdoch and Conrad Black who were “prepared” to let Blair have a go at 
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government; but “they will change to a terrible opposition if they believe I will 
keep them out for ever. It’s the one thing that could unite the Tories.”471  
 
In September 1996 Blair wrote a special piece for the Economist on the 
constitution. Commenting on the House of Commons, Blair deemed “effective 
democracy was dependent on, above all, quality”, going on to state “Electoral 
reform for the Commons has a totemic status among some of Britain’s 
constitutional reformers. I appreciate the reasons for this, not least 17 years of 
‘elective dictatorship’ by Tory governments returned on minority votes, pushing 
through divisive and destructive policies such as the poll tax and rail privatisation, 
which is why I have confirmed John Smith’s pledge to hold a referendum on the 
issue.” However, Blair affirmed he was still ‘unpersuaded’ on the merits of PR 
and stressed the purpose of the House of Commons is to form and uphold a 
government.  
 
“It is not, as some claim, a simple question of moving from an ‘unfair’ to a ‘fair’ 
voting system. An electoral system must meet two democratic tests: it needs 
to reflect opinion, but it must also aggregate opinion without giving 
disproportionate influence to splinter groups. Aggregation is particularly 
important for a parliament whose job is to create and sustain a single, 
mainstream government.”472 
 
In relation to the wider constitutional reform programme proposed by New 
Labour, Blair rejected the argument that Labour governments “should be 
concerned with delivering jobs, growth and economic equality, not with airy-fairy 
notions such as democracy and participation” and focusing on constitutional 
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matters was a “distraction.” Such a statement was inconsistent with his earlier 
remark where he emphasised socio-economic factors.  Indeed, Blair added, “the 
role of left-of-centre parties around the world and down the ages has been to 
extend democratic power”473 highlighting Blair’s pluralist credentials. 
 
By January 1997, Blair’s position had supposedly shifted and his opposition to 
reform had softened. In the course of a meeting with Ashdown, Blair is quoted as 
saying: “I have told you privately I am in favour of a change to the voting system 
provided we retain the single-member system” implying the Alternative Vote (AV) 
or the Supplementary Vote (SV). Blair had “become convinced of the need for 
electoral reform in Britain”, qualifying, “I don’t see it as fundamental”, only putting 
the matter on the agenda as “it will open the way to a relationship with you.” Blair 
could not go further than saying he was “not convinced” as he “did not want to be 
seen to be being pushed around” by Ashdown and only when an electoral 
commission had produced its findings could he announce he was in favour, 
something that will happen “after the election, not before.”474 Therefore, the 
motivating factor for Blair was the desire to keep alive the prospect of a 
relationship with the Liberal Democrats. Far from being convinced on an 
intellectual level, Blair’s rationale was tactical.  
 
Labour Party Conference 1995 
 
At the 1995 Labour Party Conference an attempt was made for the Labour Party 
to drop the commitment to the referendum on electoral reform. The General, 
Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trade Union (GMB), which had supported a 
referendum two years prior, came out in favour of FPTP. “We were in favour of a 
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referendum in 1993 because it was a compromise that got us out of having 
proportional representation” GMB said. “If we were presented with a situation 
where the FPTP campaign has greater support we would go for that.” Rumours 
were abounding Blair was looking for ways to ditch the pledge, and such a move 
would provide him with the excuse to do so. “He would be able to drop the 
referendum and then blame it on the Neanderthals in the party” said one 
unnamed opponent of electoral reform in the Financial Times. If the pledge had 
been dropped Blair could have claimed that his hands were tied by his party and 
absolve himself of responsibility. John Denham deemed PR was part of Labour’s 
modernisation programme: “It is impossible to consider modernising the Labour 
Party without changing the voting system. Tony Blair has made a commitment to 
a referendum and I expect him to stick to that.”475  
 
The Labour Party Conference Report charts how Composite 37 was moved by 
Nigel Guy (Sheffield Central CLP). “Reaffirming the party’s pledge to let the 
British people decide how they elect their government” was judged “not to be a 
distraction from bread and butter issues.” David Bloyce (Sheffield Hillsborough 
CLP) seconded the composite believing this to be about “keeping promises” and 
that “A referendum does not divide pro-and anti-electoral reformers but separates 
those who think MPs and parties with a vested interest are the right people to 
make this decision.” Alistair Watson (Glasgow Pollock CLP) moved Composite 38 
rejecting the need for a referendum, stating a poll would be unnecessary and 
damaging, asking Conference “What benefit is a referendum to the people of this 
country?” The Labour Party would win the next election because it is seen to be 
“fit to govern” and Labour policies “have convinced the electorate” not because of 
the “offer of a referendum.” PR would result in coalition and “To depend on the 
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Liberals is to dance with the devil.” Composite 38 was seconded by Toni Bennett 
(Bolsover CLP). “It is not the electoral system that wants reforming” she 
considered, “it is the capitalist system… It was the treachery of the Liberal 
Democrats that closed our pits” and it was “ridiculous” to blame FPTP. 
 
On a show of hands, delegates voted heavily in favour of retaining the party’s 
pledge to hold a referendum and Composite 38 was withdrawn. Jack Straw, a 
known supporter of FPTP, urged conference to stand by Smith’s pledge. He said:  
 
“I strongly believe that for Westminster elections by first-past-the-post is best: 
but there are many in this party, and outside, who take a different view; the 
result is that the very legitimacy of this, the most basic feature of our 
democracy has been called into question. It is now time to resolve this matter. 
Two years ago, John Smith gave a pledge to the British people that his 
Labour government would give them the final word. I ask you today to ensure 
that his pledge is reaffirmed.”476  
 
Straw’s decision to back the referendum pledge – likely to have been agreed 
after consultation with Blair – was, in the main, designed to ensure good relations 
with the Liberal Democrats in the upcoming general election rather than the 
emotive reason of Smith’s pledge. Apparent in 1995 was the Labour Party’s hope 
of keeping open the option of a deal with the Liberal Democrats should the 
situation arise whereby the Labour Party required the parliamentary support of 
the Liberal Democrats. 
 
 
                                                                  
476 Labour Party Conference Report, Brighton, 1995, pp. 219 – 222; Guardian, ‘Referendum policy 
stays’, 6th October 1995 
213 
 
Blair and the Liberal Democrats 
 
In spite of the strong showing in the polls Blair remained sceptical of Labour’s 
electoral chances, remembering what had happened in 1992 when the lead in 
the polls had evaporated in the final few days of the election campaign. Whitty, 
who was Labour’s European coordinator whilst Blair was leader of the opposition, 
recalls “When Tony took over he wasn’t convinced we were going to win the 
election, right up until the day, so he actually wanted something to offer Paddy 
Ashdown… everyone thought ‘what are you talking about Tony? We’re going to 
win’, it was game over.”477 Lipsey concurred with Whitty, finding Blair to be 
“extremely pessimistic about the chances he would get, he kept thinking he 
would lose the 1997 general election when there was never any chance of him 
losing it, and the two subsequent elections every time he thought he might 
lose.”478 According to Ashdown, Blair was “absolutely obsessed with the thought 
that the Tories could recover”479, as they had done in 1992, condemning the 
Labour Party to another parliament in opposition, a belief he maintained till the 
day before the general election.480 The long period of opposition had caused 
doubt to emerge in the Labour Party and Blair’s mind as to whether it would be 
able to form a government, either as a minority or in an alliance with the Liberal 
Democrats. 
 
The basis of a coalition between Labour and the Liberal Democrats was a 
commitment to the introduction of PR. The likeliest way for this to come about 
was a hung parliament in which Labour required parliamentary support from the 
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Liberal Democrats. For Beckett, Blair and Ashdown’s relationship “was all tied up 
with whether Labour could ever win again” recalling saying to Blair when he was 
flirting with the idea of coalition with the Liberal Democrats, “‘look Tony, don’t 
take my word for it but ask Jim Callaghan’, though he probably wouldn’t have 
done… Tony confided those issues to a close inner circle. He never had that 
conversation with me because he knew what answer he would get.”481 Beckett 
had staunchly defended FPTP during the Plant process and was known to have 
very little time for the Liberal Democrats. Like so many politicians of her 
generation, Beckett would have witnessed first-hand the Lib-Lab Pact 1977-1978 
– hence her reference to Callaghan – and because of that experience was 
sceptical of any arrangement with the Liberal Democrats, in spite of its utility 
should a hung parliament have arisen in 1997. 
 
However, at play were factors beyond crude political necessity. It is beyond doubt 
that Blair desired a relationship with the Liberal Democrats, reportedly telling Roy 
Jenkins “three or four times that he intends, even if he gets a majority, to have a 
coalition with two or three Lib Dems in it.”482 Indeed, Mandelson affirmed: “The 
truth was that Tony did want that realignment. He did want to bring the two 
parties together. He was happy to see Lib Dem Ministers in his Cabinet but he 
wanted all these things without changing the electoral system.”483 A range of 
sources utilised throughout this chapter confirm Blair’s desire for a realignment of 
the left, and importantly how it differed from the Marquand view as outlined in 
Chapter One. Bartle writes that the “period from July 1994 to June 2001 
witnessed one of the most fascinating experiments in British politics for a 
century”, as Blair and Ashdown, “followed a sustained strategy of co-operation 
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although there was no immediate need for it.”484 A detailed account appears in 
the Ashdown Diaries of the secret talks between Blair, himself and other leading 
figures from both political parties. Ashdown records a private discussion with Blair 
in October 1994, regarding cooperation in the next parliament, emphasising how 
negotiations between the two men had begun early in Blair’s leadership. 
“PA: If we had a hung parliament would you see us working together in 
government? 
TB: Yes. 
PA: Good, now let me go a stage further. If you got a majority do you still see 
us working together in government? 
TB: (after a three second pause) Yes 
PA: In which case I think we have the opportunity to do something really 
historic in politics. Lib Dems will abandon equidistance in the expectation that 
you will make it clear that you see us partners in a hung parliament. That 
leaves us with three options. The clearer we are the bigger the dividends. The 
three options for us are: 
1. Independence i.e., sitting on the Opposition benches and taking things on 
a case-by-case basis (We both agreed that this was not the best way 
forward) 
2. The love that dares not speak its name We create the expectation that we 
will work together on the broad outlines of an assumed programme, but 
without being clear about it. 
3. Full open partnership In this we would say quite openly that we would 
work together in the next government, whether you have a majority or not. 
And we would do so on an agreed programme which we would get both 
parties to agree before the election. 
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TB: That’s a very big step and one I will have to think about. But broadly, I am 
in favour of doing something along those lines if possible. We will need, in 
particular, to look at opinion polls.”485 
 
Bartle affirms the relationship between Labour and the Liberal Democrats can be 
divided into six phases: firstly, agreements on an ad hoc basis such as the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention in 1989 and the Liberal Democrats giving 
evidence to Smith’s Social Justice Commission. Secondly, the election of Blair as 
leader resulted in the continued modernisation of the Labour Party into ‘New 
Labour’, its move towards the political centre ground and Liberal Democrat 
territory. In 1994 in an interview with the Observer, soon after becoming leader of 
the Labour Party, Blair had made pluralist overtures towards the Liberal 
Democrats. 
 
“It is foolish for us to pretend that the left of centre is solely occupied by the 
Labour Party, and it is only Labour that ever has good ideas... it would be 
absurd of me to say that my views and Charles Kennedy’s are a million miles 
apart, they’re not. But this has to happen through a process of developing 
ideas, not in pacts or deals or working out who sits in what position. I try not to 
be tribal in my thinking. Indeed, there are Liberal Democrats and Labour 
people cooperating at a local level. The most important thing is that the left of 
centre develops a political philosophy with a meaning for the modern world 
and the Liberal Democrats clearly have a place in that.”486 
 
At the 1995 Labour Party Conference Blair listed his political heroes as Lloyd 
George, Keynes and Beveridge as well as Attlee, Bevin and Hardie. Publicly, 
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Blair was making inclusive statements designed to bring the Liberal Democrats 
into his ‘big tent’, both electorally in terms of voters and on a personal level, as 
Blair found many Liberal Democrats from their social-democrat wing much more 
collegial than many Labour colleagues. Importantly, Blair’s conference speech 
suggested the Labour Party did not have a monopoly on good ideas, and the 
Liberal Democrats had valid policies. John Edmonds, then leader of the GMB 
Union, thought this an “incredible” and “extraordinary” speech, not for its 
brilliance but for “a leader of the Labour Party openly regretting the foundation of 
his Party, because it splits the left… He had this deeply held belief that what we 
need to do is reunite the progressive forces that are always in a majority in this 
country.”487 Plant thought many former Labour leaders and Cabinet Ministers 
would have recoiled in horror at such a suggestion, especially Healey. “No doubt 
there was quite a few Labour prima donnas who found it almost impossible to 
think they had such terrific intellect that there was something they might have 
overlooked. Healey… would never think that a Lib Dem would have anything 
worth saying, anything whatsoever because Healey knew what needed saying 
and whoever disagreed with Healey, well they were just thick basically”488, 
emphasising the belief within elements of the Labour Party that the Liberal 
Democrats are politically inferior.  
 
The Liberal Democrats abandoned ‘equidistance’ in May 1995, the third phase, 
aligning themselves politically with Labour. Blair considered this to be important, 
wanting an agreed approach on the constitution because it would help politically, 
both in opposition and government, negating the possibility of the Lib Dems 
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opposing as a matter of course should Labour only achieve a small majority.489 
Foley writes cooperation with the Liberal Democrats “Would act as a mutual 
defence alliance against Conservative attempts to divide and rule the centre left”, 
protecting “the coherence and integrity of Labour’s own constitutional agenda 
from ambush with the Liberal Democrats”, and thus preventing “the issue itself 
from becoming defined by the Liberal Democrats.” Labour would “be afforded 
something of an amnesty from Liberal Democrat assaults” resulting in Liberal 
Democrats targeting, almost exclusively, the Conservatives.490 
 
In the summer of 1996, Blair and Ashdown asked Robin Cook and Robert 
Maclennan “to explore the possibility of co-operation between the Labour and 
Liberal Democrat parties in relation to constitutional reform.” Cook invited Plant to 
contribute to Cook-Maclennan, and for Plant it gave expression to what he had 
outlined in his Report, namely broadening Labour’s appeal by attempting to put 
into the public arena the idea that people could vote Labour knowing that the Lib 
Dems still supported part of Labour’s manifesto.491 Both parties had for some 
time been committed to a programme of constitutional change and shared a 
common view of the need to reform our democratic institutions and to renew the 
relationship between politics and the people. Following progress in the initial 
discussion the two parties agreed in October 1996 to establish a Joint 
Consultative Committee (JCC), with the following terms of reference: 
 
‘To examine the current proposals of the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties 
for constitutional reform: to consider whether there might be sufficient 
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common ground to enable the parties to reach agreement on a legislative 
programme for constitutional reform; to consider means by which such a 
programme might best be implemented and to make recommendations.’492 
 
On the matter of PR, on which the entire constitutional reform agenda could well 
have foundered, the JCC resolved it in time for the election:  
 
(Paragraph 56.) Both parties believe that a referendum on the system for 
elections to the House of Commons should be held within the first term of a 
new Parliament.  
 
(Paragraph 57.) Both parties are also agreed that the referendum should be a 
single question offering a straight choice between first-past-the-post and one 
specific proportional alternative. 
 
(Paragraph 58.) A commission on voting systems for the Westminster 
Parliament should be appointed early in the next parliament to recommend 
the appropriate proportional alternative to the first-past-the-post system. 
Among the factors to be considered by the commission would be the 
likelihood that the system proposed would command broad consensus among 
proponents of proportional representation. The commission would be asked to 
report within twelve months of its establishment. 
 
(Paragraph 59.) Legislation to hold the referendum would then be proposed 
and the choice placed before the people. This proposal would allow the crucial 
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question of how our government is elected to be decided by the people 
themselves.493 
 
The fourth stage of cooperation involved the targeting of Conservative seats in an 
attempt to unseat the sitting Conservative MP and involved the sharing of 
campaign information. Had a uniform movement of votes across the country 
taken place since 1992, the general election result would, the research suggests, 
have been different. Labour’s majority would have been 131 rather than 179. The 
Liberal Democrats would have won 28 seats meaning the Conservatives would 
have returned to Westminster with 208 MPs, highlighting how a small number of 
tactical voters can have a big effect on the election result. Curtice and Steed 
estimate that at least 15 and as many 21 seats were won by Labour through 
tactical voting. The Liberal Democrats also benefitted, gaining between 10 and 
20. The Conservatives lost at least 25 and potentially 35 seats because of 
tactical voting. Norris, using a different method, suggests 24 seats were lost.494 
Indeed, in the constituency of Tatton both the Labour and Liberal Democrat 
candidate stood down in favour of an independent candidate.  
 
The fifth phase of cooperation was the Liberal Democrats embarking on 
‘constructive opposition’, ensuring the constitutional reform programme was 
implemented and also partaking in the JCC. The sixth phase was the extension 
of the JCC’s remit to cover Europe, welfare, health and education. However, in 
both parties some felt they had been ‘bounced’ into an arrangement they didn’t 
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want to be in, and that the ‘project’ was only conducted by the leadership with 
little influence given to the backbenchers. Rawnsley dismisses the importance of 
the JCC: “No secrets of any substance were ever going to be shared around the 
Cabinet table – a fairly redundant item of furniture in the Blair government. The 
joint committee was a decorative addition, a presentation token of his often 
voiced desire to embrace a more inclusive, more pluralistic style of politics.”495 By 
the beginning of 2001, Charles Kennedy had replaced Ashdown as leader, 
revealing the JCC and ‘Lab-Lib’ relations – ‘the project’ – were in a ‘coma’, 
waiting to be revived if people wish. Kennedy’s aide stated “We haven’t held a 
meeting of the cabinet committee since the summer because we can’t see the 
point of poncing up Downing Street if we aren’t going to get something out of 
it.”496 In September 2001, the Liberal Democrats withdrew from the JCC having 
only met twice in the last two years. 
 
Blair, in the April of 1997, asked Campbell, his Press Secretary, “How would you 
feel if I gave Paddy a place in the Cabinet and started merger talks?” something 
Blair allegedly had mentioned previously, the rationale being “We could put the 
Tories out of business for a generation.”497 In the days after the 1997 general 
election, according to Ashdown, Blair mentioned ‘a merger’ of the two parties, an 
idea that left Ashdown cold, preferring positions for Liberal Democrats on cabinet 
committees.498 Derek Draper wrote an account of Blair’s first one hundred days in 
office, also mentioning the potential for a merger.499 Lipsey shared a lunch with 
Pat McFadden, one of Blair’s special advisors, in March 1998. According to 
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McFadden Blair was “instinctively against PR” considering “governments that win 
as big as in 45, 79, 97 should have overall majorities. He is happy with AV.” 
Although AV would not satisfy the Liberal Democrats, Blair “does want to do 
something with the Lib Dems, and recognises that Paddy may need more than 
just AV.” Moreover, there was the problem of Party management. Fraser Kemp 
and Jim Murphy, both Labour MPs in Scotland, were planning speeches on the 
subject at the Scottish Labour Conference. “Their theme is ‘enough is enough’ 
after Scotland, Wales, London and Europe.”500  
 
Blair continued to state his desire to reshape British politics around two 
progressive parties and, in August 1998, sent a fax to Ashdown believing it could 
be achieved “without electoral reform.” Whilst Blair did acknowledge this was an 
important issue for Liberal Democrats, the Jenkins Commission “will provide the 
means, but not the end in this process. Our task will be to convince our parties, 
and the country, of what we are trying to do.” The best option was either FPTP or 
AV with top-up although “it will be very difficult to get through parliament in the 
face of such a heavy programme of legislation on schools, hospitals and other 
measures of constitutional change.” Additionally, the boundary changes 
legislation would not be passed in time to take effect for the next general election. 
Consequently, the best time for the referendum would be at the same time as the 
next election.501 Blair would, a month later, send another fax through to Ashdown 
further explaining his position on electoral reform, repeating many of the same 
points made in the earlier fax, whilst also suggesting compromises to appease 
the Liberal Democrats. Furthermore, it was “clear that if it were to be pushed, we 
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would be fighting a referendum with a Labour Party badly divided (possibly with a 
majority anti)… the real danger then would be losing the referendum.”502 
 
Blair was pressed by Ashdown to go for a coalition in November 1998, after 
Jenkins had published his report, creating a window of enthusiasm for the Liberal 
Democrats towards the Labour Party. However, no coalition materialised then or 
over the course of thirteen years of government, and the JCC was as close as 
the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats came to forming a coalition. During 
Labour’s first term in office those individuals who were willing to pursue ‘the 
project’ left government; Peter Mandelson, supposedly an advocate of Lab-Lib 
relations left the government over the ‘home loan affair’ and Ashdown stood 
down as Leader of the Liberal Democrats in 1999. The lack of voices at the top of 
each party willing to make the case for cooperation naturally meant the merits of 
the argument were not made or heard in significant number, as Cabinet Ministers 
focused on their own department and the concerns of practical politics.  
 
Mandelson records in The Third Man secret talks revolving around “negotiating a 
policy agreement with the Liberal Democrats” and to “bring some Lib Dems into 
the cabinet” – Alan Beith and Menzies Campbell – with the process beginning 
shortly after Blair had become leader. The Labour Party was unsure of winning, 
let alone winning a landslide victory. “With Lib Dem support, we would be able to 
form a stable government.” Blair “saw a governing arrangement with them as a 
way of diluting the power of the old-left Labour MPs and the trade unions.” Key to 
any agreement was “changing the first-past-the-post system of electing MPs, in 
favour of proportional representation.” The result of the general election “killed 
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(or) at least was sure to delay it” as not only had Labour won a landslide, the Lib 
Dems were up from twenty seats to forty-six seats. Furthermore, “For many in the 
Labour Party, especially those who still seethed over the SDP split, the idea of 
offering the rebels’ successors a place in government was unpalatable, to say the 
least.”503  
 
Blair’s account, A Journey, gives no mention of electoral reform or PR, yet he 
admits from the outset he wanted the Liberal Democrats “in the big tent” as “their 
leadership was sound” and “some outstanding people in their ranks” politically 
aligned with New Labour. With Blair ideologically closer to many in the Liberal 
Democrats than in his own party, “It made sense to try to draw them in” to 
government and Blair “was certainly willing to give it a try.” In the hours after the 
election, Blair and Ashdown agreed it would be “premature to put them into 
Cabinet” yet agreeing a process of cooperation with an official committee that 
would try to draw up an agreed programme of constitutional reform.” The project 
failed as the Liberal Democrats lacked the “necessary fibre to govern” suggesting 
they were not of the same quality as Labour politicians and were capable of 
“breath-taking opportunism”, and although agreement was found on issues “that 
didn’t touch voters immediate lives” they opposed the “necessary” public sector 
reforms “which most directly touched people’s lives.”504  
 
McFadden concurred with Blair’s analysis, stating that “Whilst PR was an area of 
common interest, it was not a strong enough ‘subject matter’ in itself and there 
was a lack of common purpose in other areas that New Labour felt were 
important: public services, pensions and other domestic issues.” Blair’s faith in 
the Liberal Democrats withered, “a suspicion that grew in the years of 
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government as, under Ashdown and later Kennedy, the Lib Dems opposed 
reform to Higher Education and initiatives to provide greater administrative 
autonomy for schools and hospitals.”505 Charles Clarke confessed that when he 
was Chair of the Labour Party in 2001 there were late night meetings with the 
Liberal Democrats at County Hall going through various policy issues. Yet, 
Labour – Liberal Democrat relations between 1997 and 2001 were “very much a 
minority pursuit around Number 10 and a few of his (Blair’s) very close people. 
Nobody thought this was really where you want to go, partly for the reason that 
the ‘why do you need it?’ factor was so deep.”506 Hattersley, a critic of Blair and 
‘New Labour’ maintains the purpose of the ‘project’ was to allow Blair to “keep his 
more radical members in check. He wanted to demonstrate he was a centrist and 
he talked all the time of being centre-left or left centre, indeed sometimes just as 
a centrist…And this gesture was demonstrating his centrism or making it more 
real by having alliances.” However, “He couldn’t in conscience have done it with 
a majority that size. He wanted that partnership.”507 
 
Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart analysed Liberal Democrat voting in the House of 
Commons from 1992-2003. Although voting in the House of Commons is binary, 
Table 4 below stresses how Liberal Democrat voting behaviour changed, shifting 
“from being almost undisguisable from Labour in their behaviour to their 
becoming a bona fide party of opposition.”508 The Liberal Democrats tendency to 
vote with the Conservatives grew from 27% in the first session of the 1997 
Parliament, to 40% in the second session, 44% in the third, 47% in the fourth, 
then reaching 54% in the first session of Labour’s second term. During the 2002-
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2003 session, Liberal Democrat MPs voted against Labour in 251 of the 352 
Commons whipped votes in which they participated, meaning they opposed the 
Government in 75% of the votes.509 The move away from Labour during the 
course of the parliament would have done little to convince Labour politicians that 
the Liberal Democrats would be reliable in coalition, particularly as the “objective 
was to get them, a couple of years down the track when we were established, as 
being more supportive.”510 
 
 
 
Labour’s landslide - the 1997 general election 
 
The opinion polls since 1994 gave the Labour Party considerable leads, 
fluctuating between the high forties and low fifties and the Conservatives down 
between the high twenties and low thirties.511 All the indicators were pointing to a 
big electoral victory for the Labour Party. John Major and the Conservative Party 
were increasingly unpopular, with Worcester and Mortimore attributing five 
significant reasons: ‘Black Wednesday’ and the loss of economic credibility; 
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divisions over Europe; image management, particularly concerning MPs sex 
lives; the leadership of the Conservative Party by John Major compared to Tony 
Blair’s leadership of the Labour Party; and ‘New Labour no danger’ as the Labour 
Party had become ‘safe’, watering down its socialist commitments, as 
emphasised by the re-writing of Clause IV.512 Many of the issues that the 
Conservatives could use to warn of the perceived dangers of a Labour 
government – nationalisation, public spending, higher taxes and strong trade 
unions – had all been diluted or abandoned. The Conservative slogan ‘New 
Labour new danger’ simply did not resonate with the electorate. 
 
By May 1997 the Labour Party had concluded that electoral reform at 
Westminster was conditional on an electoral commission and a referendum. The 
1997 Labour Party Manifesto stated:  
 
“We are committed to a referendum on the voting system for the House of 
Commons. An independent commission on voting will be appointed early on 
to recommend a proportional alternative to the first-past-the-post system.”513 
 
The Labour Party had committed to a raft of constitutional reforms: devolution in 
Scotland – first emerging during the Scottish Constitutional Convention when the 
Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, trade unions and churches backed a ‘Claim of 
Right for Scotland’ – and an assembly in Wales; a continuation of the peace-
process with a power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland; an elected second 
chamber replacing the House of Lords; regional assemblies in England; locally 
elected mayors across England’s towns and cities; and a Freedom of Information 
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Act. The closed regional list (d’Hondt) system was adopted for the European 
Parliament – although it faced considerable opposition in the House of Lords –  
bringing Great Britain in line with the rest of the European Union, with Northern 
Ireland using the STV. Matt Cole writes “One MP attributed Straw’s introduction 
of a closed list system for European elections to a cynical desire to discredit PR, 
commending him on ‘playing a blinder’”514, thus negating PR becoming the ‘thin 
end of the wedge’ for FPTP elections to Westminster. Indeed, all the elected 
devolved bodies introduced by the Labour Government were committed to using 
something other than FPTP.  
 
According to Worcester and Mortimore in Great Britain as a whole, constitutional 
reform came sixteenth out of sixteenth in the concerns of voters during the 1997 
election campaign.515 It was not a ‘bread and butter’ issue and clearly lacked 
saliency with the British electorate in 1997. Indeed, anecdotally, it was often said 
Blair’s eyes glazed over when the topic of constitutional reform was raised, not 
thinking it was of concern to the ‘man and woman’ on the street, a position 
shared according to Rawnsley, by Blair’s closest aides.516 In spite of its lack of 
resonance with the electorate, constitutional reform was an attempt to transform 
the relationship of the state and its citizens. A New Agenda for Democracy 
mentioned three related principles underlying the desire for constitutional reform. 
The first was a desire to strengthen ‘checks and balances’, guarding against 
untrammelled executive power. The second was to introduce greater ‘pluralism’, 
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moving towards greater consensus in decision making. The third was to 
‘decentralise’ policy making.517 Conservative ‘misrule’ and constitutional 
impropriety had prompted the Labour movement to reassess the constitutional 
settlement of the United Kingdom. Therefore, its purpose was not so much about 
electoral appeal but to ensure that a reformed constitution would prevent a repeat 
of the Thatcher experience. 
 
Whilst the aforementioned can be termed the ‘principled’ argument, constitutional 
reform also provided a political benefit, offering clear policy differentiation 
between Labour and the Conservatives. Labour, having embraced Conservative 
spending plans for the first two years of government in an attempt to avoid the 
accusation of ‘tax and spend’, was therefore indistinguishable from the 
Conservatives on a number of policies. For Mitchell, focusing on Conservative 
misrule and utilising the constitution to their benefit, allowed the Labour Party to 
concentrate on “how politics was conducted rather than on policies” allowing 
“Labour to side-step the awkward matter of the converging policy agendas of the 
two parties.”518 Burch and Holliday concur: “Constitutional reform was one of the 
few areas in which Labour made radical manifesto promises distinguishing it from 
its Conservative opponents and its old Labour inheritance.”519 Constitutional 
reform was a useful electoral tool, emphasising different policy agenda, allowing 
Labour to appear ‘radical’, whilst leaving many of the social and economic 
changes of the past two decades intact.  
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The 1st May 1997 witnessed the greatest Labour Party victory in history, winning 
419 seats, giving the party a 179 seat majority in the House of Commons and a 
majority of 255 over the Conservatives. The result was dramatic and had a direct 
impact on the necessity of reforming FPTP and working with the Liberal 
Democrats. The electoral system that had worked against Labour during 
Conservative victories had now swung in favour of the Labour Party, partly down 
to Labour targeting key marginal constituencies and the collapse of the 
Conservative vote. Labour had learnt how to make FPTP work in its favour.  It 
was possible to walk from Lands End to John O’ Groats without passing through 
a Conservative constituency. In Scotland and Wales the Conservatives had no 
parliamentary representation, whereas the Labour Party had managed to win 
seats in areas that even in previous landslide victories they had not, and 
delivered the ‘Portillo Moment’ in Enfield Southgate. The Conservative Party 
would return to Parliament with 165 MPs, the lowest since 1906, and the smallest 
vote share it had received since 1831. The Liberal Democrats, with 46 MPs, was 
the highest for a third party since its forbearer the Liberal Party in 1929, although 
on a smaller vote share than in 1992. The election result was an emphatic victory 
for ‘New Labour’ - a ‘new dawn’ had broken – resulting in Blair becoming the first 
Labour Prime Minister since James Callaghan left office in 1979.  
 
Table 5 below estimates how different electoral systems would have affected the 
general election result. With all projections it is not definitive as it cannot 
categorically be known how electors will vote. However, whilst the 1997 
projection gave the Labour Party an even bigger majority in 1997 under AV or 
SV, the main beneficiary under all alternative electoral systems was the Liberal 
Democrats – a point made by opponents of reform after Jenkins had published 
his report – increasing the likelihood of coalition. After an election “The 
enthusiasm does tail off when the results are examined” stated Joyce Gould as 
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politicians look at the figures and consider how it impacts on their situation. 
“People say if we had this electoral system, how would we have done then? And 
if it looks as if you might not have done as well as you had done you will say ‘no, 
we’re not going to go down that road’.”520  
 
1997 general election result conducted under different electoral systems521  
(Table 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Commission on Voting System, 1998 
 
To fulfil the manifesto commitment and to ensure ‘the project’ remained on 
course, the Labour government announced a commission with a remit to 
recommend an alternative electoral system to be put before the British electorate 
in a referendum. Holding the enquiry into reforming FPTP conveniently deferred 
                                                                  
520 Interview with Baroness Gould, 3rd March 2015 
521 Making Votes Count 2, Dunleavy et al., Democratic Audit, 1998. Quoted in O. Gay, Voting 
Systems: The Jenkins Report, Research Paper 98/112, 10th December 1998, Home Affairs Sections, 
House of Commons Library 
 
 Con Lab LD SNP/PC OTHERS 
% of national vote 30.7 43.2 16.8 2.5 6.8 
Electoral Systems 
FPTP 165 419 46 10 19 
AV 110 436 84 10 19 
SV 110 436 84 10 19 
STV 144 342 131 24 18 
AMS (50:50) 202 296 118 21 18 
AV+ 168 368 89 15 19 
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a pronouncement on the matter, pushing the date back before a decision had to 
be made. The prominent ‘centrist’ Roy Jenkins was chosen as chair, an individual 
who had a chequered history with the Labour Party. The former Labour 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, President of the European Commission, member of 
the ‘Gang of Four’ who founded the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and 
President of the Liberal Democrats had sought to ‘break the mould’ of British 
politics, the means to the end being proportional representation. As such, not all 
in the Labour Party viewed Jenkins as benevolently as Blair, considering him now 
charged with the task of concocting an electoral system that had the potential to 
reduce Labour representation and ensure that the Labour Party would never 
govern as a single party again.  
 
Ashdown records a meeting between himself, Blair, Mandelson and Jenkins in 
June 1997, when Ashdown out of earshot of the others said to Blair “the obvious 
person to chair the Electoral Reform Commission is Roy”, with Blair 
acknowledging that he would think about it.522 According to Rawnsley, in July, 
Blair held a dinner with his wife Cherie, Ashdown, Jenkins and Mandelson in 
attendance. In a pre-agreed plan with Mandelson, the topic of who should chair 
the commission into recommending a new voting system arose. “Mandelson 
suddenly said: ‘I know, why doesn’t Roy do it? There’s no one better qualified.’” 
This could well have been a staged intervention flattering Jenkins into ready 
acceptance of the task.523 The choice of Jenkins as Chair was, for Edmonds, a 
gesture not just to the right of the Labour Party, but mainly, a gesture of reaching 
out beyond Labour, leaving ‘tribal’ Labour such as himself, questioning where it 
was leading. Moreover, Jenkins was a “political move in a way that Plant wasn’t. 
                                                                  
522 Ashdown, Ashdown Diaries, Volume Two, p. 44, Thursday 12th June 1997. 
523 Rawnsley, Servants of the People, pp. 195-196 
233 
 
Plant was party management, Jenkins was completely different.”524 Tribal Labour 
‘questioning where it was all going’ is exemplified by the anecdote of Blair 
informing Prescott of his decision to appoint Jenkins as chair: “it was a very good 
thing he (Prescott) was sitting down, because he exploded.”525 
 
A five-strong commission was announced in December 1997. Jenkins was joined 
by Lord Alexander of Weedon, a Conservative Peer with a career in law and 
banking; Baroness Gould of Potternewton, a former national organiser for the 
Labour Party and member of the Plant Report; the civil servant Sir John Chilcot, 
former permanent secretary at the Northern Ireland Office; and David Lipsey, a 
special advisor to Tony Crosland and political editor of the Economist. For Gould, 
she and Lipsey were chosen by Blair and Straw as they understood we would 
take into account the electoral consequences for the party of any proposed 
system. Gould affirmed: “David and I were very clear that we could only come up 
with something that didn’t do any damage to the Labour Party.”526 The Economist 
considered four of the commission to be declared reformers. Jenkins had long 
promoted electoral reform, whilst suggesting he would accept something less 
than STV, the favoured system of the Liberal Democrats. Lord Alexander had in 
his book, The Voice of the People, announced his ‘tentative personal preference’ 
for STV. Lipsey had argued for at least AV and Baroness Gould had sat on the 
Plant Commission and backed the majority vote for SV.527 Chilcot had not 
publicly declared his personal view, although in his role as permanent secretary 
at the Northern Ireland Office he would have witnessed the workings of STV first-
hand. 
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The remit for the enquiry was given by Straw, the then Home Secretary, in a 
written parliamentary answer. The commission will be “free to consider and 
recommend an appropriate system or combination of systems in recommending 
an alternative to the present system” and was given one year to report. Four 
requirements were outlined: “(i) broad proportionality; (ii) the need for stable 
government; (iii) an extension of voter choice; and (iv) the maintenance of a link 
between MPs and geographical constituencies.” Dunleavy and Margetts suggest 
the brief included two ‘Labour’ criteria – keeping the link to constituencies and 
stable government – and two ‘Liberal Democrat’ criteria proportionality, and 
extending voter choice. However, proportionality was modified to broad 
proportionality by Labour.528 Jenkins added three further criteria: the system 
should be “intellectually acceptable”, represent “a significant change” from the 
existing system and it should have a “reasonable chance of coming about 
politically.”529 The additional criteria added by Jenkins suggest the original criteria 
as outlined by Straw were going to play only a minimal role in influencing the 
decision finally reached by the Commission. 
 
On October 29th 1998 Jenkins published his report, proposing a new system to 
be put to the country in a referendum. It was noted by the Commission that the 
four requirements were “not entirely compatible.” Jenkins considered none of the 
requirements were “absolute.” Otherwise the task of the Commission “would have 
been not merely difficult (which it certainly has been) but impossible” due to the 
irreconcilable terms of reference. “Proportionality may be ‘broad’ not strict.” 
                                                                  
528 P. Dunleavy, & H. Margetts, ‘Mixed electoral systems in Britain and the Jenkins Commission on 
electoral reform’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 1: 1, (April 1999) p. 17 
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“‘Stable government’” was deemed to be a relative term, “for the only way to 
ensure it absolutely (or at least until the regime blows up) would be by avoiding 
elections altogether, which would make our inquiry otiose. Voter choice is at once 
important and imprecise. And it is ‘a link’ and not ‘the link’ between MPs’ 
geographical constituencies which has to be respected. This semi-flexibility has 
made it possible for us to aim at a point which comes near to reconciling all four 
criteria.”530 
 
The terms of reference were all open to interpretation. Broad proportionality is 
dependent on how ‘broadness’ is defined: does stable government entail 
effective government and does this require single party government or coalition; 
to what extent should voter choice be extended and the importance attached to a 
direct constituency link? Whether this was the intention of the Labour leadership 
to create a situation for the commission which ruled little out, whilst also not ruling 
anything in, is a possibility. Mclean considered, reading between the lines, the 
terms of reference were an attempt by Blair to “find something which satisfies 
reformers just enough to count as barely acceptable to them, while comforting 
conservatives that it is the minimum you could offer.”531 
 
Lipsey stated: “The terms of reference we were given were absolutely brilliant 
and completely contradictory” and “enabled us to do whatever we wanted to do 
because of the contradictions within them… They were brilliantly drafted to be 
completely impossible to fulfil.”532 Furthermore, the members of the Commission 
– perhaps bar Jenkins – had not been consulted on the terms of reference and 
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once the Commission had started its work little attention was paid to them. “If 
we’d tried to take the terms of reference seriously we would have had to ‘square 
the circle’. In a sense what we ended up doing was providing a system which 
offered an appropriate balance of the contradictory requirements within the terms 
of reference.”533 Interestingly, the overriding concern of the Commission was 
putting forward an electoral system that had the potential to be introduced. Lipsey 
affirmed: “The driving force wasn’t the terms of reference or the intellectual 
puzzle of solving them, the driving force was to find a change that was big 
enough to be worthwhile which nevertheless had some chance of success.”534 
 
Jenkins, in less detail than Plant, briefly attempts to deal with the issue of 
‘fairness’ being an “important but imprecise concept” linking the idea to electoral 
outcomes and voters, status of political parties within the political system and the 
role of MPs. Lipsey, when asked why little attention was paid to the concept of 
‘fairness’, considered it was in part a result of the different backgrounds of the 
two men. “We were all keen to have a fairer system but I don’t think that was a 
dominant theme. If you have a political philosopher like Raymond Plant running 
an enquiry it’s obviously going to play a stronger part than if you have a 
commission made up of men and women of the world.”535 Whitty, on the other 
hand, was fairly critical of Jenkins: “At least Raymond delivered a report that 
analysed some of the principles.”536 The differing objectives of the reports meant 
Plant sought to address questions of representation and democracy, whereas 
Jenkins was concerned with arriving at a political end, namely an alternative 
electoral system.  
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Jenkins affirmed: “A primary duty of an electoral system is to represent the 
wishes of the electorate as effectively as possible”; something FPTP, the 
Commission argued, distorts. Voters not receiving the “representation they want 
is more important than that the parties do not get the seats to which they think 
they are entitled.” The unfairness manifests itself upon various groups, of which 
some (women and ethnic minorities) are not specifically political, but with parties 
nonetheless being the principal beneficiaries or losers.” However, this was 
qualified by ‘proportionality of power’; arguing it would be “undesirable” for a 
minority party to be perpetually in government, resulting in a “permanent hold 
upon hinge power that neither of the larger groupings could ever exercise 
independent power without the permission of the minority.”537  
 
It was hoped that a reformed electoral system would promote more 
independence and concentration upon the legislative process, thus increasing 
the effectiveness of the House of Commons and leading to better quality social 
and economic legislation. This is in light of controversial legislation – the poll tax 
under the Conservative government and, previously, in the 1970s, nationalisation 
of the ports and aircraft industry by the Labour government – with governments 
elected on a vote share in the high thirties or low forties. The fundamental role of 
MPs was to hold the executive to account but this was made difficult by the 
whipping system, loyalty to the leader and desire to further ones political career. 
Devolution would also impact upon the role of MPs in the principalities, blurring 
the lines for the representative who is responsible for specific policy matters.   
 
The Commission deemed the virtues of FPTP to be its incumbency and therefore 
known by the public, simplicity in casting and counting votes, the lack of demand 
                                                                  
537 Report of the Independent Commission on the Voting System, pp. 2-3 
238 
 
for reform and a tendency to deliver one-party majority governments. 
Consequently, electors “while nominally voting only for a local representative, in 
fact to choose the party they wish to form a government” leaving “each member 
of Parliament with a direct relationship with a particular geographical area” based 
on “nominal equality in the sense that they are all elected in the same way. It also 
enables the electorate to sharply and clearly rid itself of an unwanted 
government.” MPs are encouraged due to their unique position in their 
constituency to serve all their constituents, a single-party government can make 
quick decisions, an unpopular government can be punished by the electorate, 
parties are encouraged to be broad-based and unorthodox MPs have a degree of 
independence from party control provided they can retain local support.538 
 
Yet the objective of the commission was not to write a defence of FPTP but to 
arrive at an alternative, believing the arguments in favour of FPTP would be 
made in the referendum campaign. FPTP has a “natural tendency… to disunite 
rather than to unite the country” leading to a “new form of Disraeli’s two nations.” 
Jenkins claimed the research conducted by the Commission showed “landslide 
majorities…are regarded with considerable suspicion by the wider public, 
perhaps more so even than coalitions.” In part, this is a result of the increased 
vote share of the third party, which is much higher than the proportion of seats 
held in the House of Commons. In comparison the Scottish and Welsh 
nationalists benefit from an ‘intense beam’ of support, its representation is more 
approximate to its strength. “This is perverse, for a party’s breadth of appeal is 
surely a favourable factor from the point of view of national cohesion, and its 
discouragement a count against an electoral system which heavily under-rewards 
it.”539 
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A further criticism of FPTP was its perceived inability to “allow the elector to 
exercise a free choice in both the selection of a constituency representative and 
the determination of the government of the country. It forces the voter to give 
priority to one or the other, and the evidence is that in the great majority of cases 
he or she deems it more important who is Prime Minister than who is member for 
their local constituency.” Accordingly, the result of who becomes MP “effectively 
rests not with the electorate but with the selecting body of whichever party is 
dominant in the area.”540  Germany’s AMS and the Republic of Ireland STV 
system “allow the voter to combine influencing the choice of government and 
expressing a preference between individuals as local representative.”541  
 
The succeeding criticism was the tendency of FPTP to lead to ‘safe seats’ and 
the lack of ‘marginal constituencies’, resulting in political parties pumping 
resources only into ‘at most 150 (out of 659) swingable constituencies.’ However, 
as mentioned in Chapter One, the number of ‘marginal constituencies’ has no 
bearing on the ability of FPTP to deliver majority government and the Scottish 
National Party surge in 2015 highlights there is no such thing as a ‘safe seat’. 
“The semi-corollary of a high proportion of the constituencies being in ‘safe seat’ 
territory is not merely that many voters pass their entire adult lives without ever 
voting for a winning candidate but that they also do so without any realistic hope 
of influencing a result.”542 However, this is not to say that individual voters within 
the constituencies which are considered ‘safe’ do not get the party in government 
for whom they voted even if the representative is from a different political party. 
Still, “In the four elections of the 1950s an average of only 86 or 13.5 per cent of 
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MPs were elected without having the support of a majority of those voting in their 
constituency. In the two elections of the 1990s these figures have risen to an 
average of 286 or 44 per cent.” The Commission considered it was a heavy count 
against FPTP that the chosen representative “in the case of nearly half of them, 
more electors voted against than for them.”543  
 
FPTP can also deliver governments based on perverse results: 1951 when the 
Labour Party polled over 250,000 more votes but the Conservatives had a 
majority of 17, and February 1974 when the Conservatives polled 100,000 more 
votes but the Labour Party won 4 more seats. This was deemed by Jenkins to be 
“not at all bad”, with 13 of the 15 general elections at the time of writing giving 
victory to the party with more votes. Yet, the report claims, if 2 out of every 15 
plane journeys ended in a crash, it would be unacceptable. However, other 
majoritarian electoral systems based in single member constituencies could 
equally result in ‘perverse’ results, as the piling up of votes in electoral 
strongholds is not ‘corrected’ by a proportional element. The final criticism was 
FPTP’s ability to produce a bias against one of the political parties, thus leading 
one party to be better rewarded by the electoral system than the other. Although 
this could “be argued to display a certain impartiality” it was a count against the 
system. Moreover, bias would “not by definition occur in a fully proportional 
system and which would be reduced by any significant move in that direction.”544 
 
Jenkins attempts to refute the arguments that FPTP leads to single-party majority 
governments, often used by defenders of FPTP, by analysing the past 150 years 
of British history. For 43 of the 150 years there has been overt coalition, a further 
34 years in which the government of the day was dependent on the 
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parliamentary votes of another party, plus another 9 years when the government 
of the day’s majority had been so slim it had no certain command of the House of 
Commons. “It is therefore the case that in only 64 of the past 150 years has there 
prevailed the alleged principal benefit of the FPTP system, the production of a 
single-party government with an undisputed command over the House of 
Commons.”545 Robert Wareing, in the Commons debate on the report of the 
Jenkins Commission, reputed the assertion. “How many times did those 
Governments (Attlee 1950-1951 and Wilson 1964-1966) lose in the Division 
Lobby? The answer is that they never did.”546 Jenkins was hardly comparing like 
with like with the reference to aeroplane journeys and also the past 150 years of 
general elections, as this includes a period before the universal franchise. Since 
1928, when men and women had the vote on the same basis, single party 
majority government has been the norm.  
 
As alternative electoral systems SV, the Second Ballot and ‘Weighted Vote’ were 
considered unsuitable. AV fulfilled three out of the four terms of reference; AV 
maintained the constituency link, increased voter choice through the use of 
preferential voting and was unlikely to lead to unstable government. Yet it would 
fail to address the ‘electoral deserts’ for major parties in parts of Great Britain and 
AV, as the table below suggests, can be more disproportional than FPTP.  
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The 1997 general election result ‘best guess’ AV projection547 
(Table 6) 
 1997 General Election Result 
FPTP 
1997 General Election two 
‘best guess’ Prediction AV 
Labour 419 452 or 436 
Conservatives 165 96 or 110 
Lib Dems 46 82 or 84 
Others 29 29 (both) 
 
For the remit to be met there had to be some modification to the maintenance of 
the constituency link.548 This led to the exploration of the suitability of STV, 
believing it “maximises voter choice, giving the elector power to express 
preference not only between parties but between different candidates of the 
same party” achieving a “significantly greater degree of proportionality.” 
Furthermore, “It avoids the problem of having two classes of member, as is the 
case with the Additional Member System.”549 However, as with Plant, STV was 
unfeasible, even as part of a hybrid scheme. Constituencies under STV would 
contain circa 350,000 electors entailing a “very long ballot paper and a degree of 
choice which might be deemed oppressive rather than liberating.”550 Additionally, 
it was deemed unlikely that electors would know significant differences between 
candidates from the same party and there was little evidence to suggest STV 
encourages participation. Furthermore, it would be difficult to reconcile using STV 
as part of a hybrid system, explaining to electors why in different parts of the 
country voters are using a different method for the same institution.551 
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Consequently, a mixed system was recommended – AV+, a variation of AMS, 
based on 80% of MPs representing parliamentary constituencies elected under 
AV, and the remaining 20% elected from county top-up areas – chosen 
“essentially from the British constituency tradition and proceeds by limited 
modification to render it less haphazard, less unfair to minority parties, and less 
nationally divisive in the sense of avoiding large areas of electoral desert for each 
of the two major parties.”552 It was also argued to be the system that came 
closest to fulfilling the terms of reference, increasing, due to the AV element, 
choice, creating a more inclusive and consensual politics. Jenkins notes “AV 
counters one important objection to electoral reform. This is the tendency to 
transfer power from voters to the subsequent deals of politicians”553 due to AV’s 
ability to avoid coalitions and deliver majority governments. The accusation of 
two types of MP was considered unproblematic as in the nineteenth century there 
was a difference between borough and county MPs. However, the British 
electorate would have become normalised to single-member constituencies 
during the course of the twentieth century, having not experienced voting for 
borough and county MPs for a considerable period of time. 
 
In the same fashion as Plant, Jenkins did “not recoil with horror from the very 
idea of coalitions, regarding them, on the basis both of British and of some 
foreign experience, as capable of providing effective and decisive governments” 
with the quality of the coalition depending on whether it was “honest.”554 Honest 
was defined by agreeing more with each other than those outside. Whether this 
is perceived as honest in the eyes of the electorate was not discussed. This was 
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qualified by distancing from permanent coalition, preferring and regarding it more 
compatible with the terms of reference, as “when there is a strong surge in one 
political direction or the other, single-party governments, even if with somewhat 
under 50 per cent of the vote.”555 However, it was considered unacceptable to 
have a ‘hinge party’ – similar to that of the FDP in Germany which had a 
perpetual grip on power even switching sides, or the New Zealand First Party – 
and it was not believed “there is anything inherent in an additional member/top-
up system which make it do so.”556 A substantial degree of proportionality could 
be attained with a top-up of 15-20%, elected through an ‘open list’ using the 
D’hondt method.557  
 
The ‘top-up’ system, it was deemed by the Commission, would be unable to have 
a by-election. Instead, the next candidate on the list should be elected or, failing 
that, the position would remain unfilled until the next general election. Gerald 
Bermingham MP asked “How are the electorate to overturn a Government in the 
middle of their term of office if they cannot boot out the Government party at a by-
election?”558 No threshold was to be imposed, unlike in Germany, but in order to 
win top-up MPs a party had to contest fifty per cent of the constituencies in the 
top-up region. Lipsey maintained the reason for a relatively small top-up element 
– a smaller percentage than either the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly –  
was an attempt to avoid spooking MPs into thinking they will lose their seat and 
their own prospects. 
 
“If you got rid of all constituencies you’re going to make every MP think that 
their seat is in danger and this is one of the big obstacles to electoral reform. 
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Never mind whether people think it will be good for their party, they want to 
know whether they’ll keep their seat under it. We were proposing a 20 per 
cent change in electorates enough to make MPs nervous but most 
constituencies would have remained recognisable. If we’d recommended half 
the number of constituencies they would have asked ‘am I going to get one?’ 
‘How do I know I’ll be on the List?’ It wasn’t very attractive to them and that 
was another factor in making the List element small and also making the List 
element not very proportional.”559 
 
The Note of Reservation 
 
Alexander dissented from the view of the rest of the Commission, arguing that 
FPTP should be used in the constituencies rather than AV as it suffered from a 
number of defects: votes are cast for parties not individuals, MPs represent all 
constituents, it is undesirable to have a less confrontational style of politics, AV 
has the potential to heighten tactical voting, a lack of support for AV amongst 
political parties and pressure groups, Alexander recalled the Plant Report, and 
how the Labour Party did not endorse SV, Plant’s suggestion. Indeed, Labour’s 
submission only “highlighted criteria which pointed ambiguously towards either 
FPTP or AV.” Moreover, FPTP was to be used in the constituency element for the 
devolved assemblies and the workings of AV entail only the second preferences 
or lower of the least successful candidates are counted, the haphazard impact of 
ranking candidates and its disproportionality towards unpopular party.560 
Alexander’s reservation was leaked to the Financial Times prior to the 
Commission’s publication, at the behest of Lipsey, in an attempt to avoid the 
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accusation ‘Jenkins divided’. Lipsey did not consider that Alexander’s dissent had 
undermined the argument proposed by the Commission.561    
 
Labour Party Submission to the Commission on Voting System 
 
Labour’s ruling National Executive Committee (NEC) submitted a document to 
the Commission on 6th July 1998, asking to “bear in mind the need for a system 
which sustains, open, stable and accountable Government.”562 The constituency 
link was and should continue to be the “bedrock of the parliamentary 
system...ensuring MPs are clearly representative of and answerable to a clearly 
defined group of electors”563 therefore making the retention of the constituency 
link vital in any alternative electoral system. Stable government was considered 
“a government which is generally able to last its full electoral term and which is 
also able to carry though its manifesto pledges”; deemed a “vital consideration” 
as in the United Kingdom it was expected the House of Commons would sustain 
a government with a clear mandate and also a strong opposition.564 Over the last 
fifty years Great Britain had enjoyed stable and representative government, aided 
by “the preponderance of single-party majority administrations.” Crucial in a 
democracy, was the “power to throw out an unpopular government” and the 
submission deemed it should be maintained in any alternative to FPTP.565 
 
The submission judged there to be a “trade-off between stable government and 
proportionality” with pure proportionality most likely to lead to coalition. Coalitions 
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are “not by definition unstable” claimed the submission, but the process of 
forming a government can be “consuming and divisive, and small parties can 
gain a pivotal position where they wield power which is disproportionate to their 
degree of electoral support.”566 Additionally, the document declared “We do not 
believe the electoral system should result in perpetual coalition” nor “was a 
government illegitimate if it received less than fifty per cent of the vote.”567 In 
relation to broad proportionality, the submission desired the Commission to look 
into proportionality of representation and proportionality of power, for the two 
were deemed not to be the same. “It would be a mistake to place so much stress 
on pure proportionality of representation that small parties are given 
disproportionate power compared to the level of support in the country.”568 
 
On the matter of voter choice, the document reasoned on two aspects: the choice 
of the individual voter and whether the overall result in terms of the Government 
supported by the House of Commons can be said to reflect the broad choice of 
the electorate as a whole. “Systems capable of producing clear winners help to 
ensure that governments are held to account between elections...Systems which 
inevitably lead to coalition can undermine the direct accountability which other 
systems produce” an “excuse for non-delivery of manifesto promises.” Post-
election deals result in voters not knowing until “after they have voted the precise 
programme to which the resulting government will be committed.”569 The 
document highlighted the strength of opposition towards PR and, moreover, a 
satisfaction with FPTP emphasising many of its perceived benefits. The only vote 
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against the NEC document, according to the Guardian, was by Dennis Skinner, 
Labour MP for Bolsover, who totally opposes PR.570  
 
Was the Commission Independent? 
 
In light of the known views of the members of the Commission, it could be argued 
that it lacked ‘independence’, and therefore was disingenuous to call the 
Commission ‘independent’ given the sympathetic views towards electoral reform 
of those who sat on the committee. Baroness Gould thought “The Jenkins 
Commission was fundamentally different to the Plant Report. Whereas Jenkins 
started from the premise of change, Plant did not.”571 Lipsey considered that 
those who thought the Commission lacked independence were incorrect. “It was 
not our job to propose a system that we thought was superior to the existing 
system. Our job was to decide on what was the best of the alternatives to the 
existing system to put in front of the British people to decide in a referendum. 
There was no point having a FPTP chapter as that argument was to be put in the 
referendum campaign. We were just deciding the best alternative for the 
referendum.”572  
 
Where the Commission may have lacked independence is contact between 
members of the commission and the Prime Minister. Lipsey rejected claims that 
the recommendation was hatched in private between Blair and Jenkins: “Any 
suspicion that our conclusion resulted from secret negotiations between Lord 
Jenkins, Tony Blair and Paddy Ashdown… is unfounded.”573 Yet Blair is reported 
to have met with Jenkins during the lifetime of the commission, which included 
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discussing how it was progressing. Jenkins informed Ashdown that Blair listened 
to the suggestion of a decentralised AMS-based system. Blair and Ashdown also 
debated in private this issue of thresholds – a party that won 45% of the vote or 
more should win over 50% of the seats, with Ashdown claiming the “Jenkins 
Commission proposals fell somewhat short of that.” Blair did not think it was 
“acceptable”, as only one post-war government would have been able to form a 
majority.574  
 
However, for a political operator with a longstanding commitment to ‘breaking the 
mould’ of British politics through electoral reform, it would have been in the 
interests of Jenkins to keep Blair informed in the hope that he would be 
sympathetic to the recommendations. This consequently raises the question of 
whether it was pre-arranged that the commission would recommend AV+? 
Margetts and Dunleavy claim there is evidence that at Easter 1998 Jenkins and 
Blair met to discuss the interim ideas of the Commission. At the time the mixed 
system was to consist of two thirds constituency and one third top up. However, 
Blair is supposed to have rejected this possibility, on advice given by Mandelson 
and Number 10 staff, who warned the PLP would not accept such a radical 
change. Consequently, Blair allegedly asked Jenkins to look again at a system 
with more constituency MPs, as this had greater feasibility.575   
 
Lipsey wrote an article titled ‘How we made up our minds’, stating the public 
influenced the commission’s decision by showing antipathy towards 
strengthening the influence of the party in placing candidates on the top-up lists. 
Consequently, top-up members were to be chosen locally for ‘smallish’ areas. 
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Additionally, voters would be able to decide between themselves which of each 
party’s candidates they prefer. Importantly, and implying that the Commission 
was keen on receiving the backing of the three major political parties Lipsey 
wrote that the position of the major parties were taken into account. “Not wanting 
our report to join the ranks of previous reports on this subject gathering dust on 
library shelves, we did establish the parameters of Mr Blair’s and Mr Ashdown’s 
thinking as well as that of the Conservative Party.” However, it was agreed the 
recommendation should not be what was most “expedient but what was right.”576  
 
The Ashdown Diaries suggest Blair, prior to the formation of the Commission, 
suggested one possibility would be “AV for the next election; the second, full 
proportionality after that. The Commission could recommend the ultimate 
destination but ought in our view to recommend the intervening staging-post of 
AV as well using the phrase ‘The government may want to do this in two 
stages’.577 Stating categorically that this was the case is very difficult to 
substantiate. Regardless, this was the course of action promoted by Lipsey who 
pressed the matter with Jenkins. “The trick we missed was we should have 
recommended moving to AV and then considered the introduction of top-up lists 
as a second stage later on and then we might just have got AV through. This was 
a tremendous tussle within in the Commission as we had people who were more 
keen on proportionality, namely Bob Alexander.”578 
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Labour divisions over PR and the 1998 Labour Party Conference 
 
In April 1998 the Labour government insisted the AV would fulfil the remit of the 
Jenkins Commission. Straw considered AV to be ‘broadly proportional’, adding 
the government planned to hold a referendum on PR well before the next general 
election. Yet, the government was not bound by the Commission’s 
recommendations, which would have to be subject to Cabinet consideration, and 
if a referendum were to be held it could choose an alternative to FPTP of its own 
liking.579 In public, Blair remained ‘unpersuaded’ on the merits of PR, and his 
personal doubts may have been supplemented by the strength of feeling within 
the PLP. Around eighty Labour MPs had joined ‘Keep the Link’, an anti-PR 
campaign group. As the name implies, the group wished to ‘retain the all-
important constituency link’ between MPs and voters. The backbench group, was 
led by Martin Salter, Labour MP for Reading West and included Dale Campbell-
Savours – who devised SV advocated by the Plant Report – and Patricia 
Hewitt.580 If change were to take place then the greatest concession should be 
the AV.    
 
The Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU), led by the General 
Secretary Ken Jackson, sought to lead a trade union and grass-root revolt 
against PR and as a result place increased strain on Labour – Liberal Democrat 
relations. “The campaign for PR is confined to the chattering classes and dining 
clubs of London” claimed Jackson. “PR is largely a metropolitan issue and one 
which working-class people have little sympathy for… Ordinary people voted 
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Labour to improve schools, create jobs and rebuild the NHS, not to change the 
way we vote. PR would give more power to minorities, undermining our ability to 
govern.” £10,000 was to be provided for the circulation of Labour’s FPTP group 
leaflet stating “No serious Labour party member could countenance a change 
which would take the party from majority government to a situation where it might 
be frozen out of government or to a situation where Labour could be held 
hostage by minority parties.”581 Stuart Bell, Chairman of the FPTP group, went 
further citing Labour’s past sense of betrayal at the hands of the Liberals; the 
1924 Labour government and David Steel withdrawing from the Lab-Lib Pact.582  
 
Gordon Brown held significant influence in the Cabinet and wider PLP, but had 
kept his views on electoral reform private. However, Robert Peston writing in the 
Financial Times affirmed Brown was strongly opposed to PR. Blair would on 
several occasions cite Brown as an impasse to electoral reform as Brown was in 
favour of FPTP and generally, bar Menzies Campbell and other individuals, the 
Liberal Democrats “were not to be trusted.”583 Brown did have a private meeting 
with Ashdown, stating that whilst he was not opposed to PR, the matter raised 
doubts and problems. “I am really frightened about factionalism in politics and 
really frightened about running a Cabinet in which individuals would have to run 
back to their own sections or groups to get validation for what they are doing.” 
Brown’s focus on ‘running a Cabinet’ suggests he was considering the 
implications of being Prime Minister in the late 1990s, long before he assumed 
the leadership. “There are those in the Labour Party” continued Brown, “who 
push for PR because they believe it will enable them to push Labour back on to a 
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conventional left-wing agenda.”584 For Blair to go against a political heavyweight 
within the Labour Party in an attempt to appease a politician from another 
political party would have weakened his own position. Interestingly, Blair and 
Brown’s thoughts on electoral reform differ on means but arrive at the same 
ends. For Blair PR was the method that would permit a reuniting of the centre 
left, allowing him to marginalise the left wing of the Labour Party. Brown 
considered that FPTP was the best method of pursuing a centrist agenda, forcing 
the Labour Party to abandon a left-wing agenda by appealing to the median 
voter.  
 
Whilst Blair is often viewed as a Prime Minister who by-passed Cabinet, utilising 
special advisors and those in his inner circle to discuss policy, the same tactic on 
this matter posed difficulties. To risk Cabinet divisions over PR in order to keep 
alive the ‘project’, with no political necessity would have entailed Blair exercising 
his authority on a matter not deemed a priority, thus damaging his position and 
the standing of his government. In addition Blair had to keep Prescott onside, 
understanding that whilst from different backgrounds and representing different 
wings of the Labour Party, he could only push his Deputy so far. On the matter of 
PR for Westminster and coalition with the Liberal Democrats Prescott was 
immovable, reportedly telling one campaigner for constitutional change “I’m not in 
fucking favour of fucking PR for anything.”585 In a meeting with Ashdown Prescott 
expanded on his reservations, being a “Labour man to the core”, not sharing 
Blair’s and Ashdown’s analysis of a schism on the political left, believing that it 
would “break up my party… I have no qualms about the Labour Party being in 
power time and time again, and in between taking our turn at defeat, too...I would 
not be prepared to support PR for the constituencies (Westminster). Under these 
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circumstances I would oppose him privately and publicly.” Prescott claims that 
“he had told Tony that another no-go point for me would be if he had you lot in 
Cabinet...I don’t believe that Tony can carry our party on it either.”586 Prescott told 
Blair: “If Ashdown walks in the back door and gets a Cabinet job, I’m straight out 
the front door. It’s not a negotiable issue for me.” Prescott could see what Blair 
was attempting to do; creating “a party of the centre including the Liberal 
Democrats that would destroy the Tories and keep us in power for ever… I was 
totally against it. Prescott told Ashdown “(a) You’re a Lib, so I’d never join forces 
with you and (b) we don’t need you. We’ve got a massive majority and I don’t like 
Big Tents… It was a bloody stupid idea.”587 
 
The 1998 Labour Party Conference saw the issue of electoral reform take centre 
stage. Edmonds, who had earlier in 1998 orchestrated a grassroots campaign to 
defend FPTP, considered “arms had been twisted” and the Labour Party 
leadership had conducted a “shabby little deal” to avoid a debate and vote on 
PR, which had been postponed as the NEC believed it would be “premature” to 
force a vote before Jenkins had reported. AEEU leader, Jackson, had also been 
involved in the FPTP campaign but bowed to pressure from the party leadership 
and had withdrawn a motion calling for FPTP to be retained. Jackson considered: 
“There is genuine diversity of opinion in our party. PR cannot become Labour’s 
EMU – a force for division, an excuse for open warfare.” Jackson then added a 
staunch defence of FPTP: “We can only go on serving our people if we keep the 
system that delivered that historic (1997) victory. PR would mean permanent 
Liberal coalitions.” “Think about the nightmare of Liberal Democrats calling the 
shots, and minority parties being able to veto parties on the back of a whim.” 
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Stuart Bell, chairman of the FPTP Group of MPs won loud applause when he 
asked delegates to “Imagine, under PR, a deal with the Liberals, coalition 
government, Paddy standing in front of you speaking as Chancellor – that is not 
going to happen because under PR he could be at the Conservative party 
conference.”588 
 
Prescott told Breakfast with Frost that he had never been a fan of PR. “I think the 
country is not very happy about it. We’ve said that we’ll have a look at it.” On 
whether Ashdown could survive as leader of the Liberal Democrats without a 
change of the electoral system, Prescott said “I’m not really interested in whether 
Paddy Ashdown survives or not. I’m talking about Labour Party policy.”589 
Prescott would quip in Cabinet after Ashdown had stood down as Leader of the 
Liberal Democrats that he wanted “to hold a minutes silence for Paddy’s 
career.”590 Blair delivered a riposte to those within Labour who opposed closer 
links with the Liberal Democrats, returning to a theme he had outlined in 
opposition. “My message to my own party is in a sense there is a longer-term, 
bigger picture here which is about people who basically agree”, declaring “We’re 
all modern social democrats, a large part of the Liberal Democrats are in that 
position and where we do agree we should be working together. Let’s not be 
tribal about all this.” Echoing his belief in reuniting the centre-left Blair 
considered, “What is important is to recognise that politics has undergone a huge 
change, here and round the world, and I just believe in doing what is sensible. If 
people do agree then why not try to work together?”591 
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During his afternoon question and answer session, Blair took a more conciliatory 
approach: “I understand it is an important issue, but frankly schools, hospitals, 
crime, industry and jobs – these are also very, very important.” Blair went on to 
say “There will be no decision taken on this unless the party is fully and 
completely involved. It is far too important a decision to be done in any other way. 
We will proceed with care once this report is published.”592 Minimising divisions 
amongst Cabinet ministers and the wider PLP was the priority of the leadership, 
whilst also avoiding accusations of reneging on its commitment to hold a 
referendum on electoral reform. A conference vote against PR and in favour of 
FPTP would have been a repeat situation of 1995, allowing Blair to have his 
hands tied by conference, permitting him to drop a commitment which threatened 
to split his party and cabinet. Yet the bigger picture for Blair was keeping open 
the option of bringing Liberal Democrats into government, which would have 
been derailed if the referendum commitment had been dropped. 
 
Reaction to the publication of Jenkins 
 
Margaret Beckett, the Leader of the House and therefore in control of the 
Government’s legislative programme, a week before the publication of Jenkins 
poured cold water on the Commission and the wider ‘project’. Manifesto 
commitments were simply a “declaration of intent and goodwill”, not a list of what 
the Government would deliver in Parliament. “One cannot take manifestos as 
being a list for the Queen’s speeches.”593 Following the publication of Jenkins it 
was reported that Blair told the Cabinet, “We’ve got to manage this process and 
manage it well”, issuing a statement: “I welcome it warmly. The report makes a 
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well-argued and powerful case for the system it recommends. It’s very much a 
modification of the existing Westminster system rather than any full-blown PR 
system as practised in other countries.” If Ashdown and Jenkins were expecting 
a positive response, a ‘well-argued and powerful case for the system it 
recommends’ would have been disappointing, offering no guarantee of Blair’s 
support for PR. Blair is reported to have told cabinet ministers that only he and 
Jack Cunningham, minister for the Cabinet Office, were empowered to speak at 
length on electoral reform. Cunningham was known to be keen on electoral 
reform whereas others were allowed to “give their views if asked” but were not to 
campaign. This was “unsustainable” according to one unnamed cabinet minister 
and “all the ingredients (were) in place for a cabinet revolt.”594 According to 
Campbell once it became apparent the leadership were attempting to help 
Ashdown and strike the balance Blair desired, the Cabinet “basically knew it (PR) 
was for the long grass.”595 
 
The Jenkins Commission proposals were met with strong opposition from a 
cross-party group including Labour backbenchers, trade unionists, Conservatives 
and the Institute of Directors. A press release from Labour FPTP campaign 
group, stated: “The proposal that 15-20 per cent of MPs should be chosen by a 
list system breaks the constituency link between MPs and electors.” Bell 
continued: “This recommendation would add to the volatility of the electoral 
system by institutionalising tactical voting and making coalition government 
inevitable.” Channel 4 conducted a poll of Labour’s Campaign Group, finding 
four-fifths thought voting reform could produce a split within the Labour Party and 
the formation of a breakaway party. Ken Jackson considered Jenkins to be 
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“irrelevant” to the concerns of the British electorate. “Labour will win the next 
election by delivering what it promised, not by appeasing the Liberals. The 
government was elected to reform the welfare state, improve our schools and 
rebuild the NHS – it must not allow Liberals to hijack its agenda for Britain.”596 It 
was reported in the Financial Times that at least 100 Labour backbenchers were 
making common cause with the Tory party and trade unionists to block the 
changes597, highlighting a significant section of the Labour Party were 
manoeuvring to ensure the proposals were rejected.  
 
A parliamentary debate took place in the House of Commons on 5th November 
1998. Straw opened the debate and only offered faint-praise for the report stating 
he was “extremely grateful to...the commission and its staff for their considerable 
work in bringing together the Report in relatively short time”. The Report had “a 
number of important points of detail...to be resolved”, a task which “would plainly 
take time”. Straw reiterated that “the process certainly could not be completed 
before the next general election” and that the government “will not rush into 
holding a referendum.” There was also the need to study the Neill Committee’s 
report on party funding and the wider constitutional changes enacted by the 
Labour government.598 Straw’s comments suggest that any government impetus 
for reform was on the wane, with the Home Secretary willing to bury PR behind 
other matters. Straw had ‘damned Jenkins with faint-praise’.  
 
Then followed the opportunity for Labour backbenchers to pass judgement: 
Gerald Kaufman considered the report to be “glutinously euphuistic as well as 
being intellectually shoddy”; with the effect of AV+ being “fewer Labour seats” 
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and “Lord Jenkins's own party will enjoy the greatest enhancement.” In a 
referendum the Labour Party would be “split.” Kaufman offered eight reasons 
why the Jenkins Commission should be rejected: hopelessly complicated, 
complex and confusing ballot paper, the report is self-contradictory, top-up 
mechanism is arbitrary, disparately sized and disparately elected top-up 
constituencies, potentially insoluble problem of filling vacant top-up seats, the 
current system works and there is an inbuilt bias against Labour in AV+.599  
 
Giles Radice entered parliament as “an unquestioning supporter of first past the 
post” yet changed his mind for three main reasons: the Thatcher government 
elected on a percentage in the low forties, FPTP is unfair towards the Liberals 
and Labour’s inability to win seats in the South of England.600 Anne Campbell, 
MP for Cambridge desired a ‘fairer’ voting system under which “Parliament better 
represents the views of the voters” believing “a large proportion of votes do not 
count.” This has resulted in “tactical voting” which was “unfair to the Conservative 
Party” in 1997 but could “equally be unfair to other parties” in subsequent 
elections. “The adversarial system is extremely off-putting to a large proportion of 
the electorate, particularly women.” Moreover, “There is no room in the system 
for taking on board someone else’s view, or to consider a range of opinion.”601 
 
Tony Benn MP affirmed: 
 
“The idea that every Liberal or Labour voter supports every item of Liberal or 
Labour party policy is absolute nonsense. People want to be represented. 
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Introducing proportionality completely destroys the idea of representation… 
(leading) to people being governed by a Government whom nobody had voted 
for, because nobody would know the basis of the coalition on polling day. At 
least the coalitions of the parties are transparent: people can see them 
developing and know what they are voting for and what their own Member 
thinks… The idea that the parliamentary Labour party would go through the 
Lobby to destroy 50 of its own Members… is ludicrous. People ask whether 
the proposals would lead to a coalition; but they are all about getting a 
coalition.”602 
 
Roger Godsiff supported the AV recommendation but not the top-up element as 
in Birmingham where the Liberal Democrats polled 11.8 per cent they would have 
won an extra seat. “It is illogical. If one wants to give more seats to the Liberals, 
so be it...but it is nonsense to give them localised democratic legitimacy in this 
way.”603 Martin Salter MP also supported electoral reform but wished to maintain 
the constituency link. Salter believed “that the system is a recipe for civil war 
inside the Labour Party. The constituencies of many Labour Members are 
surrounded by those of other Labour Members. Will we spend the next three, 
four, five or eight years deciding which of our number will be chopped? I think 
not. This system is not a recipe for a cohesive parliamentary party.”604 Bell 
considered Jenkins was “trying to increase the number of Liberal Democrat 
Members of Parliament.” FPTP “has given us stable government. It gives us the 
constituency link...it provides accountability. It also gives us the doctrine of 
mandate...Every party puts forward its proposals in a general election and the 
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country votes on them. The manifesto is there; we are there to fulfil the manifesto 
commitments. If we fail, we should say why. If we are not successful, the public 
have a chance to turn us out.”605  
 
Richard Burden, MP for Northfield, supported Jenkins arguing that the 
constituency link was maintained, the top-up list will empower voters and 
“coalitions are good or bad depends not on the electoral system, but on whether 
the electorate gives a clear view and whether the coalitions are honest, open and 
transparent.”606 Robert Wareing MP for Liverpool West Derby considered “PR 
would mean coalitions being cobbled together in back rooms by politicians. It is 
an electoral system for politicians” whereas FPTP “is an electoral system for the 
people of this country.” Furthermore, it would not be the case that the Liberal 
Democrats would support the Labour Party and he asked the question who would 
give way for Ashdown to have a seat in the cabinet.607 Claire Ward MP for 
Watford in all her years campaigning for the Labour Party had not come across a 
Labour voter who was voting Labour in order for them to change the electoral 
system. “The electorate vote for a party and a candidate to form a Government” 
and people wanted a “Labour government implementing their policies, not 
forming a coalition with the Liberal Democrats.”608  
 
Elsewhere, Alan Johnson recalls a meeting in 1999 with Tony Blair, Oona King 
and other “PR enthusiasts.” Blair, in Johnson’s opinion, “was never in that camp 
but he wasn’t hostile” due to the influence of Jenkins. At this time, Blair “was at 
his absolute pomp, we’d just had the Good Friday Agreement, he was walking on 
water.” However, he told the meeting “frankly ‘even with all my influence with the 
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PLP I do not think I could get this through.’ Blair had picked up that the mood had 
changed, we’d won. It looked like we would be in power for a long period of 
time… why should we let the Tories back in?” Johnson speculated “Whether 
Tony thought it would be unwise for him as leader of the party is another 
thing...He would have a real fight on his hands for them to water down the overall 
majority, as it undoubtedly would have done.”609  
 
When asked whether Blair had the political capital to carry AV+ through Cabinet, 
with many members hostile, Johnson considered Blair would have done. 
However, he had “used up a lot of collateral” such as the battle with “Gordon 
Brown on raising the level of spending on the NHS to the European average.” 
Blair “probably thought there were bigger battles to win than this.” The Labour 
government was committed to eradicating “child poverty, building 3,000 sure start 
centres, rescuing the NHS, getting the long waiting lists down, policies which 
were put ahead of the issues of great interest to the chattering classes, not really 
to their constituents.” It was possible if he “had have put his weight behind at that 
time with all the pro-electoral reform people within the party” and he “would have 
had the Liberal Democrats with him.” The question for Blair was “how much 
collateral would I use up in doing it.”610 Charles Clarke agrees that Blair would 
have had to exercise his authority, but “he wasn’t prepared to do that. The 
fundamental existential reason for doing it was not apparent.”611 
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Jenkins for the ‘long grass’  
 
Over the thirteen years of a Labour government, no referendum on the electoral 
system materialised and Jenkins was ‘kicked into the long grass’. The reasons for 
this are varied. Mandelson cites the example of the referenda in Scotland and 
Wales as a cause of retreating enthusiasm. “Both of which had been won” writes 
Mandelson, “but by an extremely narrow margin in Wales, Tony’s appetite for a 
further public vote was waning.”612 Furthermore, the Labour Party was elected on 
a manifesto commitment to hold a referendum on the United Kingdom’s adoption 
of the euro currency. If Blair was “worried about the obstacles to holding and 
winning a referendum on the single currency” thought Mandelson, “he knew that 
those to remaking Britain’s voting system were likely to prove even more 
difficult.”613 Moreover, if the Labour government were willing to hold a UK wide 
referendum on the electoral system then the calls to hold a referendum on the 
single currency would have likely increased, thus pressurising the government 
into holding a potentially divisive referendum for both party and country. 
 
Blair had informed Ashdown prior to the publication of Jenkins that he would be 
unable to deliver PR before the next general election. Blair outlined his 
reasoning: “there was so much constitutional change going through we had to 
watch out for overload, added to which we needed to see how it worked 
elsewhere” echoing the theme mentioned earlier that ‘enough is enough’. Blair 
“was not convinced and in any case could not get it through Cabinet” as he was 
isolated. Campbell also claims that the media “thought we were going to kick it 
out.”614 Opposition within Cabinet and the wider PLP was considerable. Prescott 
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was joined by Beckett, Straw and Blunkett. Exercising his authority as a high-
profile Cabinet Minister would have weakened Blair’s position. At the Labour 
Party Conference in 2000, Prescott scorned links with the Liberal Democrats and 
attempted to bury PR. “Put it (PR) in a boat and send it away with the Lib/Labs” 
and Prescott had “seen nothing (in the 1970s) or nothing since that convinces me 
that PR is in the nation’s interests of stable government. I’ve never been a fan of 
it.”615 Referring back to the Callaghan government was an indirect criticism and 
warning to Blair about his desire to re-unite the centre left. 
 
The lack of support in the Cabinet and the dominance of those hostile to reform 
meant there was a lack of high-profile pro-reform ministers and MPs who could 
pressurise Blair, convince fellow MPs and build support for the movement away 
from FPTP. Robin Cook – who was famously described as being in “a minority of 
one”616 – had other PR sympathisers in Cabinet, including Mo Mowlem, the 
Northern Ireland Secretary, along with Chris Smith, the Culture Secretary, and 
therefore was not a lone voice. Baroness Armstrong deemed that although Cook 
was very knowledgeable and intellectual he was never a “clubbable person” and 
was therefore “not a good champion of the cause as he could not persuade his 
colleagues it was a good idea.” In addition, Armstrong who joined Cabinet in 
2001, could not “recall anyone else who was on his side” until Alan Johnson 
joined the Cabinet at a much later date.617 For Mandelson, Blair “had not 
convinced enough people that this was a good thing to do in principle and 
therefore when the electoral need disappeared the support that existed for it 
disappeared as well.”618 Colleagues therefore had not been convinced on an 
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intellectual level. Moreover, with each Cabinet Minister focusing on their own 
department and facing the practical constraints of holding high office, there was a 
limited amount of time that could be spent on promoting electoral reform. 
 
It was also “incomprehensible” for some, deemed Mandelson, that after winning 
an historic landslide victory “we should contemplate dealing away cabinet seats 
on the hypothesis that it might help keep the Tories from returning to power ten 
years down the road.” Having won such a big majority, and given the poor state 
of the Conservative Party, there was little prospect of defeat in the foreseeable 
future. Mandelson continues: “What ultimately killed the prospect in the late 
1990s was that neither side was ready to sign up to the only workable deal: 
baseline of two Lib Dem cabinet members and a gradual move towards a simple 
AV voting system.” Blair “might have signed up to this” but Ashdown “insisted on 
a larger number of cabinet seats, a governing ‘coalition’, and a proportional 
voting system, not just AV.”619 Given the weight of support in favour of FPTP, AV 
alone would have faced considerable opposition. At a Cabinet meeting in early 
1999 Campbell noted, “Dobson and Blunkett said people were not sure what the 
purpose of the Libs strategy was, and David was unsure our people meant it 
when they said they wanted a new politics.”620 
 
However, whilst Mandelson claims he was in favour of ‘the project’, a different 
picture emerges in the Ashdown Diaries. By July 1998 Mandelson expressed the 
worry that “it will be viewed, not as like-minded people coming together in the 
national interest, but as a crude attempt by the government to buy off the 
opposition and create an even greater hegemony. Secondly, the Jenkins 
proposals will, as you know, split the Cabinet, probably around 50/50…this is 
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something very, very big on which you will find a large number of your Cabinet 
members opposed.” In Mandelson’s mind there was the problem of how the 
British public would perceive coalition, and also how Blair would get this through 
Cabinet especially before the agreed November 1998 timetable. Furthermore, 
according to Roger Liddle, it was Mandelson who “has been trying to persuade 
Blair that he can’t win a referendum on PR” and had stated it could not be won in 
September.621  
 
Mandelson replied in The Times acknowledging that Ashdown blamed him for 
blocking the switch to PR. However, Mandelson was only prepared to support the 
switch to PR if this was the Prime Minister’s will. 
 
“In the event it was not. To Ashdown this looked pusillanimous. But the 
problem was that Blair was far from convinced either that PR was desirable 
(because of the political instability it brings) or that the public would go for it in 
a referendum. A referendum vote lost would have meant losing the issue for a 
generation or more. Is this what Ashdown wanted to risk, we kept asking?” 
 
Blair maintained that if the Liberal Democrats were to become a party of 
government then they must have firm policies on economic and social issues, not 
just constitutional reform and PR. However, the reason why Blair continued to 
engage Ashdown resides in Blair’s opinion of what the ‘project’ was about. 
 
“He was willing to consider electoral reform not least because he inherited a 
commitment from John Smith to hold a referendum and there was a significant 
constituency of support for PR in the Labour Party. Hence his willingness to 
                                                                  
621 Ashdown, Ashdown Diaries, pp. 224-225, Diary entry Tuesday 7th July 1998; p. 265, Diary entry 
Sunday 13th September 1998; p. 269. Diary entry Thursday 17th September 1998. 
267 
 
set up the Jenkins Commission on electoral systems. But, for him, the project 
was always more about an approach to politics based on co-operation and 
partnership rather than tribalism or electoral mechanics…Ashdown on the 
other hand, insisted that PR was the sine quo non of enduring co-
operation.”622 
 
Domestic and foreign affairs also prompted Blair to move away from PR. The 
Labour government had encountered difficulties with other European leaders 
whose coalition partners in their own country prevented them from taking a hard 
line over Kosovo. Campbell observed the problems facing Schroeder, the 
German Chancellor, and how in part this was caused by their political system 
which “weakened leaders. Why anyone backed PR for national government was 
beyond me. It is a recipe for weakness and every time I meet Schroeder that 
view is strengthened.”623 Mandelson reflected on the importance of continental 
politics on Blair’s attitude: “He looked at the European experience and rather than 
picking out the good examples where coalitions have worked, for example in 
Germany, he points to other examples, for example Belgium which he thinks 
produces a complete mess.”624 
 
Elsewhere across Great Britain, AMS in Scotland and Wales had denied the 
Labour Party a majority in both devolved assemblies. Blair was said to be 
annoyed by the behaviour of the Liberal Democrats in Scotland, particularly in 
relation to tuition fees in coalition talks.625 This played into the hands of those 
who were already suspicious of the opportunism of the Liberal Democrats, 
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witnessing first hand their ability to hold the Labour Party hostage, something in 
their mind would happen at Westminster if PR was adopted for general elections. 
Additionally, the European elections – the first UK wide election to be held under 
PR – took place in June 1999, resulting in Labour’s representation reducing from 
62 to 29, an election in which the Labour Party had finished second behind the 
Conservatives. A poll of 150 Labour MPs for BBC One programme On The 
Record in September 1998 had shown 58 per cent in favour of the new European 
electoral system. The Sunday following the European elections, this had reduced 
to 43 per cent, with a majority now in favour of returning to FPTP.626  
 
Internally, opposition appeared to be mounting against abandoning FPTP. A 
consultation with rank-and-file Labour party members had produced 1,800 
responses; 75 per cent were in favour of retaining FPTP, while 25 per cent 
backed AV Plus. Margaret McDonagh, then Labour Party General Secretary and 
known supporter of FPTP, believed that the Liberal Democrats were failing to 
woo Conservative supporters. Without the electoral benefit of Liberal Democrats 
undermining the Conservative Party the case of working with the Liberal 
Democrats was limited.627 Therefore, the referendum pledge should be dropped. 
Fraser Kemp, a member of Labour’s FPTP campaign, said: “This consultation 
has demonstrated the tremendous support that maintaining the current system 
has in our party. The prospect of having PR foisted upon us is getting ever more 
remote and hopefully we can kill it off altogether at the next conference.”628 
However, the publishing of the results were claimed to be disingenuous: many of 
the 1,500 submissions received were postcards printed by the AEEU, a trade 
union who backed FPTP, and not all submissions had been analysed by officials. 
                                                                  
626 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/euros_99/news/368450.stm (Accessed 27th January 2015).  
627 Financial Times, ‘Labour party rank-and-file hostile to poll reform’, 5th January 2000 
628 The Times, ‘Vote against PR dashes Blair hope of Lib-Lab pact’, 5th January 2000 
269 
 
In addition, McDonagh opposed PR, leading the Guardian to ponder whether it 
was a calculated leak by Labour.629 Given the overall lack of responses it could 
be argued the ‘rank-and-file’ had displayed apathy towards the issue. The GMB 
Union also attempted to thwart a manifesto commitment appearing at the 2001 
general election by submitting an amendment to the National Policy Forum.630  
 
The lack of enthusiasm for reform was such that the 2001 Labour Party 
Manifesto commitment on proportional representation was buried behind other 
constitutional changes already made by the Labour government.  
 
“We will review the experience of the new systems (for the devolved 
administrations, the European Parliament and London Assembly) and the 
Jenkins Report to assess whether changes might be made to the electoral 
system for the House of Commons. A referendum remains the right way to 
agree any change for Westminster.”631 
 
Summary 
 
Reforming FPTP had an underlying importance for the relationship between the 
Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats, specifically Blair and Ashdown. PR was 
the mechanism, in Ashdown’s opinion, that would ensure the Liberal Democrats 
could survive during unpopular periods for the junior partner in government, 
allowing for continued support towards a Labour government whilst also allowing 
for a more open and pluralistic British politics. Indeed, Ashdown placed such 
emphasis on the introduction of PR that his position as leader of the Liberal 
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Democrats was reliant on Labour delivering such a pledge, providing him with a 
policy concession that would appease both MPs and supporters. 
 
For Blair, a coalition – whether a loose arrangement or with Liberal Democrats in 
Cabinet – offered political and ideological benefits. Politically, Blair was unsure 
whether he would achieve a parliamentary majority – a view he held up to the last 
few days of polling – and wanted to be in a position to be able to offer the Liberal 
Democrats something should a hung parliament emerge. Moreover, Blair wanted 
to bind the Liberal Democrats into a position where they would back the Labour 
government on most policies, particularly the constitutional reform agenda, thus 
preventing them peeling off and resorting to typical ‘Lib Demery’ and 
opportunism. Such a tactic would avoid the situation whereby both the Liberal 
Democrats and the Conservatives could attack the Labour government over the 
lifetime of the parliament, especially once the honeymoon period had worn off 
and the government was becoming unpopular. In addition, it would allow Blair to 
marginalise the left wing of the Labour Party, showing the electorate that he was 
a ‘centrist’ and willing to work with the centre; a visible break from ‘Old Labour’.  
 
On a theoretical level, Blair saw merit in the ‘progressive left’ thesis, subscribing 
to a more pluralistic vision of the British left. Personally and politically Blair 
aligned closely to the social-liberal wing of the Liberal Democrats believing their 
views overlapped, supporting a broadening of cooperation within Labour’s ‘big 
tent’ of support in the country and parliament. ‘The project’ was worth pursuing 
for the reasons outlined above, yet Blair had reservations about PR and whilst it 
opened up an avenue to the Liberal Democrats it was not a policy concession he 
was willing to make, a result in the main due to high-profile opponents of PR in 
Cabinet and the wider PLP. PR and coalition with the Liberal Democrats was a 
minority pursuit, the existential reason for committing to one or both did not exist 
271 
 
and with the Conservatives in disarray, it appeared Labour would remain in office 
for a prolonged period of time. The 1997 general election result had given the 
Labour Party no cause to seek the support of the Liberal Democrats, and after 
winning the greatest victory in Labour Party history, Blair was not willing to push 
his party towards doing a deal with the Liberal Democrats. 
 
Labour fulfilled their manifesto commitment insofar as a Commission was formed 
to look at the electoral system. The decision to appoint Jenkins – who had a 
personal relationship with Blair – was a political move designed to reach out 
beyond ‘tribal’ Labour, yet from the outset left many in Labour uncomfortable as a 
politician who had broken away from them in the 1980s had now been charged 
with devising a system that would, in all likelihood, reduce the number of Labour 
MPs. Straw’s terms of reference for the Commission were irreconcilable, and 
although little attention was paid to these once the Commission had embarked on 
its work, it suggested the government had asked the Commission to deliver the 
impossible. As Lipsey affirmed, the Commission was not there to ‘square the 
circle’ and address theoretical issues, but to devise a system that could be put 
before the British people in a UK-wide referendum. Indeed, it was hoped the 
system chosen offered the greatest chance of success, rather than being the 
‘best’ form of PR. The system devised was AV+, a variation of AMS, with only a 
small number of top-up seats based on a county system. Jenkins, unlike Plant, 
was from the outset an overtly political exercise, starting from the premise of 
change, designed to keep the possibility of a coalition alive, delivering the 
commitments Blair had made to Ashdown in private. 
 
Whilst much discussion took place on the prospects of closer relations between 
the two parties after May 1997, both the ‘project’ and the introduction of the 
Jenkins proposals disappeared into the ‘long grass’. Had Blair chosen to pursue 
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his relationship with Ashdown and introduce PR it risked splitting the Cabinet, the 
wider PLP and the trade unions for the sake two issues that many in the Labour 
movement didn’t much care for. In the process, Blair risked damaging his own 
position over an issue which was not deemed a priority and for which there was 
no political necessity. Consequently, as Labour and the Liberal Democrats drifted 
apart over the course of the parliament, the possibility of a realignment of the 
British left faded along with the prospect of PR at Westminster. 
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Chapter 5 - The end of New Labour and the Alternative Vote Referendum, 
2011 
 
The Alternative Vote (AV) Referendum provides the thesis with a convenient 
finishing point. After many years of discussing electoral reform and manifesto 
commitments to hold a referendum the Labour Party was faced with a UK-wide 
vote. The early polling evidence suggested there was a considerable chance that 
there would be a movement away from FPTP. However, rather than viewing the 
AV Referendum as an individual event it is best viewed as part of a wider interest 
in AV, starting with Gordon Brown becoming Prime Minister and the ensuing 
coalition negotiations after the 2010 general election. Indeed, AV has often been 
put forward by reformers within Labour as a ‘half-way house’; accepting the 
principle of reform but rejecting proportional representation (PR). The objective of 
this chapter is to examine and explore Brown’s conversion to electoral reform 
having long been considered a supporter of FPTP, the five days of coalition 
negotiations that followed the 2010 general election – specifically Labour’s 
attitude towards electoral reform and the idea of coalition government – and, 
finally the Labour Party’s performance and arguments during the AV referendum.  
 
Labour’s continuing scepticism 
 
The 2005 Labour Party manifesto stated the Party remained “committed to 
reviewing the experience of the new electoral systems – introduced for the 
devolved administrations, the European Parliament and the London Assembly.” It 
also noted that the Labour Party’s view remained that a referendum was “the 
right way to agree any change for Westminster.”632 The result of the 2005 general 
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election saw the Labour Party win a majority on only 35% of the vote across 
Great Britain and therefore a historic third successive general election. However, 
in England, the Conservatives were experiencing a revival; outpolling Labour by 
50,000 votes, although Labour won 286 seats to the Conservatives 194, in part a 
result of the smaller urban constituencies favouring Labour. A brief outpouring 
emanated from electoral reformers in the weeks that followed the election, but a 
number of Labour’s ‘big hitters’ sought to dispel calls for PR. 
 
Straw dismissed those in the days following the 2005 general election, 
particularly the Liberal Democrats, who were advocating PR as it was not the 
panacea for all ills and the Labour Party had won the 2005 general election “fair 
and square.” Whilst there had been a decline in the vote share for the two major 
parties and a case for AV could be made, FPTP was still preferable with the 
alternative being small parties on a considerably smaller vote share wielding 
disproportionate influence. The winner in any system necessarily gains much 
more power than those in opposition and FPTP had two major strengths; the 
constituency link and the ‘contract’ between electors and parties in the form of 
the manifesto. “Our people want strong majority government” wrote Straw, “not 
the mush of PR.”633 Elsewhere Straw affirmed PR would allow “weak 
governments with limited mandates to hold on to power for decades and takes 
away the fundamental power of ordinary people to remove them.” Consequently, 
“PR for the Commons would undermine our democracy, the effectiveness of our 
government and the relationship between electors and elected.”634 Lord Falconer, 
the Lord Chancellor, also dismissed calls for reform remarking, “I don’t think there 
is real groundswell for change.” Furthermore, “The consequences of change 
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would be significant for the way we are governed without the clarity of who is in 
power”, a result of politicians becoming preoccupied with establishing 
coalitions.635  
 
Therefore Labour had minimal interest in reforming FPTP. Moreover, in January 
2008 the Labour government, as promised, produced its review of the electoral 
systems used in the United Kingdom, a largely factual report that drew attention 
to the problems associated with each electoral system and not making any firm 
recommendations for reform.636 The review was debated in the House of Lords 
and the government response did not suggest that change to the method of 
electing the House of Commons was imminent. The minister, Lord Hunt of King’s 
Heath, recognised the advantages of PR but added, “The disadvantages seem to 
be pretty fundamental as well.” He acknowledged that the existing electoral 
system delivered ‘core accountability’ and was believed to deliver a legitimate 
outcome.637 
 
A noteworthy aside is Hattersley’s reasoning for coming out in favour of PR 
during the Labour government. During Labour’s first term Hattersley continued to 
profess the virtues of FPTP, dismissing Ashdown and the Liberal Democrats. “It 
is not the first time that one political party has stolen another’s clothes. But it is 
one of the rare occasions on which the dispossessed have shown so much 
admiration for the thieves. Perhaps because he believes so much that Blair 
believes, there is nothing else in honour that Ashdown can do. But he has 
become redundant. And his response to Jenkins will prove it. His only hope is to 
                                                                  
635 Guardian, ‘Falconer warns against switch to PR’, 20th May 2005 
636 Ministry of Justice, Review of Voting Systems: The Experience of New Voting System in the United 
Kingdom since 1997, CM 7304 (London: TSO, January 2008) 
637 Quoted in P. Norton, ‘Brown’s New Constitutional Settlement? Constitutional Developments in 
2007-08’, in M. Rush, & P. Giddings, (edts.) When Gordon Took the Helm, (Palgrave MacMillan, 
Hampshire, 2008) pp. 30-31 
276 
 
be given a place in the court of King Tony.”638 On the matter of the electoral 
system, the oft mentioned claim of ‘fair voting’ was “inaccurate, impertinent and 
an arrogant attempt to end the argument before it begins… The theory that 
democracy depends on parliament becoming a mathematical reflection of the 
percentage of votes cast for the rival parties is a simplistic absurdity. And the 
notion that the smallest party, in a three party system, should decide which of its 
more popular competitor’s forms the government is equally indefensible.”639  
Importantly, “For Labour it would only mean the loss of what remains of its 
socialist identity” keeping “Labour in the soggy centre for ever.”640 
 
Yet Hattersley warmed to PR, a result of Blair and the policies of New Labour, 
believing it would allow a more social democratic party to flourish, not to replace 
the Labour Party but to pull it to the left. “The attraction of a new voting system is 
the effect that new parties would have on Blair and his successors”, allowing “one 
or two new parties to flourish might produce what I hope is still possible in this 
country – a genuine social democratic government.”641 Moreover, as the country 
had become more fractured and the political system had become multi-party, 
“whether I liked it or not, the future of this country would be coalition 
government.” It would be “better for people to know there was going to be a 
coalition government to begin with. If in fact we had PR, the electorate would 
know from the beginning they were not voting for a party that would win the 
election, they were voting for a part of a government. PR was a way of signalling 
that this country now accepts coalitions and you could go to the polls thinking 
about this rather than something else… PR would make it clear that there were 
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limitations on our power before we started.”642 Hattersley’s change of mind 
emphasises how fluid attitudes towards electoral reform are.  
 
Brown’s ‘death-bed’ conversion to electoral reform 
 
Brown, having long been considered a FPTP supporter, announced as Prime 
Minister he would pursue electoral reform. Consequently it prompted questions of 
whether the basis for the reform was damascene or political expediency; 
genuinely convinced on the merits of reform or looking ahead towards a 
potentially difficult general election, hung parliament and coalition bargaining.  
 
From the outset of his Premiership Brown displayed an interest in constitutional 
reform and toyed with the idea of a snap general election to be held by mid-2008 
as the polls were pointing favourably towards Labour.643 Had Brown lost he would 
have been the shortest serving Prime Minister since George Canning in the 
nineteenth century. The plan was duly dropped, with the event dubbed the 
‘election that never was’ and no fresh mandate was sought. Brown announced he 
would seek to address several constitutional issues, something designed to 
please the Liberal Democrats. The reforms ranged from limiting the executive’s 
Royal Prerogative Powers including the decision to declare war, making the 
executive more accountable, increasing public participation and considering a 
British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities. The ideas were to be found in a 
document called The Governance of Britain, with the foreword speaking of an 
intention to forge “a new relationship between government and the citizen, and 
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begin the journey towards a new constitutional settlement.”644 There was no 
mention of electoral reform.  
 
However, as a gesture reminiscent of the Labour-Liberal Democrat talks in the 
1990s, Brown talked of a ‘government of all the talents’ offering Ashdown the 
position of Secretary of State to Northern Ireland. Indeed, Brown’s attempts to 
‘reach out’ included the suggestion of coalition to the then Leader of the Liberal 
Democrats, Sir Menzies Campbell. Three Liberal Democrat peers – Lord Lester, 
Lady Neuberger and Baroness Williams – accepted advisory posts, whilst 
retaining their independence and keeping the Liberal Democrat whip.645 Ashdown 
records that he could not observe collective responsibility in a Brown Cabinet and 
without the promise of PR the Liberal Democrats were being offered a “deadly 
suicide pill.” Brown thought such a move would pave the way for Liberal 
Democrat-Labour relations in the future, while on the matter of opposing this kind 
of government in 1997 it was because he could “not trust the Lib Dems in 
government then.”646 
 
Brown mooted the idea of electoral reform in June of 2009 in a statement to the 
House of Commons containing other constitutional reforms. In the Commons, 
Brown affirmed: 
 
“I still believe that the link between the MP and the constituency is essential 
and that the constituency is best able to hold its MP to account. We should be 
prepared to propose change only if there is a broad consensus in the country 
that it would strengthen our democracy and our politics by improving the 
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effectiveness and legitimacy of both Government and Parliament and by 
enhancing the level and quality of representation and public engagement.”647 
 
The commitment to hold a referendum on AV was made at the Labour Party 
Conference in September 2009.648 In a speech to the Institute for Public Policy 
Research (IPPR) Brown made the case for AV: “As we seek to re-engage people 
and enhance public participation I believe we should ask the people to look 
afresh at whether the electoral system can enhance the mandate of the 
constituency MP, as well as engaging people further in the choice they have at 
the ballot box.” Brown committed to arguing and campaigning for such a change, 
and in “moving towards a more democratic form of election” the hope was 
“making parliament itself better reflect the people it serves.” AV “offers a system 
where the British people can, if they so choose, be more confident that their MP 
truly represents them, while at the same time remaining directly accountable to 
them.” The referendum – should a Labour government be elected – was to be 
held “before the end of October 2011.”649 However, at the meeting of the PLP 
Mullin records how there was opposition not just to incorporating a referendum 
into the Bill, but “a host of objections to any change whatsoever.” Mullin 
concluded: “The Parliamentary Labour Party is really a most conservative 
institution. In truth, however, it is all an irrelevance since, whatever we do, no 
Tory government is going to take the slightest notice… and stinks of desperation 
and self-interest.”650  
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The commitment was in part a response to the revelations released in the Daily 
Telegraph about MPs’ expenses which was to quote Baston and Ritchie, “a 
godsend for electoral reformers.”651 FPTP, it was argued, had led to a culture of 
distant and remote MPs, a consequence of ‘safe seats’, leading MPs to assume 
immunity from criticism and wrongdoing. On the other hand, a proportional 
electoral system would make MPs more accountable to their constituents. Clive 
Betts MP rejected the argument that there was any clamour for reform amongst 
the electorate. Whilst voters wanted expenses to be cleaned up they did not think 
PR was the answer.652 As Table 7 below suggests, the size of an MPs majority 
had little bearing on the amount of money claimed as a majority of 5.1-10% led to 
the highest amount of expenses claimed. The amount of money claimed was 
more a case of the moral integrity of the MP. Yet reformers deemed AV would 
rectify trust in politics, and give better expression to the multi-party nature of 
British politics.  
 
Average expenses repayment per MP, by size of majority653 
(Table 7) 
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Straw, when moving the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill for a second 
time through the House of Commons stated: “Members will ask why we need to 
make the change now. The answer is that in the past 12 months, as everyone 
knows… we have seen a crisis of confidence in our political system and our 
politicians on a scale that none of us has witnessed before in our political lifetime. 
Trust has been profoundly damaged.”654 Not all members took so kindly to the 
suggestion they were corrupt and that corruption was a result of the electoral 
system. Tom Harris, then Labour MP for Glasgow South asked Straw rhetorically, 
whether he attributed the “stainless reputation of Italian politicians to the fact that 
the Italians have proportional representation?” Harris thought it was “utter 
nonsense” and a “complete myth to think the answer to the expenses scandal 
was changing the electoral system.”655  
 
Ed Balls, a key Brown ally, was unconvinced on adding the AV referendum 
amendment to the Bill: “we’d have to think really hard about whether or not 
there’d be unified support for it, whether it would work for us in the run up to the 
election – and I have an open mind on that.”656 Balls, whilst claiming to have 
advocated reform since 2005 for reasons to do with turnout and participation, 
was thought to be a sceptic on electoral reform. One senior minister outlined the 
‘credibility’ problem facing Labour. “How do you think it’s going to look if we are 
fiddling the rules on how to get rid of us just weeks before an election?”657 In an 
interview with the New Statesman in the days before the 2010 general election 
Balls dismissed PR, in what was thought to be a direct riposte to other Cabinet 
Ministers, including Ben Bradshaw, Alan Johnson and John Denham. “PR leads 
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to a politics of behind-closed doors deals after elections. It makes it harder to 
make long-term decisions and it gives more power to small parties.” As a matter 
of principle Balls did not think “coalition governments are better” as they are “not 
the British way of doing government.” Importantly, he could still work with the 
Liberal Democrats although a realignment of the left was not the correct course 
for the Labour Party. “Some people have said that it would be the fulfilment of 
New Labour to enter a coalition with the Liberals... actually the whole point of 
New Labour was to show we could govern for the whole country… as the Labour 
Party”658 returning to themes outlined by Blair’s dismissal of PR in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. 
 
Pressure from within 
 
Johnson, a vocal advocate of electoral reform, wrote that there should be a 
referendum on the same day as the next general election with the electorate 
asked whether they want AV+, the system proposed by Jenkins. Furthermore, it 
was reported in one newspaper Johnson would trigger a by-election and stand on 
a platform in favour of PR. Johnson’s position was in part influenced by the ‘safe 
seat’ mentality which, in his opinion, ought “at least be an aspect of the 
accusation that MPs became careless in their expenses claim and dismissive of 
their electorate.”659 Johnson admitted he had visited Brown and the Prime 
Minister was “seized by AV+” with the matter being discussed on a “sub-
committee.” However, the consensus that emerged was due to the influence of 
“people like Peter Hain, (who) thought that it should be AV, without the Plus.” 
AV+ would have involved a redrawing of the boundaries and a reduction in 
                                                                  
658 New Statesman, ‘I urge Lib Dems to bite their lip and back us’, 4th May 2010 
659 The Times, Monday 25th May 2009, Johnson reiterated the argument in the Independent, 
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constituencies, consequently “real politik”, led to a coalescing “around what was 
possible and that was AV.”660  
 
Ben Bradshaw recalls there “being widespread support for it as a policy” around 
the Cabinet.661 Seldon and Lodge record that within Cabinet, Jim Murphy and 
Andy Burnham were against, whereas those in favour included Ed and David 
Miliband, Johnson, Hain, Bradshaw and Andrew Adonis. Consequently, 
Bradshaw’s assertion that there was widespread support for AV appears 
questionable. Seldon and Lodge list only six members of Cabinet who were 
willing to support the proposal, suggesting only a minority of Cabinet Ministers 
backed AV and therefore Bradshaw was overstating the level of support. Straw 
reportedly took soundings of the PLP and found that all the Scottish MPs totally 
against as electoral reform would damage Labour in Scotland. As for Johnson’s 
idea of holding a referendum on the same day as the general election, the 
Cabinet Office informed Brown that there was not the parliamentary time to make 
that possible. Furthermore, there was doubt a referendum could be won, and ‘no’ 
votes could have a negative impact on Labour support. Nick Brown, the Chief 
Whip, steered Labour’s Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill through the 
Commons with only three Labour MPs voting against. It was reported that Nick 
Brown was informing sceptics not to worry as it was not going to be enacted 
before the general election.662 
 
                                                                  
660 Interview with Alan Johnson MP, 23rd October 2015 
661 Interview with Ben Bradshaw MP, 21st October 2015 
662 A. Seldon, & G. Lodge, Brown at 10, (Biteback Publishing Ltd, London, 2010) pp. 418-419. On 
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The Times reported that up to 100 Labour MPs had expressed interest in 
electoral reform and, whilst there was support in the Cabinet, there was no 
enthusiasm to have a referendum on the same day as the next general election. 
Johnson rejected the accusation that the policy change on electoral reform was 
based on political calculations and the desire to secure the support of the Liberal 
Democrats. Instead, Johnson was “simply a supporter of getting rid of a system 
that doesn’t empower the voter.” Straw was said to support AV, although not PR 
which would lead to backroom deals; and Alistair Darling was said to be open to 
the idea.663 Legislating in 2010, considered Bradshaw, would “expose the Tories 
for what they are – the no change status quo party” allowing for policy 
differentiation to emerge between Labour and the Conservatives. Legislating for 
AV now, according to the Guardian, was a move backed by Denham and Hain as 
it would attract the support of the Liberal Democrats, providing practical electoral 
benefits.664 Interestingly, Bradshaw, who would go on to lead Labour Yes to AV in 
2011, stated he also favoured AV+. It was “a brilliant synthesis of systems that 
both maintain the constituency link introducing a greater element of 
proportionality.” Bradshaw continued: “If one of the reasons that we want reform 
is to rebuild public trust and confidence in politics, make MPs more accountable, 
give more power to people, and establish a political and parliamentary system 
that more reflects the will of the public then AV doesn’t deliver that.”665  
 
Progress, the Blairite wing of the Labour Party, along with Labour’s Campaign for 
Electoral Reform (LCER), gathered the signatures of 35 prospective 
parliamentary candidates (PPC) in a letter to Brown expressing their belief that 
                                                                  
663 The Times, ‘Cabinet support for Johnson puts plans for voting reform on electoral agenda’, 
Tuesday 26th May 2009 
664 Guardian, ‘Cabinet members urge Gordon Brown to back electoral reform now’, 22nd January 
2010 
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Labour will only win if a referendum on electoral reform was offered on the same 
day as the general election. A “referendum on polling day on a system that 
delivers real voter choice” it was claimed, “would see hundreds of Liberal 
Democrats switching to Labour, hundreds more stay-at-home Labour supporters 
coming out to vote for the government and every Tory opponent on the back foot 
trying to explain why the failed old system is worth keeping and why Cameron 
wouldn’t give the people a say.”666 Compass, the cross-party anti-Conservative 
think tank deemed that a referendum on FPTP contained many advantages for 
the Labour Party: Cameron would represent the status quo and be put on the 
defensive, a progressive coalition could be built, voters would be more likely to 
turn out and vote Labour, and it could be Brown’s ‘Clause IV’ moment.667  
 
The attempt to win support of wavering Liberal Democrat voters was, as Curtice 
claimed, the more instrumental reason behind Brown’s conversion to electoral 
reform. For all the talk about political reform and changing the way politics is 
conducted, the opinion polls were pointing towards a hung parliament and the 
Conservatives were starting from a low point, requiring a significant swing to 
achieve a majority of one. Therefore the Labour Party, by bringing forward 
legislation on AV and making a manifesto commitment, had laid down a 
marker.668 Furthermore, polling conducted by YouGov for the Electoral Reform 
Society in August 2009 had showed that one in three Lib Dem voters would be 
willing to consider switching his or her vote to Labour if the Party delivered on an 
electoral reform referendum669 suggesting important votes could be won by this 
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policy change. Mullin wrote: “Damage limitation, not victory, is all we can 
reasonably hope for. We need to do something bold that will strike a blow behind 
enemy lines, such as switching from first-past-the-post to alternative voting. The 
Tories of course, would cry ‘foul’, but the Lib Dems could probably be persuaded 
to back it, all the while protesting that they prefer some purer form of PR… It 
won’t save us from defeat but it might save us from ruin.”670 Therefore, a 
commitment to a referendum on AV entailed practical political benefits by 
attracting wavering Liberal Democrat voters, placing the Conservatives on the 
back foot and preventing a landslide defeat. 
 
Charles Clarke considered: “If he (Brown) had been serious about it he could 
have done it. He could have legislated and why not?” Brown, in Clarke’s opinion, 
“wanted to hold it over as a point of negotiation with the Liberal Democrats” 
implying he was already looking to a post-election situation where coalition 
building was necessary. However, “All the measures he announced in terms of 
constitutional reform when he became Prime Minister, almost all, just faded 
away.”671 Mandelson, who Brown had brought back into government, outlined the 
issues that faced Brown over these constitutional matters. Firstly, “the conversion 
looked a little belated, a little shallow.” Secondly, “there was a feeling that it 
would be difficult to get the Party to campaign enthusiastically on these issues 
and, thirdly, there was the issue of how that would leave his position if he were 
defeated in the referendum, either on all the issues or on one or two of them. 
Would he then need to resign?”672  
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Labour’s commitment to AV was dismissed by Nick Clegg, the Leader of the 
Liberal Democrats. Given the underlying reasons were to appeal to the Liberal 
Democrats and the likelihood of a ‘hung parliament’ in 2010 – making Clegg 
kingmaker – it somewhat failed in its objective. Clegg’s response in the 
Independent would be tirelessly repeated – specifically ‘the miserable little 
compromise’ – by the No campaign in the AV Referendum. 
 
“The Labour Party assumes that changes to the electoral system are like 
crumbs for the Liberal Democrats from the Labour table. I am not going to 
settle for a miserable little compromise thrashed out by the Labour Party.”673 
 
Clegg had to take into account the pressures facing his own Party and he was 
not the first Leader of the Liberal Democrats to be approached by Labour with 
promises of electoral reform. Clegg had to do what was in the best electoral 
interests of the Liberal Democrats. Had he been seen to be aligning with the 
Labour Party, it had the potential to lose right-leaning Liberal Democrats to the 
Conservatives, particularly in the South-West. On the other hand, had Clegg 
been perceived to be aligning with the Conservatives he risked losing the Labour-
leaning voters who were willing to support the Liberal Democrats. Additionally, 
electoral reform was a key policy for the Liberal Democrats and, with the Labour 
Party moving on to Liberal Democrat territory, AV had to be dismissed as an 
insignificant reform, to ensure that the Liberal Democrats retained their ‘radical’ 
stance on electoral reform by offering more than any other mainstream party.  
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Prior to the general election there had been indications that Clegg wished to keep 
his distance from the Labour Party. Clegg had written an article in 2009 for 
Demos claiming that this was the ‘Liberal moment’, Labour was out of touch and 
morally bankrupt and all ‘progressives’ should fall under the Liberal Democrat 
banner674, a stance unlikely to have endeared him to Labour. Importantly, with 
the polls pointing to a hung parliament, Clegg affirmed in that situation he would 
consult with the largest party first, in all likeliness the Conservative Party. 
Moreover, Clegg did not “think at a time when people will have voted for massive 
change it would be acceptable to the public to have no change at all, to have the 
same person in Number 10.”675 Clegg was implying either Brown had to step 
down for the formation of a Lab-Lib pact or a complete change of government 
was required, namely a Conservative or Conservative-led government.  
 
Adonis – a former Liberal Democrat councillor, parliamentary candidate and 
importantly for Brown, someone who maintained good relations with his former 
party – wrote in the Independent at the start of the general election campaign that 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats were “united by a common antipathy to 
Conservative values.” Indeed, Labour and the Liberal Democrats shared a 
number of policies on public services, constitutional reform, equal rights, fair 
taxation and Europe, and “philosophically it was nonsense to pretend that the Lib 
Dems... are equidistant between left and right.” Only a Labour government was 
able to implement Lib Dem policies with policy disagreements revolving around 
PR for the House of Commons. However, with Labour’s commitment to a 
referendum on AV it was a case of “the nature of reform rather than the 
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principle.”676 Boulton and Jones viewed this as Adonis laying out Labour’s 
agenda for coalition negotiations with the Liberal Democrats.677 
  
The 2010 Labour Party manifesto, written by Ed Miliband, included a manifesto 
commitment to hold “A referendum on introducing the Alternative Vote for 
elections to the House of Commons” in order to “ensure that every MP is 
supported by the majority of their constituents voting at each election.”678 Placing 
the issue in the hands of the electorate, rather than a firm commitment to reform, 
was a useful party management tool particularly considering the impending 
general election, a tactic deployed by previous Labour leaders. Harris thought 
this to be a mistake, deeming electoral reform was a “complete red herring” and 
“one motivation for having constitutional reform should never be electoral gain.” 
The people will “not believe that the only chance of winning the next election is to 
promise some form of electoral reform.” The Labour Party after thirteen years of a 
government “should be able to stand on its own platform, own policies and win a 
fourth election.”679 Having spent thirteen years in government, Harris considered, 
the Labour Party had a record of achievement it could defend on social and 
economic matters – the ‘bread and butter’ concerns of voters - rather than 
seeking to muster a few extra votes on a niche issue.  
 
The 2010 general election and coalition negotiations 
 
It was widely predicted from inside and outside of Labour that it would be a very 
poor night for the Party. Labour had largely accepted it would lose the general 
                                                                  
676 Independent, ‘Andrew Adonis: It’s madness to split the centre-left vote’, 9th April 2010.  
677 A. Boulton, & J. Jones, Hung Together, The Cameron-Clegg Coalition, (Simon & Schuster, London, 
2012) p. 134 
678 A Fair Future for All, Labour Party Manifesto 2010 
679 BBC Daily Politics, BBC2, 2nd February 2010  
290 
 
election, with the question being ‘by how much’. The Brown government had 
become increasingly unpopular due to the financial crash, in-fighting with Cabinet 
resignations and rumours of leadership coups, and the alleged tiredness 
produced by thirteen years of government. Brown’s personal ratings as Prime 
Minister were poor. In spite of these beneficial factors for the Conservatives their 
low starting point required them to achieve a significant swing across Great 
Britain to achieve a majority of one. Indeed, an 11-point lead was required for a 
bare majority and if the Labour Party could have been on the same vote share as 
the Conservatives, they would have returned to Westminster with more MPs.680 
The 7-point lead left the Conservatives shy of a majority and produced the first 
hung parliament since February 1974. 
 
The 29% of the vote received by the Labour Party was the second lowest since 
1918 and compared to 2005 was a loss of 6% of the national vote, resulting in a 
significant reduction in votes and seats. In the south outside London, the Labour 
Party held only 10 out of 197 seats, described as the “dismembering of New 
Labour’s electoral triumph.”681 Labour had been pushed back into its heartlands. 
Worryingly, since 1997 Labour had lost 5 million voters. The bias in the electoral 
system had seen the Labour Party win a majority of 66 in 2005 on 35% of the 
vote, whereas the Conservatives on 36.1% fell short of a majority in 2010. Yet, 
the Conservatives on a small increase of the vote had managed to significantly 
increase its number of MPs. The 65.1% combined vote of Labour and the 
Conservatives was the lowest since 1918, beating the previous low of 67.6% of 
the vote set in 2005. Only 210 out of the 650 MPs in 2010 secured 50 per cent of 
the vote or more in their constituency, 67.7% had been elected on a plurality 
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compared to 1955 when only 5.9% of MPs were elected on a plurality.682 Whilst 
FPTP had all but ‘kicked’ Labour out of office – one of the professed benefits of 
the system – it had not clearly facilitated a new government.  
 
A simulation by the Electoral Reform Society predicted the Conservatives under 
AV would have won 281 seats (down 26), Labour 262 (up 4) and the Liberal 
Democrats 79 (up 22). The British Election Study simulation calculated the 
Liberal Democrats would have won 89 seats.683 Such an outcome would have 
changed the nature of the coalition negotiations, strengthening the bargaining 
hand of the Liberal Democrats. Thus the Liberal Democrats could have formed a 
coalition with Labour as a potential Lab-Lib coalition would have had 341 seats. 
Rallings and Thrasher argued that under AV many British voters would only 
indicate one preference, known as ‘plumping’ and think the Liberal Democrats 
would only have won 15 more seats. Curtice maintains that the electoral benefits 
of AV for the Liberal Democrats would be “modest”, with “the prospect of the 
occasional Conservative or Labour landslide.”684 Yet ‘modest’ gains still had the 
potential to increase the likelihood of a hung parliament in the future and make 
the Liberal Democrats kingmakers. Harris raised this point during the AV 
referendum in 2011. Although Labour and the Liberal Democrats would have had 
the numbers to do a deal and therefore “remain in power – despite losing to the 
Conservatives”, Harris questioned “How can that possibly be fair or 
democratic?”685  
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The Liberal Democrats decision to ‘go right’ 
 
The result of the general election put the onus on the Liberal Democrats to 
choose which of the two major political parties it would support in government. 
Brown, as the sitting Prime Minister, had the constitutional right to remain in 
Downing Street until the political situation became clear; either the Liberal 
Democrats along with the smaller parties would sustain a Labour government, or 
the Conservatives would form a minority government or seek to govern in 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats. It was for the Liberal Democrats a case of 
“Cannon to the left of them, cannon to the right of them”, the problem identified 
for the third party by the Spectator in the 1960s: “On the left is the gunfire of the 
party which they must smash, to replace it. On the right is the gunfire of the party 
whose camp they must occupy, in order to ransack it for votes.”686 The situation 
in which the Liberal Democrats found themselves was the lot of a political party 
which had little chance of forming a government on their own and therefore its 
only opportunity of entering government was through coalition.  
 
Supporting either party posed problems for the Liberal Democrats. Backing 
Labour would have meant propping up a ‘tired’ and defeated party, allowing an 
unpopular Prime Minister to stay in office and, due to the numbers, offered little 
prospect of stability. Peter Hennessy deemed, on Channel 4 News on the 
Monday after the election, a rainbow coalition “would have too many moving 
parts.” Many within Labour were hostile to a Lab-Lib Coalition, sceptical about its 
longevity and the high price in buying Liberal Democrat support and the 
concessions that would be made to minor parties. Supporting the Conservative 
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Party – considered by many in the Liberal Democrats to be ‘toxic’ – would mean 
being in government with a party with whom they are in direct competition for 
votes and seats in the South-West of England and alienating many voters who 
had voted for the Liberal Democrats believing them to be on the ‘progressive’ 
side of politics. In the north of England – where the Liberal Democrats had 
replaced the Conservatives as the main opposition to Labour – they would take 
the punishment for government policies.  
 
Ashdown remarked that the voters at the 2010 general election seemed to have 
“invented a deliciously painful torture mechanism for the Liberal Democrats 
because our instincts go one way (Labour) but the mathematics go the other 
(Conservatives).”687 Whilst Paddy Ashdown considered the ‘instincts’ of the 
Liberal Democrats leant towards Labour, the years of opposition to a Labour 
Government should not be underestimated in encouraging the Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats together. Previous leaders such as Ashdown, Charles 
Kennedy and Ming Campbell may have been inclined towards Labour, yet the 
‘modern era’ of Liberal Democrats had been upset by Labour’s record on civil 
liberties, the environment, constitutional reform and the Iraq War. Clegg, David 
Laws, Jeremy Browne and Danny Alexander were part of the Orange Book 
Liberals, moving away from social liberalism towards classical liberal positions, 
professing the benefits of the free market rather than the state. The shift at the 
top of the Liberal Democrats coincided with the ‘compassionate conservatism’ 
advocated by Cameron, resulting in a policy and ideological crossover on the 
centre right of British politics. 
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Adonis later recognised the ideological overlap, considering the decision of Clegg 
and Laws to enter coalition with Cameron and Osborne was not simply a matter 
of parliamentary arithmetic and building a coalition that could survive the full 
parliament, but “was a marriage of neo-liberal minds.”688 The influence of 
ideology is highlighted by the Liberal Democrats’ acceptance of faster and 
deeper public spending cuts, a policy they had opposed during the election 
campaign. “Clegg and Laws did not lead their party into coalition with the 
Conservatives despite Osborne austerity” wrote Adonis, “but because of it.” Other 
areas of agreement included education reform, allowing parents greater influence 
over state school provision, public sector reform, localism and devolution. “It was 
therefore not pre-ordained that Britain should have taken the Tory road in 2010… 
the critical determinant was Nick Clegg’s instinct to go Right rather than Left.”689    
 
Chapter 4 of the thesis alluded to the Liberal Democrats’ movement away from 
Labour, a process that began many years before Clegg’s leadership, regularly 
voting against Labour and voting with the Conservatives. Notably, in 2009, the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats worked together to defeat the Government 
over the settlement rights of the Gurkhas. Stuart states “it seems that long before 
the 2010 General Election, the Liberal Democrats had progressively fallen out of 
love with the Labour Party and were far more favourably predisposed towards the 
Conservatives.”690 Kavanagh and Cowley argue, Labour “underestimated the 
extent to which there had been a generational shift at the top of the Liberal 
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Democrats.”691 However, Baroness Armstrong deemed any thought of a Lab-Lib 
coalition ended upon Clegg winning the leadership:  
 
“As soon as Nick Clegg was elected, we said that puts off any chance of 
working with the Liberals. It was very clear from the beginning, along with the 
division within the Liberals that was very clear too, that they would rather do a 
deal with the Conservatives. We just knew and we said very strongly that ‘the 
project’ is off the table.”692 
 
Armstrong’s statement suggests the ‘general shift’ stated by Kavanagh and 
Cowley was not missed and the Labour Party realised a deal with the Liberal 
Democrats was not necessarily going to materialise. Other factors decreased the 
likelihood of coalition: The personal relationship Brown and Clegg was strained, 
Brown viewed Clegg’s politics and ideological beliefs as ‘largely Conservative’: 
English, affluent public school boy and not belonging to the same political wing of 
the Liberal Democrats as Ashdown and Kennedy. Rather disparagingly Brown 
had always referred to the Liberal Democrats as the ‘Liberals’, refusing to dignify 
them with full use of their name. Such difficult personal relations between the two 
men posed the issue of whether a government in the short term could survive 
with evident acrimony between the two leaders of the two parties in government. 
 
Edgar wrote “The conventional wisdom about the five days is that Cameron and 
Clegg played their hands better than Labour.” Labour was unprepared for talks, 
coming to the negotiating table with the Liberal Democrats with few agreed 
positions. “The reality of the election result was that, together, the Tories and the 
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Liberal Democrats commanded a comfortable Commons majority over all other 
parties, while a Labour-Lib Dem coalition would have had to rely on the fickle 
support of smaller parties to get its legislation through.”693 A coalition between the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats would produce an overall majority of 
83. For those negotiating, the knowledge of such numbers would allow a 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition the ability to pass its legislative 
programme for the duration of the parliament whilst allowing for rebels and 
marginalising the more controversial wings of both parties. Coalition also offered 
the Conservative Party the route back into government after thirteen years of 
opposition, having not won a general election since 1992, allowing Cameron to 
promote a new type of open and pluralistic conservatism, representing how the 
party had changed from the dogmatism of the Thatcher years and was willing to 
listen to ideas from outside the party. 
 
Jones deems the account given by Adonis can be termed the “‘bad faith’ 
thesis”694 as the numbers, contrary to Edgar’s view, did add up for a Labour-
Liberal coalition. Gordon Brown had thought “The key numbers were these: 
Labour plus Lib Dems 315; Tory 307; other parties, almost all of them more anti-
Tory than anti-Labour – 28.”695 The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 
from Northern Ireland was a natural ally, so was the Green MP Caroline Lucas 
who would not vote for a Conservative government. There was also an Alliance 
MP, an ally of the Liberal Democrats and an independent Unionist, bringing a 
potential Lab-Lib coalition very close to the 323 mark. Furthermore, the 
nationalist parties could not risk a repeat of 1979 when they bought down the 
Labour government and ushered in a Conservative government. Additionally, 
                                                                  
693 D. Edgar, ‘When Dave met Nick’, Guardian Review, 15th June 2013 
694 B. Jones, ‘The Road Not Taken and the ‘Bad Faith’ Theses: Why a Liberal Democrat-Labour 
Coalition Never Happened in May 2010’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 84: 4, (Oct- Dec 2013) p. 460 
695 Adonis, 5 Days in May, p. 144 
297 
 
triggering another election risked the electorate blaming the smaller parties for 
failing to act in the ‘national interest’ and provide the stable government the 
country required. If another general election had to be fought it raised the 
practical issue of cost and funding a campaign. Having already fought one 
general election and the costs that that incurred parties, would have been 
reluctant to fight a second in a short space of time. 
 
For Brown, the prospect of doing a deal with the Liberal Democrats and relying 
on the support of smaller parties, held out the prospect of remaining in power. 
Moreover, Brown told the Cabinet which met on Monday 11th May “It (was) to be 
an enduring progressive alliance… leading naturally to an electoral pact at the 
next election, with the two parties standing down in favour of each other in some 
seats. ‘This is an historic opportunity for progressive politics which may not come 
back for fifty years.’”696 The account given by Adonis claims Cabinet 
overwhelmingly backed Brown’s plan to seek to form a coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats. The trade unions were also supportive: “They are absolutely clear 
that we should govern with the Liberals rather than let them put the Tories in, with 
all that would mean for the public services and union members.”697 David 
Miliband is quoted as saying there were “grave risks – no one won, but we lost.” 
Nonetheless, Cameron had “legitimised coalition government by offering one to 
the Lib Dems rather than just saying ‘I’ve won, you’ve lost’”698 – something 
Salmond had done in 2007 for the Holyrood election – and as such, the Labour 
Party was entitled to seek to govern in coalition.  
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Denham considered coalition was in the best interests of the Labour Party and 
should be presented as “the best attainable government.” Otherwise, the “Tories 
could lock us out of power for a generation.”699 Bradshaw concurred thinking 
power should not just be handed to the Tories, for Labour as the second largest 
party could govern in the same fashion as Brandt and Schmidt, the “great historic 
progressive German Governments.”700 The issue of the Liberal Democrats was 
then raised. Mandelson, whilst supporting Brown’s plan, affirmed “the Lib Dems 
will need to stop being normal opportunist Lib Dems.”701 Liam Byrne thought 
“Many of the PLP think it better to renew in opposition and they positively relish 
the idea of the Liberals doing a deal with the Tories.”702 Only Burnham clearly 
opposed coalition. “While we might be able to stitch something together, it won’t 
be ‘renewal’ and the country won’t listen to us,’ he said. ‘The public will find it a 
surprise; it will build up resentment and we will find ourselves punished in an 
election in twelve to eighteen months’ time.”703 Burnham became the first senior 
minister to publicly express opposition when on The World At One, he declared 
that the Party had to “respect the result of the general election and we can’t shy 
away from the fact that Labour didn’t win.”704 
 
The “evident sceptics” in Cabinet were Darling and Straw. There was the “spectre 
of real problems in working with the Lib Dems in practice.” For Straw, “We have 
been fighting the Lib Dems like cats and dogs.”705 Straw fleshed out his 
objections in Last Man Standing. Brown, whilst advocating an alliance with the 
Liberal Democrats, was not at ease with the idea like Mandelson and Adonis. 
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Brown “went through the dangers to the country, and the Party, if the Tories were 
to take power, whether in a coalition or as a minority government, claiming that 
‘15 million people had voted for the progressive majority’.” Yet, for Straw, Brown 
“hadn’t quite come to terms with the fact that we had lost the election, 
comprehensively, even if we’d done a lot better than most of us had feared.” 
Having witnessed how the Liberal Democrats “operated institutionally”, Straw was 
unable “to trust them as a party.” Moreover, the numbers did not add up. “Still 
eleven seats short of a bare overall majority in the Commons. I’d witnessed the 
hand-to-mouth existence of the 1974-1979 Labour government, the constant 
crises, the grubby deals… the grotesque spectacle of nearly dead Labour MPs 
having to be brought into Speaker’s Court in ambulances so that their vote could 
be counted – and that was with sixty more seats than we’d won now.”706   
 
Straw is reported to have told Brown on Sunday 10th May that a period in 
opposition might not be bad for Labour as “We have to accept that we lost. We 
need time in opposition.”707 On the Tuesday, Sadiq Khan, Burnham and Bob 
Ainsworth gathered in Straw’s Commons room. “We were all of one mind. A Lib-
Lab coalition would not work.” Straw sent Brown a note outlining his reservations 
on why “coalition with the Lib Dems would be doomed – on grounds of 
legitimacy, stability, and the management of the economy and public finances.” 
Importantly, Straw succinctly rejected the ‘progressive-left’ thesis. “The fanciful 
notion of a ‘progressive alliance’” was in Straw’s opinion, nothing more than 
“arrogant nonsense” as “there was no ‘Progressive Alliance’ on the ballot paper’. 
Many of those who voted Lib Dem would have done so tactically to stop Labour, 
despite, not because of, the Lib Dems’ policy offer.”708  
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Darling questioned whether there could be agreement on the economy, rejecting 
the view that Labour could put something together with the Liberal Democrats. 
The “principled objection” considered Darling was, “On any view, we had lost the 
election. We did not have the moral right or the high ground needed to form a 
government and then embark on highly contentious and deeply unpopular 
measures as we set about cutting borrowing.” The practical objection was “that 
the numbers did not add up. Even adding the Liberal to the Labour MPs, we 
would still be short of a majority in the House of Commons. We would be at the 
mercy of the minority parties from Northern Ireland and the Scottish and Welsh 
Nationalists, who would be able to extract what they wanted on a daily basis.”709 
There was no harm in Labour talking to the Liberals in case their deal with the 
Conservatives unravelled thought Darling, “not being against coalitions in 
principle.” However this was qualified: “In practice one involving the Labour Party 
was dead in the water.”710  
 
Bradshaw debated who had won the election and who had legitimacy to govern 
with Adam Boulton on Sky News. Boutlon claimed that Labour had lost the 
election and if the result was done on a points system – points won for votes and 
seats gained, points lost due to seats and votes lost – only a Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition had the moral authority to govern. Moreover, the 
parliamentary numbers meant only a Conservative-Liberal Democrat government 
could offer stability. Bradshaw rejected this view, claiming the combined Labour 
and Liberal Democrat vote share had 5 million more votes than the 
Conservatives and “no one had won the election.” Regardless that the 
Conservatives could make the same argument about combining vote shares and 
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therefore the ‘legitimacy’ to govern, Bradshaw’s reasoning was based on policy 
issues – the economy, electoral reform, Europe, securing the recovery and 
paying down the deficit – meant there was a “much more sustainable potential 
coalition between us and the Liberal Democrats and the other progressive 
parties.”711 Bradshaw continued: “I’ve always thought it tragic and made more 
tragic by FPTP that we have been lumbered with majority Conservative 
governments for most of our modern history because the progressive centre and 
left are divided.” However, in light of the 2015 general election result, he shared 
Adonis’ preference “for them to all join the Labour Party so we have one centre 
left progressive party that can fight more effectively and beat the 
Conservatives.”712 
 
John Reid publicly opposed a deal with the Liberal Democrats, telling the BBC a 
Lab-Lib pact would be "disastrously wrong for the country and the Labour party.” 
In terms of the country "I fail to see how trying to bring together six different 
parties – and even then not having a majority – will bring the degree of stability 
we need.” Furthermore, “it doesn't match up from the point of view of the 
electorate for the two losing parties to cobble together a deal." Relying on the 
nationalist parties, who would demand extra spending for their respective parts of 
the United Kingdom, would result in an English backlash who would suffer the 
brunt of spending cuts. "From the point of view of the Labour Party, if we look as 
if we are ‘cocking a snook’ at the electorate when we have lost more MPs than at 
any time with the exception of 1931, they will wreak revenge on the Labour Party 
at future elections.”713 Reid told Sky News he feared a Lab-Lib Pact would result 
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in “mutually assured destruction” and that it was the responsibility of the 
Conservatives as the biggest party to form a stable government.714 
 
David Blunkett not just opposed coalition but openly damned the Liberal 
Democrats on BBC Radio 4 questioning what was in the best interests of the 
British people and “our future democracy.” Blunkett stated: “we see now what it 
would be like with fully fledged PR, don’t we? We see what we would have to put 
up with. Secondly, can we trust these people? Can we trust the Liberal 
Democrats? They’re behaving like every harlot in history.” Thirdly, what were the 
thoughts of the British public, “not what a small group on each side feel but how 
we put together something that people in this country can respect as part of our 
living democracy?” Blunkett, in the same fashion as Reid, outlined the potential 
political damage: “A coalition of the defeated, cobbled together, uncertain 
whether it can carry anything night by night” what it “would do to the Labour Party 
and its vote.” Blunkett questioned how the nation would have felt if having 
rejected Heath in February 1974 he’d remained in power through a deal with 
Jeremy Thorpe.715  
 
Brown’s position as Prime Minister and behaviour towards the Liberal Democrats, 
was considered a block to a Lab-Lib coalition, initially refusing to give a specific 
date for when he would step down. This caused angst amongst the Liberal 
Democrats, who did not want to be seen as propping up a defeated Prime 
Minister. Brown announced on Monday 10th May that he would step down by 
September 2010, a move that paved the way for negotiations with the Liberal 
Democrats. The Lib Dem precondition of Brown standing down in Straw’s opinion 
“could only add to the instability of any arrangement with them, and provoke 
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scorn from the electorate that they were being foisted off with a new prime 
minister who had been untested at the election.”716 For Harris, who had told 
Brown during his premiership that he should stand down, it reinforced his 
opposition to electoral reform. “The electorate should have the final say on who 
governs and it should not be up to Clegg. Clegg was one person and in 2010 
sacked Gordon Brown and appointed David Cameron… One MP should not have 
that amount of power… Clegg, who’s not even a member of the Labour Party 
tells Brown he has to go and he goes. All these Labour colleagues saying go, 
and being ignored, then Clegg of all people tells him to go and he does.”717 On 
the matter of electoral reform, Harris blogged that Labour MPs will not vote for 
the replacement of FPTP with AV, or for a referendum on further change after 
that towards PR. Moreover, "The word ‘progressive’ has now been redefined as 
‘willing to barter away everything you campaigned for in return for the chance to 
be in government, albeit at the beck and call of a party that has spent its entire 
existence trying to wipe you off the political map’."718  
 
In the cities of northern England the Liberal Democrats had become the main 
opposition to Labour, as the Conservatives had still not recovered from their 
electoral decline in industrial areas since the 1980s. In Liverpool and Sheffield, 
for example, the Liberal Democrats had gained control of the city councils for 
periods of the Labour government. Bradshaw considered the attitude towards the 
Liberal Democrats was determined by both the “historical and geographical 
context” and therefore the hostility in those areas was understandable. However, 
in other parts of Britain, Labour and the Liberal Democrats had a common enemy 
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in the Conservatives.719 Johnson reiterated the geographical dimension, as some 
of the opposition to coalition stemmed from local government. “You read a Lib 
Dem focus leaflet with them being all things to all people, some of the terrible 
things they put out if they thought they had a chance of beating the sitting Labour 
MP, leading to an understandable offence.” Johnson believed this caused an 
“inability” for some Labour MPs “to look at the bigger picture.”720  
 
Mandelson remarked in The Third Man that during the days following the 2010 
general election he reminisced about the Lab-Lib talks in the 1990s. Mandelson 
“did not see them so much as a missed opportunity as an opportunity that was 
never really there to be grasped.” There were strong forces against a deal “in 
both of our parties… and the circumstances were never propitious enough to 
overcome them.” Whilst not an excuse for not working towards cooperation, 
something could have been put together “at any time during the previous thirteen 
years. When the circumstances changed with the hung Parliament in 2010, both 
the electoral arithmetic and the lack of an established rapport between our 
parties and their leaderships militated against any serious prospect of a 
progressive alliance.”721 
 
For Labour MPs two immediate issues were influencing their decision. Firstly, did 
the Labour Party have the ‘moral authority’ to govern and, secondly, did the 
numbers stack up for a coalition with the Liberal Democrats? A ‘coalition of 
losers’ would have faced questions of legitimacy – denying the biggest party in 
terms of votes and seats the right to govern – especially from an unsympathetic 
press. Longer-term issues can be added: firstly, looking forward, the electoral 
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consequences for Labour if it were to enter a coalition with the Liberal Democrats 
and minor parties. By remaining in office there was a fear the electorate would 
wreak revenge and do considerable damage to the Labour vote, its 
representation in parliament and its standing as a national party. Secondly, a 
period back in opposition would allow Labour to regroup, whilst it was hoped that 
the coalition government took the electoral punishment for introducing the deep 
economic cuts forecast in the parliament, providing an opportunity to return to 
office in 2015. Thirdly, the problems of sharing office with the Liberal Democrats 
with whom Labour had a strong dislike and mistrust was succinctly outlined by 
one Liberal Democrat who thought a Lab-Lib coalition would be primarily a 
Labour government with one or two Lib Dems – “a continuation of the current 
government, just with a few irritants added in.”722 
 
Labour’s offer on electoral reform 
 
The negotiations provide an example of the length that Labour was willing to go 
to tie in the Liberal Democrats and remain in office. Considerable opposition to 
coalition and electoral reform existed within the PLP, yet the Cabinet was willing 
to countenance the idea. Mandelson considered the disagreement on electoral 
reform “was never properly tested in the coalition negotiations.”723 However, 
during the five days following the election it is clear electoral reform was one of 
the key determinants. On Friday 8th May, the day after the election, an hour 
before Cameron made his ‘big, open and comprehensive offer’ to the Liberal 
Democrats, Brown made a statement on the steps of Downing Street. He spoke 
of his “plan to carry through far-reaching political reforms, including changes to 
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the voting system”, believing that the “British people should be able to decide in a 
referendum what the system should be.”724 Although unspecific, Brown appeared 
to be willing to consider going further than the manifesto commitment already 
made on AV. 
 
Boulton and Jones record a meeting on Saturday 9th May between Mandelson 
and Alexander, during which Alexander floated the idea of Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats imposing AV without a referendum. According to Mandelson, “he said 
their worry was that a referendum would be lost because voters might see a Lib-
Lab pact as a self-interested stitch-up on both sides, so it might be better to avoid 
such a test.” Alexander pointed out that the Lib Dems had no such manifesto 
commitment, simply a commitment to deliver it. Reportedly, legislating for AV 
without a referendum was due to the Lib Dem fear that a ‘coalition of the losers’ 
would find it hard to sell anything to the British public let alone a new voting 
system.725 This was not the first time Mandelson had affirmed he thought a 
referendum on changing the voting system would be lost. Mandelson had told 
Blair that a referendum on the Jenkins’ proposal might not be won.    
 
According to the journalist Michael Crick, Brown held two secret meetings with 
Clegg on Sunday 10th May. The suggestion of AV without a referendum was 
made at their first meeting. Qvortrup suggests at these talks that it might be 
possible to go ahead with AV without a public vote and then have a referendum 
later on more radical and proportional electoral reform.726 After the Cabinet had 
met on Monday 11th May, news broke that Cameron had offered AV with a 
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referendum to the Liberal Democrats. Brown told Adonis: “We’ve got to go as fast 
as possible on AV. There’s got to be a referendum, but do the legislation in 
parallel, or something like that, so it can be brought in immediately after the 
referendum. We can’t have the Lib Dems claiming they have got nothing to 
choose between us and the Tories on this.”727 
 
Laws, a member of the Lib Dem negotiating team, recorded the first negotiating 
meeting on Monday 11th May between Labour and Liberal Democrats. Adonis 
reiterated Labour’s commitment to a referendum thinking “most Labour MPs will 
support AV but vote against proportional representation.” Harman emphasised 
the opposition to AV: "Most Labour MPs will grit their teeth and vote for AV, but 
let's be clear that many of my colleagues are not exactly champing at the bit!" 
implying a referendum on AV would not be easy to implement. When the Lib 
Dem negotiating team questioned further, Laws writes, Labour “cracks opened 
up.” Alexander asked “can we rely on Labour MPs supporting an AV 
referendum?” Adonis said, "That is what is guaranteed in our manifesto" yet Balls 
intervened to say: "AV would not be at all straightforward” and “the chief whip 
thinks it would be difficult to get the AV referendum through. Many of our 
colleagues are opposed to it. It cannot be guaranteed." It was, for Laws, a 
“deadly intervention” for the whole prospect of a Lab-Lib coalition, questioning 
“how could we go into coalition with a Labour Party that could not even guarantee 
to deliver a referendum on AV… that it had promised in its own manifesto.”728 
 
Laws records at the second meeting how electoral reform was again discussed. 
Mandelson thought there were three main issues: political legitimacy, policy 
agreement and deliverability. However, Adonis affirmed the AV Referendum 
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would be a “confidence issue for the government”, implying that the government 
would challenge its own backbenchers to vote down the government. Adonis 
reiterated that Labour could “certainly agree to a post-legislative referendum on 
AV.” However, if STV or AV+ was put into the Bill it raised problems of timing and 
deliverability. “Labour would support AV but we would have to oppose PR.” 
Mandelson agreed with Adonis arguing that it would be best if a Lab-Lib coalition 
coalesced around AV, to avoid dividing the coalition and presumably to present a 
united front in the referendum. Balls, as in the first negotiations, was sceptical, 
deeming “Getting our people to support AV is going to be quite hard. There are a 
lot of Labour MPs opposed.”729  
 
Ed Miliband’s account of the first meeting of the two teams maintains Brown was 
not willing to offer AV without putting it to the people. The first Miliband knew that 
the Lib Dems might push for AV without a referendum was “the first meeting we 
had as part of the negotiating team, and all those at the meeting on the Labour 
side... were completely sceptical about this and thought it’s not a runner.” A large 
part of one of the meetings with the Lib Dems was “consumed by whether or not 
we could have AV without a referendum… or have it for by-elections. We didn’t 
want it without a referendum but they said as a compromise, ‘well, let’s just have 
it for by-elections.’ We thought that was just for the birds, frankly.”730 The 
influence of political ambition for both Ed Miliband and Ed Balls cannot be 
underestimated as regardless of the pressure placed on Brown to stand down as 
Prime Minister from the Liberal Democrats, he had lost the general election, and 
the precedent is for the party leader to stand down. Remaining in government 
with Brown as Prime Minister – to stand down at ‘some point’ in the future – 
would have meant a leadership contest whilst in government, potentially during a 
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time of unpopularity for the government due to spending cuts, in coalition 
government and without having been tested at a general election. Therefore, a 
lack of enthusiasm for the Liberal Democrats and scepticism towards electoral 
reform hampered the likelihood of a Lib-Lab deal, increasing the likelihood of 
Labour moving into opposition and conducting a leadership election.  
 
Johnson “had a role with Chris Huhne talking about PR as part of the deal.” 
According to Johnson, the deal on offer from Labour was either “genuine PR, AV 
Plus or something similar, a referendum with the British people on a meaningful 
and genuine alternative.” However, the Liberal Democrats asked for “AV without 
any reference to the British people, no referendum introduced through 
Parliament, and then further down the line a referendum on a much more 
proportional electoral system.” This was not acceptable as the prevalent belief in 
the Labour Party was that a constitutional change requires going “back to the 
British people.” Accordingly, this is “what the negotiations floundered on.”731 
Seldon and Lodge support this view, writing Brown was willing to assent to a 
multi-question referendum allowing for a choice between FPTP, AV or a 
proportional system, therefore going beyond AV. The government would make 
this an issue of confidence to ensure its passage through the Commons, yet the 
Liberal Democrats demanded AV without a referendum.732  
 
Cameron and the Conservative leadership team were under the impression that 
the Labour Party was willing to offer AV without a referendum. Whether Cameron 
foisted his doubting backbenchers into coalition with the Liberal Democrats, 
based on fallacious rumours about AV without a referendum is a contentious 
matter. During a debate on the British constitution and Home Affairs, early in the 
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lifetime of the coalition government, Dr Julian Lewis, the Conservative MP for 
New Forest East, asked Straw the following: 
 
“Will the right hon. gentleman confirm that in the course of the competitive 
negotiations with the Liberal Democrats as to which side was going to form a 
Government, his party offered the Liberal Democrats a deal whereby AV 
would be rammed through this House without a referendum?” 
Straw: “The answer is no… a very significant proportion of Labour Members, 
including myself, would never have accepted such a proposition had it been 
put forward - let us be absolutely clear about that.”733 
 
Later in the same debate, Lewis would raise the same issue with Clegg. 
 
“I asked him (Straw) whether it had been the case that the outgoing Labour 
Prime Minister had offered, during the coalition negotiations, to ram through 
the alternative vote without a referendum. I am not giving away any trade 
secrets when I say that Conservative MPs were told that that was the case. 
The Deputy Prime Minister is in a position to know. Were the Liberal 
Democrats offered by the Labour party the alternative vote without a 
referendum? Can he set the matter to rest?” 
Clegg: “The answer is no… That was not offered by the Labour party in those 
discussions.”734 
 
Clegg repeated his position in Nick Robinson’s Five Days that Changed Britain 
stating “that had not been offered by Labour. There had been talk about what 
kind of electoral systems would require a referendum, whether we should request 
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a referendum on this electoral system but not on that. There was plenty of toing 
and froing on that. The perception which I think was accurate was that there was 
discussion around and might have been an offer made, it might have been 
considered... Was it formally made to me? No. It was not formally made to 
me.”735 Crick, based on conversations he had held, considered the Lib Dems 
asked Labour for AV without a referendum and at some point Brown may have 
discussed it without making a formal offer, this was then over egged by the Lib 
Dems in their conversations with the Conservatives. Cameron didn’t probe 
deeply enough, and perhaps didn’t want to knowing he could use this to cajole 
his MPs into accepting AV with a referendum.736  
 
The negotiations between Labour and the Liberal Democrats were unsuccessful. 
There was considerable opposition within the PLP and sections of the Cabinet for 
a deal with the Liberal Democrats, a point not missed by the latter. Moreover, 
Labour appeared to be unprepared for the negotiations compared to the 
Conservatives and Labour were unwilling to make as many policy concessions. 
Specifically for Labour, AV was a means of tying the Liberal Democrats into 
government not an end in itself, doubtful of even making it onto the statute due to 
opposition within the PLP. On the other side, the Liberal Democrats understood 
that by negotiating with Labour they could gain more concessions from the 
Conservatives; ‘stringing along’ Labour to strengthen their hand. Laws admitted 
to a select committee that talks with Labour were, in part, a device to ratchet up 
concessions from the Tories. “Coalition with the Labour Party was certainly 
something we were willing to consider and we would have been mad not to 
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because it would have weakened our negotiating position in terms of delivering 
as many of our policies as possible.”737  
 
The ‘miserable little compromise’: the AV Referendum, 2011 
 
The AV Referendum in 2011 came about as a result of the coalition negotiations 
between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Neither the Conservatives 
nor Liberal Democrats had a manifesto commitment. The Conservatives were 
committed to FPTP and the Liberal Democrats committed to STV. Therefore, the 
referendum was a result of political bargaining. One member of the Liberal 
Democrat Federal Executive summed up the attitude on AV after the election: 
“this is as good as it’s going to get, we can’t get any better”738; understanding the 
limitations of pursuing PR and vindicating the view that the Conservatives were 
the preferred partner all along, as the Labour leadership was prepared to make a 
similar offer. For Labour, whereas Plant and Jenkins had been theoretical and 
political exercises respectively, conducted on the whole behind closed doors, the 
referendum openly and publicly pitted Labour politicians against one another. 
The response of the Labour Party was vital to the overall outcome of the 
referendum as the Party had the ability to influence key sections of the electorate 
who would determine the outcome of the referendum, a point not missed by 
either side of the split within Labour. From the outset the split was apparent as in 
campaigning and financial terms Labour did not register as a permitted 
participant, and as a party did not spend anything on the campaign. On the other 
hand, the Conservatives spent £660,785 and the Liberal Democrats spent 
£62,782. Instead, Labour split into two campaign groups; ‘Labour No to AV’ and 
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‘Labour Yes’. The former spent £192,084 whereas the latter like the Party itself 
did not spend anything, and was therefore outspent by the ‘Conservative Yes’ 
campaign.739  
 
In comparison, the stance of the coalition parties was clear. The Conservative 
Party was overwhelmingly against, whilst the Liberal Democrats were 
overwhelmingly in favour. Cameron and Clegg had to respond to different 
pressures and consequently the result mattered for the coalition partners; 
Cameron had to deal with his backbenchers, disgruntled at being in coalition with 
the Liberal Democrats and opposed to AV believing it could prevent the party 
from winning a parliamentary majority in the future. Although it was also claimed 
that Cameron had assured Clegg he would not campaign hard against AV; 
Cameron would duly make several high profile statements in favour of the status 
quo. On the other hand, Clegg, whose ministerial oversight included 
constitutional reform, had to provide something substantial for his own MPs, party 
members and electoral base to show that the Liberal Democrat participation in 
government with the Conservatives was worthwhile. Many Lib Dems across the 
party felt uneasy about being in coalition with the Conservatives, thinking it was 
damaging aligning with a party that they had spent their entire existence fighting.  
 
The Coalition Agreement: Our Programme for Government stated: 
 
“The parties will bring forward a Referendum Bill on electoral reform, which 
includes provision for the introduction of the Alternative Vote in the event of a 
positive result in the referendum, as well as for the creation of fewer and more 
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equal-size constituencies. Both parties will whip their Parliamentary Parties in 
both Houses to support a simple majority referendum on the Alternative Vote, 
without prejudice to the positions parties will take during such a referendum.” 
 
Binding the issue of AV with a reduction in the number of constituencies across 
the United Kingdom – an act which was believed to be in the electoral interests of 
the Conservative Party – was designed to satisfy the separate demands of the 
coalition partners: electoral reform, a longstanding policy commitment for the 
Liberal Democrats and, as a quid pro quo, the Conservatives could nullify the 
Labour Party’s advantage in small urban constituencies by reducing and 
therefore redrawing the constituency boundaries. Furthermore, the Conservatives 
had two insurances for either winning or losing the referendum: if the referendum 
was lost the reduction in the number of parliamentary constituencies would help 
mitigate the bias towards Labour; should the referendum be won, the Fixed Term 
Parliament Act would prevent the Liberal Democrats withdrawing from the 
coalition.  
 
However, the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill 2010 did not 
sit well with Labour MPs and peers. Denham considered, “there is no 
philosophical, legal, practical or parliamentary reason for combining the 
referendum with boundary changes: it’s simply that the changes favour the 
Tories.”740 Baroness Armstrong stated there was concern about the legislation on 
the equalisation of constituencies, believing this to be part of “another agenda.”741 
The Labour Party would have been affected by the reduction of MPs, particularly 
in its industrial heartlands where constituencies tend to have fewer electors, 
along with Scotland and Wales, and a number of Labour MPs would have had to 
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find different constituencies to contest. Additionally, a considerable number of 
voters – estimated to be 3.5 million – were missing from the electoral register, 
many of whom would be in urban areas; poorer, working class, or students more 
inclined to support Labour. Several Labour peers sought to wreck the Bill in the 
House of Lords by imposing a 40 per cent turnout threshold, proposed by 
Falconer. Only at the last minute did the Bill pass in the Lords, by 224 votes to 
210. Other Labour Peers indicated that they would let the referendum clauses 
pass if they were decoupled from the constituency redistribution parts of the 
Bill.742   
 
Arguments by Labour proponents and opponents of AV 
 
For Harris, the holding of a referendum highlighted “how rotten coalition 
government is” as it was taking place “not because there was the demand for any 
reform, it was because the Lib Dems wanted something out of the coalition 
agreement as a ‘compromise’”, the consequence of “two-party horse trading 
behind closed doors.” As such, “it wasn’t at all democratic or transparent.” After 
all, the ‘Coalition Agreement’ had no mandate, drafted after the general election, 
influenced by a handful of politicians at the top of the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat parties. “The Lib Dems themselves never supported AV. So we had a 
referendum on a system proposed by a government, neither of which the two 
parties in the government supported. The only party that had proposed a 
referendum on AV was the Labour Party. We were against having a 
referendum… on a system that nobody wanted.”743 Falconer was also critical of 
the cause of the referendum. Not only was it a “complicated system”, which 
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“people didn’t understand… which nobody wants” with “no groundswell of 
support” it was a “Liberal Democrat driven change… basically it is a concoction of 
the politicians.”744 
 
Burnham, who had stood in Labour’s leadership contest, raised opposition to AV, 
reasoning: “Let's not get obsessed by this issue, because it really is irrelevant. It's 
a kind of fringe pursuit for Guardian-reading classes” implying that it might be a 
concern of the ‘radical middle classes’ but it is not a dispute that has any traction 
amongst working-class Labour voters. Burnham went on to say it was not his job 
to “prop up the Liberal Democrats by helping them win a referendum that is 
important to them.” The Liberal Democrats at the time were languishing in the 
opinion polls around 10% down from 23% in the general election. Burnham’s 
comments indicate that he was not interested and it was not the Labour Party’s 
job to restore their electoral fortunes. The Labour Party could not officially take 
sides in the referendum, according to Burnham: “The party nationally couldn’t 
campaign for any one position.” Furthermore, “those who are calling for retention 
of first past the post are making an incredibly important and legitimate 
argument.”745 
 
In July 2010 Burnham continued to express doubts on the merits of AV in the 
New Statesman. Although Burnham did not want to dismiss the importance of the 
debate, he was asking Labour to keep it in perspective. “I don't believe any of my 
constituents would put it in their top ten most important issues.” Focusing on the 
matter of electoral reform could “cement an impression Westminster and the 
Labour Party is out of touch and talking about things that are not the everyday 
concerns of people.” The coalition government had embarked on a course of 
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deep spending cuts; “1.3 million people, we're told, are in danger of losing their 
jobs. There are more urgent and important issues.” Hence, the social and 
economic issues take precedence over constitutional arrangements. Although he 
was “tending towards AV”, questions remained what the reform meant for “our 
political system and Labour's place within it.” Coalition government “could be 
attractive and it would be wrong for Labour to snigger or dismiss coalition”, yet 
Burnham stated his reservations as “this country has been served well by 
majority government over the years; that clarity helps drive social change when 
it's necessary. You have to look carefully at what kind of political system you 
want.”746 
 
Burnham was appointed as Labour’s election campaign co-ordinator and 
reiterated in November 2010 that the Labour Party would not campaign in favour 
of AV in the referendum, as it would be concentrating on the Scottish, Welsh and 
local elections on the same day. Therefore, AV was not the priority and allowed 
Labour to avoid the potentially divisive issue as the party machine and activist 
network could not help the ‘yes’ campaign. Clegg, in Burnham’s opinion, had 
“sold electoral reform campaigners short by agreeing to hold the AV referendum 
on the same day as the local and national elections. The referendum should have 
been held on its own day, when the yes and no campaigns could have argued it 
out.” Labour’s “sole priority” in 2011 “has to be, and will be, winning in Scotland 
and Wales, and doing well in the local elections. It would be a recipe for chaos 
and confusion if Labour candidates were also supporting AV in their literature. 
The election and referendum campaigns have to be separate and distinct.” Clegg 
had been outmanoeuvred by Cameron. “You cannot have what is essentially a 
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tribal battle over issues like spending cuts being fought out at the same time as a 
cross-party campaign is under way.”747  
 
Joan Ryan, who had lost her seat in the 2010 general election was deputy 
campaign director of the cross-party NOtoAV, said: “This issue is more important 
than party politics. The Labour Party has said that MPs, councillors and activists 
are free to make up their own mind. We are pleased to see so many MPs from 
right across the party united in voting No and we are confident that many Labour 
supporters will be joining them.” Tom Watson, reportedly switched from FPTP to 
AV, thought it was hard to analyse any pattern in how Labour members thought. 
“New intake MPs, MPs in safe or marginal seats, northern MPs or whatever – it is 
an issue that divides all the Labour tribes, groups and regions.”748 In addition, 
trade unions joined the NOtoAV campaign including the GMB, Community, 
Alliance, Aslef and the Prison Officer’s Association. Unite although not officially 
part of No2AV campaigned against reform and Unison remained neutral. Billy 
Hayes of the Communication Workers Union supported AV: “The MP has to get 
50% of the vote…If you vote No to AV you are actually voting Yes to David 
Cameron”749 suggesting only Cameron would benefit from the retention of FPTP. 
 
Labour’s Yes to AV campaign wrote a letter to the Guardian in December 2010: 
 
“When just a few thousand people determine every election result in a few 
swing seats, the interests of the Labour party and the people we represent go 
unheard. The alternative vote means the majority get their voices heard... 
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When people switch off from politics it damages Labour, not the Tories. That’s 
why the Tories don’t want fairer votes. They don’t want change; they say no! 
Labour is the party of fairness and change. Labour says yes. It’s time for 
change.”750 
 
Present at the launch of the Labour Yes campaign were Johnson, Denham, 
Bradshaw, Livingstone, Oona King, Kinnock and the Labour leader Ed Miliband. 
Yet, some of the aforementioned had varied history with electoral reform: 
Kinnock became convinced of the need for reform. Johnson and Denham both 
supported AV+, with the latter believing AV “would have given us an even bigger 
majority in 1997 and it would have given the Tories an even bigger majority in 
1983 and 1987 as well.”751 Bradshaw became the front of the Labour Yes to AV 
campaign.752 Johnson, on reflection, considered AV to be a “sop” as it was 
missing the “Plus bit” meaning electoral reformers “were not enthused by it.”753 
Given that AV was not the preferred choice of a number of electoral reformers, it 
was perceived as a ‘Trojan horse’. Harris perceived AV to be “seen by reformers 
as a stepping stone to something else, not an end in itself”, something he thought 
“was very cynical and dishonest.”754 Beckett concurred, deeming the “people who 
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wanted AV wanted it as a stepping stone, they did not want it as a system in 
itself.”755  
 
Denham stressed AV to be “fairer”, making each “MP work harder”, having to 
“gain the support of a greater group, the support of half the people who voted”, 
resulting in the “end of people being told they have to vote tactically or their vote 
will be wasted, it’s more democratic, it’s fair and it will produce a better type of 
politics.”756 However, there was a backlash against the accusation of ‘lazy’ MPs 
from Labour figures including Ian Murray, Jeremy Corbyn and Kerry McCarthy. 
Murray stated “It's been deliberately designed to upset MPs and provoke 
negative feelings towards them, saying they're not working hard enough and 
raking up the expenses issue again. I'm calling on the campaign to name the 
MPs they think are lazy because all the ones I know work very hard.”757  
 
In an article for the Guardian, Denham, along with Chris Huhne and Caroline 
Lucas, explained why party difference must be put aside to change British 
politics. Britain, the article claimed, “votes as a centre-left country and yet the 
Conservatives have dominated our politics for two-thirds of the time since 1900.” 
Progressives, tactical voting and safe seats were all mentioned as AV would be 
the “dawn of an honest age”, creating a “system that reflect how Britain actually 
votes, the progressive majority will be one step closer to reality.”758 Given that 
Britain was a year into a Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government, 
the ‘progressive majority’ argument had been shaken and the refutation offered in 
Healey’s autobiography appeared increasingly relevant.759 
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Harris rejected the argument that it was FPTP that had delivered Conservative 
governments for much of the twentieth century. Blaming FPTP for Labour’s 
electoral defeats was fallacious as the “Tories governed for most of the century 
because they were more popular, because they won more votes, because they 
had more popular policies and because they won the argument.” Passing 
judgement about events post-1992, Harris affirmed the Labour Party faced two 
different options: either to stop “trying to connect with the voters” and seek to 
“change the electoral system so we could achieve government by changing the 
rules” or do as Tony Blair did and propose “new, attractive policies and 
messages, broadening our appeal beyond our traditional base.” For Harris the 
correct course of action was the one pursued by Blair, as elections are won, “by 
appealing to more voters, not by changing the system.”760 Denis MacShane 
submitted written evidence to the House of Commons Constitutional Reform 
Committee. FPTP in the post-World War Two era had facilitated an almost even 
split of Labour and Conservative governments:  
 
“There was once a fashionable view that coalitions in and of themselves 
produce good government. Yet Britain’s electoral system has produced both 
good and bad governments. There are plenty of examples of coalition 
governments being complete disasters… In Britain since 1945, Labour has 
ruled for 30 out of 65 years. This is as good if not a better record of longevity 
in power than all European left parties outside of Scandinavia and better than 
Australia or Ireland where electoral systems are closer to AV than Britain’s 
first past the post system… if one of the key desired goals of democratic 
politics is a regular alternance of power then the evidence suggest that FPTP 
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has delivered that better in the UK since 1945, than AV or other electoral 
systems used elsewhere.”761 
 
Tessa Jowell supported AV considering preferential voting would force politicians 
to look beyond “what might be defined as a core vote” and put the “voter first.” 
Jowell extended the argument of ‘making more votes count’, estimating on BBC 
Daily Politics that “at the last election the focus was on 460,000 swing voters. We 
should be looking to involve the whole country in electing our government.”762 
The number referenced by Jowell was supposedly the number of voters who 
determined the outcome of the 2010 general election, targeted by the 
Conservatives and Labour in marginal constituencies, in order to win a 
parliamentary majority. Consequently, only a fraction of the electorate determines 
who forms the government. However, as Harris noted, such an argument fails to 
consider the clear majority of voters who have participated in the election and 
how they have decided to vote. “Everyone’s vote matters” stated Harris, “even 
those who are committed to voting one way at every election have the same right 
to have their voices heard. Elections are won, yes, by persuading part of the 
electorate to change their minds. But they’re also won by persuading an even 
larger proportion of the electorate not to.”763 
 
Indeed, the fundamental reason why Harris was in favour of FPTP was that “it 
gives the people of this country something extremely valuable: the ability to sack 
a government.”764 The argument that the purpose of elections was to elect a 
government was regularly used by supporters of FPTP during the AV 
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Referendum. Prescott deemed: “It is what government does that is the important 
thing about elections… Government is the most important decision people can 
make. Trusting government, which is often brought up by people in AV, is about 
whether governments carry out what they have promised.”765 Blunkett, in the 
NOtoAV campaign video released the day before the referendum, echoed 
Prescott’s sentiments, ending the campaign broadcast stating FPTP was “a 
system that elects a government rather than having decisions taken after the 
election about policies and programmes.”766  
 
Conversely to Miliband’s refusal to share a platform with Clegg, Reid shared a 
platform with Cameron – an ‘unholy alliance’ that cut across class lines – 
humorously pointing out he had yet to see any of those MPs advocating AV step 
forward to say they are the ones who are not working hard enough. Reid 
continued: “It would be an outrage to try and secure a change in our electoral 
system for tactical party advantage.” This was the aim of the leadership of the 
Liberal Democrats, yet what they had to realise was “every system has its losers 
as well as its winners, which is the nature of elections; it is the nature of the 
contest.” Consequently, “The answer for losing parties is to work harder to win 
the confidence of the electorate (and) when you lose elections you accept the will 
of the people.” Reid’s statement correlated with his attitude towards coalition after 
the May 2010 general election when he proclaimed that Labour must accept 
defeat. “What you don’t try and do is try and change the rules of the game to suit 
yourself” as the British way is not for the “Government to sack the electorate, or 
change the electoral system just because they, the politicians, don’t like the 
result. In a democracy it works the other way round.”767 The objective of reaching 
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out across class and party lines worked, as the Guardian published a poll the 
following day highlighting how support for AV had plummeted. According to Dan 
Hodges, a communications consultant for ‘NOtoAV’, it was the moment when the 
referendum campaign was, to all intents and purposes, over.768 
 
Supporters of FPTP claimed AV would lead to hung parliaments and therefore 
coalitions. The evidence on AV suggests otherwise as since 1979, only in 1992 
would a coalition government have resulted.769 Regardless, Falconer considered 
under AV, “the public will get more disconnected” because of “more coalitions, 
more hung parliaments.” Falconer questioned whether going back on promises 
made once in power in a coalition is “going to connect people to their politicians 
or disconnect people further from their politicians?” In his view it would “very 
strongly… disconnect people further.” 770 Prescott reiterated the argument, 
considering AV was “necessarily a step towards coalition and coalition does not 
give you the stability of government.” Moreover, as shown by the Conservative-
Liberal coalition, it “doesn’t deliver the promises made to the electorate; it’s fixed 
by a few people in the room.”771 Caroline Flint MP wrote in the Labour supporting 
Daily Mirror that AV was “complicated, unfair and expensive” and at present 
“British elections are simple and decisive – you vote for what you believe in with 
one vote each… The Lib Dems want a system that makes coalitions more likely, 
where politicians fix a deal behind closed doors and the people have no say.”772 
 
Advocates of AV criticised those within Labour who opposed AV, arguing it was 
the same system used for electing the Leader of the Labour Party, a pertinent 
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point as Ed Miliband had narrowly been elected only nine months prior to the 
referendum. The argument put forward by No campaigners within Labour was the 
same as the argument made in the Plant Report: different institutions depending 
on their function could use different electoral systems. Beckett thought that 
electing a government and electing a leader of a political party were “two 
completely different things”, a view shared by Prescott.773 Harris fleshed out the 
position adding that choosing the Leader of the Labour Party is “choosing 
amongst people who are members of the same party as me, who have the same 
set of values and principles as I do. In a general election you are not.” Thus, AV 
is “sensible for you are giving second or third preference to other Labour 
candidates.” In a general election Harris didn’t “have a second or third 
preference”, only “one preference” which was the Labour Party.774 
 
Ed Miliband and AV 
 
Ed Miliband, the newly elected Leader of the Labour Party supported AV, albeit 
unenthusiastically. Miliband found himself in the minority in the PLP, and faced 
dissent from a number of high-profile Labour politicians. The referendum put into 
focus Miliband’s political judgement and had AV won the referendum, he risked 
being on the ‘wrong’ side of the PLP. Should FPTP be maintained it had the 
potential to lead to the perception that Miliband was an electoral underachiever. 
However, Miliband had the objective of attracting disaffected Liberal Democrats 
into the Labour fold. Therefore, the act of coming out in favour of AV would have 
appealed to former Liberal Democrat voters, regardless of the overall outcome of 
the referendum. It was in many ways a ‘win win’ situation for Miliband, who could 
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present himself as a moderniser if the public supported AV whilst privately 
relishing the predicament in which Clegg and the Liberal Democrats would find 
themselves should a key Liberal Democrats coalition policy be rejected by the 
electorate. Equally, a Yes vote would have caused difficulties for Cameron. 
Conservative backbenchers, many disillusioned with ‘compassionate 
conservatism’ compounded by the inability of Cameron’s rebranding to win a 
majority, would have blamed him for conceding permanent coalition government 
with the Liberal Democrats or opposition should the Liberal Democrats join forces 
with Labour.  
 
Miliband wrote in the Guardian that AV offers an “opportunity for political reform, 
ensuring the voice of the public is heard louder than it has been in the past.” 
Miliband gauged the matter “not to be at the top, or even near the top, of many 
people’s lists of concerns”, being a matter not often raised in his constituency or 
any other, implying a lack of enthusiasm. However, the reform was still necessary 
due to the low current standing of politicians in the eyes of the public, and 
therefore the opportunity should be taken to make politics more relevant to 
people. AV “combined the direct representation of first-past-the-post with one that 
will make the votes of more people count” and breaking that link would be a 
mistake. AV would not alone bridge the disconnect between people and 
politicians, as House of Lords reform was also necessary, but AV had the benefit 
of increasing “political accountability” forcing “parties to admit where there is 
agreement between them, prising open our confrontational system.”775  
 
At the launch of ‘Labour Yes’, Miliband claimed that “the great tragedy in British 
politics has been the split in the progressive vote, a long tragedy in British 
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political history.” Whilst Clegg’s decision to go into coalition with the 
Conservatives had made this less obvious, it should not be assumed that is 
“going to persist forever because that would be a cardinal mistake when we look 
back at our history.” In a direct approach to those disaffected by the coalition 
government, Miliband claimed the Tories were against reform because “They fear 
the creation of a progressive majority in this country.”776 Miliband returned to the 
‘split in the progressive vote’ in the days leading up to the referendum, reiterating 
his belief that AV would “reflect confidence… give expression to the anti-
Conservative majority… that there is a genuine progressive majority” in Britain. 
“Margaret Thatcher never secured the support of a majority of people in this 
country… The first-past-the-post system helped her force extremely divisive 
policies through parliament that did lasting harm to so many communities.” 
Miliband dubiously and disingenuously added: “Labour has always been a force 
for political reform.”777 Basing his argument on the ‘progressive-left’ thesis, yet 
refusing to share a platform with Clegg, the leader of the other ‘progressive’ party 
was contradictory, and a ‘tribal approach’. Although Miliband could point to 
sharing a platform with other Liberal Democrats, to not share with Clegg implied 
any sincerity towards reuniting the left was ‘skin deep’.  
 
The Financial Times reported that regardless of a No vote in the referendum, 
Miliband wished to retain a commitment to electoral reform in the next Labour 
manifesto, keeping alive the possibility of a pact with the Lib Dems. According to 
one unnamed Labour insider “if there is a No vote, it’s important that the margin 
of defeat is as narrow as possible to keep the reform agenda alive.”778 If correct, 
it infers the Labour leadership were keeping their options open to a potential deal 
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with the Liberal Democrats in 2015, suggesting even as early as 2011 they were 
unsure of outright victory and desired an ‘insurance’ policy. Bradshaw delivered a 
speech at Kings College London. “If the No vote wins in May, That’s it. We’re not 
going to get another bite at this cherry. If the British people vote to keep FPTP 
that means any change to our electoral system is off the agenda.” In relation to 
the Labour Party, “I know my own party will not re-visit this, it’s not going to have 
an appetite for this.”779 Bradshaw was perhaps encouraging those to vote AV by 
emphasising how it was a ‘once in a generation’ chance although if the Labour 
leadership were hoping to carry this over into 2015 then the issue would return to 
the agenda.  
 
The impact of the Liberal Democrats ‘betrayal’ 
 
Focusing on the issue of coalition government and the role of the Liberal 
Democrats within it, particularly on what were perceived as ‘broken promises’, 
was understandable, and became a vocal point for the No campaign. The 
coalition government was one year into the parliament, and the Liberal 
Democrats were becoming increasingly unpopular. Students were particularly 
upset due to the volte face on tuition fees amongst other Lib Dem policies that 
failed to make it into the Coalition Agreement. Watson judged “I always expected 
there would be a majority of Labour MPs voting no. Much of this is to do with Nick 
Clegg. I have never known an issue inside the Labour Party that is being so 
determined by your attitude to one man.”780 Clegg had become the persona non 
grata, symbolic of the broken promises, and whilst the Yes campaign chose to 
focus on other figures, he was part of the reason why the referendum was taking 
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place. When Clegg insisted on attending a ‘Yes to Fairer Votes’ event Miliband 
withdrew, stating: “What is the problem with Nick Clegg? Where do you start? He 
was the person who promised new politics. And the brief bout of Cleggmania 
there was, was supposed to be about new politics. I’m afraid he has become the 
exemplar of old politics; of breaking your promises.”781  
 
Clegg played directly into the hands of the No campaign, who could tap into 
Labour voters’ dislike of the Liberal Democrat leader, with posters appearing of 
‘No to President Clegg.’ Indeed, the scathing attacks on Clegg in the campaign 
literature were according to Matthew D’Anconna pushed by Labour people in the 
No campaign.782 Hodges supports this view, writing how Joan Ryan pushed for 
the twin attack of the £250 million cost of the AV referendum and the personal 
attack on Clegg. Indeed, it was Ryan who met one of Cameron's close aids, 
Stephen Gilbert, and advocated Cameron and Reid making a joint statement to 
avoid accusations of NOtoAV being a ‘tory front’. Reportedly, Cameron and 
Conservative HQ did not wish to attack Clegg when he was already down, yet in 
order to motivate Labour voters, it was agreed to emphasise how the referendum 
was an opportunity to punish Clegg and the Lib Dems for letting the 
Conservatives in.783 ‘Labour No to AV’ also attacked Clegg mercilessly, 
associating him with all the pledges he had failed to keep and utilising ‘pictorial 
narratives’, one of which was a mock Guardian front page with the headline: 
‘New voting system saves President Clegg’. Other images included Clegg 
walking into Downing Street with his hand on Cameron’s back after the formation 
of the coalition government and Clegg holding the tuition fees pledge.  
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As such, Labour were pinning the blame on the Liberal Democrats for propping 
up the Conservatives, rubbishing any suggestion that the Liberal Democrats were 
on the ‘progressive’ side of British politics and holding them equally responsible, 
if not more so than the Conservatives, for the coalition’s economic reforms. For 
some within the Labour Party, a No vote offered the opportunity to inflict damage 
on the Liberal Democrat and give Clegg a ‘bloody nose’. Baroness Armstrong, 
“agreed with Tony (Blair) on bringing about progressive centre-left politics” and 
was personally “ambivalent towards the huge anti-Liberal factor in the Labour 
Party.” However, the referendum was “a means of kicking the Liberals” as the 
“compromises the Liberals made to go in with the Tories were a bit shocking and 
therefore they deserved a kicking.”784 Harris echoed Armstrong’s sentiment 
stating: “the hatred of the Liberals and the belief that they had betrayed all their 
own principles was a factor throughout the last parliament and I have no doubt 
impinged on the AV debate.”785 Indeed, a post-referendum analysis by the Liberal 
Democrats considered the whole exercise and campaign tactics were designed 
“to kick the party twice.”786 
 
Whitty deemed the referendum took place “too early in the lifetime of the 
coalition” and that the Labour Party had “been defeated; so the thinking was we’d 
better let the other lot run it for a bit. The perceived wisdom was to work out how 
to get back into power on the traditional method.”787 Therefore, gains that could 
be made by disrupting the workings of the coalition – particularly damaging 
Cameron who would be held responsible for the change to the electoral system 
by his backbenchers – was not the preferred option. Instead, Labour were 
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prepared to ‘wait their turn’ to resume office under the current system. Harris 
affirmed Clegg was not “the main driving force behind Labour’s opposition.” 
Instead it was a case of the Labour Party opposing a “flawed proposal”, because 
“we are against electoral reform… Most of us understood the debate was about 
more long term important issues rather than getting short term political advantage 
over another political party.”788 In this case, the other political party was the 
Conservatives and the vehemently anti-Liberal section in the Labour Party was 
more than happy to gain an advantage over the Liberal Democrats. 
 
The Result 
 
On 5th May 2011 the electorate went to the polls to vote in only the second UK-
wide referendum. The vote coincided with elections to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly of Wales and local 
government elections in England outside London. Whereas in 1975 the issue 
was the United Kingdom remaining in the European Economic Community, in 
2011 the question put to the British electorate was as follows: 
 
“At present, the UK uses the ‘first past the post’ system to elect MPs to the 
House of Commons. Should the ‘alternative vote’ system be used instead?” 
 
The outcome was unanimous: AV was rejected by the electorate by a majority of 
2:1 with only ten counting areas across the United Kingdom voting in favour of 
AV. Baston and Ritchie analysed the result, and deemed the scale of the defeat 
for reformers a ‘disaster’. Only a further eleven counting areas returned a yes 
vote above 45% and all eleven shared similarities with the ten counting areas 
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that did return a yes vote: “highly educated, youthful, liberal and cosmopolitan 
areas… The political colours of the areas with a Yes vote of more than 45 per 
cent were mostly Labour – not Labour strongholds (except Hackney) but places 
where local political competition tends to be between Labour and Lib Dem 
(Islington, Haringey, Oxford, Cambridge, Southwark), Labour and SNP or Labour 
and Green.”789 The Yes campaign “had made the reforming vote a stereotype of 
itself, the domain of the metropolitan liberal middle classes – a potentially broad 
coalition had been whittled down to its hard core.”790   
 
Polling conducted on behalf of YouGov on election-day found 47% of Labour 
voters backed Yes and 53% voted No. 53% of those belonging to ABC1 voted 
Yes whereas 60% of C2DE voted No.791 Whilst the Yes campaign may have 
thought little of the Labour ‘old guard’ – Beckett, Reid, Blunkett – labelling them 
‘dinosaurs’, traditional Labour voters may have looked more kindly upon these 
experienced politicians. Moreover, claims by electoral reformers that there was 
public demand for reform was proved doubtful due to both the magnitude of 
defeat in terms of votes and the widespread rejection across the United Kingdom. 
As Beckett pointed out, “It was a comprehensive victory. It would look (if another 
referendum was held) as if the people spoke but they got it wrong, so let’s ask 
them again, which is not a wise thing for any government to do. Given the result 
of the referendum and the experience of the coalition, it probably does mean it is 
dead in the water for a very long time.”792  
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790 Ibid., pp. 56-57 
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Summary 
 
The final years of the Labour government and the following leadership contest 
was a turbulent period for the Labour Party: economic crash, MPs expenses, the 
unpopularity of Brown and the Labour government, a poor result in the 2010 
general election, the end of thirteen years of government and the emergence of a 
Conservative-Liberal coalition government. Throughout, electoral reform was on 
the political agenda although interest was motivated by political expediency 
rather than a genuine conversion. Labour had won three successive general 
elections and talk of reform, looked and indeed was, belated and insincere. 
Publicly, talk of ‘cleaning up politics’ after the expenses scandal was secondary 
to the political calculation of keeping alive the prospect of a post-election deal 
with the Liberal Democrats. Labour understood it was likely to lose the upcoming 
general election and whilst Labour MPs voted for the government Bill they did so 
in the knowledge it would be ‘washed up’ with the dissolution of Parliament. The 
manifesto commitment was a direct appeal to Liberal Democrat voters to vote 
Labour and the Liberal Democrat Party that Labour was serious about reform. 
However, it was expected that Labour would lose the election and the Party 
would be out of office.  
 
The five days that followed the 2010 general election were important for it 
exposed two tensions: Labour’s antipathy towards electoral reform and its 
attitude towards coalition, the likely consequence of PR. Electoral reform was a 
key policy that the Liberal Democrats had long desired and to which Labour had 
a manifesto commitment. Yet negotiations floundered, in part due to Labour’s 
scepticism towards entering a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, and although 
PR was mooted it was never formally offered. As Balls stated in the negotiations, 
AV, let alone PR would have struggled to pass through the House of Commons 
334 
 
given the opposition within the PLP. Moreover, high-profile Labour figures were 
openly damning the idea of coalition, which added to the Liberal Democrats’ 
belief that whatever Labour offered, it was not deliverable. However, the failure of 
‘realignment’ and the fulfilment of the ‘progressive-left’ was influenced by factors 
other than electoral reform: ideological overlap between the Orange Book liberals 
and ‘compassionate conservatism’, parliamentary arithmetic and the political 
stability of coalition with the Conservatives, and the gradual ‘falling out of love’ 
with Labour over the course of thirteen years of government. The ‘bad-faith’ was 
apparent on both sides and the political will was therefore lacking. 
 
Attitudes to coalition were, to some degree, influenced by the heavy electoral 
defeat and the desire to renew in opposition, allowing the Conservatives to take 
the electoral punishment for unpopular public expenditure cuts. Yet the 
arguments put forward by the likes of Blunkett, Reid and Straw went beyond one 
solitary general election defeat, to the heart of Labour’s thinking about coalition 
government at Westminster. There was the question of how a ‘coalition of the 
losers’ reliant on the potentially fickle support of the minor parties would survive 
from day-to-day. Moreover, how would such a government be perceived by the 
electorate and the media, what would this do to the standing of the Labour Party 
as a national party of Great Britain, and if it was perceived negatively, what would 
be the electoral backlash at future elections and would this do irrevocable 
damage to the Labour vote? Whilst Adonis might have viewed such an attitude 
as ‘defeatist’ it was the more realistic and politically acceptable decision to make. 
The Labour Party, as a serious party of the British State, had to play by the rules 
and accept when it was defeated and await its turn to form a government in the 
future by winning under FPTP.  
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It would be the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition who would deliver 
Labour’s referendum manifesto pledge. Burnham had made clear in 2010 that 
Labour would campaign neither for nor against, instead focussing on the different 
elections taking place across Great Britain. The matter was deemed secondary to 
the primary concern of winning seats in local government and the devolved 
assembles. During the AV Referendum, the newly elected Labour leader Ed 
Miliband found himself in the minority view of the PLP, supporting a switch to AV. 
Miliband, having only narrowly beaten his brother months earlier in a tight 
leadership contest, had little political capital to use and although he campaigned 
in favour, it was not considered a priority like the other elections taking place 
across Britain. Labour duly split. Many of the Labour politicians who were openly 
opposed and expressed reservations of coalition with the Liberal Democrats in 
2010 were most opposed to AV, including Reid, Blunkett, Falconer, Harris and 
Beckett. Whilst Clegg was attacked mercilessly and provided a figurehead to 
point out all that was wrong AV and coalition government, underpinning the 
referendum was a traditional defence of FPTP: broadly, arguments centred on 
the purpose of voting is the creation being a single-party government, the 
electorate’s ability to sack a government and the rejection of hung parliaments 
and coalition government as it would lead to broken promises and the trading 
away of manifesto pledges. For the Yes side, whilst they could call upon the 
support of high-profile Labour figures such as Ed Miliband, Johnson and 
Bradshaw, the refrain of ‘fair voting’ lacked traction as did the belief that AV 
would clean up politics, create greater choice and increase accountability. Whilst 
politicians on the left talked about the split on the British left and how AV would 
foster ‘progressive’ politics, the creation of the coalition government suggested 
such a notion was illusory. The sheer scale of the defeat for AV has meant that 
electoral reform, whether it be a different majoritarian system or proportional 
representation, has been set back a generation.  
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Conclusion 
 
In conclusion we return to the research questions which were outlined in the 
introduction, namely: what are the main theoretical approaches in the Labour 
Party towards electoral reform; what are the main historical approaches to 
electoral reform within the Labour Party; and, why has interest in electoral reform 
grown within the Labour Party since the 1980s and with what consequences?  
 
The thesis has addressed the research questions, with the theoretical, historical 
and recent interest in electoral reform explored in considerable detail. H. J. 
Hanham’s assertion, quoted in the introduction, that the electoral reform debate 
contains a dual aspect, entailing both the theoretical and historical793 can be 
ascertained in relation to the Labour Party. The competing views on the electoral 
system within the Party are based on different theoretical frameworks, each 
striving for supremacy and experiencing times of prominence, reflecting political 
context, and the pressures facing the Party. In addition, issues of real politik have 
received attention throughout the thesis, for it must be remembered that the 
Labour Party acts not only in the realm of ideas, but in the context of the day to 
day battle of Westminster politics. 
 
The intention of the thesis has been to draw out ideas implicit in the narrative. 
Labour’s attitude towards the electoral system, as the thesis makes apparent, is 
primarily based on two competing views: democratic elitism and pluralism, of 
which democratic elitism has been the dominant strand. Marxism has rarely held 
influence on Labour’s attitude towards the Westminster electoral system. 
However, it would be a mistake to dismiss Marxism as its importance can be 
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viewed in its critique of the Labour Party’s acceptance of parliamentary 
orthodoxy. 
 
The Party, as the political wing of the Labour movement, has considered 
parliamentary representation the priority, with socialism to be achieved through 
the parliamentary method. Popular movements have been side-lined in favour of 
elections, with Labour attempting to capture the state and utilise the power 
invested in a parliamentary majority to reform and ameliorate capitalism. 
Although Labour had experienced minority government in 1924 and 1929-31, 
Labour’s 1945-51 majority government highlighted the benefits of a single-party 
majority in the House of Commons, convincing the Party that the state could be 
used to meet Labour’s ends. The state was there to be captured, and the 
Westminster Model of politics and workings of FPTP was deemed the best 
attainable method to produce Labour governments and the implementation of its 
distinct socio-economic agenda, symbolised by the introduction of the welfare 
state. The objections raised by Labour’s political opponents within and outside 
Parliament could be countered by a parliamentary majority, with the oft repeated 
achievements of Labour governments used to defend FPTP. Despite the raft of 
constitutional changes introduced by New Labour, Labour’s commitment to 
parliamentary means continues. During the days following the May 2010 general 
election Labour’s behaviour and attitude displayed a clear and unfailing 
constitutionalism, abiding by the ‘rules of the game’, and in some cases, gladly 
accepting defeat and entering opposition. 
 
Marxists and pluralists have utilised arguments professing proportional 
representation (PR) would permit a realignment in British politics. Yet the 
direction and implications of realignment differ. For Marxists, the Labour Party 
would be pulled to the left by the emergence of a fully avowed socialist party, 
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exposing the class divisions within society. Alternatively Labour would split with 
the right of the Labour Party joining the centre party, and the left of the Party – 
freed from constitutional and economic orthodoxy of Labour – able to join a 
Socialist party truly representing the interests of the working class. Consequently, 
the compromises Labour makes with capital in order to win elections – necessary 
through the workings of FPTP forcing Labour to attract and win the votes of non-
socialists and Conservatives – would cease, as PR would reveal the class 
divisions within society.  
 
Such a view contradicts the principles and objectives of Labour which, as 
outlined, is concerned with parliamentary representation and the formation of a 
government operating in the interests of working people. For this end to be 
realised it is necessary for Labour to build broad electoral coalitions, attracting 
support from across different classes and regions of Great Britain. Therefore, 
Labour becomes not just a class-based party but a national party and importantly 
desires to be perceived by the electorate as a national party. Consequently, the 
Labour Party is a broad church, in relation to its electoral base, membership and 
parliamentarians; including trade union members, the working class and middle-
class, intellectuals, all from across the regions of Great Britain. FPTP encourages 
the Labour Party to come together, fusing a coalition of people who broadly share 
the same principles, deeming it better to work within one party than with those 
who may or may not agree in a different party. An electoral system that causes 
division, such as STV where Labour candidates would compete against one 
another, would only benefit the Conservatives as Labour’s factions from left, 
centre and right would be exposed. Prevalent amongst the FPTP supporters 
during the Plant Report was the recent memory and trauma of the SDP and, 
more generally, Labour’s history of ruptures. An electoral system which had the 
potential to foster further splits was to be opposed. 
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Pluralists consider that the divisions within society are not sufficiently represented 
under FPTP. The declining vote share enjoyed by the two major parties suggests 
they are becoming less representative of society. The Labour Party is not exempt 
meaning the political system requires reform, replacing the constricting and 
limiting FPTP with PR in order to give expression to the diverse and fluid nature 
of society. PR would also facilitate a realignment of the left between the 
‘progressive’ parties in British politics. PR would offer a more inclusive, collegiate 
and open politics, allowing the ‘progressive’ parties to work together to defeat the 
Conservatives. Greater democratic legitimacy would result through the combining 
of votes, so government would have the support of over 50% of the electorate, 
containing a more diverse range of views, therefore leading to a ‘better politics’, 
ending tribalism and sectional interest.  
 
Healing the historic schism on the British left between Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats through PR would permit Labour to create a greater electoral coalition 
which otherwise would remain out of reach. Labour on its own is incapable of 
attracting the support of social groups required to deliver a parliamentary majority 
due to its ‘tribalism’ and belief that only it is capable of defeating the 
Conservatives. Through political engagement a renewed interest in politics would 
ensue, allowing Labour to gain from those who deem constitutional reform to be 
important. This entails several benefits for the Labour Party, making it ‘safe’ in 
the eyes of the electorate and therefore electable, as the Labour left would be 
silenced by the moderating influence of the centrist MPs. The centre party would 
also ensure a Labour government would remain in office for a prolonged period 
of time, working in unison in parliament, creating both a united front against the 
Conservatives at Westminster and in the country. By doing so a Conservative 
government would be prevented, perhaps for a generation, allowing for the 
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implementation of, to some degree, a social democratic policy agenda. Unlike the 
twentieth century which was dominated electorally by the Conservative Party, the 
‘progressive’ forces in British politics could ensure a ‘progressive’ twenty-first 
century.  
 
Whilst the pluralist analysis has its supporters within the Labour Party, and has 
experienced times of prominence, the elitists have remained dominant. The 
professed benefits of pluralism have been treated with caution, not just by the 
Labour leadership but by much of the wider PLP, perceiving it as placing at risk 
the Labour Party having sole control of the levers of power through a 
parliamentary majority in the House of Commons. The Labour Party considers 
itself to be the sole defensive agent of the working class with a unique socio-
economic ideology committed to furthering its interests. A coalition involving 
Labour and one or more of its opponents would be to admit that Labour can no 
longer fulfil its primary role, whilst also watering down the policies designed to 
ameliorate capitalism and benefit the working class, breaking the doctrine of the 
‘mandate and the manifesto’, the contract between government and the British 
people.  
 
Plant broke with Labour orthodoxy when he stated it is far better that Labour 
implemented some of its manifesto in coalition with a likeminded partner than 
remain impotent in opposition, thus rejecting the doctrine of the mandate and the 
manifesto. No longer did a single policy document and the general election, in an 
era of declining class and political loyalty, with voting now taking place on 
instrumental lines and electors thinking of their own interests in deciding how to 
vote, sufficiently represent the views and changing nature of British society. For 
Plant, FPTP supporters wanted to resist the idea of people voting instrumentally. 
The idea of class identification and the more cultural identification of working 
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people led Labour FPTP supporters to conclude the working class should vote 
Labour however hopeless it might seem, rather than voting tactically or 
instrumentally. Consequently, an election is partly about expressing loyalty to a 
set of ideas.794 
 
Labour politicians from across the Party have viewed elections to primarily be 
about the election of a government. Therefore, during the AV Referendum it 
should have been no surprise that the majority of Labour MPs backed FPTP, 
continuing Labour opposition to electoral reform also seen at the time of Plant 
and Jenkins. Indeed, Labour’s adherence to FPTP at Westminster has been 
maintained despite the ideological shifts within the Party and the acceptance in 
the latter part of the twentieth century of much of the New Right agenda. 
Therefore, the continuing acceptance of FPTP suggests a profound conviction in 
a model of governance akin to Schumpeter’s democratic elitism.795 Throughout 
the chapters analysing and reappraising the arguments contained in the Plant 
Report, Jenkins Commission and the Alternative Vote referendum, themes found 
within democratic elitism are found within Labour’s justification for the 
preservation of FPTP for Westminster elections. Elections are concerned with the 
choice of a government; government is to do the governing not the wider 
electorate through popular participation as government is better placed to know 
the facts; democracy is contained in the mandate and manifesto which acts like a 
contract between the government and the electorate; and the theory offers the 
electorate accountability and the ability to pass judgement on the government at 
the subsequent general election.  
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Furthermore, not only on an intellectual level has the Labour Party conformed to 
the elitist model, but so to have the actions of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
and Labour leadership. Labour’s scepticism of coalition at Westminster has been 
common place through much of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. 
Whilst that Lib-Lab Pact was born out of necessity, the aftermath of the 2010 
general election clearly revealed Labour’s reluctance to fully embrace coalition 
with the Liberal Democrats. Whilst the scale of the 2010 election defeat is 
important, prominent Labour figures damned coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats. Blunkett succinctly scorned the Liberal Democrats, coalition and PR 
stating, “we see now what it would be like with fully fledged PR, don’t we? We 
see what we would have to put up with”796 emphasising Labour’s continuing 
doubt at Westminster of anything resembling power sharing.  
 
Consequently, the ‘progressive left’ thesis put forward by Marquand797 has been 
rejected: firstly, because it runs counter to Labour’s objective of having sole 
control over the levers of power, and secondly, the likely introduction of PR, often 
thought of as a method to aid realigning the British left, would be an acceptance 
that Labour is no longer capable of governing without the support of others. The 
electorate would question Labour’s resolve and standing as a national party and 
consider it as far as the elitists in Labour are concerned as an acceptance of 
defeat. The Marquand view has been dismissed, for it has been based on a 
misreading of twentieth century British politics. Far from Labour and the Liberal 
Party – in all its various guises – complementing one another, sharing the same 
history, ideology and policies, they are in direct competition for votes, seats and 
power and have different views on the direction in which socially and 
economically they desire to take the country.   
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Whilst the pluralist analysis outlines the overlapping policies and shared values 
between the two parties – especially the right of the Labour Party and the Liberal 
Democrats on issues such as nationalisation, welfare, the economy, taxation and 
Europe, support and opposition towards PR does not fit comfortably into a ‘Left-
Right split’. Not all those on the right of the Labour Party support PR just as not 
all those on the left of the Party support FPTP and, therefore, the matter is best 
viewed as an issue based on competing governing strategies and perceived self-
interest. Tom Harris, on the right of the Party, is staunchly in favour of FPTP 
having little time for the Liberal Democrats. On the other hand, Ben Bradshaw 
MP supports a move away from FPTP to PR. During Blair’s premiership, a figure 
on the left of the Cabinet such as John Prescott damned the notion of PR, 
vetoing Blair’s overtures towards the Liberal Democrats. On the right of the 
Cabinet, Jack Straw also dismissed PR. On the left of the Party John McDonnell 
MP is in favour of PR whereas Denis Skinner remains wholly opposed.  
 
However, attitudes towards the electoral system in the Labour Party are fluid. 
Roy Hattersley changed his mind, having led the arguments against PR in the 
1980s and 1990s, he then accepted PR. Collectively, the Labour Party in the 
1920s moved away from PR towards FPTP, a position it has maintained ever 
since with fluctuating confidence. Baroness Armstrong’s moved towards FPTP 
and her comments encapsulates Labour’s wider thoughts on PR and its 
consequences:  
 
“The longer I was on the Working Party the less convinced I became about 
change. I went on as an agnostic but came off thinking the sacrifices we 
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would have to make from losing our system were greater than what we would 
gain, largely because of one person and the identification with constituents.”798 
 
Between the polarised views is a cohort of MPs who are agnostic on the matter 
of electoral reform, deeming it not to be a burning issue. Lord Mandelson neatly 
summarised the view, stating “It’s not a passionate view of mine and it’s not the 
highest priority issue for me.”799 Hattersley deemed, “There is no point the Labour 
Party tearing itself apart over a Liberal issue… an issue that is somewhat 
marginal.”800 Labour politicians perceive liberal issues to be of no concern to the 
electorate and working class, reminiscent of Gilbert Gray’s quip ‘they speak of 
little else in Barnsley’. Whilst PR might be an urgent issue for the liberal 
intelligentsia and north London dinner table sets, the working class – as far as 
the dominant view in the Labour Party is concerned – are interested in the 
economy, health service and education, not the mechanisms that send 
representatives to Parliament.  
 
Harris wrote:  
 
“There are some in Labour’s own ranks who yearn for the chance to reshape 
British politics by uniting the ‘progressive’ forces against the evil Tories. 
Perhaps they might even prefer a Lab-Lib coalition to an outright Labour 
majority. When you start drawing up policies to impress the Lib Dems, it 
certainly gives the impression that you’re planning for failure, rather than 
preparing for majority rule.”801  
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PR becomes a distraction from the task of winning the general election, which is 
to be fought under FPTP against the Conservatives. Advocating electoral reform 
is a sure sign of defeatism, pandering to the Liberal Democrats rather than 
appealing to the electorate through credible and sensible policies and displaying 
confidence in your own ability to win. Moreover, the electorate did not vote 
Labour to introduce PR but to build hospitals and schools, and it is on these 
issues that the electorate will judge the Party. The 1992 general election was a 
case in point. Although Labour had been discussing constitutional issues 
including PR for several years, ambiguity over PR was blamed for defeat, 
creating a distraction from the serious business of governing. Whilst competing 
views on the electoral system are sincerely held, unity is required in the Labour 
Party. The matter becomes – as far as the leadership is concerned – one of party 
management, a position adopted by John Smith who thanked the Plant 
Commission for its deliberations, before committing the Party to a referendum on 
the electoral system to side step a divisive issue. A referendum commitment 
found favour with Blair and Brown, both of whom acknowledged the divisions in 
Cabinet, the PLP and wider Labour movement. 
 
Realignment of the left is also rejected by Labour politicians through appeals to 
Labour history, recalling how the Liberals voted with the Conservatives to oust 
James Callaghan in 1979, beckoning in eighteen years of Conservative 
government. The SDP split in which Labour MPs left the Party – comparable to 
MacDonald forming the ‘National Government’ – was intent on replacing Labour 
as the main opposition to the Conservatives. At a local level the Liberal 
Democrats fought and beat Labour, for example the city councils in Liverpool and 
Sheffield. The campaigning and electoral tactics deployed by the Liberals on the 
ground, in election material and general demeanour, has led some in Labour to 
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view them as untrustworthy, duplicitous and opportunistic. Consequently, they 
are viewed as inferior, not of the same quality as Labour politicians, having no 
firm principles and beliefs. Harris affirmed “you should never give Lib Dems any 
power, ever – but certainly not the power over who runs the Labour Party”802, 
alluding to Clegg’s role in Brown resigning as Leader of the Labour Party, and the 
wider implication under PR of a small party dictating to the larger Labour Party. 
The Liberal Democrats entering coalition with the Conservatives has reinforced 
the perception that, in the words of Ramsay MacDonald, the Liberals are ‘cads’. 
 
Tony Blair’s personal and political relationship with Paddy Ashdown in the 1990s 
gave hope to the pluralists in the Party: the Cook-MacLennan Pact brokered 
agreement between the two parties on Labour’s constitutional reform agenda; the 
independent commission on the voting system led by Roy Jenkins (chosen much 
to the disapproval of the ‘tribalists’) proposed a new electoral system; and a joint 
cabinet committee was formed to discuss political issues, predominantly those on 
the constitution. However, personnel, principle and politics ensured that the 
‘historic schism’ remained, as agreement could not be reached on timings, nature 
and direction of a ‘progressive alliance’. Moreover, bar a handful of individuals on 
either side who thought it a worthwhile pursuit, opposition throughout all levels of 
the PLP ensured that over thirteen years of Labour government the two parties 
drifted apart, so much so that the Liberal Democrats entered a coalition with the 
Conservative Party in May 2010. The AV referendum in 2011 allowed Labour to 
direct its displeasure at the Liberal Democrats entering a coalition with the 
Conservatives, simultaneously rubbishing the notion of the ‘progressive left’ and 
the Liberal Democrats long-treasured hope of electoral reform. 
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The events of May 2010 exposed the failings of the ‘progressive left’ thesis, and 
vindicated those in the Labour Party who had opposed realignment. Beckett 
considered that the ‘progressive left’ was “A leap of faith without any concrete 
evidence which supports the claim… The assumption was the Liberal Democrats 
would always go with the Labour Party. It never seemed to me to be accurate.”803 
Straw deemed: “The fanciful notion of a ‘progressive alliance’” nothing more than 
“arrogant nonsense. There was no ‘Progressive Alliance’ on the ballot paper. 
Many of those who voted Lib Dem would have done so tactically to stop Labour 
despite, not because of, the Lib Dems’ policy offer.”804 Indeed, both Beckett and 
Straw cut their teeth as politicians during the Lib-Lab Pact and Healey’s dismissal 
of the ‘progressive left’ and PR, based on his experience of the Lib-Lab Pact, 
summarises Labour’s prevalent attitude: FPTP produces the best form of 
government; compromising on policy does not better represent the views of the 
electorate; Labour cannot escape its problems through PR and coalition; there is 
an anti-Labour majority just as large as the anti-Conservative majority due to the 
centre parties being deeply divided; and the benefits of PR in terms of aiding the 
Labour Party in forming a government are unlikely to materialise.805  
 
Consequently, the rejection of the ‘progressive left’ thesis is based on historical 
as well as theoretical grounds. Once Labour had replaced the Liberals as the 
main opposition to the Conservatives in the 1920s, elections and the pursuit of 
power was to revolve around Labour and the Conservatives. There was to be no 
room for the Liberal Party who could be dismissed as an irrelevance. As Labour 
discovered what could be achieved through a parliamentary majority interest in 
PR faded, for Labour had become a party of government. Yet, PR returned to the 
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fore in the Labour Party in the latter third of the twentieth century and remains to 
the present day. Interest in PR in the first third of the twentieth century was 
concerned with Labour maximising representation and gaining a foothold in the 
political system as the third party in British politics. Opinions diverged, yet 
MacDonald’s view that Labour should compete and stand independently across 
Great Britain prevailed, remaining dominant and largely unchallenged until the 
1980s.  
 
Labour had in the post-World War Two era experienced electoral success and 
periods in government. At the height of the two-party system PR was at best a 
minority pursuit, generally in British politics and specifically in the Labour Party. 
Losing in 1951 despite polling more votes than the Conservatives – leading to 
thirteen years in opposition – prompted little interest in PR. Instead, the Party 
was concerned about an increasingly affluent working class and its implications 
for Labour Party policy and the introduction of socialism. Morrison waxed lyrical 
about the workings of Westminster and at the 1965 Speaker’s Conference, all 
Labour representatives offered strong defences of FPTP.  
 
In contrast, electoral success seemed remote after two successive landslide 
defeats in 1983 and 1987. Interest in PR revolved around the idea of whether 
Labour could ever win again. Therefore, PR was part of a wider interest in 
constitutional reform and new methods that would allow the Labour Party to form 
a government. Labour was struggling to maintain its standing as a broad-based 
national party in the face of a dominant and confident Conservative statecraft. 
Moreover, the policies of the Conservative government were undermining the 
planks of social democracy, who enjoyed a large parliamentary majority achieved 
even at the height of Thatcherism, on a vote share in the low 40s. Pluralist 
arguments in favour of PR became fashionable, growing in prominence and 
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challenging orthodox views in the Labour Party, so much so that the Labour 
leadership were forced into commissioning the Plant Report. In addition, electoral 
benefits for the Labour Party lay in wait for the Party should it focus constitutional 
reform and adopt PR, attracting the support of wavering Liberal Democrat voters. 
 
Evidently, interest in PR has remained within the Labour Party despite thirteen 
years of government between 1997-2010. Towards the end of the Brown 
government, electoral reform returned to the agenda, primarily in the hope that 
they could hold it over into the coalition talks with the Liberal Democrats. A 
historic three successive election victories, of which 1997 and 2001 were 
landslide victories, may have justified those who rejected PR during the eighteen 
years in opposition. But as the AV referendum highlighted, a significant minority 
of the PLP consider electoral reform to be a worthwhile pursuit. Many of the 
arguments in Plant in favour of electoral reform continue to be utilised to the 
present day by pluralists within the Party, suggesting a continuity of rationale. 
However, reformers in the Labour Party are hindered by a lack of agreement on 
the type of electoral system they wish to see implemented and are faced by a 
unified bloc of FPTP supporters. The thesis has shown that attitudes towards the 
electoral system are both matters of principle and perceived self-interest. Given 
views are sincerely held on both sides, for as long the Labour Party exists, PR 
will continue to cause division. 
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Appendix 1 - List of Interviewees  
 
• Dame Margaret Beckett MP, 26th March 2014, Houses of Parliament 
 
• Lord Elder, 27th March 2014, Houses of Parliament 
 
• Lord Rosser, 28th March 2014, Houses of Parliament 
 
• Lord Whitty, 31st March 2014, Houses of Parliament 
 
• Charles Clarke, 21st May 2014, St Ermins Hotel, London 
 
• Dr Tim Lamport, 14th July 2014, Personal Residence, Croydon 
 
• Baroness Armstrong, 16th July 2014, Houses of Parliament 
 
• Lord Hattersley, 17th November 2014, Houses of Parliament. 
 
• Lord Lipsey, 21st January 2015, Houses of Parliament. 
 
• Baroness Gould, 3rd March 2015, Telephone Interview 
 
• Lord Mandelson, 31st March 2015, Telephone Interview 
 
• John Edmonds, 9th April 2015, Kings College London 
 
• Tom Harris, 2nd October 2015, Café Gandolfi, Candleriggs, Glasgow 
 
352 
 
• Ben Bradshaw MP, 21st October 2015, Telephone Interview 
 
• Alan Johnson MP, 23rd October 2015, Telephone Interview  
 
• Lord Plant, 14th September 2016, Houses of Parliament 
 
Personal Correspondence 
 
• Bryan Gould, 26th February 2014 
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Appendix 2 
 
Labour List recorded the names of Labour MPs who had declared whether they 
were supporting FPTP or AV. The final list published by Labour List on 4th May 
2011 revealed 132 MPs had sided with NOtoAV and 92 had come out in favour 
of Labour Yes to AV.806 
No to AV Yes to AV 
Bob Ainsworth Diana 
Johnson 
Diane Abbott Madeleine 
Moon 
David 
Anderson 
Graham 
Jones 
Debbie 
Abrahams 
Albert Owen  
Ian Austin Helen Jones Rushanara Ali  Teresa Pearce 
Adrian Bailey Kevan Jones Douglas 
Alexander 
Stephen 
Pound 
Gordon Banks Eric Joyce  Heidi 
Alexander 
Nick 
Raynsford 
Margaret 
Beckett 
Gerald 
Kaufman 
Graham Allen Jamie Reed 
Stuart Bell Alan Keen William Bain Jonathan 
Reynolds 
Joe Benton Ian Lavery Ed Balls Lindsay Roy  
Clive Betts Tony Lloyd Kevin Barron  Joan Ruddock 
Hazel Blears Ian Lucas Hugh Bayley Anas Sarwar 
David Blunkett Denis 
MacShane 
Hilary Benn Alison 
Seabeck 
Nicholas 
Brown 
Khalid 
Mahmood 
Tom 
Blenkinsop 
Virendra 
Sharman 
Russell Brown Shabana 
Mahmood 
Benjamin 
Bradshaw 
Barry 
Sheerman 
David Cairns Steve 
McCabe 
Kevin 
Brennan 
Andrew 
Slaughter  
Ronnie 
Campbell 
Michael 
McCann 
Lyn Brown Andrew Smith 
Jenny 
Chapman 
Siobhain 
McDonagh 
Gordon Brown Peter Soulsby 
Katy Clark Jim 
McGovern 
Chris Bryant  Jack Straw 
Tom Clarke Alan Meale Karen Buck Gareth 
Thomas 
Ann Clwyd Ian Mearns Richard 
Burden 
Stephen 
Timms 
Vernon Coaker Andrew Miller  Liam Byrne Stephen Twigg  
                                                                  
806 http://labourlist.org/2011/01/labour-mps-are-they-yes-or-no-to-av-yes-92-no-132/ (Accessed 2nd 
November 2016) 
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Jeremy 
Corbyn  
Austin 
Mitchell 
Martin Caton Chuka 
Umunna 
David Crausby Graeme 
Morrice  
Ann Coffey  Tom Watson 
Mary Creagh Grahame 
Morris 
Yvette Cooper Alan 
Whitehead  
John Cryer George Mudie Stella Creasy  Malcolm Wicks 
Jim 
Cunningham 
Meg Munn Jon Cruddas John 
Woodcock 
Margaret 
Curran 
Jim Murphy Alex 
Cunningham 
 
Nic Dakin Paul Murphy Alistair Darling  
Simon 
Danczuk 
Ian Murray Wayne David  
Ian Davidson Lisa Nandy Gloria de 
Piero 
 
Geraint Davies Pamela Nash John Denham  
Jim Dobbin Fiona 
O’Donnell 
Frank Dobson   
Thomas 
Docherty 
Chi Onwurah Jack Dromey  
Brian H. 
Donohoe 
Toby Perkins Angela Eagle  
Jim Dowd Bridget 
Phillipson 
Bill Esterson  
Michael 
Dugher 
Yasmin 
Qureshi 
Frank Field  
Maria Eagle  Rachel 
Reeves 
Paul Flynn  
Julie Elliott Emma 
Reynolds 
Mike Gapes  
Louise Ellman Linda Riordan  Roger Godsiff  
Natascha 
Engel 
Geoffrey 
Robinson 
Helen 
Goodman 
 
Chris Evans John 
Robertson 
Lilian 
Greenwood 
 
Jim Fitzpatrick Frank Roy Nia Griffith  
Robert Flello  Jim Sheridan  Peter Hain   
Caroline Flint Gavin Shuker David 
Hamilton 
 
Yvonne 
Fovargue 
Marsha Singh Fabian 
Hamilton 
 
Sheila Gilmore  Dennis 
Skinner 
Harriet 
Harman 
 
Pat Glass Angela Smith Huw Irranca-
Davies 
 
Mary Glindon Nick Smith Dan Jarvis  
Paul Goggins John Spellar Alan Johnson  
Tom Greatrex Graham 
Stringer 
Susan Elan 
Jones  
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Kate Green Gisela Stuart Tessa Jowell  
Andrew 
Gwynne 
Gerry Sutcliffe Liz Kendall   
David Hanson Mark Tami Sadiq Khan  
Tom Harris Emily 
Thornberry 
David Lammy  
John Healey Karl Turner  Mark 
Lazarowicz 
 
Mark Hendrick Derek Twigg Andrew Love  
Stephen 
Hepburn 
Keith Vaz Fiona 
Mactaggart 
 
David Heyes Valerie Vaz  Gordon 
Marsden 
 
Julie Hilling Joan Walley Kerry 
McCarthy 
 
Margaret 
Hodge 
David Watts John 
McDonnell 
 
Sharon 
Hodgson 
Chris 
Williamson 
Alison 
McGovern 
 
Jim Hood Phil Wilson Catherine 
McKinnell 
 
Kelvin Hopkins David Winnick John Mann  
George 
Howarth 
Rosie 
Winterton 
Michael 
Meacher 
 
Lindsay Hoyle Shaun 
Woodward  
Alun Michael  
Tristram Hunt David Wright David 
Miliband 
 
Cathy 
Jamieson 
Iain Wright Ed Miliband  
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